thought he should effect by the ftudy of philofophy, and had not a few no lefs folid than pleasant notions concerning the folly and madness of vice. But he confeffed he had no remorfe for his paft actions as offences against God, but only as injuries to himself and to mankind.

Upon this fubject I fhewed him the defects of philofophy for reforming the world. That it was a matter of fpeculation, which but few either had the leifure or the capacity to enquire into; but the principle that must reform mankind must be obvious to every man's understanding. That philosophy, in matters of morality, beyond the great lines of our duty, had no, very certain fixed 'rule; but, in the lefs offices and inftances of our duty, went much by the fancies of men and cuftoms of nations; and confequently could not have authority enough to bear down the propenfities of nature, appetite, or paffion for which I inftanced in thefe two points; the one was about that maxim of the Stoics, to extirpate all fort of paffion and concern for any thing. That, take it by one hand, feemed defirable, becaufe, if it could be accomplished, it would make all the accidents of life eafy; but I think it cannot, because nature, after all our ftriving against it, will ftill return to itself: yet, on the other hand, it diffolved the bonds of nature and friendship, and flackened induftry, which will move but dully without

an

an inward heat; and, if it delivered a man from any troubles, it deprived him of the chief pleafures of life, which arife from friendship. The other was concerning the reftraint of pleafure, how far that was to go. Upon this he told me the two maxims of his morality then were, that he should do nothing to the hurt of any other, or that might prejudice his own health; and he thought that all pleasure, when it did not interfere with thefe, was to be indulged as the gratification of our natural appetites. It feemed unreasonable to imagine, thefe were put into a man only to be reftrained, or curbed to fuch a narrowness this he applied to the free ufe of wine and

women.

:

To this I answered, that, if appetites being natural was an argument for the indulging them, then the revengeful might as well allege it for murder, and the covetous for ftealing, whofe appetites are no less keen on those objects, and yet it is acknowledged that thefe appetites ought to be curbed. If the difference is urged from the injury that another perfon receives, the injury is as great if a man's wife is defiled or his daughter corrupted; and it is impoffible for a man to let his appetites loose to vagrant lufts, and not to tranfgrefs in these particulars: fo there was no curing the diforders that muft arife from thence but by regulating these appetites. And why fhould we not as well think that God intended our

brutish

brutish and fenfual appetites should be governed by our reafon, as that the fierceness of beasts should be managed and tamed by the wifdom, and for the ufe, of man? So that it is no real abfurdity to grant, that appetites were put into men on purpose to exercife their reason in the reftraint and government of them, which to be able to do ministers a higher and more lafting pleasure to a man than to give them their full scope and range. And, if other rules of philosophy be observed, such as the avoiding those objects that stir paffion, nothing raises higher paffions than ungoverned luft; nothing darkens the understanding and depreffes a man's mind more; nor is any thing managed with more frequent returns of other immoralities, fuch as oaths and imprecations, which are only intended to compass what is defired : the expence, that is neceffary to maintain thefe irregularities, makes a man false in his other dealings. All this he freely confeifed was true: upon which I urged, that, if it was reasonable for a man to regulate his appetite in things which he knew were hurtful to him, was it not as reasonable for God to prefcribe a regulation of thofe appetites whose unreftrained courfe did produce fuch mischievous effects? That it could not be denied, but doing to others. what we would have others do unto us was a juft rule: those men, then, that knew how extreme fenfible they themselves would be of the difhonour of

their

their families, in the cafe of their wives or daughters, muft needs condemn themfelves for doing that which they could not bear from another; and, if the peace of mankind, and the intire fatisfaction of our whole life, ought to be one of the chief measures of our actions, then let all the world judge, whether a man, that confines his appetite, and lives contented at home, is not much happier than those that let their defires run after forbidden objects. The thing being granted to be better in itself, then the question falls between the restraint of appetite, in fome inftances, and the freedom of a man's thoughts, the foundness of his health, his application to affairs, with the easiness of his whole life: whether the one is not to be done before the other? As to the difficulty of fuch a restraint, though it is not easy to be done, when a man allows himself many liberties in which it is not poffible for him to ftop, yet those, who avoid the occafions that may kindle these impure flames, and keep themfelves well employed, find the victory and dominion over them no fuch impoffible or hard matter as may feem at firft view: fo that, though the philofophy and morality of this point were plain, yet there is not strength enough in that principle to fubdue nature and appetite. Upon this I urged, that morality could not be a ftrong thing unless a man were determined by a law within himself; for, if he only measured himself by decen

су,

cy, or the laws of the land, this would teach him only to ufe fuch cautions in his ill practices, that they fhould not break out too vifibly; but would never carry him to an inward and univerfal probity. That virtue was of fo complicated a nature, that, unless a man came intirely within its difcipline, he could not adhere ftedfaftly to any one precept; for vices are often made neceffary supports to one another. That this cannot be done, either steadily or with any fatisfaction, unless the mind does inwardly comply with, and delight in, the dictates of virtue; and that could not be effected, except a man's nature were internally regenerated and changed by a higher principle: till that came about, corrupt nature would be ftrong and philofophy but feeble, efpecially when it ftruggled with fuch appetites or pasfions as were much kindled or deeply rooted in the conftitution of one's body. This, he faid, founded to him like enthusiasm, or canting: he had no notion of it, and fo could not understand it. He comprehended the dictates of reafon and philofophy; in which, as the mind became much converfant, there would foon follow, as he believed, a greater eafinefs in obeying its precepts. I told him, on the other hand, that all his fpeculations of philofophy would not ferve him in any ftead to the reforming of his nature and life, till he applied himfelf to God for inward affiftances. It was certain that the impreffions

made