heart faileth: but God is the strength of my heart, and my of exercising them depends. "I am fearfully and wonderfully portion for ever. Like as the hart desireth the water-brooks, made: marvellous are thy works, and that my soul knoweth so longeth my soul after thee, O God. My soul is athirst for right well." Our own nature, and the objects we are surGod, yea, even for the living God: when shall I come to ap- rounded with, serve to raise our curiosity; but we are quite pear before him? How excellent is thy loving kindness, O out of a condition of satisfying it. Every secret which is disGod! and the children of men shall put their trust under the closed, every discovery which is made, every new effect which shadow of thy wings. They shall be satisfied with the plen- is brought to view, serves to convince us of numberless more teousness of thy house and thou shalt give them drink of which remain concealed, and which we had before no susthy pleasures, as out of the river. For with thee is the well picion of. And what if we were acquainted with the whole of life and in thy light shall we see light. Blessed is the creation, in the same way and as thoroughly as we are with man whom thou choosest, and receivest unto thee: he shall any single object in it? What would all this natural knowledge dwell in thy court, and shall be satisfied with the pleasures amount to? It must be a low curiosity indeed which such of thy house, even of thy holy temple. Blessed is the people, superficial knowledge could satisfy. On the contrary, would O Lord, that can rejoice in thee: they shall walk in the light it not serve to convince us of our ignorance still; and to raise of thy countenance. Their delight shall be daily in thy name, our desire of knowing the nature of things themselves, the and in thy righteousness shall they make their boast. For author, the cause, and the end of them? thou art the glory of their strength: and in thy loving kind- As to the government of the world: though from considness they shall be exalted. As for me, I will behold thy pre-eration of the final causes which come within our knowsence in righteousness: and when I awake up after thy like-ledge; of characters, personal merit and demerit; of the faness, I shall be satisfied with it. Thou shalt show me the vour and disapprobation, which respectively are due and bepath of life; in thy presence is the fulness of joy, and at thy long to the righteous and the wicked, and which therefore right hand there is pleasure for evermore."

SERMON XV.

UPON THE IGNORANCE OF MAN.

When I applied mine heart to know wisdom, and to see the business that is done upon the earth: then I beheld all the work of God, that a man cannot find out the work that is done under the sun: because though a man labour to seek it out, yet he shall not find it; yea further, though a wise man think to know it, yet shall he not be able to find it.-Eccles. viii. 16, 17.

must necessarily be in a mind which sees things as they really are; though, I say, from hence we may know somewhat concerning the designs of Providence in the government of the world, enough to enforce upon us religion and the practice of virtue: yet, since the monarchy of the universe is a dominion unlimited in extent, and everlasting in duration; the general system of it must necessarily be quite beyond our comprehension. And, since there appears such a subordination and reference of the several parts to each other, as to constitute it properly one administration or government; we cannot have a thorough knowledge of any part, without knowing the whole. This surely should convince us, that we are much less competent judges of the very small part which comes under our notice in this world, than we are apt to imagine. "No heart can think upon these things worthily: and who is able to conceive his way? It is a tempest which no man can see: for the most part of his works are hid. Who can The writings of Solomon are very much taken up with re- declare the works of his justice? for his covenant is afar off, flections upon human nature and human life; to which he and the trial of all things is in the end :" i. e. The dealings of hath added, in this book, reflections upon the constitution God with the children of men are not yet completed, and canof things. And it is not improbable, that the little satisfac- not be judged of by that part which is before us. tion and the great difficulties he met with in his researches a man cannot say, This is worse than that: for in time they into the general constitution of nature, might be the occasion shall be well approved. Thy faithfulness, O Lord, reacheth of his confining himself, so much as he hath done, to life and unto the clouds: thy righteousness standeth like the strong conduct. However, upon that joint review he expresses mountains: thy judgments are like the great deep. He hath great ignorance of the works of God, and the method of his made every thing beautiful in his time: also he hath set the providence in the government of the world; great labour and world in their heart; so that no man can find out the work weariness in the search and observation he had employed that God maketh from the beginning to the end." And thus himself about; and great disappointment, pain, and even St. Paul concludes a long argument upon the various dispenvexation of mind, upon that which he had remarked of the sations of Providence: "O the depth of the riches, both of the appearances of things, and of what was going forward upon wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his this earth. This whole review and inspection, and the result judgments, and his ways past finding out! For who hath of it, sorrow, perplexity, a sense of his necessary ignorance, known the mind of the Lord ?"

