ly government, that repentance universally supersedes the execution of laws, the motives to obedience being enfeebled, crimes will be multiplied. But motives are certainly employed in the divine government, as in those maintained among men. It seems, therefore, that the pardoning of sin, without some attendant act or event expressing the same thing, which is expressed in the divine law, would encourage disorder and vice through the empire of God. The subjects of his government would naturally, I should think necessarily, conclude, that his abhorrence of sin was less than his threatenings had led them to imagine.

"Whatever may be the rules of pardoning mercy," says Mr. Hampton, "it can hardly be supposed that a wise and good lawgiver will exercise it, or mitigate the rigor of the law, especially in many instances, without showing at the same time, his regard to the reasonableness of the law and the equity of its sanctions; or, which is the same, to the demands of his law and justice; because otherwise his conduct would be an encouragement to disobedience, and of consequence, his mercy, though a favor to a few, would be injustice to the whole."

If God see fit to pardon sin on any conditions, we cannot reasonably suppose that they will be such, as either to give a wrong impression concerning himself, or to propagate a spirit of disorder and rebellion. It is highly important that God should be known through the universe, as a God hating sin, and that every apprehension of a different nature should be removed. God cannot deny himself, nor will he ever cease to exhibit, in his providence, that proportion, harmony, and divine beauty, which adorn his character.

LECTURE XXXIV.

ATONEMENT.

It was said in the last lecture, that those, who oppose the doctrine of our Saviour's atonement, must do it on this ground, that nothing of the kind was necessary.

It was remarked, in reply, that even if we were unable to discern any need of atonement, i. e. any obstacles to the exercise of mercy on terms of repentance merely, it would, by no means, follow, that such reasons did not exist in the view of that Being, who beholds the whole universe, with all its relations and connexions. But far from conceding the truth of what is here supposed, I proceeded to suggest a number of considerations, which, according to the best ideas we can form on the subject, present obstacles to the pardoning of sin, merely on condition of repentance.

I shall now apply more directly, to the government of God, some observations then made concerning civil governments, with a view further to show, that the propriety of pardoning sin on the sole condition of repentance, is far from being obvious.

Were offenders made happy on so easy terms, the obedient and disobedient would be treated alike. Whereas, the divine law declares, it shall go well with the righteous, and ill with the wicked; the event, as here supposed, is, that it will go well with both. For if the wicked, i. e. those, who have sinned while in a state of probation, are made happy, they receive precisely what was promised to the righteous; nothing more than happiness being promised to the latter. Now, if the matter

were left here, would not an observing spectator of God's proceedings, on being told that virtue is an object of divine approbation, and vice, of the divine displeasure, immediately reply, "How does this appear? Two beings, we see, are put on their trial for happiness, on condition of obedience; but he, who disobeys, receives the same treatment, as the other."

Or, suppose two beings in a state of trial disobey their Creator. The one repents and is rewarded; the other does not repent, and is punished. In the latter case, i. e. when the impenitent is punished, the divine law and the divine proceedings express precisely the same thing, viz. hatred of sin. In the former case, the expressions of the two are completely opposite.

That the consideration of repentance does not legally justify this difference, will be evident, when we consider the necessary extent of divine requirements. These are nothing less, than unfailing moral rectitude. If it be suitable, that Jehovah should demand of his creatures conformity, in any instance, to that which is morally right; such conformity, may, with propriety, be demanded in all instances. Indeed, there would be undeniable inconsistency, were not the demand universal. You cannot easily suppose any thing, more dishonorable to the supreme Lawgiver, than that he should tolerate particular violations of law, on condition that the remainder should be kept. If intelligent creatures conform to the law, it is no more than their duty : it cannot, of course, have the slightest influence, strictly speaking, in making amends for crimes. It is not the less true, that I violated the law yesterday, because I have kept it to day; nor is there, on that account, less demerit and turpitude in yesterday's offence. Penitence is only the feelings of an obedient heart, in view of its past delinquency. The only difference, therefore, between the repenting and unrepenting transgressor, is, that the disobedience in one case is continued longer than in the other. But the law, with equal clearness, denounces punishment against both.

By what has been said, this much at least, I conceive, has been made to appear, that there is not an obvious propriety in

forgiving sin without atonement; and that, according to the best views, which we can entertain on the subject, it was necessary, if grace were exercised towards sinners, that such exercise of grace should be accompanied with some expression of the divine will and character, comporting with that expression, which is made in the divine law; something, which might prevent the subjects of God's moral government from imagining that his hatred of sin is less than his law represents.

A sentiment, similar to this, was found in the first edition of Dr. Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, clothed in that powerful language, which he had so much at his command. "If we consult," said he, "our natural sentiments, we are apt to fear, lest before the holiness of God, vice should appear more worthy of punishment, than the weakness and imperfection of human nature can ever seem to be of reward. Man, when about to appear before a Being of infinite perfection, can feel but little confidence in his own merit, or in the imperfect propriety of his own conduct. In the presence of his fellow creatures, he may often justly elevate himself, and may often have reason to think highly of his own character and conduct, compared to the still greater imperfection of theirs. But the case is quite different, when about to appear before his infinite Creator. To such a Being, he can scarcely imagine, that his littleness and weakness should ever seem to be the proper object, either of esteem or reward. But he can easily conceive, how the numberless violations of duty, of which he has been guilty, should render him the object of aversion and punishment. Neither can he see any reason, why the divine indignation should not be let loose, without any restraint, upon so vile an insect, as he is sensible that he himself must appear to be. If he would still hope for happiness, he is conscious that he cannot demand it from the justice, but that he must entreat it from the mercy, of God. Repentance, sorrow, humiliation, contrition, at the thought of his past conduct, are, upon this account, the sentiments which become him, and seem to be the only means, which he has left for appeasing that wrath, which he knows he

has justly provoked. He even distrusts the efficacy of all these, and naturally fears, lest the wisdom of God should not, like the weakness of man, be prevailed upon to spare the crime, by the most importunate lamentations of the criminal. Some other intercession, some other sacrifice, some other atonement, he imagines must be made for him, beyond what he himself is capable of making, before the purity of the divine justice can be reconciled to his manifest offences."

In view of these considerations, and of the acknowledged fact that God does, in some way or other, pardon offenders, there is, to say the least, a degree of probability, that measures have been taken of the nature described.

I now ask your attention to an undeniable fact, viz. the death of Jesus Christ, by whom the worlds were made, and in whom dwelt the fulness of the Godhead bodily.

Judging from the language, both of the prophets and evangelists, it would seem that his sufferings, on this occasion, were unusual in their severity. The prophet Isaiah uses the following language: He was oppressed and afflicted: It pleased the Lord to bruise him, and put him to grief.

vesture.

In the twenty-second Psalm, are many passages, which are by no means applicable to David. To Christ, they apply with exactness; and this application is made by himself, and by the evangelists, who record his sufferings: They pierced my hands and my feet; they parted my garments, and cast lots upon my I am poured out like water, and all my bones are out of joint; my heart is like wax, it is melted in the midst of my bowels. My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me? Why art thou so far from helping me, and from the words of my roaring? From the history which we have of our Saviour, it appears that he was, emphatically, a man of sorrows, and acquainted with grief. Immediately before his death, he is represented as passing through a scene of suffering, of which, on ordinary principles, no satisfactory account can be given. On the night of his crucifixion, when he had supped with his disciples, he withdrew from them, and kneeled down and prayed,