menting on the Indian policy a few months later Colonel Bouquet suggested that "the dread of English Power is in my opinion the only motive capable of Making a Solid Impression upon their minds and they must be convinced by their own Eyes that it is not out of necessity, but out of regard for them that we offer them our alliance — and I doubt whether we Shall ever root out the French Interest in that Country till we make our appearance in it with a Force sufficient to make ourselves respectable and awe both the French & the Savage.'

Whether the Indian question would have had any other issue than open conflict had the Indian department rather than the army attempted its solution is problematical. Certainly the Indian superintendents and agents, understanding the Indian character and the various aspects of the question imcomparably better than the military officials, held views in striking contrast to these officials. The correspondence of Sir William Johnson, John Stuart, and George Croghan is filled with intimations that the policy of Amherst and his subordinates was sure to lead to disaster. "I greatly fear,' says Johnson, "the Indians have been in General considered as too inconsiderable for some time past, and I most heartily wish we may have no occasion to attribute any future Hostilities to such a way of thinking, which must produce neglect and disregard on our sides, and discontent and Revenge on theirs, the consequence of which will be a recommencement of Hostilities." "If," he observed again, "we conquer their prejudices by our generosity they will lay aside their Jealousys, & we may rest in security. this is much cheaper than any other plan, & more certain of success.'

1 Bouquet to Gage, November 30, 1764, post, 366.

2 Johnson to lords of trade, September 25, 1763, post, 31. 3 Johnson to lords of trade, August 30, 1764, post, 307.

Although the savages were ripe for revolt and although the movement appeared almost simultaneous, it is doubtful whether the ramifications of the rebellion would have been so far reaching and proved so formidable had it not been for the unifying work of Pontiac, the great chief of the Ottawa.1 Pontiac was not only the principal chief of the Ottawa but also the virtual head of the Chippewa and Potawatomi. He had long exerted a despotic sway over these nations, and his powerful influence had been extended among all the western Indians. Although he shared with his fellow savages their bitter resentment against the British on account of their arrogance and alleged parsimony, he appears to have been impelled to action by patriotism and ambition as well. He wished to reëstablish completely the old régime. The return of French ascendency would mean the restoration of the Indian's happiness. His hunting grounds would be preserved. A permanent Indian confederacy comprehending all branches of the race, with himself at its head, may well have been in his mind. At any rate Pontiac clearly understood that the Indians disunited could avail little against the advance of the British; that the latter could not be checked without aid from the Indians' former allies; and he confidently believed that, by reuniting, the French and Indians could drive the British into the sea. In order to accomplish this purpose French power in the West must be rehabilitated and the Indian nations united into one great confederacy. During the years 1761 and 1762 he developed the plot and in 1762 he dispatched his emissaries to all the Indian nations. The ramifications of the conspiracy extended to all the Algonkin tribes, to some of the nations on the lower Mississippi, and even to a portion of the Six Na

1 See note on Pontiac, post, 241. For discussion of Pontiac's character see Parkman, Conspiracy of Pontiac, 1:193, 194.

tions. The original aim was the destruction of the British garrisons on the frontier, after which the British settlements beyond the mountains were to be attacked. The assault on the outposts, beginning in May, 1763, was sudden and overwhelming; Detroit, Fort Pitt, and Niagara alone held out, the remainder of the posts falling without serious attempts at defense.

In the meantime the British ministry was attempting to formulate some plan whereby the Indian nations might be peacefully reconciled. News of the outbreak of the war reached England in August, 1763, and the discussion of plans for checking it without resort to arms was at once entered upon. Throughout the summer and autumn of 1763 the proposed policy was under discussion, and in October there was issued as a result the royal proclamation of 1763, aimed specifically at the pacification of the Indians by reserving to them for the present all the lands west of the Alleghenies and by laying down some general regulations for the administration of the Indian trade.1 Had this proclamation been issued a few months earlier and had its contents been communicated to the Indians by the officials of the Indian department this devastating war might have been averted or at least confined within narrower limits. Under the circumstances, however, peaceful pacification was impossible.