"So that

suggests various reflections to his mind. But, notwithstand- Thus the scheme of Providence, the ways and works of ing all this ignorance and dissatisfaction, there is somewhat God, are too vast, of too large extent for our capacities. There upon which he assuredly rests and depends; somewhat, which is, as I may speak, such an expense of power, and wisdom, is the conclusion of the whole matter, and the only concern and goodness, in the formation and government of the world, of man. Following this his method and train of reflection, as is too much for us to take in, or comprehend. Power, and let us consider, wisdom, and goodness, are manifest to us in all those works of God, which come within our view: but there are likewise of the creation; no part of which can be thoroughly underinfinite stores of each poured forth throughout the immensity stood, without taking in its reference and respect to the whole: and this is what we have not faculties for.

I. The assertion of the text, the ignorance of man; that the wisest and most knowing cannot comprehend the ways

and works of God: and then,

II. What are the just consequences of this observation and knowledge of our own ignorance, and the reflections which

it leads us to.

And as the works of God, and his scheme of government, I. The wisest and most knowing cannot comprehend the are above our capacities thoroughly to comprehend: so there works of God, the methods and designs of his providence in possibly may be reasons which originally made it fit that the creation and government of the world. many things should be concealed from us, which we have Creation is absolutely and entirely out of our depth, and perhaps natural capacities of understanding; many things beyond the extent of our utmost reach. And yet it is as concerning the designs, methods, and ends of divine Provicertain that God made the world, as it is certain that effects dence in the government of the world. There is no manner must have a cause. It is indeed in general no more than ef- of absurdity in supposing a veil on purpose drawn over some fects, that the most knowing are acquainted with: for as to scenes of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, the sight of causes, they are as entirely in the dark as the most ignorant. which might some way or other strike us too strongly; or What are the laws by which matter acts upon matter, but cer- that better ends are designed and served by their being contain effects; which some, having observed to be frequently cealed, than could be by their being exposed to our knowrepeated, have reduced to general rules? The real nature and ledge. The Almighty may cast clouds and darkness round essence of beings likewise is what we are altogether ignorant about him, for reasons and purposes of which we have not the of. All these things are so entirely out of our reach, that least glimpse or conception.

we have not the least glimpse of them. And we know little However, it is surely reasonable, and what might have been more of ourselves, than we do of the world about us: how expected, that creatures in some stage of their being, suppose we were made, how our being is continued and preserved, in the infancy of it, should be placed in a state of discipline what the faculties of our minds are, and upon what the power and improvement, where their patience and submission is to

VOL. II.-3 S

be tried by afflictions, where temptations are to be resisted, afford him, becanse it was not the sun itself! If the make and difficulties gone through in the discharge of their duty. and constitution of man, the circumstances he is placed in, or Now if the greatest pleasures and pains of the present life the reason of things affords the least hint or intimation, that may be overcome and suspended, as they manifestly may, virtue is the law he is born under: scepticism itself should by hope and fear, and other passions and affections; then the lead him to the most strict and inviolable practice of it; that evidence of religion, and the sense of the consequences of vir- he may not make the dreadful experiment, of leaving the tue and vice, might have been such, as entirely in all cases course of life marked out for him by nature, whatever that to prevail over those afflictions, difficulties, and tempta- nature be, and entering paths of his own, of which he can tions; prevail over them so, as to render them adsolutely know neither the dangers nor the end. For though no dannone at all. But the very notion itself now mentioned, of a ger be seen, yet darkness, ignorance, and blindness are no state of discipline and improvement, necessarily excludes such manner of security.

