young child at the date of the crime and that the other witnesses for the state are now very old are to be considered by the jury.2

§ 4. The motive of the witness to misrepresent.-Though we may have been repeatedly deceived by the misrepresentations of others, we find, by experience, that men, as a rule, tell the truth. Where neither prejudice nor passion exists, and where the individual has no private or personal interests to advance by distorting the truth, we may rely upon the credibility of his testimony, if it is probable and if we know him to be an intelligent man, possessing adequate powers and opportunities for acquiring knowledge. The entire absence of all motive to give false testimony justifies an assumption that his testimony is true, for sane men do not usually act without motive, and will not ordinarily violate the principles of truth without some object in doing so, particularly if they are questioned under oath, with the fear of punishment for perjury before their eyes. Accordingly, in the case of persons, such as police and private detectives and others engaged in the detection of crime, or expert witnesses who testify under pay,3 who, from their professional occupation, character, or position, are inclined to take prejudiced or distorted views of human nature, it will require a high degree of credibility in the evidence to satisfy the mind of an impartial hearer.

On the other hand, where no motive can be imagined strong enough to prompt the witness to make a false statement, and where all motives that exist in his bosom prompt him to tell the truth, we have every reason to accept his evidence as credible, irrespective of the poor opinion we may have of his veracity under circumstances where he would have a motive to misrepresent the truth.

Again, our belief in the truthfulness of a witness is confirmed. when we find him narrating incidents which we have ourselves observed, when placed in similar circumstances. On the other hand, he may relate minor incidents which, being credible and probable, as well as consistent with the main facts, are so startling

People v. Hancock, 7 Utah 170, 25 Pac. 1093.

"Skilled witnesses come with such a bias on their minds to support the

cause in which they are embarked that hardly any weight should be given to their evidence." Tracy, In re, 10 Cl. & F. 154, 191.

and original that, considering his mental capacity, they could no have been invented by him.

§ 5. Concurrent or corroborative testimony.-The confidence w place in the testimony of a witness may be increased or diminishe by the concurrence of his testimony with that of others. If th testimony of other witnesses to the same facts, or to facts calcu lated to produce as evidence the same results, is credible in itself consistent with the testimony first offered, and the character o the witnesses is not impeached, the corroboration, in the absenc of collusion, is almost conclusive. The same result is effected where the evidence of one witness is confirmed by that of another witness to the same facts, and it also appears that the witnesses are hostile to each other and hence actuated by different motives Here the relations of both witnesses to the issue are so diametri cally opposed that collusion is absolutely impossible.

No witness can fairly be expected to remember all the details of any transaction, and if he claims to do so suspicion is quickly aroused. But where he unintentionally omits details which are supplied by other witnesses, or where he apparently contradicts other witnesses on minor points and the contradiction is fully reconcilable by any one who possesses a full knowledge of the whole subject or transaction, his hearers may well feel justified in believing that his narrative is trustworthy because wholly unpremeditated and unfabricated by him.

Another element affecting the credibility of evidence is found in the frequent occurrence of undesigned coincidences, which, though sometimes startling and unexpected, are unaccountable except upon the hypothesis that the narrative, of which they form a part, is true. No event stands alone. It is the result of others which precede it. It may in its turn be the fruitful cause of many others which follow or relate to it. So every fact or circumstance is connected with others of a collateral nature, rendering it well nigh impossible for any one to concoct a narrative which, upon comparison with other and related circumstances, will stand the test. Even by comparing the various parts of the story, a mind trained in the habit of investigation may quickly ascertain the truth or falsity of the narrative; for, in such a case, the fabrication, however skillfully constructed, will crumble to pieces by reason of its inherent lack of verity.

Again, the well-recognized connection often observed between collateral or subordinate facts which are proved or admitted and the main fact in issue frequently furnishes most cogent and satisfactory proof of the existence of the latter. This is only applying to the law of evidence the principles of inductive reasoning, which are used, often unconsciously, by all men in the conduct of their most trivial as well as of their most important affairs. Such a process furnishes a basis for the division of evidence into direct and circumstantial. Direct evidence of the crime is the evidence of an eye-witness that it was committed. This includes in criminal law, the confessions and admissions of the accused and dying declarations. Circumstantial evidence consists of facts proved from which the jury may infer by a process of reasoning or inference that the accused committed the crime. The application of the principles of reasoning allows the jury to draw inferences or presumptions, of fact from other facts which are proved to their complete satisfaction. On the other hand, the rules of circumstantial evidence have opened the door for presumptions of law, which are only presumptions of fact that have, from frequent recurrence, become rules of law."

§6. Circumstantial evidence-To sustain conviction must exclude every rational hypothesis except that of guilt.-The necessity of frequent resort to circumstantial evidence to prove guilt in criminal

*"All evidence is, in a strict sense, more or less circumstantial; whether consisting of facts which permit the inference of guilt, or whether given by eye-witnesses; for the testimony of eye-witnesses is based upon circumstances more or less distinctly and directly observed. But, of course, there is a difference between evidence consisting in facts of a peculiar nature, and hence giving rise to presumptions, and evidence which is direct as consisting in the positive testimony of witnesses, and the difference is material according to the degree of exactness and relevancy, the weight of the circumstances and the

credibility of witnesses. The mind may be reluctant to conclude upon the issue of guilt in criminal cases upon evidence which is not direct, and yet, if the facts brought out, taken together, all point in the one direction of guilt, and to the exclusion of any other hypothesis there is no substantial reason for reluctance. Purely circumstantial evidence may be often more satisfactory and a safer form of evidence, for it must rest upon facts which must tend collectively to establish the guilt of the accused." Gray, J., in People v. Harris, 136 N. Y. 423, 428, 33 N. E. 65.

