obtain ocular and certain information relative to the true state of all these positions. But have we followed the course of events? Have we had timely advice in Cracow or Poland, in Turkey or Persia, in Sweden or Germany, of the unceasing and daily progress of Russian influence and domination? If we have remained in ignorance, how was it possible to offer an effective resistance; or to combine in opposition to her those States by which she is detested, and which have more than once made a vain appeal to us for co-operation*? Far from engaging them on our side by an effective protection, or an imposing attitude, we have allowed Russia to reduce them one by one, first to impotence, and afterwards to servitude. Whenever we come forward to remonstrate, the evil has been already achieved; so that our trivial choler only serves to encourage our antagonist by a display of our inactivity, and to hasten the accomplishment of his enterprise.

At the present moment Austria plays the chief part at Cracow. The Austrian troops were the first to enter the territory, and an Austrian general was selected to put the merciless orders of the three Powers in execution. But does this apparent zeal of Austria prove that she has a direct personal interest in the step which has been taken? We no more believe such to be the case, than we give credit to the confidence of the Sultan in the good faith of Russia, because we learn that he has just placed all the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire, who have hitherto acknowledged no spiritual control but that of a patriarch residing at Constantinople, in a state of dependence on another patriarch residing in Russia, and appointed by the Emperor. If any maintain a contrary opinion, we shall remind them that the influence of Austria alone retarded until 1836 this blow, which Russia had long since resolved upon; that the serious remonstrances of Austria were the sole cause which put an end to the previous occupation of the territory of Cracow, when in 1831 a Russian body of troops had been stationed upon it for two months; and that Austria had last year the option of refusing offers made, to her by Russia, for incorporating the free town and its territory with her own dominions.

These facts are strikingly elicited from those parts of the despatches of Count Pozzo di Borgo which relate to Austria. See The Portfolio.

This proposal was actually made at Töplitz, and rejected by Austria. In returning from that conference, Count Nesselrode passed through Cracow, and VOL. II. N° II.

Y Y

But when Austria had lost all hopes of checking the design of Russia, she doubtless, and perhaps with sufficient reason, thought it best to anticipate its execution on this point. Discouraged as she may well be by the policy of the west of Europe, perhaps she even stooped to receive under this form the wages of her compliance. Whatever may be the true state of the case, we are not of those who are astonished by her conduct. We believe that Austria does what her position obliges her to do; and that as she distinctly perceives the necessity which presses her, she will take no half measures, which would redouble her peril, without ensuring to her real advantages. We, nevertheless, persist in our firm and unalterable conviction that it is still in the power of England to sever Austria from Russia: her interest and her discernment afford grounds for this belief. But nothing can decide her to take such a step except acts, and decisive acts, on the part of our government. Before she will brave the animosity of Russia, she must be well assured that allies will not be wanting to back her. Till then, she acts consistently in submitting to the will of that power. Till then, although we may desire to restrain the policy of Russia, we must cease to rely upon Austria, and upon what has long been proclaimed to be her interest. FOR THE INTEREST OF AUSTRIA IS TO FOLLOW AND SUPPORT US WHEN WE ACT, BUT TO TURN A DEAF EAR TO OUR PREVIOUS PROPOSALS.

It must then at length be acknowledged, that no more barriers exist between ourselves and Russia: all those intermediate positions are gone; and henceforward our interests immediately conflict with her's. The occupation of Cracow and the part performed by Austria, are the signals which announce to us that Russia has once more appropriated to herself one of the most powerful engines which we might have directed against her. We are aware how much this reflection tends to discourage some of those who feel that it is absolutely necessary for us to resist Russia. And we ourselves are persuaded that when we are called upon to combat that power, no adequate and satisfactory success can be obtained without the concurrence of Austria. But the error has hitherto consisted in a

caused a petition to be secretly presented to him, signed by about ten traders of the place, who prayed the Emperor Nicolas to unite the city to his empire.

notion that those powers whose concurrence will ensure our victory, could WITHOUT US prevent the struggle and spare us the conflict. This misapprehension has caused the progress of the evil; and we may eventually have to atone for it by immense sacrifices, which a little foresight and activity would have prevented. Nevertheless, even if we admit the extreme. case of a war, the line of conduct to be pursued remains unchanged. Austria is still the pivot on which the chances of the conflict turn. For that very reason our determination will lead Austria to take those steps to-morrow which she would have taken yesterday of her own accord, and which she entreated us, at no distant period, to take in concert with her. But the more we delay that determination, the more difficult it becomes to signify it to her, and to liberate her from the ties with which she is entangled.