sensible evidence and conviction of religion, and of the conse- Secondly, Our ignorance is the proper answer to many quences of virtue and vice. Religion consists in submission things, which are called objections against religion; particuand resignation to the divine will. Our condition in this larly, to those which arise from the appearances of evil and world is a school of exercise for his temper: and our igno- irregularity in the constitution of nature and the government rance, the shallowness of our reason, the temptations, difficul- of the world. In all other cases it is thought necessary to be ties, afflictions, which we are exposed to, all equally contri- thoroughly acquainted with the whole of a scheme, even one bute to make it so. The general observation may be carried of so narrow a compass as those which are formed by men, on; and whoever will attend to the thing will plainly see, that in order to judge of the goodness or badness of it: and the less sensible evidence, with less difficulty in practice, is the most slight and superficial view of any human contrivance same, as more sensible evidence, with greater difficulty in prac- comes abundantly nearer to a thorough knowledge of it, than tice. Therefore difficulties in speculation as much come into that part, which we know of the government of the world, the notion of a state of discipline, as difficulties in practice: does to the general scheme and system of it; to the whole set and so the same reason or account is to be given of both. Thus, of laws by which it is governed. From our ignorance of the though it is indeed absurd to talk of the greater merit of assent, constitution of things, and the scheme of Providence in the upon little or no evidence, than upon demonstration; yet the government of the world; from the reference the several parts strict discharge of our duty, with less sensible evidence, does have to each other, and to the whole; and from our not being imply in it a better character, than the same diligence in the able to see the end and the whole; it follows, that however discharge of it upon more sensible evidence. This fully ac- perfect things are, they must even necessarily appear to us counts for and explains that assertion of our Saviour, Blessed otherwise less perfect than they are.* are they that have not seen, and yet have believed; have become Thirdly, Since the constitution of nature, and the methods Christians and obeyed the gospel, upon less sensible evi- and designs of Providence in the government of the world, dence, than that which Thomas, to whom he is speaking, in- are above our comprehension, we should acquiesce in, and sisted upon. rest satisfied with, our ignorance, turn our thoughts from that But after all, the same account is to be given, why we which is above and beyond us, and, apply ourselves to that were placed in these circumstances of ignorance, as why which is level to our capacities, and which is our real businature has not furnished us with wings; namely, that we ness and concern. Knowledge is not our proper happiness. were designed to be inhabitants of this earth. I am afraid Whoever will in the least attend to the thing will see, that it we think too highly of ourselves; of our rank in the creation, is the gaining, not the having of it, which is the entertainand of what is due to us. What sphere of action, what bu- ment of the mind. Indeed, if the proper happiness of man siness is assigned to man, that he has not capacities and consisted in knowledge considered as a possession or treasure, knowledge fully equal to? It is manifest he has reason, and men who are possessed of the largest share would have a knowledge, and faculties superior to the business of the pre- very ill time of it; as they would be infinitely more sensible sent world faculties which appear superfluous, if we do not than others of their poverty in this respect. Thus he who take in the respect which they have to somewhat further, and increases knowledge would eminently increase sorrow." Men beyond it. If to acquire knowledge were our proper end, of deep research and curious inquiry should just be put in we should indeed be but poorly provided: but if somewhat mind, not to mistake what they are doing. If their discoveelse be our business and duty, we may, notwithstanding our ries serve the cause of virtue and religion, in the way of ignorance, be well enough furnished for it; and the observa-proof, motive to practice, or assistance in it; or if they tend tion of our ignorance may be of assistance to us in the dis- to render life less unhappy, and promote its satisfactions; charge of it. then they are most usefully employed: but bringing things to light, alone and of itself, is of no manner of use, any otherwise than as entertainment or diversion. Neither is this at First, We may learn from it, with what temper of mind a Suppose some very complicated piece of work, some system or man ought to inquire into the subject of religion; namely, constitution, formed for some general end, to which each of the parts with expectation of finding difficulties, and with a disposition tution would consist in the reference and respect, which the several had a reference. The perfection or justness of this work or constito take up and rest satisfied with any evidence whatever, parts have to the general design. This reference of parts to the general design may be infinitely various, both in degree and kind. Thus He should beforehand expect things mysterious, and such one part may only contribute and be subservient to another: this to as he will not be able thoroughly to comprehend, or go to the third; and so on through a long series, the last part of which alone bottom of. To expect a distinct comprehensive view of the may contribute immediately and directly to the general design. Or whole subject, clear of difficulties and objections, is to forget a part may have this distant reference to the general design, and may our nature and condition; neither of which admit of such sign or end, for which the complicated frame of nature was brought also contribute immediately to it. For instance: if the general deknowledge, with respect to any science whatever. And to into being, is happiness; whatever affords present satisfaction, and inquire with this expectation, is not to inquire as a man, but likewise tends to carry on the course of things, hath this double resas one of another order of creatures. pect to the general design. Now suppose a spectator of that work Due sense of the general ignorance of man would also be- or constitution was in a great measure ignorant of such various referget in us a disposition to take up and rest satisfied with any slight and partial view which he had of the work, several things apence to the general end, whatever that end be; and that, upon a very evidence whatever, which is real. I mention this as the con-peared to his eye disproportionate and wrong; others, just and beautrary to a disposition, of which there are not wanting instan- tiful; what would he gather from these appearances? He would imces, to find fault with and reject evidence, because it is not mediately conclude there was a probability, if he could see the whole such as was desired. If a man were to walk by twilight, reference of the parts appearing wrong to the general design, that must he not follow his eyes as much as if it were broad day this would destroy the appearance of wrongness and disproportion: and clear sunshine? Or if he were obliged to take a journey but there is no probability, that the reference would destroy the parby night, would he not "give heed to any light shining in the ticular right appearances, though that reference might show the things darkness, till the day should break and the day-star arise?", already appearing just, to be so likewise in a higher degree or another manner. There is a probability, that the right appearances It would not be altogether unnatural for him to reflect how were intended: there is no probability, that the wrong appearances much better it were to have day-light; he might perhaps have were. We cannot suspect irregularity and disorder to be designed. great curiosity to see the country round about him; he might The pillars of a building appear beautiful; but their being likewise lament that the darkness concealed many extended prospects its support does not destroy that beauty: there still remains a reason from his eyes, and wish for the sun to draw away the veil:to believe that the architect intended the beautiful appearance, after but how ridiculous would it be to reject with scorn and dis- for a man of himself to think thus, upon the first piece of architecwe have found out the reference, support. It would be reasonable dain the guidance and direction which that lesser light might ture he ever saw.

