fome one of the family, who by his age or fervices, or by the part he poffeffed in the direction of their affairs during the life-time of the parent, had already taught them to respect his advice, or to attend to his commands; or laftly, the profpect of thefe inconveniencies might prompt the first ancestor to appoint a fucceffor, and his pofterity, from the fame motive united with an habitual deference to the anceftor's authority, might receive the appointment with fubmiffion. Here then we have a tribe or clan incorporated under one chief. Such communities might be increased by confiderable numbers, and fulfil the purposes of civil union without any other or more regular convention, conftitution, or form of government, than what we have defcribed. Every branch which was flipped off from the primitive stock, and removed to a diftance from it, would in like manner take root, and grow into a feparate clan. Two or three of thefe clans were frequently, we may fuppofe, united into one. Marriage, conqueft, mutual defence, common diftrefs, or more accidental coalitions, might produce this effect.

II. A fecond fource of perfonal authority, and which might eafily extend, or fometimes perhaps fupercede the patriarchal, is that, which refults from military arrangement. In wars, either of aggreffion or defence, manifeft neceffity would prompt thofe who fought on the fame fide to array themfelves under one leader. And although their leader was advanced to this eminence for the purpose only, and during the operations of a fingle expedition, yet his authority would not always terminate with the reafons for which it was conferred. A warrior who had led forth his tribe against their enemies with repeated fuccefs, would procure to himself even in the deliberations of peace, a powerful and permanent influence. If this advantage were added to the authority of the patriarchal chief, or favoured by any previous diftinction of ancestry, it would be no dif

ficult

ficult undertaking for the perfon who poffeffed it to obtain the almoft abfolute direction of the affairs of the community, especially, if he was careful to affociate to himself proper auxiliaries, and content to practife the obvious art of gratifying or removing those who oppofed his pretenfions.

But although we may be able to comprehend how by his perfonal abilities or fortune one man may obtain the rule over many, yet it feems more difficult to explain how empire became hereditary, or in what manner fovereign power, which is never acquired without great merit or management, learns to defcend in a fucceffion, which has no dependence upon any qualities, either of understanding, or activity. The caufes which have introduced hereditary dominion into fo general a reception in the world, are principally the following-the influence of affociation, which communicates to the fon a portion of the fame respect which was wont to be paid to the virtues, or ftation of the father-the mutual jealousy of other competitors-the greater envy, with which all behold the exaltation of an equal, than the continuance of an acknowledged fuperiority-a reigning prince leaving behind him many adherents, who can preferve their own importance, only by fupporting the fucceffion of his children-Add to these reasons, that elections to the fupreme power having upon trial produced deftructive contentions, many ftates would take refuge from a return of the fame calamities, in a rule of fucceffion; and no rule prefents itself fo obvious, certain, and intelligible, as confanguinity of birth.

The ancient state of fociety in moft countries, and the modern condition of fome uncivilized parts of the world, exhibit that appearance, which this account of the original of civil government would lead us to expect. The earlieft hiftories of Palestine, Greece, Italy, Gaul, Britain, inform us, that thefe countries were occupied by many fmall independent

Z 2

natious,

nations, not much perhaps unlike thofe which are found at prefent amongst the favage inhabitants of North America, and upon the coaft of Africa. These nations, I confider, as the amplifications of fo many fingle familics; or as derived from the junction of two or three families, whom fociety in war, or the approach of fome common danger had united. Suppofe a country to have been first peopled by shipwreck on its coafts, or by emigrants or exiles from a neighbouring country, the new fettlers having no enemy to provide againft, and occupied with the care of their perfonal fubfiftence, would think little of digesting a fyftem of laws, of contriving a form of government, or indeed of any political union whatever; but each fettler would remain at the head of his own family, and each family would include all of every age and generation who were defcended from him. So many of thefe families as were holden together after the death of the original ancestor, by the reafons, and in the method above recited, would wax, as the individuals were multiplied, into tribes, clans, hords, or nations, fimilar to thofe into which the ancient inhabitants of many countries are known to have been divided, and which are still found, whereever the state of fociety and manners is immature and uncultivated.

Nor need we be furprized at the early existence in the world of fome vaft empires, or at the rapidity with which they advanced to their greatness, from comparatively small and obfcure originals. Whilst the inhabitants of fo many countries were broken into numerous communities, unconnected, and oftentimes contending with each other; before experience had taught thefe little flates to fee their own danger in their neighbour's ruin; or had inftructed them in the necefity of refifting the aggrandizement of an afpiring power, by alliances and timely preparations; in this condition of civil policy, a particular tribe which by any means had got the ftart of the rest in

ftrength,

ftrength, or difcipline, and happened to fall under the conduct of an ambitious chief, by directing their first attempts to the part where fuccefs was most secure, and by affuming, as they went along, thofe whom they conquered, into a fhare of their future enterprizes, might foon gather a force, which would infallibly overbear any oppofition, that the fcattered power and unprovided state of fuch enemies could make to the progrefs of their victories.

Laftly, our theory affords a prefumption, that the earliest governments were monarchies, because the government of families, and of armies, from which, according to our account, civil government derived its inftitution, and probably its form, is univerfally monarchical.

CHAP.

CHA P. II.

HOW SUBJECTION TO CIVIL GOVERNMENT I S MAINTAINED.

COULD

SOULD we view our own fpecies from a diftance, or regard mankind with the fame fort of observation, with which we read the natural history or remark the manners of any other animal, there is nothing in the human character which would more furprize us, than the almost universal subjugation of ftrength to weakness-than to fee many millions of robuft men, in the complete ufe and exercise of their perfonal faculties, and without any defect of courage, waiting upon the will of a child, a woman, a driveller, or a lunatic. And although when we fuppofe a vaft empire in abfolute fubjection to one perfon, and that one depreffed beneath the level of his fpecies by infirmities, or vice, we fuppofe perhaps an extreme cafe, yet in all cafes, even in the moft popular forms of civil government, the phyfical trength refides in the governed. In what manner opinion thus prevails over ftrength, or how power, which naturally belongs to fuperior force, is maintained in oppofition to it; in other words, by what motives the many are induced to fubmit to the few, becomes an enquiry which lies at the root of almoft every political fpeculation. It removes, indeed, but does not refolve the difficulty, to fay, that civil governments are now-a-days almoft univerfally upheld by ftanding armies, for the queftion ftill returns, how are these armies themfelves kept in fubjection,

or