ments, but also by proof that on a former occasion, under circumstances where it was his duty to state the whole truth, he omitted to state material and relevant facts which he now states." Thus, it may be proved that a witness omitted to state facts at the preliminary examination which he testifies to on the trial.50 But, for his silence to be admissible, it must appear from all the circumstances that it was his duty to tell the whole truth. The witness must be permitted to explain his previous ignorance or silence, and to show that his present forgetfulness or past ignorance was real and not assumed. He may testify that the occasion of his silence was a proceeding in a court of justice during which he was not questioned upon the matter at all. The denial by the witness that he omitted any fact on a previous examination may be dispensed with. If he says he does not remember, the party seeking to impeach may prove the omission to testify.52 The witness may himself testify that he actually forgot the facts upon the earlier occasion, or suppressed them through fear, and, in a word, to any fact showing that his silence or concealment was in good faith and prompted by right motives.55 54 § 243. Relevancy of evidence to show the general reputation for truthfulness of a witness who has been impeached.-The party 121, 79 S. W. 552; State v. Gilliam, 66 S. Car. 419, 45 S. E. 6; State v. Sharp, 183 Mo. 715, 82 S. W. 134; State v. Thomason, I Jones (N. Car.) 274; Thompson v. State, 38 Ind. 39; State v. Flint, 60 Vt. 304, 14 Atl. 178. But see contra, Ball v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. 214, 20 S. W. 363; Hobbes v. State, 133 Ind. 404, 32 N. E. 1019, 18 L. R. A. 774; State v. McKinney, III N. Car. 683, 16 S. E. 235, and civil cases fully cited in Underhill on Ev., page 512. 40 Brown v. State, 79 Ala. 61, 62; Commonwealth v. Harrington, 152 Mass. 488, 25 N. E. 835. 51 Babcock v. People, 13 Colo. 515. 22 Pac. 817; State v. Vickers, 47 La. Am. 1574, 18 So. 639; Territory v. Clayton, 8 Mont. 1, 19 Pac. 293; Hyden v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. 401, 404, 20 S. W. 764. 52 Brown v. State, 79 Ala. 61, 63. It may be shown that his prior statement was omitted from the record of the former proceeding. United States v. Ford, 33 Fed. 861. 53 State v. Turner, 36 S. Car. 534, 15 S. E. 602. E. 366. whose witness has been directly impeached has the right to introduce evidence to overcome any presumption that may have arisen that he is not credible. Not only may he introduce cumulative evidence to corroborate him, but he may attempt to prove that his general reputation for truthfulness is good. It has been held that a party should not be permitted to prove that his witness was a man whose reputation for veracity was good, where the impeachment consisted wholly of evidence that the witness had made contradictory statements out of court.56 But the majority of the cases repudiate this distinction. It is now held almost universally that evidence to show that the reputation of the witness for veracity is good may be introduced whenever the evidence of the witness has been impeached in any way, whether by his contradictory declarations or by a direct attack upon his character.57 But evidence that a witness enjoys a reputation for truthfulness is not receivable to strengthen his testimony merely because he has been contradicted by an adverse witness,58 or because he has been shaken or confused on cross-examination.59 But it has been held in Texas that a witness for the prosecution, who had been subjected to a most searching cross-examination having a strong tendency to discredit him before the jury, might have his credibility sustained by the introduction on the part of the state of proof that his reputation for truth and veracity were good, though his character had not been directly attacked and no contradiction had been shown.60 A witness who testifies that the accused has a bad reputation for truth and veracity may be contradicted by proving that on prior occasions he had made an inconsistent statement."1 451. "Brown v. Mooers, 6 Gray (Mass.) ham v. State, 153 Ala. 38, 45 So. 580; State v. Christopher, 134 Mo. App. 6, 114 S. W. 549. For civil cases see Underhill on Evidence, § 352. *Clem v. State, 33 Ind. 418; Surles v. State, 89 Ga. 167, 15 S. E. 38; Griffin v. State, 26 Tex. App. 157, 9 S. W. 459, 8 Am. St. 460; Harris v. State, 30 Ind. 131; State v. Jones, 29 S. Car. 201, 7 S. E. 296; Magee v. People, 139 Ill. 138, 28 N. E. 1077; State v. Fruge, 44 La. Ann. 165, 167, 10 So. 621; People v. Ah Fat, 48 Cal. 61; Tipton v. State, 30 Tex. App. 530, 17 S. W. 1097; Commonwealth v. Ingraham, 7 Gray. (Mass.) 46; Gra 58 Saussy v. South Florida R. Co., 22 Fla. 327; Britt v. State, 21 Tex. App. 215, 17 S. W. 255. 50 Stevenson v. Gunning, 64 Vt. 601, 25 Atl. 697; contra, State v. Rice (S. Car., 1897), 37 S. E. 452. 60 Harris v. State, 49 Tex. Cr. 338, 94 S. W. 227. 61 Norris v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 166, 106 S. W. 136. $244. Limitations upon the right to ask questions which disgrace the witness.-An important distinction must be noted as regards the competency of questions the answers to which involve facts which tend to disgrace the witness. The mere fact that a witness on his direct examination must, in order to answer a relevant question truthfully, make an admission which, while it may not tend to criminate him, may disgrace him or lower him in the estimation of his friends and acquaintances, is not sufficient to exclude the answer. Thus a woman or child may testify in rape that she had sexual intercourse with the accused over an objection that this was evidence that would degrade her. It would be not only unjust but absurd, particularly in a criminal prosecution, to close the mouth of a witness for that reason where the liberty and perhaps the life of an innocent person may depend upon his answer. His answer will not subject him to any criminal or civil liability. It may, on the other hand, be