CHAPTER XXX. OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC JUSTICE. § 446. Obstructing justice and resist- § 458. Compounding offenses - The intent to screen the offender -Mode of proving that a crime was committed. 459. Contempt defined-Inherent judicial power to punish. 460. Direct and constructive contempt distinguished - Court may take notice of without evidence. 461. Procedure in receiving evidence of constructive contempt. 462. Escape-Distinct from prison breach. 463. Intention of permitting escape -Negligence of officer. 464. Aiding prisoner to escape. 465. Illegality of arrest, when rele vant. 466. Ferjury-The intent to swear to what is false. 467. Materiality of the testimony. 468. Number of witnesses required and corroboration of single witness to prove falsity. 469. Falsity of the testimony. 470. Proof of the testimony alleged to be false. § 446. Obstructing justice and resisting arrest-Proof of official character of officer resisted-Validity of his appointment.-Though in civil cases the courts will judicially notice that certain persons are officers,1 on a trial for resisting or assaulting an officer it 1 Underhill on Ev., § 240. must be shown that the person resisted was an officer and that the accused was aware of his official character. These facts cannot be presumed. The officer who issued or served the writ may testify orally that he was an officer and acted as such. It is enough that he was an officer de facto,* and evidence to prove the invalidity of his appointment is usually inadmissible." If the officer is alleged with unnecessary particularity "to have been legally appointed and duly qualified," the court may require his appointment to be proved." In the case of an indictment for 2 Pettibone v. United States, 148 U. S. 197, 205, 37 L. ed. 419, 13 Sup. Ct. 542; Merritt v. State (Miss., 1889), 5 So. 386; Rex v. Osmer, 5 East 304; State v. Carpenter, 54 Vt. 551; State v. Maloney, 12 R. I. 251; State v. Downer, 8 Vt. 424, 429, 30 Am. Dec. 482; Commonwealth V. Israel, 4 Leigh (Va.) 675; Yates v. People, 32 N. Y. 509; Commonwealth v. Kirby, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 577; State v. Hilton, 26 Mo. 199; State v. Smith, II Ore. 205, 8 Pac. 343; Horan v. State, 7 Tex. App. 183; Duncan v. State, 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 148; State v. Beasom, 40 N. H. 367; State v. Murphy (Del., 1907), 66 Atl. 335. Cf. Putman v. State, 49 Ark. 449, 453, 5 S. W. 715; State v. Pickett, 118 N. Car. 1231, 24 S. E. 350; Johnson v. State, 51 Fla. 44, 40 So. 678. Evidence of other offenses to show that accused was resisting arrest for another crime, see 105 Am. St. 991, note. State v. Downer, 8 Vt. 424, 429, 30 Am. Dec. 482; State v. Carpenter, 54 Vt. 551, 553. It may, and perhaps must, be proved that the officer stated he came to arrest the defendant, or that he read a warrant to him, or stated he had a warrant for him. These facts are essential, though if the accused began his resistance on seeing the officer it is not necessary to prove the warrant was read. Commonwealth v. Cooley, 6 Gray (Mass.) 350, 356. See Ormond v. Ball, 120 Ga. 916, 48 S. E. 383; State v. Smith, II Ore. 205, 207, 8 Pac. 343; State v. Maloney, 12 R. I. 251; Oliver v. State, 17 Ark. 508, 510; Commonwealth v. McCue, 16 Gray (Mass.) 226, 227; State v. Zeibart, 40 Iowa 169, 175. Floyd v. State, 79 Ala. 39, 42; Cockerham v. State (Miss., 1895), 19 So. 195; State v. Bates, 23 Iowa 96, 99. To require every officer to establish the validity of his appointment in collateral proceedings would be intolerable and a dangerous obstruction of justice. Heath v. State, 36 Ala. 273, 276. Robinson v. State, 82 Ga. 535, 546, 9 S. E. 528; Commonwealth v. Kirby, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 577, 581; State v. Armistead, 106 N. Car. 639, 642, 10 S. E. 872; People v. Hopson, I Denio (N. Y.) 574. Contra, Creighton v. Commonwealth, 83 Ky. 142, 147, 4 Am. St. 143. It seems, however, that the validity of a written warrant of appointment may be inquired into and if invalid, it is inadmissible. United States v. Phelps, 4 Day (Conn.) 469, 470. State v. Sherburne, 59 N. H. 99; State v. Copp, 15 N. H. 212. resisting arrest it must be shown to authorize a conviction that an attempt was made to arrest the accused." § 447. Intention to obstruct justice-Evidence of threats, or to show invalidity of warrant.-The intention to obstruct the officer may be inferred from the language of the accused. Threats and violent epithets against the officer are admissible, though not alone sufficient to constitute the offense of obstructing an officer," nor is it necessary to prove that the officer was beaten or assaulted. 10 Evidence that the obstruction was unsuccessful," or that the person whose arrest the accused tried to prevent was not in fact guilty,12 or that property which the officer attached, believing it belonged to the defendant, did not belong to him,13 has been held not relevant. 