II. Let us then consider, what are the consequences of this knowledge and observation of our own ignorance, and the reflection it leads us to.

which is real.

a

all amiss, if it does not take up the time which should be em-lightly by ourselves: that we form our temper to an implicit ployed in better work. But it is evident that there is another submission to the divine Majesty; beget within ourselves an mark set up for us to aim at; another end appointed us to absolute resignation to all the methods of his providence, in direct our lives to: another end, which the most knowing may his dealings with the children of men: that, in the deepest fail of, and the most ignorant arrive at. "The secret things humility of our souls, we prostrate ourselves before him, and belong unto the Lord our God; but those things which are join in that celestial song; "Great and marvellous are thy revealed belong unto us, and to our children forever, that we works, Lord God Almighty! just and true are thy ways, thou may do all the words of this law. Which reflection of Mo-King of saints! Who shall not fear thee, O Lord, and glorify ses, put in general terms, is, that the only knowledge, which thy name?"

CORRESPONDENCE

BETWEEN

DR. BUTLER AND DR. CLARKE.

THE FIRST LETTER.

is of any avail to us, is that which teaches us our duty, or assists us in the discharge of it. The economy of the universe, the course of nature, almighty power exerted in the creation and government of the world, is out of our reach. What would be the consequence, if we could really get an insight into these things, is very uncertain; whether it would assist us in, or divert us from, what we have to do in this present state. If then there be a sphere of knowledge, of contemplation and employment, level to our capacities, and of the utmost importance to us; we ought surely to apply ourselves with all diligence to this our proper business, and esteem every thing else nothing, nothing as to us, in comparison of it. Thus Job, discoursing of natural knowledge, how much it is above us, and of wisdom in general, says, "God understandeth the way thereof, and he knoweth the Reverened Sir, I suppose you will wonder at the present place thereof. And unto man he said, Behold, the fear of the trouble from one who is a perfect stranger to you, though you Lord, that is wisdom, and to depart from evil is understand-are not so to him; but I hope the occasion will excuse my ing. Other orders of creatures may perhaps be let into the boldness. I have made it, Sir, my business, ever since I secret counsels of heaven; and have the designs and methods thought myself capable of such sort of reasoning, to prove to of Providence, in the creation and government of the world, myself the being and attributes of God. And being sensible communicated to them: but this does not belong to our rank that it is a matter of the last consequence, I endeavoured after or condition. "The fear of the Lord, and to depart from a demonstrative proof; not only more fully to satisfy my own evil," is the only wisdom which man should aspire after, as mind, but also in order to defend the great truths of natural his work and business. The same is said, and with the same religion, and those of the Christian revelation which follow connexion and context, in the conclusion of the book of Ec- from them, against all opposers: but must own with concern, clesiastes. Our ignorance, and the little we can know of that hitherto I have been unsuccessful; and though I have other things, affords a reason why we should not perplex got very probable arguments, yet I can go but a very little ourselves about them; but no way invalidates that which is way with demonstration in the proof of those things. When the conclusion of the whole matter, "Fear God, and keep his first your book on those subjects (which by all, whom I have commandments; for this is the whole concern of man." So discoursed with, is so justly esteemed) was recommended to that Socrates was not the first who endeavoured to draw men me, I was in great hopes of having all my inquiries answered. off from labouring after, and laying stress upon other know- But since in some places, either through my not understandledge, in comparison of that which related to morals. Our ing your meaning, or what else I know not, even that has province is virtue and religion, life and manners; the science failed me, I almost despair of ever arriving to such a satisfacof improving the temper, and making the heart better. This tion as I aim at, unless by the method I now use. You is the field assigned us to cultivate: how much it has lain cannot but know, sir, that of two different expressions of the neglected is indeed astonishing. Virtue is demonstrably the same thing, though equally clear to some persons, yet to happiness of man: it consists in good actions, proceeding others one of them is sometimes very obscure, though the from a good principle, temper, or heart. Overt-acts are en- other be perfectly intelligible. Perhaps this may be my case tirely in our power. What remains is, that we learn to keep here; and could I see those of your arguments, of which I our heart; to govern and regulate our passions, mind, affec-doubt, differently proposed, possibly I might yield a ready tions: that so we may be free from the impotencies of fear, assent to them. This, sir, I cannot but think a sufficient envy, malice, covetousness, ambition; that we may be clear excuse for the present trouble; it being such a one as I hope of these, considered as vices seated in the heart, considered may prevail for an answer, with one who seems to aim at as constituting a general wrong temper; from which general nothing more than that good work of instructing others. wrong frame of mind, all the mistaken pursuits, and far the In your Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of greatest part of the unhappiness of life, proceed. He, who God, Prop. VI. [edit. 2d. p. 69, 70.] you propose to prove should find out one rule to assist us in this work, would de- the infinity or omnipresence of the self-existent Being. The serve infinitely better of mankind, than all the improvers of former part of the proof seems highly probable; but the other knowledge put together. latter part, which seems to aim at demonstration, is not to me

