as any Law whatever; or as if the Reafon of Things were not a Law, becaufe, forfooth, it ⚫ is confider'd as having, as fuch, no Sanctions annex'd: But furely fuch Sanctions do not make any thing more a Law, than it would be without them. They may be ufeful, or neceffary, to enforce the Law, and to procure • a more regular Obedience to it; but where the Law is founded in Reafon, it wants no other • Sanctions to make it a Law, or obligatory, to • all rational Agents: It is fo in itself, and as fuch; and the Sanctions annex'd, are only ex‹ trinfic Appendages, and enter not neceffarily into the Idea of a rational Law, or its Obligation as • fuch: And whoever will fay, that Sanctions annex'd, are what only make Morality obligatory upon a moral Agent, may as well fay, that the Sanctions make it Morality; for surely,there ⚫ is not more Difficulty in conceiving a moral Law obligatory without Sanctions, than in conceiving Morality without Obligation.-But this by the way-They who do not like the Word Law, may change it, without any Detriment to the Question: For call it a Rule of Action; and then I apprehend that a rational Agent, is as • much obliged, as fuch, i. e. morally obliged, to act by the Rule of Reafon, that is, to act as a rational Agent, or as what he is, as if it were a Law, guarded by a thousand Sanctions.

• Man then, being a rational Agent, is, fimply, and as fuch, morally obliged to act by the Law, or Rule of natural Reafon; and whatever he is fo obliged to, is thereby his Duty,

founded

founded in, and arising from, the natural Relation and Fitness of Things, which is that

Rule or Law.

The prefent Queftion then is, whether the Act of Prayer, from Man to the fupreme Being, be an Act to which he is, fimply, as a rational Agent, obliged from the natural Relation and Fitness of Things.

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Now, Man is a Being fenfible of the many and various Wants and Neceffities, whether Temporal, or Spiritual, to which he is by his Nature liable. He is dependent upon the fupreme Being, as his Creator and Preferver, for the Supply of fuch Wants; and in whofe Power and Will alone it is to grant, or not to grant, fuch Supplies.-Will it now from hence follow, that Man, as a fenfible, dependent, rational Agent, is oblig'd, as fuch, fimply, and from the natural Relation and Fitness of Things, to apply to that Being, in whofe Power and Will alone it is to grant fuch Supplies? Does there not feem to be as natural a Connection, Relation, and Fitness, between Want, Dependence, &c. and Application to him on whom that Dependence is, and in whofe Power and Will the Supply of fuch Wants are; as there is between < any moral Fitneffes whatever?I don't mean ⚫ a Fitness of Means to an End merely, but a Fitnefs of Congruity, a Fitnefs in fe, arifing from the natural Relation between God and Man.

May it not be farther argued, that Man, being a Creature thus dependent; all fuch Actions, Conduct and Behaviour, which are ex

preffive

preffive of an Acknowledgement of fuch Dependence, are, as a rational dependent Agent, Parts of his moral Duty, arifing fimply from the natural Relation and Fitnefs of Things? Is ⚫ there not a natural Fitness of Action, between . fuch a dependent State, and the Acknowledgment of it? i. e. Is not fuch a dependent, rational Agent, obliged, fimply, as fuch, by the Rule of Reason, that is, by the Rule of Fitness, to acknowledge himself to be, by his Conduct and < Behaviour, what he is; and would not a contrary • Conduct be acting counter to the natural Relation, which fuch a dependent, rational Agent bears to him, on whom he is fo dependent? Is not the Act of Prayer therefore, or fuch an Act of Application, (being one of the ftrongest Means of fuch Acknowledgement, as is before mention'd) an Action whofe fimple Fitness is founded in the Nature and Reafon of Things? And, if fo, does it not become, as fuch, a Duty, and obligatory, a Part of the moral Law, or Religion of Nature? and there'fore farther, a Part of Conduct which may bè inquired into by the fupreme Fudge; to whom Man is accountable.-But obferve here, that I do not make the Obligation to arife from his being thus accountable; but from his being a fenfible, dependent, rational Agent: But fince he is alfo an accountable Agent, he may be called to account for his Conduct in this, as well as any other Part of the moral Law.

Farther ftill, May not the like be said of an Obligation of Man, confider'd as a finful of

Ꭰ

fending,

fending, accountable Agent, to apply for Pardon to that fupreme Judge, on whofe Will and Power alone fuch Pardon depends? Is there not, as before, a Fitnefs of Congruity in fuch Conduct, arifing from his Nature and Circumftances, and the Relation he bears to God? i. e. would fuch a Creature act as fuch, if he did otherwife; and therefore is not a moral Obligation thereby induced?

The Cafe then being thus, is not Man, as a rational Agent, morally obliged to act according to thefe moral Relations and Fitnefes? Would he behave as a rational Agent, if he did not act according to them? If not, then by being fuch, he is morally obliged to act as fuch, i. e. he is morally obliged to act as what he is; fince otherwise, he could not be, what by Suppofition he is; for being fuch, is acting as fuch; they are the fame Thing. This is 'what I mean by moral Obligation; which is as much Obligation as can be induced by any Sanctions whatever: All this I know is ftrange Language to those who cannot fee that the Obligation, arifing from the Nature and Reafon of Things, carries its own Sanction along with it, from the univerfal Confufion, naturally confequent upon counteracting them; which, to a rational Agent, ought to be, (though in fact it prove otherwise) as strong a Sanction as any Rewards and Punishments fuperadded; and they who deny this to be Obligation, seem to have no Notion of any Obligation but external, and coercive, or that a Man cannot be faid to be

4

" bound

bound in any other Senfe than that of being tied Neck and Heels.

But it may be faid, perhaps, that the fupreme Being, having at once, and eternally, one determin'd Scheme of Providence, viz. of always, and invariably doing what is right and fit to be done in all Cafes; and knowing externally, and at once, all our Wants, and what is right and fit to be done; and confequently what, in all Cafes, will certainly and invariably be done; the Act of Prayer may appear, in the Nature and Reafon of Things, to be improper, and unfit; as it is fuppofing, either that God may be prevailed upon by it, to do what is not right and fit to be done; or elfe that he would not do what is right and fit to *be done, without it-Alfo to be useless and unneceffary; fince it cannot be fuppofed that he will (or can, morally fpeaking) alter this one eternal Scheme of Providence, fix'd according to the Standard of Rectitude, on account of fuch Application as is supposed; that Wit

may be alfo unwife (and therefore unfit) as our Ignorance of the whole Scheme of Providence may occafion us to afk Things unfit and improper, and which, however partially good for us, may upon the whole be not foand the Act of Prayer be thus, in the Nature ' and Reason of Things, ufelefs, unnecessary, unfit, and unwife; then, not obligatory, or a Duty; but the contrary of which will be fo; and, Thy Will be done, as it is the shorteft, fo it may be thought, perhaps, to be alfo the wifeft, and moft religious Addrefs. < Whether

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