absolutely essential to a proper administration of justice. Hence a witness will be compelled to give relevant evidence, however greatly it may degrade, disgrace or humiliate him, provided his reply will tend to throw light upon the question at issue.63 62 Other considerations may be invoked where the question which tends to disgrace the witness is asked while he is under crossexamination. The policy of the law does not permit, or at least does not encourage, cross-examination upon matters wholly irrelevant merely for the purpose of subsequent contradiction. Hence, if the witness, while being cross-examined, is asked, "Have you ever been convicted of burglary?" and replies that he has not, the interrogating party is bound by his answer. But objections to evidence because of its irrelevancy are to be taken by a party, not by the witness. It is impossible to formulate any general rule by which can be determined the relevancy of questions upon cross-examination. The matter is largely in the judicial discretion. It may with safety be said that the court 62 State v. George, 214 Mo. 262, 113 Miller, 72 Mich. 265, 40 N. W. 429, 16 S. W. 1116. Am. St. 536; Coleman v. State, 53 ought to interfere whenever necessary to protect the witness from needless insult and contumely, and to forbid impertinent questions which are altogether irrelevant, and have been asked merely to surprise, annoy and confuse the witness, and to cause him to lose his temper."4 Subject to this limitation the law regards as relevant all facts which tend to illustrate the credibility of the witness or which may enable the jury to determine the weight of his testimony. § 245. Impeachment by showing social connections, occupation and manner of living. The previous conduct of the witness, his life and associations, whether irreproachable or the reverse, are all relevant. Every person possesses, to a certain extent, the power of selecting his domicile and avocation. So the choice of his business and social connections, the circle of his friends and acquaintances, and his general mode and course of living are · largely in his own control. If, therefore, he voluntarily associates with those who are engaged in disreputable pursuits; or if he is addicted to disgraceful or vicious practices, or follows an occupation which is loathsome and vile, though not perhaps criminal; no rule of law prevents such facts from being shown to determine his credibility, by questions put to him upon his cross-examination. And usually he may be questioned as to specific facts, in his past career, which may tend to his disgrace, provided they are not too remote in point of time.65 But it is generally held that a female witness cannot be asked if she is a professional prostitute or a dissolute woman, or if she keeps a disorderly house." And, as a rule, compelling a witness Commonwealth v. Shaw, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 593; Commonwealth v. Sacket, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 394; State v. Rogers, 31 Mont. 1; 77 Pac. 293. 65 Warren v. Commonwealth, 99 Ky. 370, 35 S. W. 1028, 18 Ky. Law 141; Clayton v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. 489, 21 S. W. 255; Carroll v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. 431, 24 S. W. 100, 40 Am. St. 786; Roberts v. Commonwealth, 14 Ky. Law 219, 20 S. W. 267; Ryan v. People, 79 N. Y. 593; State v. Philpot, 97 Iowa 365, 66 N. W. 730; State v. Miller, 100 Mo. 606, 13 S. W. 832, 1051; State v. Taylor, 117 Mo. 181, 22 S. W. 1103; People v. Casey, 72 N. Y. 393; Reg. v. Burke, 8 Cox C. C. 44; People v. Giblin, 115 N. Y. 196, 21 N. E. 1062, 4 L. R. A. 757; State v. Hilsabeck, 132 Mo. 348, 34 S. W. 38; State v. Moran, 216 Mo. 550, 115 S. W. 1126; Dyer v. State (Tex. Cr. 1903), 77 S. W. 456. GG Holtz v. State, 76 Wis. 99, 44 N. W. 1107, 1110; Stayton v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. 33, 22 S. W. 38; Ketching to answer degrading or disgracing questions is largely a matter of judicial discretion.o7 68 Thus, for example, the witness may be compelled to answer the question, "How long since you lived with your wife?" The facts that a man had abandoned his family, has no permanent place of abode and has become a tramp, are very material upon his credibility. So it may be shown by cross-examining a witness that he has sought to bribe another witness, or otherwise to fabricate evidence,70 or that he had been instructed what to say upon the witness stand," or had offered to leave the state if paid for doing so." 72 69 Now that an ex-convict or a person convicted of a felony is competent as a witness, it remains to inquire to what extent the conviction may be shown as impeachment. As a matter of ordinary observation it is clear to most persons that the mere fact that a witness has been convicted of an infamous crime, or, in fact. of any offense, will not prevent him from telling the truth or from being believed in a case where he has no motive to deceive. It is not usually the facts of a man's past which prompt him to give false testimony, except where the circumstances of the past create his present motives. Thus, it might be that a conviction or even a prosecution brought about by a person against whom the witness is testifying would create prejudice against that person, and the convict witness could not fairly and truthfully testify against him. Ordinarily this is not the case. The rule that a prior conviction may be shown to impeach a witness which is man v. State, 6 Wis. 417; La Beau v. People, 34 N. Y. 223, 230. Contra, State v. Hack, 118 Mo. 92, 23 S. W. 1089; Tla-Koo-Yet-Lee V. United States, 167 U. S. 274, 42 Law ed. 166, 17 S. Ct. 855; State v. Romero, 117 La. 1003, 42 So. 482; Swint v. State, 154 Ala. 46, 45 So. 901. But see, State v. Boyd, 178 Mo. 2; 76 S. W. 979, in which case the witness was permitted to be asked about her child being born out of wedlock. 67 Commonwealth v. McDonald, 110 Mass. 405; State v. Hobgood, 46 La. Ann. 855, 15 So. 406; People v. Carr, |