Lastly, Let us adore that infinite wisdom and power, and convincing. The latter part of the paragraph is, if I mistake goodness, which is above our comprehension. "To whom not, an entire argument of itself, which runs thus: "To hath the root of wisdom been revealed? Or who hath known suppose a finite being to be self-existent, is to say that it is a her wise counsels? There is one wise and greatly to be contradiction for that being not to exist, the absence of which feared; the Lord sitting upon his throne. He created her, may yet be conceived without a contradiction; which is the and saw her, and numbered her, and poured her out upon all greatest absurdity in the world." The sense of these words his works." If it be thought a considerable thing to be ac-("the absence of which") seems plainly to be determined by quainted with a few, a very few, of the effects of infinite the following sentence, to mean its absence from any parpower and wisdom; the situation, bigness, and revolution of ticular place. Which sentence is to prove it to be an absurdsome of the heavenly bodies; what sentiments should our ity; and is this: "For if a being can, without a contradiction, minds be filled with concerning Him, who appointed to each be absent from one place, it may, without a contradiction, be its place and measure and sphere of motion, all which are absent from another place, and from all places." Now supkept with the most uniform constancy! "Who stretched out posing this to be a consequence, all that it proves is, that if the heavens, and telleth the number of the stars, and calleth a being can, without a contradiction, be absent from one place them all by their names. Who laid the foundations of the at one time, it may, without a contradiction, be absent from earth, who comprehendeth the dust of it in a measure, and another place, and so from all places, at different times; (for weigheth the mountains in scales, and the hills in a balance." I cannot see, that if a being can be absent from one place at And, when we have recounted all the appearances which one time, therefore it may, without a contradiction, be absent come within our view, we must add, "Lo, these are part of from all places at the same time, i. e. may cease to exist.) his ways: but how little a portion is heard of him! Canst Now, if it proves no more than this, I cannot see that it thou by searching, find out God? Canst thou find out the reduces the supposition to any absurdity. Suppose I could Almighty unto perfection? It is as high as heaven; what demonstrate, that any particular man should live a thousand canst thou do? deeper than hell; what canst thou know?" years; this man might, without a contradiction, be absent The conclusion is, that in all lowliness of mind we set from one and from all places at different times; but it would

not from thence follow, that he might be absent from all places at the same time, i. e. that he might cease to exist. No; this would be a contradiction, because I am supposed to have demonstrated that he should live a thousand years. It would be exactly the same, if, instead of a thousand years, I should say, for ever; and the proof seems the same, whether it be applied to a self-existent or a dependent being.

