Evidence that a person charged with a crime was seen in the vicinity where the crime was committed shortly after or before the event is admissible, and if when seen he was engaged in the commission of another crime, the evidence, otherwise admissible. is not therefore to be disregarded.10

Usually some connection between the crimes must be shown to have existed in fact and in the mind of the accused, uniting them for the accomplishment of a purpose common to both, before such evidence can be received.11

Thus on a trial of the accused for a homicide it may be shown that the accused shot and killed the owner of the premises he was breaking into, though such proof shows or tends to show the accused was guilty of the crime of burglary.

The connection must appear from the evidence. Whether any connection exists is a judicial question. If the court does not clearly perceive it, the accused should be given the benefit of the doubt and the evidence should be rejected. The minds of the jurors must not be poisoned and prejudiced against the prisoner by receiving evidence of this description unless the case clearly comes under the exception.12

to a common end, then they may be given in evidence to show the process of motive and design in the final crime. The several crimes are parts of a chain of cause and consequence, so linked together as to be necessarily provable as several parts of the same act or crime." The court in People v. Stout, 4 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 71, 127; Mason v. State, 42 Ala. 532, 535, 539. See Thomas v. State, 103 Ind. 419, 432, 2 N. E. 808; People v. Cahill (Cal. App., 1909), 106 Pac. 115.

and dangerous. The people might have shown the condition of things where the property was found, but they could not prove another felony, unless it was so strongly connected with the felony charged as to prove, or strongly tend to prove, that the man who committed the one was guilty of the other." But when two persons in a stage coach were robbed at the same time, it was held that on the trial of the accused for robbing one of them, it might be shown that

10 State v. Johnson, 111 La. 935, 36 property belonging to the other was So. 30. found on him. Rex v. Rooney, 7 C. & P. 517.

"In Hall v. People, 6 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 671, the defendant was charged 12 See remarks of Agnew, J., in with stealing certain articles. It was Shaffner v. Commonwealth, 72 Pa. held error to permit proof that other St. 60, 13 Am. 649, and Cf. People articles stolen from another party v. Sharp, 107 N. Y. 427, 14 N. E. 319, were found in his possession. The 1 Am. St. 851; Burge v. United States, court said: "This testimony is loose 26 App. D. C. 524 (homicide).

It is immaterial (at least where the evidence of another crime is offered to show guilty intent or knowledge) that the other crime was committed before or after the crime for which the accused is on trial.13

§ 89. Evidence of other offenses to show specific intention or guilty knowledge. Another exception to the rule occurs when the intention present in an act is material. Thus, suppose the question is, was a given act, either by the accused, or by some other person, intentional or accidental? Here it is relevant to prove that the person whose intention is in question had performed acts of a precisely similar nature either before or after the act the intention of which is in question. And if it be found that he has performed many such acts, we have the best of grounds for drawing the conclusion that the act, in the present instance, is intentional and not accidental.1 So where the commission of an act

"People v. Shulman, 80 N. Y. 373; State v. Williams, 76 Me. 480; Reg. v. Cotton, 12 Cox Cr. Cas. 400; Bielschofsky v. People, 3 Hun (N. Y.) 40; State v. Bridgman, 49 Vt. 202, 210, 24 Am. 124; Williams v. People, 166 Ill. 132, 46 N. E. 749; Penrice v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 105 S. W. 797; People v. Putnam, 90 App. Div. (N. Y.) 125, 85 N. Y. S. 1056; State v. Johnson, III La. 935, 36 So. 30; Rex v. Wyatt, 73 L. J. K. B. 15, 52 Wkly. Rep. 285, 68 J. P. 31, 20 Cox Cr. Cas. 462, 20 Times Law Rep. 68.

"People v. Seaman, 107 Mich. 348, 65 N. W. 203, 61 Am. St. 326; Morse v. Commonwealth (Ky.), III S. W. 714, 33 Ky. L. 831, 894. Where upon the trial of one for a homicide by poisoning, the defendant admits the death by poisoning, but alleges that the poison was accidentally taken or administered, it is relevant to show that other persons, as, for example, relatives and friends with whom the accused came in contact, had died,

II-UNDERHILL CRIM. Ev.

previous to the present crime by the same poison. Reg. v. Cotton, 12 Cox Cr. Cas. 400, I Green's Cr. Law 102, 104; Goersen v. Commonwealth, 99 Pa. St. 388; Zoldoske v. State, 82 Wis. 580, 597, 52 N. W. 778.