The occupation of the Illinois country was now something more than a mere formality-something more than a formal transfer of sovereignty from France to Great Britain in accordance with the terms of the treaty of Paris. Its occupation was at once involved with the crushing of the Indian confederacy and the reoccupation of the posts that had fallen into the hands of Pontiac and his confederates. It was obvious that these results must be attained before the occupation of

1 Post, 39.

Fort de Chartres would be practicable from the east. The participation in the rebellion of the Shawnee and Delaware tribes of the upper Ohio River region precluded for a time, however, the possibility of reaching the Mississippi posts by way of the Ohio River without a much larger force than the commander in chief had in the service in the East. The colonies, moreover, were already avoiding the call for additional troops.1

General Thomas Gage, who succeeded Sir Jeffery Amherst as commander in chief of the British army in America in November, 1763, was convinced that the early occupation of the posts on the Mississippi was essential, since it would in a measure cut off the communication between the French and the Indian nations dwelling in that vicinity. The Indians, finding themselves thus inclosed, would be more easily subdued. It was expected, therefore, that an expeditionary force would move up the Mississippi River from Mobile, which had recently been occupied as a part of Louisiana ceded to the English.3 The Mississippi River had been declared open to the French and British alike by the treaty of Paris, and it was expected that the consent of the French government of Louisiana could be secured for the use of that portion of the river which remained under French control. Little opposition might be expected from the southern Indians toward whom a somewhat more liberal policy had been pursued. Presents to the value of four or five thousand pounds had been sent to Charleston in 1763 for distribution among the southern nations which would tend to counteract any possible intrigues that might be carried on by the French traders from New Orleans. It was not

1 Beer, British Colonial Policy, 263.

2 Report from Robertson, March 8, 1764, post, 220.

3 Bouquet to Gage, December 1, 1763, post, 536; Gage to Bouquet, December 22, 1763, B.M., Add. MSS., 21638.

4 Winsor, Mississippi Basin, 433.

believed, moreover, that Pontiac's influence would extend so far southward.

As has already been suggested, Governor Dabbadie of Louisiana had, soon after the announcement of the treaty of peace, transmitted orders to all the French commandants in the ceded territory to evacuate the posts. A few months later Major Robert Farmar, commanding the British forces at Mobile, in British West Florida, and Lieutenant Colonel Robertson, quartermaster general for America, who had been sent to Mobile to investigate conditions in Florida and the ceded portions of Louisiana,1 were negotiating with the French officials for assistance in reaching the isolated posts on the upper and lower Mississippi. The French appear to have offered every facility within their power, even agreeing to leave a portion of the armaments at the posts, although the right of the British to demand possession of the artillery was based on a disputed interpretation of the treaty,2 to allow the British to outfit their expeditionary force at New Orleans, and to coöperate in conciliating the Indians in the lower Mississippi Valley—all these facts would seem to indicate a generous and conciliatory spirit.

Having been advised that the most convenient period of the year for a successful ascent of the river began about January 20,5 it was determined to have a force in readi

1 Farmar to the secretary at war, January 24, 1764, printed in Rowland, Mississippi Provincial Archives: English Dominion, 1: 8.

2 Kerlérec to Farmar, October 2, 1763, post, 36; Robertson to Dabbadie, December 5, 1763, post, 205; Dabbadie to Robertson, December 7, 1763, post, 58; Dabbadie to the minister of marine and colonies, January 10, 1764, post, 207.

Dabbadie's journal, post, 167-169; Report from Robertson, March 8, 1764, post, 217; Details of what happened in Louisiana at the time of the occupation of the Illinois, post, 226; Gage to Halifax, April 14, 1764, post, 240; Neyon de Villiers to Loftus, April 20, 1764, post, 244.

4 Dabbadie's journal, post, 173, 175; Kerlérec to Farmar, October 2, 1763, post, 37; Neyon de Villiers to Dabbadie, December 1, 1763, post, 50; Dabbadie to minister of marine and colonies, January 15, 1764, post, 214; Aubry to the minister, January 15, 1764, post, 214; Details of what happened in Louisiana, post, 225. 5 Report from Robertson, March 8, 1764, post, 217.