THE ANSWER TO THE FIRST LETTER."

Sir,-Did men who publish controversial papers accustom themselves to write with that candour and ingenuity, with which you propose your difficulties, I am persuaded almost all disputes might be very amicably terminated, either by What else I have to offer is in relation to your proof, that men's coming at last to agree in opinion, or at least finding the self-existent being must of necessity be but one. Which reason to suffer each other friendly to differ. proof is as follows, in Prop. VII. (edit. 2d. p. 74.) "To Your two objections are very ingenious, and urged with suppose two or more different natures existing of themselves, great strength and acuteness. Yet I am not without hopes necessarily, and independent from each other, implies this of being able to give you satisfaction in both of them. To plain contradiction; that, each of them being independent your first, therefore, I answer: Whatever may, without a from the other, they may either of them be supposed to exist contradiction, be absent from any one place, at any one time, alone; so that it will be no contradiction to imagine the other may also, without a contradiction, be absent from all places not to exist, and consequently neither of them will be neces- at all times. For, whatever is absolutely necessary at all, is sarily existing." The supposition indeed implies, that since absolutely necessary in every part of space, and in every each of these beings is independent from the other, they may point of duration. Whatever can at any time be conceived either of them exist alone, i. e. without any relation to, or possible to be absent from any one part of space, may for the dependence on, the other: but where is the third idea, to same reason (viz. the implying no contradiction in the nature connect this proposition and the following one, viz. "so that of things) be conceived possible to be absent from every other it will be no contradiction to imagine the other not to exist?" part of space at the same time; either by ceasing to be, or Were this a consequence of the former proposition, I allow by supposing it never to have begun to be. Your instance it would be demonstration, by the first corollary of Prop. III. about demonstrating a man to live a thousand years, is what, (2d edit. p. 26.) but since these two propositions, ("they may I think, led you into the mistake; and is a good instance to either of them be supposed to exist alone,") and, (" so that it lead you out of it again. You may suppose a man shall live will be no contradiction to imagine the other not to exist,") a thousand years, or God may reveal and promise he shall are very widely different; since likewise it is no immediate live a thousand years; and upon that supposition, it shall consequence, that because either may be supposed to exist not be possible for the man to be absent from all places in independent from the other, therefore the other may be sup- any part of that time. Very true: but why shall it not be posed not to exist at all; how is what was proposed, proved? possible? only because it is contrary to the supposition, or That the propositions are different, I think is plain; and to the promise of God; but not contrary to the absolute nawhether there be an immediate connexion, every body that ture of things; which would be the case, if the man existed reads your book must judge for themselves. I must say, for necessarily, as every part of space does. In supposing you my own part, the absurdity does not appear at first sight, any could demonstrate, a man should live a thousand years, or one more than the absurdity of saying that the angels below the year; you make an impossible and contradictory supposition. base in an isosceles triangle are unequal; which though it For though you may know certainly (by revelation suppose) is absolutely false, yet I suppose no one will lay down the that he will live so long; yet this is only the certainty of a contrary for an axiom; because, though it is true, yet there thing true in fact, not in itself necessary: and demonstration is need of a proof to make it appear so. is applicable to nothing but what is necessary in itself, neces

