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ATTEMPT TO REACH THE ILLINOIS.

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Aubry, the commandant of the troops, and an officer named Foucault went surety for the performance of the contract. Loftus did not arrive until the 7th of February, at which date. not one boat was finished, or indeed any preparation made, although the completion of the contract had been due eighteen days previously. D'Abbadie apologized for the dilatoriness of the contractor, ascribing the badness of the weather as its cause, and with the view of shewing his desire of aiding Loftus, ordered a few men to assist at the boats. They worked so slowly that Loftus employed the soldiers of his own detachment who were carpenters and smiths. What Loftus especially desired was to obtain pilots and Indian interpreters, no one of the detachment having any knowledge of the river, or of the disposition of the Indians to be met in the ascent. After the protestations of d'Abbadie, Loftus applied for his help in procuring them, but he could never obtain a positive answer: a course of conduct the more embarrassing, as none of the French would accept any position in the expedition without the governor's approval. This passive opposition was everywhere apparent. On one occasion Loftus had agreed with an inhabitant of New Orleans to bring a boat from the bayou of St. John's to the Mississippi by land; d'Abbadie refused permission on the frivolous ground that he had not been previously consulted. On another occasion a M. Lagauterais, an officer on half pay, had agreed with colonel Robertson to accompany the expedition. Loftus gave him money in anticipation of his service: but a few days before the expedition started Lagauterais returned the money, on the plea that it would injure him if d'Abbadie knew of his engagement. D'Abbadie proposed sending an officer, M. Boirand, with Loftus to the last habitation at point Coupé. The theory of his presence was to prevent the inhabitants imposing upon Loftus; but he was of no benefit. D'Abbadie offered a place for a British officer in a boat he was sending to the Illinois. The offer was accepted, but in a day or two afterwards, d'Abbadie informed Loftus that he could not be answerable for his safety, so great was

the aversion of the savages to the English. In a short time Loftus formed the opinion, that d'Abbadie was really placing every obstacle in the way of his ascent. During this time, the French governor was sending up the river among the Indians the most infamous and unjust character of the English, and of Loftus in particular, as one from whom they could expect neither justice nor mercy; giving a most false and defamatory account of the government of Mobile under Farmer. The consequence was, that when Loftus started on the 27th of February, he did so without pilot or interpreter. In the passage up, two Indians offered their services. Boirand, the officer sent by d'Abbadie, said he knew one of them, and warned Loftus that he was a sharp fellow, of whom it was necessary to be careful, but did not object to him as a slave. No exception was made to this man when passing by the French settlements; but on their arrival at point Coupé, the commandant saw fit to order his arrest, without giving notice. to Loftus. Loftus accordingly sent Boirand to point out that no one had the right to seize a man in his boats, who was under the protection of his flag, the navigation being free to both nations Boirand returned with the reply that the man was a slave. Loftus complained that he had not been previously told of the fact, upon which Boirand undertook to bring up several witnesses to prove the man's character. Nevertheless, those who came forward declared him to be no slave; accordingly he was surrendered, but at the last habitation he was privately seized and sent to New Orleans.

The expedition proceeded up the river, when on the 20th of March they were attacked and forced to retire. On their return, Loftus sent captain Thorn to ask permission to occupy their old camp. No objection was made to this course: d'Abbadie congratulated Thorn on what had taken place, telling him if he had reached Natchez he would have been destroyed, for five hundred Indians were in waiting there to attack the party. The day after the arrival of Loftus, several canoes full of Indians came to New Orleans. They were received "very graciously" by d'Abbadie, and Loftus learned

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INTRIGUES OF D'ABBADIE.

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immediately that they were the very Indians who had attacked him. The following day an officer named Clouet called on Loftus to present d'Abbadie's compliments, and to ask if he could be of any service. Loftus said he was exceedingly thankful, but he must express his surprise at d'Abbadie giving his countenance to the Indians, who had fired upon his detachment and killed his men. Clouet did not deny their presence; all he could say was that d'Abbadie had given them no presents, and that he could not punish them, as to do so would endanger the safety of their own people. Loftus pointed out that these Indians were almost French and were living among the population, and that it was difficult to suppose that they would have taken the steps they had done, without d'Abbadie's knowledge and approval. Clouet declared that the governor was ignorant of the whole affair, and that it had entirely proceeded from love to the French and hatred to the English, and he added, so long as there was a French government at New Orleans, the British would never get possession of the Illinois by the Mississippi. "I had no further transaction with Mr. d'Abbadie," adds Loftus, and he proceeds to point out that all the assistance he received was the presence of a few artificers, ordered away before the work was finished, and that there were numbers of pilots and interpreters in the town, but none were furnished him. Loftus had reason to think that d'Abbadie prevented Lagauterais joining the expedition, from the knowledge that he would be of much use. He believed that the attack upon him was even directed by Frenchmen, two of the number being officers on half pay, the others being volunteers. Every one in New Orleans expected that the party would be attacked, and one of the citizens told the officers that they would be back sooner than they expected. D'Abbadie had sneeringly said, that the expedition had been stopped by thirty men. Loftus declares that there were five times that number, yet he added, "thirty were sufficient to make us retire in the circumstance we were in, for we had not men enough to man our oars, and had we laid any of them aside

to use our arms, the boats would have gone down the stream;" and he could not have attacked the savages on shore unless they had been willing to fight. While confidently expressing M. d'Abbadie's knowledge of the attack upon him, Loftus proceeds to say that he "has very interesting [sic] motives for preventing us taking possession of the Illinois as long as he can; and that is a most beneficial trade he carries on to that place, which brings him in four-score thousand crowns a year, which would be entirely lost on our taking possession of that post." Loftus accompanied his paper by documentary evidence; one of these papers positively affirmed that the attacking party was headed by six Frenchmen who gave powder and ball to the Indians. All the officers accompanying the expedition, in a document signed by them, declared that major Loftus' statement was true in every particular.

1764]

BRADSTREET'S COLUMN.

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CHAPTER VI.

By the middle of March, 1764, the column placed under the command of Bradstreet was organized and fit for service. It was destined to ascend the lakes from Niagara to place. reinforcements in Detroit, and after chastising the tribes on the southern shore of lake Erie westward, descend from Sandusky to the country of the Delawares and Shawanees, and co-operate with Bouquet. It consisted of the 17th regiment, completed by drafts from the 55th to its full strength, four companies of the 80th, and a strong accession of provincial troops, viz., 500 from New York, 500 from Connecticut and New Jersey, and a contingent of 300 from Canada, 50 of the Royal Artillery, and ten pieces of light ordnance, the whole forming a corps of 2,000 men. To the remaining companies. of the 55th the duty was assigned of keeping open the communications west of Albany, the main forts only being strongly garrisoned. Forts Schuyler, Onondaga, Stillwater, and Saratoga, were left with a few men only in charge.

It had been long considered that the presence of French Canadians in the field with British troops, would have great influence both on the settlers of Detroit and the Indians on the lakes. The reports constantly spread by the French. traders, that war was going on in Canada with the promise of a powerful flotilla to appear on the lakes, and a strong corps d'armée to enter Canada from the Ohio, had had great influence in maintaining the disaffection. Gladwin had from the commencement maintained, that the appearance of French Canadians on the British side would go far to destroy the illusions which were entertained. Thus their enlistment had been suggested on political grounds, independently of the additional strength of the contingent. When it was resolved to carry out this policy, Murray confidently expressed the