NOTE F.

CANAL FROM LAKE CHAMPLAIN TO THE ST. LAWRENCE.

No. 1.-EDWARD BANCROFT TO HON. T. T. TOWNSHEND.

(Archives series, Q, vol. 43-2, p. 681.)

SIR,-According to my promise, I have procured the original draughts of Mr. Deane's observations, respecting a Canal from Lake Champlain &c. and have caused transcripts of them to be made, after some abridgement of which I found them susceptible, and which I ventured to make, to save your time, as well as My Lord Sydney's, which I know the importance of. The observations thus abridged and transcribed I have now the honor of inclosing to you.

Should the plan of making a navigable Canal, from Lake Champlain, appear to deserve the attention of Government, I should suppose the first step to be taken, would be to order a survey to be made, of the distance and perpendicular fall from its two extremities, in order to ascertain the expence and the practicability of the undertaking, if indeed there be any doubt of this last point.

It was Mr. Deane's intention to have gone himself to Lake Champlain this summer, if his observations had in any degree been honored with Lord Sydney's approbation, but I am afraid his health will not allow him to do it, with any prospect of advantage this season. He is going a little way out of Town, but if you should at any time have any commands for him, I will take care that they shall be duly forwarded.

I have the honor to be with great respect, Sir,

Your Most Humble & Most Obedient Servant

CHARLOTTE STREET

(RATHBONE PLACE)

July 10th 1788.

EDWD. BANCROFT.

No. 2.—OBSERVATIONS (No. 1) RESPECTING A NAVIGABLE CANAL FROM

LAKE CHAMPLAIN.

(Submitted to Lord Dorchester by S. Deane.)

(Archives, series Q, vol. 43-2, p. 683.)

Whether it might be for the interest of Great Britain, that the States of America should return to their former Connection with this Country, is a question on which there are different opinions, but as there is now very little probability of such an event, I shall avoid any discussion thereof.

The American States are at this time but little removed from anarchy and their credit, political as well as Commercial, is reduced almost as low as possible, and yet when their local situations and circumstances are maturely considered, it will appear that collectively, they must eventually become of great importance to every European power, which has possessions either insular or continental, in that quarter of the world. It will hardly be possible for these states to continue long united in one general confederation and whenever a disunion takes place, it will separate the strong from the weak, or the northern from the southern states. By the former I mean the states East and North of the River Delaware. Of these the New England

States are, and will continue, the most powerful, their country is naturally strong, and it is already populous, and they are the only States in America in which a maritime and adventurous spirit predominates.

They are acknowledgly but four at present, but will soon be six, Vermont is in fact already independent, and the province of Maine will be so in a few years, by which there will be six States, united by Blood, Manners, Religion and every Tye, which unites and holds men in one common interest. They have sprung from one common stock, from English ancestors, who, first settled in New England, and at this time more than one half of the inhabitants of New York and New Jersey are Emigrants, or descendants of Emigrants from the New England States. When to this circumstance that of the local situation of this Northern Division is added, it is highly probable they will continue for a long time after this separation, united among themselves, and that they will for ever give laws to the rest of the States, who from their situation, Dissonant Manners and Habits, and from the heterogeneous Tempers or materials (as I may say) of which they are composed, have no basis on which they will ever be able to form a lasting union.

In case of a war between Great Britain and France, or Spain, the Friendship of this Northern Division of the American States will be of very great importance. For although they have not at present, and probably will not soon have a Maritime Force of any great strength, yet they can by the number and Hardiness of their Seamen do infinite mischief to the Commerce of that Power, against which they may

take part.

During the Late War the American Privateers made a greater number of prizes of British vessels than France, Spain or Holiand together, and this although they fitted out their Cruisers under every disadvantage; and of the armed vessels which made these Depredations in the British trade, four out of five belonged to this Northern Division; This recent instance justifies me in saying that it will be of very great importance whenever the supposed disunion takes place, to secure the Friendship and Alliance of the Northern States, whilst the Southern States, will never be of any consequence, except in point of commerce.

Mutual convenience and interest form the most sure basis for a permanent alliance between nations and in this instance both are to be found, for there is no nation in Europe, with whom an alliance can be so natural and beneficial to the above mentioned States, as with Great Britain. In peace, four fifths of their commerce must centre in this Kingdom, and in war no power can assist, or distress them so much as this can by a Maritime Force at Halifax, or an army at Canada. Their present ill temper will soon subside and pass off, and there is more of it to be met with in newspapers than any where else.

It is not my design to enter on a detail of those measures, which ought to be adopted and pursued on this subject, much less to recommend a treaty with Congress, in their present weak and divided state, in which they must necessarily remain until the above mentioned division takes place (and this is much nearer than is generally apprehended). For in the actual state of things in America, there is in fact no power to treat with, and from the nature of the commerce between the two countries and the present state of it, there is nothing, or next to nothing to treat about.