Perhaps it may be answered, that I have not rightly ex-sary in all places and at all times equally. plained the words, "to exist alone;" and that they do not To your second difficulty, I answer: What exists necessamean only, to exist independent from the other; but that rily, not only must so exist alone, as to be independent of "existing alone" means that nothing exists with it. Whether any thing else; but (being self-sufficient) may also so exist this or the other was meant, I cannot determine: but, which alone, as that every thing else may possibly (or without any ever it was, what I have said will hold. For if this last be contradiction in the nature of things) be supposed not to exist the sense of those words, ("they either of them may be sup- at all: and consequently (since that which may possibly be posed to exist alone;") it indeed implies that it will be no supposed not to exist at all, is not necessarily existent), no other contradiction to suppose the other not to exist: but then I thing can be necessarily existent. Whatever is necessarily ask, how come these two propositions to be connected; that, existing, there is need of its existence in order to the supto suppose two different natures existing of themselves neces-posal of the existence of any other thing; so that nothing can sarily and independent from each other, implies that each of possibly be supposed to exist, without presupposing and inthem may be supposed to exist alone in this sense? Which cluding antecedently the existence of that which is necessary. is exactly the same as I said before, only applied to different For instance; the supposal of the existence of any thing sentences. So that if "existing alone" be understood as I whatever includes necessarily a presupposition of the exist first took it, I allow it is implied in the supposition; but ence of space and time; and if any thing could exist without cannot see that the consequence is, that it will be no contra-space or time, it would follow that space and time were not diction to suppose the other not to exist. But if the words, necessarily existing. Therefore, the supposing any thing "existing alone," are meant in the latter sense, I grant, that possibly to exist alone, so as not necessarily to include the if either of them be supposed thus to exist alone, it will be presupposal of some other thing, proves demonstrably that no contradiction to suppose the other not to exist: but then that other thing is not necessarily existing; because, whatI cannot see, that to suppose two different natures existing, ever has necessity of existence cannot possibly, in any conof themselves, necessarily and independent from each other, ception whatsoever, be supposed away. There cannot possiimplies that either of them may be supposed to exist alone bly be any notion of the existence of any thing, there cannot in this sense of the words; but only, that either of them may possibly be any notion of existence at all, but what shall be supposed to exist without having any relation to the other, necessarily preinclude the notion of that which has necessary and that there will be no need of the existence of the one in existence. And consequently the two propositions, which you order to the existence of the other. But though upon this judged independent, are really necessarily connected. These account, were there no other principle of its existence, it sorts of things are indeed very difficult to express, and not might cease to exist; yet on the account of the necessity of easy to be conceived but by very attentive minds: but to such its own nature, which is quite distinct from the other, it is an as can and will attend, nothing, I think, is more demonstraabsolute absurdity to suppose it not to exist. bly convictive.

Nov. 10, 1713.

S. C.

Thus, sir, I have proposed my doubts, with the reasons of If any thing still sticks with you in this or any other part them. In which if I have wrested your words to another of my books, I shall be very willing to be informed of it; sense than you designed them, or in any respect argued un- who am, sir, your assured friend and servant, fairly, I assure you it was without design. So I hope you will impute it to mistake. And, if it will not be too great a trouble, let me once more beg the favour of a line from you, by which you will lay me under a particular obligation to be, what, with the rest of the world, I now am,

Reverend Sir, your most obliged servant, &c. Nov. 4, 1713.

second general proposition; as if the words ["some oue P. S. Many readers, I observe, have misunderstood my unchangeable and independent being,"] meant [one onlybeing;] whereas the true meaning, and all that the argument there requires, is, [some one at least.] That there can be

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN DR. BUTLER AND DR. CLARKE.

541

but one, is the thing proved afterwards in the seventh pro- other things: I think this is plainly begging the question; position.

THE SECOND LETTER.

for it supposes that there is no other being exists, but what is casual, and so not necessary. And on what other account, or in what other manner than one of these two, there can be need of the existence of a necessary being in order to the existence of any thing else, I cannot conceive.

Thus, sir, you see I entirely agree with you in all the consee the truth of the suppositions themselves. sequences you have drawn from your suppositions, but cannot

Reverend Sir, I have often thought that the chief occasions of men's differing so much in their opinions, were, either their not understanding each other; or else, that, inI have aimed at nothing in my style, but only to be intellistead of ingeniously searching after truth, they have made it gible; being sensible that it is very difficult (as you observe), their business to find out arguments for the proof of what to express one's self on these sort of subjects, especially for they have once asserted. However, it is certain there may one who is altogether unaccustomed to write upon them. be other reasons for persons not agreeing in their opinions: and where it is so, I cannot but think with you, that they thanks for your trouble in answering my letter, and for your I have nothing at present more to add, but my sincerest will find reason to suffer each other to differ friendly; every professed readiness to be acquainted with any other difficulty man having a way of thinking, in some respects, peculiarly that I may meet with in any of your writings. I am willing to interpret this, as somewhat like a promise of an answer to what I have now written, if there be any thing in it which deserves one. I am, Reverend Sir,

his own.

I am sorry I must tell you, your answers to my objections are not satisfactory. The reasons why I think them not so are as follow:

Nov. 23, 1713.

Your most obliged humble servant.

THE ANSWER TO THE SECOND LETTER.

