Whether there be, or be not, any Force in 'fuch Objections, upon the foot of natural Reafon, you will confider; or whether they may be anfwer'd by faying, that an Obligation to fuch Application, does not exclude a Deference, and Submiffion at the fame time to God's Will.That the afking, thro' Ignorance, Things improper, does not take from the Obligation of fuch Application in general. And tho' God be fuppofed to have one invariable, determined Scheme of Providence, which is not to be alter'd on account of human Application; yet it will not follow that fuch Application is ufelefs, unneceffary, or unfit; becaufe, fuch Application, appearing à priori to be in itself a fit Action, from the natural • Relation and Fitnefs of Things, as before explain'd; may it not be fuppofed that fuch Action, and Conduct, on Man's fide, may make a necessary Part of that Scheme of Providence; fo as to be a Qualification on the Part of Man, whereby that Scheme is to be perform'd? i. e. tho' God will always and invariably do, what is right and fit to be done in all Cafes; and eternally knew what always would be fo; and confequently was, in the Nature of Things, certain and fixt, yet that • eternal Fitness and Certainty in the Scheme of Providence, may depend on Man's Performance on his Part, in the Act of Application, as a fit Action, arifing from our Relation to him; as a natural Acknowledgment of our Dependence; or as a necessary Qualification, and

f

• Means

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• Means of Conveyance; effential to, and fo making a Part. in, the one invariable Scheme being thus connected with, and being one Link in the great Chain of Providence, just as the "eternal Certainty of Events (which is true of all Events) does not interfere with the Obligation of Man, to do what is right and fit, to produce fuch Events as future Contingences; fuch Means being, on the contrary, in the Scheme ' of Providence, neceffarily or effentially connected "with that Certainty of Events.

I know not whether I have expreffed myfelf clearly, or whether what I have troubled you with comes up to what you enquire after, either as to the Question you intend, or the Proof of it.-I pretend only to give a few Hints, which, if they meet with your Approbation, you will improve; if otherwise, you will however find at least one natural Fitness in them; and whatever other Obligation they may fall fhort of proving, they will not, I hope fail of proving that which I think myfelf under, of always being at your Command, and, dear Sir,

Long-Ditton,

Nov. 12.1748.

Your faithful and obedient Servant,

Jo. CLARKE.

P. S. The Question you propofe is attended with Difficulties; and I must confefs,

that, upon looking this Letter over again, I do not think it comes up to fo clear a Proof as I could wish, but believe it may be improved."

D 3

Sir,

6

Sir,

IN

N anfwer to the Favour of your's, concerning the natural Fitness, and moral Obliga-" tion, of the Duty of Prayer, I fhall join Iffue with you in Opinion that a moral Obligation may arife from the Fitness of Things, where ⚫ there is no external Sanction to enforce it. Reafon, no doubt, is an eternal and immutable Law, or Rule of Action, to all reafonable Beings, or, elfe the Deity could have no Law, or Rule of Action that is binding upon his mo ral Perfections, and we could not reafon from them in Proof of the Truth of Religion. And, if God be under a moral Obligation to make the Fitnefs of Things, i. e, Reason, the Rule of his Conduct, all intelligent Creatures must be under the fame Obligation to act reafonably, tho' not under the fame Neceffity, for want of his abfolute Perfection: But, then, as we are not, like the Deity, felf-fufficient, and yet, as Beings capable of Happiness, or Mifery, cannot avoid acting with a View to our own Happiness, upon the whole; if you take away the External Sanctions of Religion - a future • State of Rewards and Punifliments in many Cafes the natural Fitness or Reafon of Things would be alter'd with regard to particular Perfons, under particular Circumftances; and, confequently, in all thofe Cafes all moral Obligation must ceafe, unless intelligent, conscious Beings could be morally obliged, knowingly, to make themselves Miferable, which I ap

prehend

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prehend to be as contrary to Reason, and the Fitnefs of Things, as can poffibly be conceived. I need not give Examples, they being fo va< rious and obvious in common. Life: But, let C us come to the Queftion, and, in order to it, I must transcribe my State of it, as you had it my firft Letter.

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The Thing to be Proved is this, viz. "That "Prayer is a Duty, not only as a natural Means, " of Religion and Virtue, but in itself, and for "its own fake; a Duty arifing from the Nature " of Man, and the Nature of God; from us, " as dependent, finful Creatures, to him, as our "Creator, Preferver, and Judge; to which let "me add, farther, by way of Explanation, "without any regard to its Influence upon ourfelves, or other Men.

In your Anfwer to my Letter you tate my * Question thus: "The Thing which you want "to fee prov'd, is contained in the following "Propofition, viz. that the Act of Prayer, "from Man to the fupreme Being, is a Duty of "natural Morality; or a Duty, the Obligation

to which is founded in, and will arife, sIM"PLY, from the natural Relation, and Fitness " of Things."-In "In another Part of your Letter it is ftated thus" The prefent Question is, "Whether the Act of Prayer, from Man to the fupreme Being, be an Act to which he is fimply, as a rational Creature, obliged from "the natural Relation and Fitness of Things ?" Tho' the Obfervation has not an immediate Connection with our main Queftion, it may, D 4 however,

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however, be of fome Ufe to obferve, by the way, that the Phrase, natural Religion, which you here ufe, is of an ambiguous Signification: For, when we fay that any Thing is a Duty of natural Religion, we may mean that the natural Understanding of Man, unaffifted by any external Revelation, might have discovered our Obligation to the Performance of it. In this Senfe of the Words, I must be of Opinion that there is no fuch Thing as natural Religion; and that if Men had been left, folely, to the • Guidance of their unaffifted Reason, there never would, or could, have been any Religion at all: -But, if you mean no more by natural Religion than this, viz. that the natural UnderStanding of Man, inlightened and strengthen'd by external Communications, and Affiftances ⚫ from the Author of it, gradually improv'd this natural Faculty by Exercife; by which means Men, in time, became capable, in great measure, of discovering the natural Fitness of the moral Duties of Religion, from the Relation of • Things; I fay, if no more than this be meant, I fubfcribe to it, and think it as clear as any one Truth in Morality, that Prayer, in this • Senfe of natural Religion, is one of its prime "Duties, as having, in the Exercise of it, a • natural Fitnefs, or Tendency, to promote Religion and Virtue, by means of its Influence upon the Minds and Conduct of Men, which, I think, muft be fufficient to convince you you have not rightly stated my Question, in those Paffages which I have cited from your

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Letter,