proceedings is apparent in the very nature of things. Whenever it is possible the criminal will endeavor to perform his nefarious deeds in secrecy, and where no eye-witnesses are present to behold him. So he will choose the time and occasion which are most favorable to concealment, and sedulously scheme to render detection impossible. Circumstantial evidence alone is enough to support a verdict of guilty of the most heinous crime, provided the jury believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty upon the evidence. No greater degree of certainty in proof is required where the evidence is all circumstantial than where it is direct, for in either case the jury must be convinced of the prisoner's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." They are bound by their oath to render a verdict upon all the evidence, and the law makes no distinction between direct evidence of a fact and evidence of circumstances from which the existence of the fact may be inferred.'

Carlton v. People, 150 Ill. 181, 187, 37 N. E. 244, 41 Am. St. 346; State v. Atkinson, 40 S. Car. 363, 18 S. E. 1021, 42 Am. St. 877; People v. Cronin, 34 Cal. 191, 202; People v. Daniels (Cal.), 34 Pac. 233; State v. Hunter, 50 Kan. 302, 304, 32 Pac. 37; State v. Avery, 113 Mo. 475, 495, 21 S. W. 193; State v. Slingerland, 19 Nev. 135, 141, 7 Pac. 280; State v. Elsham, 70 Iowa 531, 31 N. W. 66; State v. Moelchen, 53 Iowa 310, 5 N. W. 186; Epps v. State, 102 Ind. 539, 554, I N. E. 491; Griffin v. State, 2 Ga. App. 534, 58 S. E. 781; Murphy v. State, 118 Ga. 780, 45 S. E. 609; Commonwealth v. Sheffer, 218 Pa. 437, 67 Atl. 761; Vernon v. United States, 146 Fed. 121, 76 C. C. A. 547; Oakley v. State, 135 Ala. 29, 33 So. 693; Martin v. State, 125 Ala. 64, 28 So. 92; People v. Hiltel, 131 Cal. 577, 63 Pac. 919; State v. Evans, 1 Marv. (Del.) 477, 41 Atl. 136; Andrews v. State, 116 Ga. 83, 42 S. E. 476; State v. Hunter, 50 Kan. 302, 32 Pac. 37; Thomas v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 20 S. W. 226, 14 Ky. L. 288; Cunning

ham v. State, 56 Neb. 691, 77 N. W. 60; State v. Atkinson, 40 S. Car. 363, 18 S. E. 1021, 42 Am. St. 877; Bill v. State, 5 Humph. (Tenn.) 155. Direct and circumstantial evidence differ merely in their logical relation to the fact in issue. Evidence as to the existence of the fact is direct. Circumstantial evidence is composed of facts which raise a logical inference as to the existence of the fact in issue. A conviction may well be had upon circumstantial evidence, but to warrant such conviction the proven facts must not only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but must clearly and satisfactorily exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of guilt. United States v. Greene, 146 Fed. 803.

Hence a prejudice against circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to disqualify a person who entertains it from serving as a member of the jury. But to sustain a verdict founded on circumstances not directly proving a crime, the circumstances themselves must be proved to the satisfaction of the jury. The danger that the jurors, unused to logical mental processes, may assume as proved circumstances in support of which the evidence is wholly or partially inadequate, is always present. It has been often said that witnesses may lie, but that circumstances never do. It should not be forgotten, however, that the circumstances from which guilt may be inferred must be proved by the direct evidence of witnesses who saw them, and that such witnesses may misrepresent or forget, or be mistaken as to the circumstances they testify to.

The first duty of the jury is to determine carefully upon all the testimony as stated by the witnesses whether the incriminating circumstances, from which they may infer guilt, are proved, beyond a reasonable doubt." No general rule can or should be laid down as to what constitutes proof of circumstances in any particular case. Each case is a rule unto itself, and is to be determined upon its peculiar circumstances. But all the circumstances as proved must be consistent with each other, and, taken together, they must point surely and unerringly in the direction of guilt.

and is equivalent to a truth or that which is real. It is in the ingenious combination of facts that they may be made to deceive or to express what is not the truth. In the evidence of eye-witnesses to prove the facts of an occurrence, we are not guaranteed against mistake and falsehood, or the distortion of truth by exaggeration or prejudice, but when we are dealing with a number of established facts, if, upon arranging, examining and weighing them in our mind, we reach only the conclusion of guilt, the judgment rests upon pillars as substantial and as sound as though resting upon the testimony of eyewitnesses." Gray, J., in People v. Harris, 136 N. Y. 423, 429, 33 N. E.

65; State v. McKay (N. Car.), 63 S. E. 1059. Circumstantial evidence is admissible, though there are eye-witnesses to the crime. Commonwealth v. Karamarkovic, 218 Pa. 405, 67 Atl. 650; State v. Ryder, 80 Vt. 422, 68 Atl. 652; State v. Tyre (Del.), 67 Atl. 199; State v. Cephus (Del.), 67 Atl. 150; Tatum v. State, I Ga. App. 778, 57 S. E. 956; Riley v. State, 1 Ga. App. 651, 57 S. E. 1031; State v. Samuels (Del.), 67 Atl. 164.