sel calling him. By this means, the evidence is readily limited and confined within the issue for the reason that the relevancy of the answer can in most cases be ascertained from the character of the question. But this is a matter of practice only and there is no legal principle which prevents a witness from giving his testimony in narrative form if he is requested to do so by counsel. The danger of giving testimony in narrative form is that irrelevant and other improper evidence may be interjected and a motion to strike out may become necessary. Even though evidence given is stricken out, it has had its effect and for this reason, testimony given in narrative form must be closely watched and the improper portion of it promptly objected to.1 It is not usually allowable, on the direct examination, to ask leading questions, i. e., questions which, by their form or character, "suggest to the witness the answer desired;" as, for example, questions which are a statement of fact, and suggest that the witness is to deny or affirm its truth by answering "yes" or "no." Somewhat similar and equally inadmissible are questions which assume the truth of facts which are in issue, or which are material, which have not been proved, or certain answers to have been given to prior questions, when such answers have not been given.3 Except in the examination of experts, it is not permissible on the direct examination to question a witness upon matters not within his personal knowledge, or to endeavor, by assuming questions, to elicit his opinion on or inference from any matters of fact. Sometimes, however, leading questions may be asked on the examination-in-chief. The matter is largely in the control of 'Horton v. State, 120 Ga. 307, 47 443; and see Underhill on Ev., p. S. E. 969. 21 Greenl. on Ev., § 434. State v. Johnson, 29 La. Ann. 717; Hays v. State (Tex.), 20 S. W. 361; Chambers v. People, 4 Scam. (Ill.) 351; State v. Duffy, 57 Conn. 525, 18 Atl. 791; Bostic v. State, 94 Ala. 45, 10 So. 602; People v. Lange, 90 Mich. 454, 51 N. W. 534; People v. Fong Ah Sing, 70 Cal. 8, 11 Pac. 323; Andrews v. State (Ala.), 48 So. 858; People v. Brow, 90 Hun (N. Y.) 509, 35 N. Y. S. 1009, 11 N. Y. Cr. 25-UNDERHILL CRIM. EV, 470. Accused as Witness.-Compelling accused to cover or uncover his head or face, 94 Am. St. 339. Compelling accused to utter certain words or sounds, 94 Am. St. 341. Compelling accused to exhibit marks on his person, 94 Am. St. 340. Compelling accused to make footprints, 94 Am. St. 343. Compelling accused to try on shoes, 94 Am. St. 344. Compelling accused to give specimen of his handwriting, 94 Am. St. 344, 345. the judge, who may and should exercise a sound discretion. The general rule should not be departed from without good reason. Least of all should the state be allowed to make out its case by putting evidence in the mouths of its witnesses. If the witness is intelligent, he must be asked general questions to save time and facilitate justice; and where leading questions on vital and material points are permitted to be put by the state, and no reason or necessity appears for them, the judicial discretion will be deemed to have been abused and a new trial may be ordered for this alone.* § 212. When leading questions may be asked on the direct examination. The general rule is subject to some important exceptions. An exception is recognized in the case of an unwilling witness, or one who, on the direct examination, is hostile to the party calling him and refuses to answer fully, or one who colors his testimony. to favor the opposing party, or attempts to conceal what he knows by ambiguous language. 4 Coon v. People, 99 Ill. 368, 39 Am. 28; Cannon v. People, 141 Ill. 270, 30 N. E. 1027; Brassell v. State, 91 Ala. 45, 8 So. 639; McClain v. Commonwealth, 110 Pa. St. 263, I Atl. 45; Commonwealth v. Chaney, 148 Mass. 6, 18 N. E. 572; Harvey v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. 545, 34 S. W. 623; App. v. State, 90 Ind. 73; Anderson v. State, 104 Ala. 83, 16 So. 108; Barnes v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. 320, 39 S. W. 684; State v. Knost, 207 Mo. 18, 105 S. W. 616; Craddick v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 385, 88 S. W. 347; State v. Bateman, 198 Mo. 212, 94 S. W. 843; State v. Napper, 141 Mo. 401, 42 S. W. 957; Lyles v. State, 130 Ga. 294, 60 S. E. 578; State v. Kendall, 143 N. Car. 659, 57 S. E. 340; People v. Way, 119 App. Div. 344, 104 N. Y. S. 277, 21 N. Y. Cr. 149; State v. George, 214 Mo. 262, 113 S. W. 1116; People v. Weber, 149 Cal. 325, 86 Pac. 671; State v. Dalton, 43 Wash. 278, 86 Pac. 590; Shaffer v. United States, 24 App. Cas. (D. C.) 417; Taylor v. State, 82 Ark. 540, 102 S. W. 367. For a very strong case where a witness who refused to answer was plied with leading questions by both the counsel and the court and was finally committed for his persistent contempt in refusing to answer, see State v. Dalton, 43 Wash. 278, 86 Pac. 590. People v. Caldwell, 107 Mich. 374, 65 N. W. 213; Fitzpatrick v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. 20, 38 S. W. 806; People v. Gillespie, 11 Mich. 241, 69 N. W. 490; Schuster v. State, 80 Wis. 107, 49 N. W. 30; State v. Tall, 43 Minn. 273, 45 N. W. 449; State v. Benner, 64 Me. 267; People v. Bernor, 115 Mich. 692, 74 N. W. 184; Hughes v. State, 29 Ohio C. C. 237; Johnson v. State, 133 Wis. 453, 113 N. W. 674; Caswell v. State (Ga. App.), 63 S. E. 566; Territory v. Meredith (N. And where a witness is very ignorant or refuses to answer, or answers in such a way that his answer is likely to be misunderstood by the jurors, or where for any reason the interests of justice seem to require it, a leading question or indeed, several leading questions, put by the court itself are not error." This exception to the general rule excluding leading questions is of particular value and is most often invoked where the prosecution must necessarily prove the guilt of the accused by the testimony of his friends or associates. So the prosecution may put leading questions to an accomplice who has turned state's evidence, but who equivocates or refuses to give his evidence in full under the belief that his answers may incriminate him. The exception is