A pardon may be granted for the sole purpose of rendering a convict competent to testify. And a pardon, if full and unconditional, is not ineffectual or in any way open to attack merely because it was granted solely to enable a witness to testify for the state in a criminal prosecution pending in a court which is under the jurisdiction of the pardoning power.51 An absolute pardon is irrevocable as soon as it is delivered and accepted by the grantee or his agent.52 If, however, the pardon is conditional, and something must be done before the pardon shall operate to restore competency, the party who calls the witness will be required to show that the condition has been performed. 53 Sometimes the statute provides that no person convicted of crime shall be a witness unless he has been pardoned or punished. Under a statute which provides that a person convicted of felony shall not be a witness unless he has been punished therefore, a person who has been fined, but who has not paid his fine, is not a competent witness.54 § 208. Mode of proving pardon-Parol evidence.-In accordance with the rule that the courts will take judicial notice of all public laws, a proclamation or statute granting a general amnesty need not be proved,55 though an executive pardon of any particular individual, being in its nature a private deed or release, must be proved. This must be done by the production in court of the instrument itself or a certified or exemplified copy.56 04 Quillin v. Commonwealth, 105 Va. 874, 54 S. E. 333. 65 United States v. Hall, 53 Fed. 352, 354; United States v. Wilson, 7 Pet. (U. S.) 150, 162, 8 L. ed. 640: State v. Blalock, Phil. (N. Car.) 242; State v. Keith, 63 N. Car. 140, 143. On Judicial notice, see Underhill on Ev., §§ 240, 242. 56 Hunnicutt v. State, 18 Tex. App. 498, 51 Am. 330; United States v. Wilson, 7 Pet. (U. S.) 150, 161, 8 L. ed. 640; State v. Baptiste, 26 A pardon is valid, though it incorrectly state the date of the conviction, or even state an impossible date, if it was intended to cover and does cover the offense." Parol evidence is admissible to identity the person and the particular conviction of crime named in the pardon.58 The incompetency resulting from a conviction of crime is no part of the punishment. Nor does a conviction disqualify the convicted person as a witness beyond the geographical limits of that state wherein judgment was rendered. Hence a person convicted in one state is not incompetent to testify in the courts of another state, unless the statutes of the latter declare that persons convicted of crime are not competent." § 209. Statutory regulations removing the incompetency of persons convicted of crime.-The common-law incompetency of persons convicted of crime to testify as witnesses is generally abolished by statute in this country. In many of the states the fact that the witness has been convicted of any crime, however his offense may show or imply an absolute lack of respect for the truth, is not a valid objection to his competency. But it is always permissible to prove the fact of his conviction by proper evidence, that the jury may be enabled the better to estimate his moral character, as a man, and the credibility of his evidence."0 Contra, Pitner v. State, 23 Tex. App. 366, 5 S. W. 210. 60 This is the statute law in New York (Code Civ. Pro., § 832), Rhode Island (Gen. Laws 1896, ch. 244, § 40), Utah (Comp. Laws 1888, Vol. 2, tit. 10, ch. 2), Colorado (§ 7266, R. S. 1908), Georgia (Code, § 5269), 5 Martin v. State, 21 Tex. App. 1, Michigan (Comp. Laws 1897, §§ 10, 11, 17 S. W. 430. 210), Illinois (R. S., ch. 51, § 1058, ed. 1909), Massachusetts (Rev. Laws 1902, ch. 175, 88 20, 21), Minnesota (Rev. Laws 1905, 8 4780), New Hampshire (Pub. Stat., ch. 224, § 26), Ohio (Bates' R. S., §§ 5240, 7284), Iowa (Rev. Code 1897, § 4601), Maine (Rev. St. 1903, ch. 84, § 119), Missouri (R. S. 1899, § 4680, con 61 These statutes are not usually retroactive. So where a person is convicted of a crime which, under an existing statute renders him incompetent as a witness, a subsequent statute permitting those convicted of criminal crimes to testify, does not make him a competent witness. But where a statute provides that a conviction of any crime is not a valid objection to the competency of the person convicted one under sentence of imprisonment for life, may testify even though by statute he is deemed to be civilly dead.62 1 A conviction of some crimes, as perjury, the commission of which involves an utter disregard for the obligation of an oath is still, in some states, an insuperable objection to the competency of a witness.63 In a few of the states a witness who has been convicted of a capital crime or of certain felonies which involve or indicate great moral degeneration, such, for example, as burglary, forgery, rape, arson, perjury, bigamy, sodomy, etc., is by statute absolutely incompetent to testify.