You say, "Whatever is absolutely necessary at all is absolutely necessary in every part of space, and in every point of duration." Were this evident, it would certainly prove what you bring it for; viz. that "whatever may, without a contradiction, be absent from one place at one time, may also be absent from all places at all times." But I do not conceive, that the idea of ubiquity is contained in the idea of selfexistence, or directly follows from it; any otherwise than as, Sir, It seems to me, that the reason why you do not apwhatever exists must exist somewhere. You add, "Whatever prehend ubiquity to be necessarily connected with self-existcan at any time be conceived possible be absent from any ence, is because, in the order of your ideas, you first conceive one part of space, may for the same reason [viz. the implying a being (a finite being, suppose), and then conceive self-exno contradiction in the nature of things] be conceived possible istence to be a property of that being; as the angles are to be absent from every other part of space, at the same time." properties of a triangle, when a triangle exists; whereas, on Now I cannot see, that I can make these two suppositions the contrary, necessity of existence, not being a property for the same reason, or upon the same account. The reason consequent upon the supposition of the things existing, but why I conceive this being may be absent from one place, is antecedently the cause or ground of that existence; it is evibecause it doth not contradict the former proof [drawn from dent this necessity, being not limited to any antecedent subthe nature of things], in which I proved only that it must ject, as angles are to a triangle; but being itself original, necessarily exist. But the other supposition, viz. that I can absolute, and (in order of nature), antecedent to all existence; conceive it possible to be absent from every part of space at cannot but be every where, for the same reason that it is any one and the same time, directly contradicts the proof that it where. By applying this reasoning to the instance of space, must exist somewhere; and so is an express contradiction. you will find, that by consequence it belongs truly to that Unless it be said, that as, when we have proved the three substance, whereof space is a *property, as duration also is. angles of a triangle equal to two right ones, that relation of What you say about a necessary being existing somewhere, the equality of its angles to two right ones will be wherever supposes it to be finite; and being finite, supposes some cause a triangle exists; so, when we have proved the necessary which determined that such a certain quantity of that being existence of a being, this being must exist every where. But should exist, neither more nor less: and that cause must there is a great difference between these two things: the one either be a voluntary cause; or else such a necessary cause, being the proof of a certain relation, upon supposition of such the quantity of whose power must be determined and limited a being's existence with such particular properties; and con- by some other cause. But in original absolute necessity, sequently, wherever this being and these properties exist, antecedent (in order of nature), to the existence of any thing, this relation must exist too: but from the proof of the neces- nothing of all this can have place; but the necessity is necessary existence of a being, it is no evident consequence that it sarily every where alike.

exists every where. My using the word demonstration, in- Concerning the second difficulty, I answer: That which stead of proof which leaves no room for doubt, was through exists necessarily, is needful to the existence of any other negligence, for I never heard of strict demonstration of matter thing; not considered now as a cause (for that indeed is of fact. begging the question), but as a sine qua non; in the sense as

In your answer to my second difficulty, you say, "What-space is necessary to every thing, and nothing can possibly sover is necessarily existing, there is need of its existence, be conceived to exist, without thereby presupposing space: in order to the supposal of the existence of any other thing." which therefore I apprehend to be a property or mode of the All the consequences you draw from this proposition, I see self-existent substance; and that, by being evidently neces proved demonstrably; and consequently, that the two propo- sary itself, it proves that the substance, of which it is a prositions I thought independent are closely connected. But perty, must also be necessary; necessary both in itself, and how, or upon what account, is there need of the existence of needful to the existence of any thing else whatsoever. Exwhatever is necessarily existing, in order to the existence of tension indeed does not belong to thought, because thought is any other thing? Is it as there is need of space and dura- not a being; but there is need of extension to the existence of tion, in order to the existence of any thing; or is it needful every being, to a being which has or has not thought, or any only as the cause of the existence of all other things? If the other quality whatsoever. I am, Sir, former be said, as your instance seems to intimate: I answer; space and duration are very abstruse in their natures, and, I think, cannot properly be called things, but are considered rather as affections which belong, and in the order of our thoughts are antecedently necessary, to the existence of all things. And I can no more conceive how a necessarily existent being can, on the same account, or in the same manner as space and duration are, be needful in order to the existence

London, Nov. 28, 1713.

Your real friend and servant.

THE THIRD LETTER.

Reverend Sir,-I do not very well understand your mean

of any other being, than I can conceive extension attributed ing, when you say you think, "in the order of my ideas I first to a thought; that idea no more belonging to a thing existing, conceive a being (finite suppose), to exist, and then conceive than extension belongs to thought. But if the latter be said, self-existence to be a property of that being." If you mean that there is need of the existence of whatever is a necessary that I first suppose a finite being to exist I know not why; being, in order to the existence of any other thing; only as this necessary being must be the cause of the existence of all

* Or, mode of existence.