As we have used the dreaded word-war, we hasten to avoid any misapprehension of our meaning which might arise on so momentous a subject. It is a serious mistake to suppose that war is the only means of repression, which it is possible for us to exert against Russia. No other power lies so open to the consequences of a sustained system of diplomatic exertion. In other countries every appearance of foreign hostility unites contending parties, and strengthens the government within as well as without. In Russia, on the contrary, it instantly begets internal revolt and external resistance: it emboldens and brings into concert the nations which she keeps in obedience or in dependence by the address with which she deprives them of all hopes of foreign succour, and of all means of resolving upon a common organised resistance.

These considerations might have sufficed long ago to deter mine our government to send out intelligent agents, under whatever title and in whatever capacity was thought most appropriate, to various points in the interior and on the different frontiers of Russia. Amongst these missions, Cracow deserved peculiar attention. That city has hitherto offered-and, should the occupation cease, it will still offer to the governments of Europe, the singular advantage of finding upon that sole point a Polish government which remains independent. At Cracow the Russians, Prussians, and Austrians, notwithstanding the title of protectors conferred upon their governments by the treaty of Vienna, are quite as alien to the state as the

Turks or the English. The treaty gives to the three protectors no sort of prerogative, as far as the internal administration of the affairs of the city is concerned. It was our peculiar duty to take care that no such prerogative should be usurped. The constitution of Cracow, which was drawn up in 1815, and textually inserted in the treaty, does not even contain the names of the protectors, and makes no mention whatever of their protectorate*. The position of a French or English diplomatic agent in relation to the government of Cracow, would be, by right, very nearly equivalent to that of the residents of the protecting courts. His importance will entirely depend on the tenor of his current instructions, and on his official character, which must evidently not be inferior to that of the agents of any other powers. is clear that without this last condition, he will not represent the vigilance, the policy, and the power of his nation; and that the weakness of his government would be proclaimed by the mission of a subaltern agent destined to be the object of the haughty slights of his colleagues.

It

In the midst of the countless restrictions which shackle the commerce of Europe, Cracow, possessing by treaty (as we have shown in an earlier page of this article), a right of free communication with all parts of ancient Poland, might have become a point of the utmost importance, if the affairs of the west of Europe had been conducted by men of tolerable foresight. For we may apply to the commerce of Cracow, as well as to all the stipulations of the treaty with regard to Poland, the motto of a knight of old

"Regardez-moi et je fleurirai."

• We quote the constitution of 1815; for that which was thrust upon the town in 1833 is, and must remain for us, a mere dead letter de jure, whatever it may be de facto. We have only inscribed it at the head of the present article as one of the official documents which prove the numerous insults and violations of which Cracow has been the object. We quote, however, the 27th article of the Constitution of 1833, because it embodies the spirit of the whole act, by establishing a new power, which is henceforward the sovereign arbiter of the destinies of the

state:

"En cas de différens soit entre le Sénat et la Chambre des Représentans, "soit entre les membres de ces deux corps, sur l'étendue de leurs pouvoirs, ou "sur l'interprétation de la présente Constitution, les résidens des trois Cours protectrices, réunis en Conférence, auront à décider de la question," &c.

The armed occupation of the territory is the inevitable sanction of that authority which this article confers upon the Conference.

Let it not be imagined, however, if we here speak of the great commercial advantages to be derived from Cracow as a post of almost unequalled importance, that a mere commercial agent on the spot will be competent to ensure them to us, or to revive rights which have been superseded. Such an appointment would be a fresh mockery, worthy of our foreign policy for the last twenty years. It would be a fresh display to our rivals, and to those nations whose hopes and prayers are turned towards us, of that lethargic pusillanimity, which, even when it perceives its peril-possessing means to avert the danger, and to ensure incalculable benefits-chooses to prolong for another hour that slumber from which it will be so fearfully roused.

ARTICLE XI.

State and Tendency of Parties.

THE partiality of Journalists is very much to be regretted both on their own account and that of the Public. They voluntarily descend from the high position, which they might occupy in society, into one of inferior utility and honor. By maintaining their impartiality, they might distribute the rewards of genius and patriotism, be the arbiters of taste and promoters of incalculable benefit to those, among whom they live. By an opposite course they become the slaves of faction, despicable panders to depraved appetites, and instruments of immeasurable evil.

These remarks have been called from us by a sincere regard for the honor of the Profession, in which we are engaged. To speak slightingly of our cotemporaries, in order to extol ourselves, would be a symptom of such mean jealousy and odious rivalry, that we trust, we cannot be supposed capable of it. None, on the contrary, can be more anxious, than ourselves, to uphold it in its greatest dignity, and, if it unfortunately be degraded, to contribute humbly to its restoration. In our criticisms, literary and political, truth and fairness shall always be found to preside. We should scorn to take away a character as to pick a pocket or break into a house; and we know