The presence of a criminal intention to corruptly influence the juror must be shown. This is now doubtless the correct rule in this country, though the earlier common law, because of its intense abhorrence of any act savoring of maintenance, punished as embracery a mere exhortation on the part of a stranger that a juror should appear and act according to his conscience.2 § 451. Bribery defined-Evidence of circumstances to prove corrupt intention.-The crime may be defined as an attempt, whether successful or the reverse, to influence an officer in his official conduct, either in the executive,33 legislative or judicial department of the government, by the offer of a reward or pecuniary consideration. The scope of this definition is as broad as the 35 stitute an attempt to bribe or influence a juror. Thus evidence that the accused said to a juror "you are the only friend I have on the jury, and I want you to look after my right. How will it go? I will make it all right. It will not be to your loss when we meet again" has been held to constitute an attempt to bribe a juror. State v. Dankwardt, 107 Iowa 704, 77 N. W. 495. 21 Russ. on Cr. (9th Am. Ed.) 264. It is not essential to prove that the person to whom the bribe was offered had been drawn as a juror, if it appears that he was summoned as such. And the testimony of other jurors that the defendant tried to bribe them is admissible. State v. Williams, 136 Mo. 293, 38 S. W. 75; State v. Woodward, 182 Mo. 391, 81 S. W. 857, 103 Am. St. 646n. But in the case of State v. Williford, III Mo. App. 668, 86 S. W. 570, it was held that a conviction could not be sustained unless it was shown that the juror had been impaneled and sworn in a criminal case then pending. 83 officer. Haynes v. Commonwealth, 104 Va. 854, 52 S. E. 358. 4 State v. Sullivan, 110 Mo. App. 75, 84 S. W. 105. The offer of a bribe, though unaccepted, is bribery at common law. Walsh v. People, 65 Ill. 58, 59, 61, 16 Am. 569; Rex v. Plympton, 2 Ld. Raym. 1377; State v. Ellis, 33 N. J. L. 102, 97 Am. Dec. 707n; People v. Ah Fook, 62 Cal. 493, 495; Barefield v. State, 14 Ala. 603, 607; State v. Miles, 89 Me. 142, 36 Atl. 70; People v. Hammond, 132 Mich. 422, 93 N. W. 1084, 9 Det. Leg. N. 667. It is not necessary to prove the money was either actually tendered or produced. Jackson v. State, 43 Tex. Cr. 260, 64 S. W. 864. See Glover v. State, 109 Ind. 391, 401, 10 N. E. 282; State v. Geyer, 3 Ohio N. P. 242. As to the solicitation of a bribe, State V. Bowles, 70 Kan. 821, 79 Pac. 726, 69 L. R. A. 176; punishable at common law. Walsh v. People, 65 Ill. 58, 16 Am. 569; People v. Hammond, 132 Mich. 422, 93 N. W. 1084; State v. Desforges, 48 La. Ann. 73, 18 So. 912. The tender and taking of a A police officer is an executive check is not bribery under U. S. R. S. 37 duty of the officer who accepts a bribe. If the object of the offering is to influence the officer in any matter which may come before him, that is, which is within his official jurisdiction and duty, it is immaterial that he fails, or has no opportunity or power to carry out the illegal agreement. On the trial of the person giving the bribe, corrupt intent on the part of the recipient need not be proved. If the briber parted with the bribe with an intent to bribe, the offense is proved, though the officer did not know what it was, or its purpose, and kept it solely for the purpose of public justice. The corrupt intention of the officer receiving, or of the person offering a bribe, must be proved, when necessary, beyond a reasonable doubt. The briber's intention to influence can be inferred only from his language where no money or other valuable thing is produced. He may show his intoxication at the time to rebut the inference of corrupt intent by proving he did not know what he was saying. But the witness will not be permitted to state that the accused was so drunk as not to know what he was doing.*1 39 38 40 § 452. Judicial notice of official character and acts.-The courts will take notice that the person who was bribed was a public 5451, as the check is void. Green v. 316, 99 N. W. 147, 11 Det. Leg. N. 10; State v. Lehman, 182 Mo. 424, 81 S. W. 1118, 103 Am. St. 670, 66 L. R. A. 490; People v. Van de Carr, 87 App. Div. 386, 84 N. Y. S. 461; People v. Mol, 137 Mich. 692, 100 N. W. 913, 68 L. R. A. 871, 11 Det. Leg. N. 446; People v. Jackson, 47 Misc. (N. Y.) 60, 95 N. Y. S. 268. 38 Commonwealth v. Murray, 135 see 116 Am. St. 40, note. 37 Ruffin v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. 565, 38 S. W. 169; Newman v. People, 23 Colo. 300, 47 Pac. 278; People v. Markham, 64 Cal. 157, 161, 30 Pac. 620, 49 Am. 700. Cf. Messer v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. 635, 40 S. W. 488, as to receipt of bribes by an agent of the accused. State v. Ames, 90 Minn. 183, 96 N. W. 330. As to power of officer. People v. McGarry, 136 Mich. 30 State v. Pritchard, 107 N. Car. 921, 926, 12 S. E. 50; People v. Salsbury, 134 Mich. 537, 96 N. W. 936; State v. Ames, 91 Minn. 365, 98 N. W. 190. 40 White v. State, 103 Ala. 72, 16 So. 63, 67; State v. Campbell, 73 Kan. 688, 85 Pac. 784, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 533n. "White v. State, 103 Ala. 72, 16 So. 63; ante, § 166. 42 44 43 officer, of the date of his appointment or accession, of his public acts, and of the date when his term expires by death or limitation. It suffices if the officer is an officer de facto. The regularity and validity of his tenure are irrelevant. The defendant will not be permitted to show that the officer was not appointed in writing, or sworn, or that he was otherwise unqualified under a statute." 46 § 453. Necessity for reliance on evidence of accomplices in the bribery-Compulsory examination of accomplice.