have been of the healing profession. The inquiries are confined to that branch of mental science, which Dr. Brown has called the physiology of the mind. Ethics, politics, and natural religion are not touched upon. After some observations on the objects of science, and on the different sciences considered as certain and uncertain, he proceeds to consider in the first part, "the nature and extent of our knowledge of mind." The second part treats of the origin of our information in respect of mind and matter. Part third treats of the intellectual operations; part fourth of the application of the rules of philosophical inquiry to medical science, and part fifth contains some remarks on the conditions necessary to a well-regulated mind. It is not our purpose to examine the conduct of the work in all these parts. The author needs not our praise, even were it wanting from other quarters. In going over the book, our attention dwelt especially on that division of it, which treats of the investigation of truth; and as no subject can be more important to us as intelligent beings, we shall say a few words concerning it in this place, suggested by the remarks of Dr. Abercrombie.

When one has reached that period of life, at which selfexertion begins, some curious and most weighty questions offer themselves. Those who have gone on farther towards maturity, are seen for ever striving with each other about opinions. Time and toil and trouble are spent on these. The heat of controversy is burning all around, and in the devouring flame are swallowed up all private feelings however tender. The world is cut up into parties, and the party bond is found to be stronger than the tie of friends and kindred, and all this is for opinions. Opinions, then, one concludes, must be a most serious matter, if the cause of such serious consequences; and it is naturally asked, how far man is responsible in forming his opinions a question of such high interest, and in our view so little understood or examined, that we may be pardoned for dwelling on it at some length.

Our author has discussed this subject in much fewer words than its importance seemed to demand. His remarks are all within the compass of one page, and that little is not very satisfactory.

"Upon the grounds," says he, "which have been briefly referred to in the above observations, it will appear, that the

principles on which a man should form his opinions, are essentially the same with those by which he ought to regulate his conduct. If this conclusion be admitted, it will enable us to perceive the fallacy of a dogma which has often been brought forward with much confidence, that a man is not responsible for his belief. When taken abstractly, this is true; but in the practical application of it, there is a great and dangerous fallacy." — p. 153.

Now there is this essential difference between forming our opinions, and regulating our conduct. In the latter case, we have set before us what we are to shun, and what we are to pursue. Ignorance of duty, we all know, is one of the rarest excuses that can be pleaded for crime. But when opinions are to be formed, we have no one standard which all must follow; for this were to suppose infallibility on one side, and prejudice on the other. Nor can we see any "dangerous fallacy" in the "practical application" of the principle which he condemns. If terms be rightly understood, and the result of inquiry be not mistaken for the process of investigation, the doctrine seems to us practically useful. This we hope to show in the course of the following remarks.

Is belief, then, we would inquire, independent of the will? The question may appear to some quite unnecessary, because so often asked. But men are yet far from being agreed on this point; and to us the affirmative seems so clear, that we are inclined to think some circumstances foreign to the question must have been taken into view by those who doubt it. Thus some of the infidels and free-thinkers happen to have decided rightly upon this subject, and certain zealous Christians in consequence formed an opposite opinion; forgetting in their indignation that wise precept, fas est et ab hoste doceri." Again, the doctrine that belief is involuntary, has been thought to contradict what is found in the Bible. We shall attempt hereafter to show the falsity of this notion. In the mean time we may remark, that it is at least unwise to inquire into the supposed tendency of a principle, before we have ascertained its truth. Moreover, much dispute on this question, as on many others, has doubtless arisen from a misapprehension of terms. When we declare belief to be involuntary, we mean that the conclusion which we draw from contemplating the relations of certain

facts, is beyond our control. This is allowed in demonstrative reasoning, but is often denied of moral or probable reasoning. Let us see wherein consists their difference, and we shall then be better able to decide on the grounds of this distinction. All reasoning, both mathematical and moral, is made up of certain propositions united by certain relations, in such a manner as to lead to some new proposition differing from all the foregoing, which is called the conclusion or inference. Mathematical is distinguished from moral evidence, first, in that each step of the reasoning is perceived intuitively; secondly, it is hypothetical, whereas moral reasoning is employed about absolute existences; thirdly, the language of mathematics is peculiar, being signs of things, not of words, and of such a nature, that there is no possibility of mistaking its meaning. These are the distinctive marks of demonstrative reasoning, and are the circumstances that give it its character of certainty. Other reasoning has a different character, and is hence called uncertain. But let us again consider what is the peculiar state of the mind in investigation and conclusion, before we rashly infer any thing from this distinctive characteristic. Take the simplest possible case of demonstration in the syllogistic form, thus —if A be equal to B, and if B be equal to C, then A must be equal to C. This is hypothetical in the two first terms, but the third term or inference is certain; and none will deny that here the mind cannot but believe. Now let us take away the hypothesis, and it becomes a case of probable reasoning; but except for the removal of the hypothesis, the cases are precisely the same. For we now say, A is equal to B, and B is equal to C.