14 The motive which prompts the conduct of the accused in resisting arrest is important. The accused may show any fact tending to prove that the officer used undue violence or force in arresting him, and that he, in self-defense, used force necessary to repel it. If, however, having submitted to an arrest which was accompanied with undue, violence or force, he subsequently resists the officer while in his custody, a verdict of guilty will be sustained.15 The validity of the warrant under which an arrest was attempted will be presumed until the contrary is shown.16 The burden to prove its invalidity is on the defendant." The illegality or invalidity of the warrant is always relevant. Any 'Cooksey v. State, 84 Ark. 485, 106 S. W. 674. State v. Morrison, 46 Kan. 679, 684-689, 27 Pac. 133; State v. Seery, 95 Iowa 652, 64 N. W. 631; Woodward v. State (Tex. Cr. App., 1910), 126 S. W. 271. "Allen v. State, 5 Ga. App. 237, 62 S. E. 1003. 10 Woodworth v. State, 26 Ohio St. 196, 200. But evidence showing only an effort to elude arrest will not sustain a charge of resisting an officer. State v. Welch, 37 Wis. 196, 202, 203; Clay v. State (Miss., 1897), 22 So. 62. 11 State v. Gilbert, 21 Ind. 474. person may resist arrest and may use such force as is necessary to prevent the arrest under an illegal warrant and may show its invalidity on his trial by parol evidence.18 The defendant cannot be permitted to prove that, after having resisted arrest, he offered to surrender himself and to go before some other justice if his attorney should advise him the warrant was valid.19 § 448. Preventing attendance of witnesses.-A willful and corrupt attempt to prevent the attendance of a witness before a lawful tribunal is an offense at common law. The essence of the offense is the attempt to interfere with and obstruct the administration of justice.20 No physical act of intervention is necessary to constitute the crime, but it may be committed by persuasion, advice or threats.21 At common law it need not be proved that the witness was under a subpoena, that he was called in behalf of either party, or that his evidence was material.23 22 § 449. False swearing.-This crime consists in testifying knowingly and falsely under oath in a non-judicial proceeding, as, for example, on applying for a marriage license, or on registration as a voter. The language used by the accused and his knowledge 18 State v. Wimbush, 9 S. Car. 309, 317; State v. Hailey, 2 Strob. (S. Car.) 73; Underhill on Ev., § 208; State v. Knapf, 50 Wash. 229, 96 Pac. 1076, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 66; Lee v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. 94, 74 S. W. 28; Ryan v. City of Chicago, 124 Ill. App. 188. It is sufficient to charge resistance or obstruction in the language of the statute. The particular manner is matter of evidence. Oliver v. State, 17 Ark. 508, 509; United States v. Bachelder, 2 Gall. (U. S.) 15, 24 Fed. Cas. 14490; State v. Copp, 15 N. H. 212, 215; Gibson v. State, 118 Ga. 29, 44 S. E. 811. Contra, Horan v. State, 7 Tex. App. 183. 191; Lamberton v. State, 11 Ohio 282. 20 State v. Holt, 84 Me. 509, 24 Atl. 951; Perrow v. State, 67 Miss. 365, 368, 7 So. 340; State v. Curdy (Del., 1910), 75 Atl. 868. "State v. Bringgold, 40 Wash. 12, 82 Pac. 132. State v. Keyes, 8 Vt. 57, 66, 67, 30 Am. Dec. 450; State v. Horner (Del.), 26 Atl. 73, 74; State v. Bringgold, 40 Wash. 12, 82 Pac. 132; Commonwealth v. Bailey (Ky.), 87 S. W. 299, 26 Ky. L. 583. 23 Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 14 Gray (Mass.) 87, 89, 74 Am. Dec. 665. See Gandy v. State, 77 Neb. 782, 110 N. W. 862. See post, § 470. Cf. Tedford v. People, 219 Ill. 23, 76 N. E. 60; Young, In re, 137 N. Car. 552, 50 S. E. 220. of its falsity must be proved. If the accused is alleged to have sworn falsely to several facts, proof that he swore falsely to one is insufficient.25 A conviction will not be sustained unless founded on the evidence of two credible witnesses, or on that of one such witness corroborated strongly by circumstances pointing to the falsity of the statements.20 False swearing is a statutory offense, and is distinct from perjury at common law." Neither can be sustained by proving the other, nor can a statute requiring a grand juror to disclose the testimony of a witness on the trial of the latter for perjury before the grand jury be construed to apply to his indictment for false swearing before them.28 § 450. Embracery-Evidence required.-This crime, which may be regarded as a particular form of bribery, is defined as an attempt to influence a juror or jurors corruptly by gifts, persuasions or threats, or by any other means (except the evidence or argument submitted in open court), by a party or by a stranger, whether the verdict be given or not and whether the verdict, if given, be true or false. 20 Proof of giving money to a person to be distributed among jurors is sufficient, though the money never reached them. For proof of an actual tender or offer of the money so as to enable the juror to expressly receive or reject it is not necessary.30 A proposal or expression of a willingness to bribe is sufficient. A mere attempt to bribe a jury is embracery, though it may for any reason have been unsuccessful.31 27 State v. Coleman, 117 La. 973, 42 S. W. 75; State v. Sales, 2 Nev. 268; So. 471. 28 Commonwealth v. Scowden, 92 Ky. 120, 122, 17 S. W. 205, 13 Ky. L. 404. See ante, §§ 192-194. Rosc. Cr. Ev. 721. Evidence that defendant has solicited money to use in corruptly influencing the jurors is also sufficient. Mere words may con |