* These statutes are to be construed with strictness. The terms, descriptive of crimes, mentioned in them, will be presumed to have been used in the sense they possessed at common law.65 Nor strued in State v. Myers, 198 Mo. 225, 94 S. W. 242), Delaware (Laws, Vol. 17, ch. 598, § 3), Kansas (Gen. St. 1905, § 5219), Nebraska (Comp. St. 1903, title x, ch. 1, §§ 328, 330), Nevada (Comp. Laws 1900, § 3471), Montana (Code Civ. Pro., 8 647), Oregon (Ann. Codes, St., § 722), Florida (Gen. St. 1908, § 1506), Connecticut (Gen. St., § 1098). 61 State v. Landrum, 127 Mo. App. 653, 106 S. W. IIII. 62 Arkansas (Rev. Stat., § 2482), Tennessee (Code, § 5595), Texas (Code Crim. Pro., § 768), Virginia (Code of 1904, § 3898); Quillin v. Commonwealth, 105 Va. 874, 54 S. E. 333. In Pennsylvania, a person under sentence of death for murder is a competent person to testify as a witness. Commonwealth V. Clemmer, 190 Pa. St. 202, 42 Atl. 675. 65 Williams v. Dickenson, 28 Fla. 90, 9 So. 847; Commonwealth v. Mi Martin v. Territory, 14 Okla. 593, nor, 89 Ky. 555, 560, 13 S. W. 5, 11 78 Pac. 88. 63 This is the case in Alabama (Code 1907, § 4008), Florida (Gen. St. 1906, § 1504), Maryland (Pub. Gen. Laws, Art. 35, § 1), Mississippi (Code of 1906, § 1920), Pennsylvania (Code, § 2859), Vermont (R. S. 1880, $ 1008), Washington (Ball. Code, §§ 5992-6940). Ky. L. 775. It seems that a person convicted of felony is competent, provided he has not been sentenced. Hurley v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. App. 282, 33 S. W. 354; Evans v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. App. 485, 34 S. W. 285; Robinson v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. App. 104, 35 S. W. 651; State v. Dalton, 20 R. I. 114, 37 Atl. 673; Underwood v. should any of these statutes be construed to prevent the accused from testifying in his own behalf. 66 § 210. Statutes construed.-The authorities are divided upon the question whether, under the existing statutes, the conviction of a witness for a crime which would not have rendered him incompetent at common law can be shown for the sole purpose of impeaching his credibility. A great deal depends upon the express terms of the statute. On the one hand it has been held that the witness may be discredited by showing him to have been guilty of a misdemeanor, though of course, if a statute provides expressly that the witness may be interrogated as regards his "conviction of felony," proof of a conviction of misdemeanor is inadmissible. 68 67 But the current of the decisions supports the more logical doctrine that a conviction of those infamous crimes only can be shown which would have destroyed his competency at the common law.69 Where a statute removes the common law disability arising from a conviction of infamous crime, the confession of a witness that he has perjured himself in the same matter as that in which he is now testifying constitutes no objection to his competency." 70 State, 38 Tex. Cr. App. 193, 41 S. W. (N. S.) 451n; competency of defend618. ant as witness, 38 Am. St. 895, 897n; competency as witness of declarant of dying declaration, 86 Am. St. 640– 642n. The interpretation and construction of writings are discussed in Underhill on Ev., § 206. State v. Pfefferle, 36 Kan. 90, 95, 12 Pac. 406; Commonwealth v. Ford, 146 Mass. 131, 133, 15 N. E. 153; Commonwealth V. Hall, 4 Allen (Mass.) 305; Helm v. State, 67 Miss. 562, 573, 7 So. 487; State Heusack, 189 Mo. 295, 88 S. W. 21. V. Hanners v. McClelland, 74 Iowa 318, 322, 37 N. W. 389; People v. White, 142 Cal. 292, 75 Pac. 828. Testimony as to facts learned while spying or eavesdropping, 17 L. R. A. CHAPTER XVIII. THE EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. 222. When answers to questions in- 223. Re-direct examination. 226. Refusal to testify. 227. Interpreting the language of the witness. 228. Improper reception of evidence by the jurors. 229. View by the jurors-Discretionary power of the court. 230. Purpose of the view is to afford evidence. 231. The right of the accused to be present during the taking of the view. 232. Presence of the accused while taking testimony. 233. Experiments in and out of court. § 211. Direct examination-Leading questions.-The witness, after being sworn, is asked his name and address, that his identity may be ascertained or confirmed. He may then be interrogated as to facts within his knowledge relevant to the guilt or innocence of the accused. Usually in criminal cases, the material facts within the knowledge of a witness are elicited by questions put to him by the coun |