These are statements whose truth is to be found out like that of other statements of the kind; but being once admitted to be true, it is plain that the conclusion, viz. that A is equal to C, follows with the same certainty as in the first case, and of course is equally independent of the will. If the facts are not allowed, then the opposite conclusion follows with equal force; and if they are considered doubtful, still this state of doubt must be equally as necessary and involuntary as the state of certainty ; since the only difference between the two states is, that in the latter the evidence is complete, in the former it is imperfect. If, then, the evidence be allowed in one case to produce a certain conclusion, want of sufficient evidence

must, for the same reason, be allowed to produce a doubtful conclusion; and the will in both cases has nothing to do with the mind's decision.

But the evidence of consciousness, it is thought, contradicts all that we have attempted to prove, and this is often confidently appealed to. In our opinion here is the whole cause of the fallacy, and the ground of the popular maxim, "Men easily believe what they wish to be true." In all moral reasoning there are two sides; and the inquirer may direct his attention to either one in preference to the other, knowing that the one preferred will lead to a desired conclusion. This preference, however, is often imperceptible; and hence, when the wished-for end has been reached, it is naturally said that the will alone influenced the belief, by those who lose sight of the mind's partiality before arriving at the result.

It were hardly worth the while to spend words on such a discussion, if it were no more than a barren speculation. But unless we are mistaken, its fruit is profitable for daily use. For, first, it decides the momentous question we have before remarked upon, how far man is responsible for his belief. And, second, it shows the folly (to give it no worse name) of setting up any doctrine or doctrines as necessary to be believed.

I. Our conclusions on this point are cheering, because they are plain and decisive. We are to set out in the pursuit of truth, with minds steadily fixed on the end which we would accomplish; devoid, as far as may be, of prejudice and passion; diligent in seeking out every thing that would throw light on either side. Here we are happy to agree with our author.

"A man is undoubtedly responsible for the care with which he has informed himself of the facts and evidences, by which his belief on these subjects ought to be influenced; and for the care and anxiety with which he gives to each of these facts and evidences its due weight in the momentous inquiry. He is further responsible for any degree of that vitiated and corrupted state of the moral feelings, by which his judgment may have been biassed, so as to prevent him from approaching the subject with the sincere desire for truth of a pure and uncontaminated mind."— p. 153.

It is sometimes, however, as important to point out what is not, as what is, required of us; and this happens to be a case of this sort. We are not responsible for the result of the investigation, when it has been conducted with all possible fairness; unless one shall show that any but voluntary acts come under moral cognizance. But who, it will be asked, does employ all possible candor in investigation? Perhaps no one; and what is the inference? That they are most praiseworthy who have made greatest endeavours to root out prejudice; not they, who, in spite of prejudice and corrupt morals, have accidentally come nearest to the truth. There is a "fair-weather virtue" that is uninjured, because never tried. Is there not a faith of like character, which is yet firm, only because it has never been shaken by inquiry?

II. There have been found in every age of the Christian church, sects who have denied that future salvation can be hoped for by any who do not concur in their belief. Each of them has set up a standard of their own, and all are called upon to follow it, as they value their eternal welfare. In the earlier and darker periods, we may suppose this was done, in some measure, to gain proselytes. If threats of temporal punishment had done much, yet more was to be expected from threats of spiritual danger; and this was found to be a more convenient and efficacious way, than the more troublesome and less decisive method of argument. But it were unfair to charge the followers of the doctrine, at the present day, with such culpable motives. Common candor demands that we should take their sincerity for granted; but having made this concession, we find little else to say for the doctrine. For, first, it rests on the ground of infallibility; and this is plain, beyond contradiction. To say that we have certainly discovered truth without any mixture of error, is surely to say, in other words, that we are by nature infallible; for, had we been liable in any instance to err, how can we be confident that we have now escaped? But, it may be asked, would you then conclude that a firm faith is inconsistent with a belief in our own fallibility? By no means; for there is a wide difference between confidence in the results of our own inquiries, and disparagement of those, which lead to opposite conclusions. And here we cannot forbear quoting from an able writer on

VOL. XIV.

N. S. VOL. IX. NO. I.

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