of the greatest importance where the material witnesses against the accused are members of his family, or his collateral kindred, or persons, not being of his kindred or family, with whom he has been on terms of intimate friendship. For example, a very slight unwillingness to answer, coupled with the fact that the unwilling witness is the wife or child of the accused, or his brother or sister will be sufficient to permit leading ques Mex.), 91 Pac. 731; Underhill on Ev., 335, p. 474. In Moody v. Rowell, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 490, 28 Am. Dec. 317, the court said: "The court have no doubt that it is within the discretion of a judge at the trial, under particular circumstances, to permit a leading question to be put to one's own witness, as where he is manifestly reluctant and hostile to the interests of the party calling him, or where he has exhausted his memory without stating the particular required, where it is a proper name, or other fact, which cannot be significantly pointed to by a general interrogatory, or where the witness is a child of tender years, whose attention can be called to the matter required, only by a pointed or leading question. So a judge may, in his discretion, prohibit certain leading questions from being put to an adversary's witness, where the witness shows a strong interest or bias in favor of the cross-examining party, and needs only an intimation to say whatever is most favorable to that party. The witness may have purposely concealed such bias, in favor of one party, to induce the other to call him and make him his witness; or the party calling him may be compelled to do so, to prove some single fact necessary to his case. This discretionary power to vary the general rule is to be exercised only so far as the purposes of justice plainly require it, and is to be regulated by the circumstances of each case." tions. And so where a woman with whom the accused had maintained illicit relations was called to testify to a conversation she had had with him, any unwillingness on her part to disclose the answers of the accused may justify leading questions. As a general rule, the latitude allowed the state in respect of leading questions in the examination of a witness apparently hostile is largely in the discretion of the trial court." § 213. Forgetful witnesses may be asked leading questions.— Leading questions may, in the discretion of the court, be put to a forgetful witness, or to one who simulates forgetfulness. And if, by reason of the stupidity or ignorance of the witness, real or assumed, or his inclination to prevaricate, the general questions which have been put fail to bring specific answers, leading questions may lawfully be propounded.10 Leading questions are often allowed in the examination of witnesses of tender years who may be incapable, because of inexperience and the embarrassment attendant on a public judicial examination, of framing their knowledge in intelligible language." But this exception is not univer 7 People v. Sexton, 187 N. Y. 495, the extent to which this may be done 80 N. E. 396, 116 Am. St. 621. depends upon judicial discretion ex8 State v. Walker, 133 Iowa 489, ercised in the light of the circum110 N. W. 925. stances in which the question arises. That these two persons, wife and daughter of the defendant, were unwilling witnesses against him was manifest from their relations to him and from their apparent lack of recollection. It was, therefore, permissible for the district attorney to ply them with leading questions, and even to cross-examine them." People v. Sexton, 187 N. Y. 495, 80 N. E. 396, 116 Am. St. 621. 'Ward v. State, 85 Ark. 179, 107 S. W. 677. "The district attorney was permitted to cross-examine and impeach his own witnesses, the defendant's wife and daughter. The reason of the rule upon which that contention is based suggests the exceptions that are necessary to its practical application. The party who calls a witness certifies his credibility. Therefore, a witness may not be impeached by the party at whose instance he testifies. This general rule is subject, however, to the exception that, when a witness proves hostile or unwilling, the party calling him may probe his conscience or test his recollection, to the end that the whole truth may be laid bare; and sally recognized, and it would seem that the tender age of a witness may furnish a reason why leading questions should not be asked, because of the ease with which young persons and children may be misled thereby." Leading questions may also be put to a witness whose memory, while clear and strong, as regards the main facts of a complicated transaction, is weak and indistinct as to minor accompanying facts, such as places or dates.13 So, to refresh the memory of one's own witness, counsel may ask if the witness did not at some prior date state facts which may be inconsistent with his present testimony.14 If the memory of a witness is faint, he may be plied with leading questions on unimportant and irrelevant, but suggestive facts. He may be asked what his uniform habit or routine of acting was in connection with certain transactions, if the evidence of the unimportant fact or routine suggests to him a relevant but forgotten fact.15 In the introductory portion of the direct examination, leading questions are allowed. Thus counsel are permitted, instead of asking what was said, to ask a witness whether specific statements were made 593; Polson v. State, 137 Ind. 519, 35 N. E. 907; Proper v. State, 85 Wis. 615, 55 N. W. 1035; Paschal v. State, 89 Ga. 303, 15 S. E. 322; State v. Megorden, 49 Ore. 259, 88 Pac. 306; Leak v. State (Tex. Cr.), 97 S. W. 476; McCann v. People, 226 Ill. 562, 80 N. E. 1061; ante, § 205. In State v. Megorden, 49 Ore. 259, 88 Pac. 306, it is said: "Considering the youth of these witnesses, one being 18 years of age and the other 14, and the fact that they were testifying upon the trial of their father for killing their mother, we think there was no error in permitting such questions. 12 Coon v. People, 99 Ill. 368, 39 Am. 28. 13 In a prosecution for rape or seduction, or for an indecent assault, where it is difficult to induce the fe male, who is usually the principal |