But when the Northern shall be separated from the Southern States, a more firm and efficient system of Government will be adopted by the former and the Friendship and Alliance of this Division of the States will be infinitely preferable to any Treaty whatever with the whole.

I think therefore that Great Britain will act wisely in looking forward to these events, and being ready to take advantage of them. And this will be most effectually done by being able in case of a future war in which the Northern States may be disposed to join to do them the most essential services on one hand, or the greatest mischiefs on the other, according to the part they may take.

The situation of Halifax is such, that a maritime force stationed there, can with the utmost facility command the whole of the coast, and intercept their commerce

and Lake Champlain extending two hundred miles from North to South, from the centre of Canada, to the centre of the frontiers (and far within them) of this Northern Division presents an object of great importance for the above purpose.

If the Northern Division and Confederation of the American States are masters of this Lake, they can, if hostile to Great Britain, distress and even destroy the settlements in Canada, on the other hand, if Great Britain at this time takes such measures as will secure the future command of this Lake, her possessions in Canada will, in case of Hostilities be secure, and she may thence carry the war into the heart of the Enemies' Country. By the late Treaty of Peace, nearly the whole of this Lake is included in the Territory of the American States. The country round it, and down the rivers running into it, is already in a great degree settled by emigrants from New England, and will in a few years become as populous as any part of America. But those settlers cannot find a market for the production of their labour, but over this Lake and through Canada, nor can they be supplied with those heavy articles from abroad, without which they cannot exist, but through the same channel, for if they look Southward for markets, the distance and the expences of carriage are intolerable.

This commerce is in many respects an important object to this country; it will of itself create a large and annually increasing demand for coarse and heavy manufactures, in return for which there will be sent into the River St. Lawrence the finest masts and spars of any in America, and in the greatest quantity for the British Navy, and beyond Comparison the best Oak Timber of any in America for Butt, Pipe, Hogshead or Barrel Staves, for the British or West Indian markets. The most material articles wanted in the British West Indies, from the Continent of America, are Flour, Horses, Fish and Lumber, principally staves for Rum and Molasses casks or hogsheads.

Öther necessaries may be had from other countries, and some may be raised in the Islands, and some articles consumed by them at present may be dispensed with. but Oak Staves cannot. Nova Scotia and Newfoundland can supply Fish, and Canada Flour, in large quantities and some Horses.

Canada also produces many other articles consumed in the West Indies, and were a Trade open'd and encouraged from thence to the Islands, the British possessions on the Continent might soon be brought to supply her Islands with everything, except what may be sent on better terms from Europe.

Canada has little or no Pine fit for masts, and no Oak of any value; These deficiencies may be abundantly supplied by opening a Navigable Canal from Lake Champlain round the Rapids or Falls at St. John's into the navigable waters below them. and by opening a free Trade with Vermont and with the Frontiers of New England and of New York. By this it will at all times be in the power of Great Britain to send a Naval Force into that Lake and command the Navigation of it, and thence whatever may happen it will not be the interest of New England and New York to be on unfriendly terms with the British Government.

By this all the Trade of that extensive country, the Inhabitants of which are rapidly increasing will centre in Canada, which will be of more service and benefit to Great Britain than if all that Country round the Lake had been included in her American Dominions at the Peace.

Whenever the division of the States takes place, it must also necessarily be in the manner I have mention'd, and in all future times subsequent to that Revolution, the Southern States, whether united or not, must have the same friends and the same enemies with the Northern, on account of their inferiority in numbers and strength, and from their Local situation.

October 25th, 1785.

No. 3.-ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS (No. 2) RESPECTING A NAVIGABLE CANAL FROM LAKE CHAMPLAIN.

(Submitted to Lord Sydney by S. Deane.)

(Archives, series Q, vol. 43-2, p. 693.)

There can, I think, be no doubt of the practicability of cutting a navigable canal from the water of Lake Champlain, round the Rapids into the level of the River below them. To ascertain the expence of doing this, it will be necessary to procure a survey of the ground through which the Canal is to be cut, and an estimate of the distance from the upper to the lower level of the water; and of the perpendicular height of the fall between these points. This survey and estimate might be made by any tolerable engineer in a few hours, and when made the expence of the proposed Canal might be easily calculated with considerable certainty.

But in an undertaking of this kind, the expence must not be rigorously calculated and opposed to its pecuniary advantages, these being but a part of the benefits which it certainly will produce, for besides the great and continually increasing profit arising from the transportation of bulky and heavy goods and merchandize to and from Lake Champlain by the proposed Canal, and the great extension of British commerce necessarily resulting from it, there are important political considerations which intitle this undertaking to the immediate protection and encouragement of His Majesty's Ministers as it will eventually enable the King's remaining American subjects to supply the British West India Islands, with those productions, which Great Britain and Ireland cannot well, if at all afford; and at the same time secure the Province of Quebeck against all danger of future invasion from the United States, should they hereaftar join any power at war with this Kingdom.

