gainer, by the saving of the greater part of those pensions to retired chancellors, of which the amount is so large at present, so likely to be increased in, the shiftings of present politics, and so inconvenient a check on the crown's free choice of a very important minister.

The addition of two judges to the House of Lords, could be the only source of increased expense. Lord Brougham proposed that this should be saved, by imposing the duties of assisting the Lord Chancellor, on the retired chancellors and chief justices, and by requiring the occasional aid of the judges of the courts below. To taking judges out of their own courts for occasional purposes, and to gratuitous work, we strongly object: and on our plan, there would never be any retired chancellors-at least, none fit for work. It has been suggested, that some high offices, of a semi-judicial nature, might be made permanent; and that the duty of acting as assistant judges in the House of Lords might be imposed on their occupants. The office of Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and that of President of the Council, or Privy Seal, might be made available for this purpose. By this means, these judges would have ample salaries, with no increase of expenditure; or, at least, none that would equal the saving in Chancellors' pensions.

We have thus laid before our readers an outline of our ideas on that portion of the great field of law reform, which has been brought under our notice by Sir Edward Sugden's pamphlet. Small as we think the merit of that work to be, it has at least been useful in calling public attention to a most important legal question. All the acrimony with which party writers, for party purposes, have assailed the alleged defects in the administration of justice in particular courts -all the difficulties which the accidents of political changes, have lately placed in the way, of making the ordinary appointments of great legal functionaries—have been most serviceable in forcing the consideration of important and permanent reforms on the attention of the public, and of men in power. Whatever may be the immediate settlement of these matters of detail, the great principles which the discussion has stirred, will not fade from the public attention. The friends of law reform may congratulate themselves on the great improve

ment at present evinced, in the general mode of thinking on these subjects, and on the additional impulse recently given to correct opinions. In spite of all the prejudices and interests, which are ever ready to thwart us, a force has been called into activity in the cause of legal reform, which, we are convinced, will lead to the utmost results that we desire. The great change, which ministers are specifically pledged to propose, will produce the best effects, both in its passing and in its operation. There is reason to believe that the present government, also contemplate alterations in other matters which we have discussed, quite as extensive as those which we have ventured to suggest. No better sign can be given of the good intentions of a ministry. The palm of law reform, is not to be won without encountering opposition, and exercising perseverance, and grappling with dif ficulties not without dust, and even peril. But the wearing it is well worth the gaining it.

ARTICLE XII.

Report of the Select Committee on Agriculture, with the Minutes of Evidence taken before them. Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed, 2nd August, 1833. Report of the Proceedings of the Agricultural Meetings, held in London on the 14th and 15th December, 1835. London: 1835.

FEW subjects can be more appropriate to the purposes of this Review, than that which is popularly known by the appellation of the "Corn Question"—or, unhappily, by that of the "Corn Laws;" with which last name we head the present article. It is of a nature peculiarly international; whether with reference to the fears of the landed interest, on the one hand, lest the produce of foreign countries should cripple the agriculture of our own,-or, on the other hand, to the apprehensions of the commercial interest, lest the exclusion of foreign corn should lead to such a disruption of our commercial connexions, as eventually to ruin our trade. Even the

politician augurs good, or forbodes evil, as the choice shall fall upon the alternative systems of friendly intercourse, or selfish estrangement.

At the termination of the war, the industrial peculiarity of England, among the nations, was that of a decided bias to manufacturing and commercial pursuits; while the industry of the continent had a marked inclination to agriculture. Such, indeed, was the character of the long war by which the peace had been preceded, that it could not fail to produce these distinguishing peculiarities. A most serious question was then propounded to the statesman-whether he should take the actual position of the country and the world, as the basis of his future measures, or whether he should undertake to create for himself a totally new basis, in order that he might have a foundation for measures, schemed in his own brain, but for which the existing order of things was wholly unfitted? The war had given us the command of the seas, and thus our commercial superiority was established; and it so happened that, during the war, the chief of those inventions in machinery, and of those discoveries in science, which have wrought revolutions in the condition of man, were either brought by us first into use, or were by us matured. England had, by these means, acquired a greater command over the precious metals than any other nation; because, she was thereby enabled to send forth, into the general markets of the world, a greater value in her manufactures, in proportion to the quantity of human labour expended upon them, than any other nation could send. This power is the foundation of all riches; and since it exerts itself in commanding the larger share of the quantity of precious metals extant in the world, it has a direct tendency to raise the rents of land in the country, by which it is possessed. Whatever excuses may be made for the errors of our statesmen, in not seeing at once, and in the happy moment for a right decision, that they had then in their hands, self-created, a foundation for their future proceedings, far preferable to anything which their vain and fanciful devices could produce,--no excuse can now be offered for that wilful blindness, which sees no remedy for the evils of its own making, except in their noxious repetition.