-As soon as the crime is consummated by the delivery of the money or valuable thing by the briber to the bribed, the latter is an accomplice of the former. The voluntary testimony of either may be used against the other separately tried. It is sometimes provided by statute that an accomplice in bribery may be compelled to testify at any trial or investigation, that his evidence thus given cannot be used against him, and that he shall not be liable to indictment or prosecution for the bribery. Because of the secret nature 44 State v. Gramelspacher, 126 Ind. 398, 403, 26 N. E. 81, citing cases; Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202, 34 L. ed. 691, II Sup. Ct. 80. As to member of congress, United States v. Dietrich, 126 Fed. 676. "Doe v. Riley, 28 Ala. 164, 65 Am. Dec. 334. For civil cases holding that the courts will judicially notice of ficial names, etc., see Underhill on Ev., § 244. Florez v. State, II Tex. App. 102, 104; State v. Gardner, 54 Ohio St. 24, 42 N. E. 999, 31 L. R. A. 660; Commonwealth v. Saulsbury, 152 Pa. St. 554, 558, 25 Atl. 610 (extortion). See ante, 88 446, 447; Commonwealth v. Wotton, 201 Mass. 81, 87 N. E. 202; State v. Haas, 163 Fed. 908. 49 48 Ruffin v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. 565, 38 S. W. 169. One who gives money to a person who solicits a bribe, intending to denounce him, and to procure his arrest, is not an accomplice. It is proper, however, to subject the decoy to a rigid cross-examination as to his motive. People v. Liphardt, 105 Mich. 80, 62 N. W. 1022; Newman v. People, 23 Colo. 300, 47 Pac. 278. The admission of evidence from witnesses employed to entrap the accused is not contrary to public policy. People v. Bunkers, 2 Cal. App. 197, 84 Pac. 364, rehearing denied, 84 Pac. 370. Testimony of accomplices, decoys and conspirators, see Elliott Evidence, § 2906. Testimony of accomplices in prosecution for bribery, see 98 Am. St. 176, note. 48 See ante, § 71, et seq. of the crime, and the necessity that there should always be at least two participants, it is both necessary and customary to rely largely on accomplice evidence. When an accomplice is used as a witness, the utmost good faith should be observed in dealing with him. The spirit as well as the letter of the statute should be regarded. 50 § 454. Proving other acts of bribery. The giving or the receipt of other bribes, remote in time, differing in purpose and distinct from the act charged, is inadmissible." Where defendant was indicted for receiving a bribe to permit gambling, and it was agreed that other bribes should be paid in the future, separate acts of bribery are relevant as part of a system and to show the intent, purpose and understanding with which the money was received.52 The declarations of the accused before the commission of the crime to the person from whom he is charged with soliciting a bribe are admissible on the question of his intent. The objection that they tend to show a separate crime will not cause their rejection.53 The rule that the acts and declarations of one of several conspirators during the conspiracy and intended to carry it into effect are admissible against the others, is applicable to a prosecution for bribery where it appears from the evidence that there was a conspiracy to bribe and the accused is connected with it. Everything the accused said to his confederates and did to carry out the plan to bribe is admissible.55 A witness for the prosecution may testify what he did after a conversation with one involved in a conspiracy to bribe on the separate trial of a co-conspirator. This testimony may be admissible on the question whether the witness was or was not an ac 50 People v. Spencer, 66 Hun (N. Y.) 149, 151, 21 N. Y. S. 33; Feople v. Singer, 18 Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y.) 96; People v. Clark, 14 N. Y. S. 642; Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 35 L. ed. 1110, 12 Sup. St. 195; People v. Clements, 5 N. Y. Cr. 282, 298, 300; Commonwealth v. Bell, 145 Pa. St. 374, 391, 22 Atl. 641, 644. People v. Sharp, 107 N. Y. 427, 457-463, 14 N. E. 319, I Am. St. 851. See ante, $87. 56 complice, in a case where the prosecution alleges that the witness was employed to entrap the accused. So conversations between third persons may be admitted where it appears that the money was obtained from them for the purposes of bribery, in order that the jury may see the connection between the source from which the money came and the accused.57 62 § 455. Bribery of voters-Judicial notice of elections.-Bribery, and attempts to influence voters at elections, were in England indictable at common law,58 and this rule is generally recognized in the United States." A conviction of bribing a voter has been sustained on proof of a promise to pay for loss of time," to pay the traveling expenses of the voters," or by showing that a candidate supplied voters with refreshments, or that he publicly declared that if he were elected he was willing to perform the duties of the office for a smaller compensation than was allowed by law," or promised to appoint an opposing candidate as his deputy if the latter would withdraw from the contest. But a conviction for receiving a bribe to vote for a particular candidate is not sustained unless the state proves that the vote was cast. This fact must not be left to the jury to infer from the former political convictions of the accused. Under the secret ballot it is extremely difficult for this to be done, unless the voter shall voluntarily lift the veil of secrecy. No one can examine his ballot, or testify to its contents, unless his knowledge was acquired from the voter himself.65 The courts will take judicial notice of the 64 People v. Emmons, 7 Cal. App. 626, 38 L. J. Q. B. 313, 21 L. T. (N. 685, 95 Pac. 1032. S.) 56. |