The articles wanted in the West Indies are chiefly the following: Horses, Live Stock (such as Cattle, Hogs, &c.), Flour, Lumber of all Kinds, Fish and some others of less importance. Horses are raised in Canada but not equal to the demand in the Islands, and they are a heavy slugg breed, fit only for mills, and carts (for which they answer tolerably well) but for other purposes, the Horses bred in New England and in New York are preferr'd. Fish may be sent from Nova Scotia and Newfoundland; and the manufacture of Flour is encouraged in Canada, which the opening of this Canal, by affording water to erect mills upon will greatly tend to do, the Islands may at all times be supplied from thence at a cheaper rate than from any other country. The Lumber wanted in the West Indies (and which is an article not to be dispensed with) is not to be found in Canada, or Nova Scotia, in any sufficient quantity, but the country round Lake Champlain abounds with Timber of the best quality, for that purpose, and by the proposed Canal it may be procured and sent to the West Indies with the cargoes of Horses, Flour, &c.

But the supplying of the West Indies with what they want is, although the great object, not the only one. Let anyone cast his eye over the map of the country situated and bordering upon Lake Champlain, Lake George and the waters communicating with them and he will see at once, that an immense extent of territory, now rapidly becoming populous, can never be supplied with heavy, coarse and bulky goods by any means so well as through Canada, and that there must be a certain, and for ages to come, an increasing demand for the Sugar, Rum, Salt and other productions of the British West Indies and for the coarse woollens, hardware and other heavy bulky manufactures of Great Britain.

If it be asked how these goods are to be paid for, I answer that this is the business of individuals, and that when Government has removed obstacles which cramp or impede commerce, everything is done which true policy dictates; and there can be no danger but those concerned in trade will do their part and take care of themselves.

But it has been proved that this country, when the proposed communication is opened, will have ample resources to pay for the articles wanted from the West

Indies by its lumber and other produce, and for European remittances it will have everything the Northern States have or ever had, Fish and Oil excepted.

It has immense forests of Pine of the largest size and of the best quality in the world for masts, which may be met with on the banks of these waters and floated into the St. Lawrence, and then shipped for Great Britain. The richest and best iron mines in America, or perhaps in the world, are found on the banks of Lake Champlain; and from the low price of coal and the facilities of water carriage, iron may be manufactured and sent to market to great advantage. Potash, Flax Seed, Wheat and other articles may be had in that country and in great quantities as the population increases. Every commercial acquisition or advantage must ultimately prove a political one to this country, if not grossly perverted and misapplied, but besides the commercial advantages resulting from this plan, there is one of great political importance to the future peace and security of the British settlements in Canada, by forming this Canal of such a depth as to float vessels of ten or twelve feet water, from the St. Lawrence into the Lake, and by limiting the commerce on the Lake, except in small or open boats, to British bottoms, the Lake will at all times be under the command of Great Britain, and in case of a war with the American States all danger of an invasion of Canada will be removed. Moreover, by this intercourse, in which the advantages will be mutual, the Northern parts of New England and of New York with Vermont will become averse to a rupture with Great Britain and it will scarcely be possible for the other States to force them to join in offensive measures, since if ever they should become so infatuated as to fly directly in the face of their own interests, all sources of foreign supplies, except at an intolerable expence, would be instantly cut off, their trade ruined and their country exposed in every part to be invaded and harassed from Canada, on which, by their having no force on the Lake, it would not be in their power to retaliate.

The above are the outlines of a plan which may be executed at an expence very inconsiderable when compared with the magnitude of the objects in view. I am so fully convinced of the practicability of what I propose, and of the consequences pointed out, that were I in the same situation, in point of fortune, in which the late unhappy contest found me, I would, with the assistance of my friends, undertake it on private account, but in the first part of the late war I suffered great losses by the active part which I took, and in the latter part of it, and since its conclusion much greater by the p. ejudices and resentment of my countrymen for having pointed out their dangerous situation and the fatal consequences of their independency, and urging for a reconciliation with Great Britain. Although there are individuals of my acquaintance in this country able to advance a Capital equal to the undertaking. yet men of that description have objects at home and cannot be easily prevailed on to embark in distant enterprises. From the best information I have been able to collect, it is my opinion that about £10,000 would be sufficient for the undertaking. and that a moderate toll on goods transported on the Canal wonld pay the interest and in time refund the capital.

If Lord Dorchester continues to approve of this plan, and if the ultimate expence comes any way near the sum mentioned (£10,000), it cannot, under any circustances, be an object of any consequence with Government to advance it, by installments, as the work advances, under the inspection and control of His Lordship and of his successors in Government.

The lands purchased, the Canal and works of every kind which may be erected, might be pledged to Government as a security for the repayment of the money, at or within some given term, interest on it not to commence until three years after the work shall be completed; and in all future times ships and stores belonging to Government shall pass the canal free of toll, as shall masts and spars for the use of His Majesty's Navy.

By this, the only expense to Government will be the interest of the Capital, for a ce:tain term, which will be very inconsiderable when compared with the above mentioned advantages.