Sermons, above mentioned, of Archbishop Tillotfon, not only as it is a Vindication of what I have advanced; but as it is a Vindication of that excellent Man from the Charge of Arianifm, after his having publifh'd four Sermons profeffedly in proof of Christ's Divinity. The Paffage is at p. 135. "If Christ be only a Man, how can he be prefent every where, to thofe that call upon him; fince this is not the Nature of Man, but God, to be able to be present every where? If Chrift be only a Man, why do we "call upon him as Mediator; fince Prayer to a "Man is deemed ineffectual to fave us? If Chrift be only a Man, why do we put our Hope in him; fince Hope in Man is accurfed "in Scripture ?" At p. 140, there is another Paffage, that, by neceffary Inference, proves Chrift's Divinity: Praying to them (Saints and Angels) in all Places, and at all Times, and "for all forts of Bleffings, does fuppofe them to

have the incommunicable Perfections of the "divine Nature imparted to them, or inherent "in them, viz. his Omniprefence, Omniscience, "and Omnipotence; and to whatever Being we "afcribe thefe Perfections, in doing fo, we make "it God." We, therefore, being commanded to pray to Chrift in all Places, and at all Times, and for all forts of Bleffings, this is a plain Declaration of his truly divine Nature: And it is for want of thefe divine Perfections that St. Paul, in his Epistle to the Coloffians, abfolutely forbids praying to Angels; and if not to Angels, much lefs to Saints.

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I hope, I have made it plain that God ONLY, the one fupreme God, is a capable Object of Prayer, because be ONLY is omniprefent, omniscient, and omnipotent; but it does not follow, that, because he is capable, at all Times, and in all Places, to hear, and answer all the Prayers of all his Creatures, therefore he permits, much less requires, us, to pray to him, fince he knows, without our telling him, all our Wants, and is difpofed, by his Goodness, to fupply them, as far as is confiftent with his Wifdom, without our afking him. His Will in this Cafe cannot be proved by his bare Capacity to be prayed to, but must be grounded upon fome other Confideration, drawn either from our Nature, or his Express Command. Next, therefore, I proceed to enquire how we can discover it to be the Will of God that we should pray to him.

CHAP IV.

Concerning our Obligations to the Duty of Prayer.

God Reafon must deduce from his Nature, and ours; or be built upon his express Command, contained in fome external Revelation. As for what relates to the Proof of the Duty from the Nature of God, the Nature of Man, and the Nature of the Duty, I cannot ftate that Matter in a clearer Light, than in the following Letters that paffed on this Occafion, between a very learned and ingenious Divine, the late Mr.

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Jofeph Clarke of Long-Ditton, and myself, and therefore I fhall here publish them.

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Sir,

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To the Reverend Mr. JOSEPH CLARKE.

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S you are juftly allow'd to have an excellent metaphyfical Genius, and very minutely to have confider'd the Nature, Relation, and Fitnefs of Things, with the moral Obligations arifing from them, I fhould be much oblig'd to you, and our learned Friend Mr. Harveft, for your Sentiments upon a Subject of Confequence, that I would examine with all poffible Accuracy. I want a Proof of the Duty of Prayer from natural Principles. I have read a good deal upon the Subject, and muft be of Opinion that very eminent Writers have us'd very inconclufive Arguments, which ⚫ in the Confequence muft always do more hurt than good. It has ever been an establish'd * Maxim with me, that Truth can never be ferv'd by Error, neither can it ever ftand in need of fuch falfe Friends to fupport it. They always give an Advantage to the Enemy, by bringing a Difcredit upon the Caufe which they attempt to ferve. Whenever the Inconclufiveness of fuch Arguments are detected and expofed (and there will always be Infidels able and ready to do it) it ftaggers weak Minds, and brings a Diftruft upon the clearest Arguments, which will either hinder a fair Examination, or give a wrong Bias to the Judgment, and occafion them to imagine that a thing is not capable of

not prove

being proved at all, because thofe Arguments do it. The Thing to be prov'd is this, viz. That Prayer is a Duty, not only as it is a • natural Means of Religion and Virtue, (which 'I think capable of Demonftration) but in itSelf, and for its own fake; a Duty arifing from the Nature of Man, and of the Deity; from us, as dependent finful Beings, to him, as the Creator, Preferver and Judge of the World. This, I fay, is the Point to be prov'd: This is what eminent Men have publickly attempted to prove, but not to my Satisfaction, nor the • Conviction of Infidels. If any Body can do it, you and he can; and by doing of it you may not only gratify the Curiofity of an old, inqui'fitive Friend, but do publick Service to Religion and to Mankind. I am,

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Your affectionate Friend and Servant,

W. WEBSTER.

Sir,

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To the Reverend Dr. WEBSTER.

fhould have anfwer'd the Favour of yours, which now lies before me of Octob. 21, by the Time you defired; but was prevented, by being obliged to be abfent from home, till Yesterday; therefore hope you will excuse the Neglect. I cannot presume to think myself. ' able to give you the Satisfaction you defire, in a Matter which others, fo much better quali

sfied,

fied, have not fucceded in; and, what is more, · a Matter wherein you feem to diftruft yourself, who (without a Compliment) I think capable of doing as much upon all Subjects, as any one; but yet I cannot difpenfe with myself, from venturing to give you my Thoughts upon the Queftion you propofe; that I may not, by a Refufal, render myself unworthy of the • Honour you do me, in thinking them worth your knowing; though I fhould perhaps better confult my own Advantage, by being filent.

The Thing you want to fee proved is, if I miftake not, contain'd in the following Propofition, viz.

The Act of Prayer, either for Spirituals, or Temporals, from Man to the fupreme Being,' is a Duty of natural Morality; or the Obligation to which, is founded in, and will arife fimply from, the natural Relation and Fitness of Things. • What has occurr'd to me in thinking upon it, is as follows:

That Act, to which Man, fimply, as a ra• tional Agent, is obliged from the natural Relation and Fitness of Things; will be to him a Duty, founded in, and arifing fimply from, such • Relation and Fitness.

I know it is always urged by those who are against the Scheme of Obligation from Fitness, &c. that there can be no Obligation without a Law; and no Law without Sanctions annex'd. This I have always looked upon as a moft pi'tiful Logomachy; as if the Law of Redfon,

were not as much a Law, to rational Agents,

as