In the progress of the twenty years, which have been

gradually exposing the grand mistake made at the close of the war, the landed interest, from time to time, condescended to argue a little with those enlightened men, who endeavoured to make them comprehend the error of their course: but now, when to every rational mind the question has received a complete decision, they content themselves with sneering at, or crying down, every man who considerately points out to them those sure and undeviating laws of human affairs, which never fail in the end to punish all nations which despise their dictates. To say the least of it, this is a disgraceful course; and when we think on the names of the many prominent men among us— their stations in life, and their necessary education-who seek to confound the voice of wisdom, by calling up the vociferous cheers of thoughtless auditories, with the words, "Philosophers," and "Theorists," used as cant terms, irreverently intended to imply ignorance and absurdity in men of science, we blush for the upper ranks of our national society.

Two-and-twenty years of habitual hostility had rendered the business of war a sort of second nature to the country; by calling into exercise many branches of industry peculiar to that state, and which could not but fall into disuse upon the return of peace. The transition was necessarily a painful one, even under the most skilful management; and the "revulsion," as it was then termed, by which that transition was attended, was, to a great extent, unavoidable, and irremediable except by the lapse of time. But though many of the employments of war were inapplicable to a state of peace, there was nothing in the respective natures of agriculture and commerce to render one, more than the other, unfit to meet the change. They were both equally peaceful employments: why then, while we were suffering under unavoidable change in some matterswhile change in se constituted our peculiar grievance of the time-why, at that time, seck to make forcible change in other matters, and thus aggravate the evil which was of a temporary nature, by superadding another evil, to which no definite limit can be assigned?

As if war of some kind, with the rest of the world was our natural element, we no sooner terminated that of the sword with one country, than we declared the war of commerce with all the rest. And by what peculiar class amongst us, we ask,

was this deed done?-By the landed interest, is the answer. And who, now, at the end of these twenty years, is the complaining party?-Again we answer, the landed interest.

With such views of the nature and character of questions relating to our Corn Laws, and their international consequences, it has been doubtless expected, that we should take some suitable opportunity for discussing them. Our intention was, to have entered in due season into an examination of the subject in all its bearings, with the hope of placing before our readers the most ample means of a correct judgment; but it is forced upon us, by passing events, too suddenly, to enable us fully to accomplish that object in the present number; and therefore, we shall, upon the present occasion, be content to perform only so much of our purpose, as those events seem to render imperiously necessary.

The two publications which are placed at the head of this article, furnish very appropriate materials for the observations we feel called upon to offer at this time. The first, is the Report of an Agricultural Committee of the House of Commons, which sat in the session of 1833; and the delivery of it may be considered to be an important stage in the later progress of the Corn Question. The most marked peculiarity of this report consists in the giving to the landed interest one excellent piece of advice ;-" let well alone." The second publication shows that this advice has not been taken; for it furnishes an instance of determined agitation, which, if it do not die, as we rather think it may, through its own violent and passionate exertions, will require the check of some other power. It is by such unceasing conduct of the landed interest, that we are forced upon this early and hasty examination of the alleged grounds of their complaints.

We had one very distinct motive for wishing to gain a little more time before we took up the subject. Some very important features of it seemed to be in the process of development, and we have been watching their progress with great attention. A larger experience is desirable; but we shall avail ourselves of that quantity which we already have. The first matter to which we allude, is the novel fact, that this country is now entering the fifth year-if not even the sixth year-of full and sufficient supply from its own lands.