To show intent: Proof of other offenses admissible where it tends to show intent, notes, 105 Am. St. 978, 981, 991, 992, 994, 1001, 62 L. R. T. 214-274; to show fraudulent intent, 105 Am. St. 983; to show felonious intent, 105 Am. St. 991; to show innocence of intent, 105 Am. St. 995; to show guilty intent, 105 Am. St. 991, 996; to rebut inference of innocent intent, 105 Am. St. 991, 997; where the act is criminal regardless of intent, 105 Am. St. 998; where defendant admits criminal intent, 105 Am. St. 998; to show intent where it may be otherwise shown, 105 Am. St. 999; to show common scheme, plan or system indicating intent, 105 Am. St. 1000, 62 L. R. A. 218; to show intent where there is other evidence or pre

alleged to be a crime is admitted by the accused but he denies that he intended to commit it or alleges that he did it without guilty knowledge his doing similar acts, wholly independent and unconnected with that under investigation is relevant to show intention.

Evidence of similar and independent crimes (but never of those which are dissimilar) is often relevant to show the presence of some specific intent. Thus, evidence of forgeries by the accused has been received to prove the intent to defraud, which is essential in forgery;15 and of arson or of attempts at arson to prove that a burning was not the result of accident.

So, when it is material to show that a given act was done with a fraudulent intention, as, for example, in a prosecution for obtaining goods by false pretenses. Other disconnected false pretenses in which the presence of fraud is recognized may be proved solely to show the intent.16 To illustrate where the accused had used a fraudulent abstract of title to induce one to sell him goods in exchange for real estate it may be shown that the accused had on the same day employed the same means to induce another person to sell him goods."

§ 90. Relevant evidence not inadmissible because indirectly proving or tending to prove another crime-Dissimilar crimes united in motives.-All evidence is relevant which throws, or tends to throw, any light upon the guilt or the innocence of the prisoner. And relevant evidence which is introduced to prove any material fact ought not to be rejected merely because it proves, or tends to prove, that at some other time or at the same time the accused has been guilty of some other separate, independent and dissimilar crime. The general rule is well settled that all evidence

Ala. 70, 45 So. 588; Mitchell v. State, 140 Ala. 118, 37 So. 76, 103 Am. St. 17n; Ryan v. United States, 26 App. D. C. 74; Warford v. People, 43 Colo. 107, 96 Pac. 556; Raymond v. Commonwealth, 123 Ky. 368, 96 S. W. 515, 29 Ky. L. 785; Carnes v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. App. 437, 103 S. W. 403; Weatherford v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. App. 430, 103 S. W. 633; Commonwealth v. McDermott, 37 Pa. Super. Ct. 1; People v. Neff, 191 N. Y. 210, 83 N. E. 970; Woodward v. State, 84 Ark. 119, 104 S. W. 1109.

18 Commonwealth v. Tuckerman, 10 Gray (Mass.) 173; Commonwealth v. Eastman, 1 Cush. (Mass.) 189, 217, 48 Am. Dec. 596; Thomas v. State, 103 Ind. 419, 432, 2 N. E. 808; People v. Schooley, 89 Hun (N. Y.) 391, 35 N. Y. S. 429. See, also, $$ 89, 423, 438. "A man may have one forged or counterfeit note in his possession

and yet, with reason, be assumed to be ignorant of its true character. But if he has been proved to have had many such false instruments in his hands at various times; and particularly, if it appears that he knew that they were suspected of being forged, he can not complain if the inference is drawn that he was aware of their character." It is reversible error for the court to fail to instruct the jury that evidence of other crimes should only be considered upon the question of the intent. Martin v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. App. 125, 35 S. W. 976; Thornley v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 35 S. W. 981. See, also, People v. Hagenow, 236 Ill. 514, 86 N. E. 370; Vasser v. State, 75 Ark. 373, 87 S. W. 635; Gassenheimer v. United States, 26 App. D. C. 432.

17 State v. Roberts, 201 Mo. 702, 100 S. W. 484; Walsh v. United States, 174 Fed. 615.

must be relevant. If evidence is relevant upon the general issue of guilt, or innocence, no valid reason exists for its rejection merely because it may prove, or may tend to prove, that the accused committed some other crime, or may establish some collateral and unrelated fact.18

Thus, the fact that the evidence introduced to prove the motive of the crime for which the accused is on trial points him out as