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made in his reason governed him as they were lively presented to him; but these are fo apt to flip out of our memory, and we fo apt to turn our thoughts from them, and at fome times the contrary impreffions are so strong, that, let a man fet up a reasoning in his mind against them, he finds that celebrated faying of the poet

Video meliora, proboque; deteriora fequor

"I see what is better, and approve it; but follow what is worse"

to be all that philosophy will amount to. Whereas thofe, who upon fuch occafions apply themfelves to God by earnest prayer, feel a difengagement from fuch impreffions, and themselves endued with a power to refift them; fo that those bonds, which formerly held them, fall off.

This, he faid, muft be the effect of a heat in na ture it was only the strong diversion of the thoughts that gave the feeming victory, and he did not doubt, but, if one could turn to a problem in Euclid, or to write a copy of verfes, it would have the fame effect. To this I answered, that, if fuch methods did only divert the thoughts, there might be fome force in what he said but, if they not only drove out fuch inclinations, but begat impreffions contrary to them, and brought men into a new difpofition and habit of mind, then he must confefs there was fomewhat more than a diverfion in these changes, which were brought

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on our minds by true devotion. I added, that reafon and experience were the things that determined our perfuafions that experience without reafon may be thought the delufion of our fancy, fo reason without experience had not fo convincing an operation; but thefe two meeting together, muft needs give a man all the fatisfaction he can defire. He could not say it was unreasonable to believe that the Supreme Being might make fome thoughts ftir in our minds. with more or lefs force as it pleafed; especially, the force of thefe motions being, for the most part, according to the impreffion that was made on our brains, which that power, that directed the whole frame of nature, could make grow deeper as it pleased. It was alfo reasonable to fuppofe God a being of fuch goodness, that he would give his affiftance to fuch as defired it; for, though he might, upon fome greater occafions, in an extraordinary manner turn fome people's minds, yet, fince he had endued man with a faculty of reafon, it is fit that men should employ that as far as they could, and beg his assistance; which certainly they can do. All this feemed reasonable, and at laft probable. Now good men, who felt, upon their frequent applications to God in prayer, a freedom from thofe ill impreffions that formerly fubdued them, and inward love to virtue and true goodness, an eafinefs and delight in all the parts of holiness, which was fed and cherished

cherished in them by a seriousness in prayer, and did languish as that went off, had as real a perception of an inward ftrength in their minds, that did rife and fall with true devotion, as they perceived the ftrength of their bodies increased or abated, according as they had or wanted good nourishment.

After many difcourfes upon this fubject, he still continued to think all was the effect of fancy. He faid that he understood nothing of it, but acknowledged that he thought they were happy whose fancies were under the power of such impreffions, fince they had fomewhat on which their thoughts refted and centered; but, when I faw him in his laft ficknefs, he then told me he had another fenfe of what we had talked concerning prayer and inward affiftances. This fubject led us to difcourfe of God, and of the notion of religion in general. He believed there was a Supreme Being: he could not think the world was made by chance, and the regular courfe of nature seemed to demonftrate the eternal power of its Author. This, he faid, he could never shake off; but when he came to explain his notion of the Deity, he faid he looked on it as a vaft power that wrought every thing by the neceffity of its nature; and thought that God had none of thofe affections of love or hatred which bred perturbation in us, and by confequence he could not fee that there was to be either reward or punishment. He thought our conceptions

ceptions of God were fo low, that we had better not think much of him; and to love God feemed to him a prefumptuous thing, and the heat of fanciful men. Therefore he believed there should be no other religious worship but a general celebration of that Being in fome fhort hymn: all the other parts of worship he efteemed the inventions of priests, to make the world believe they had a fecret of incenfing and appeafing God as they pleafed. In a word, he was neither perfuaded that there was a special providence about human affairs, nor that prayers were of much use, fince that was to look on God as a weak being that would be overcome with importunities. And, for the ftate after death, though he thought the foul did not diffolve at death, yet he doubted much of rewards or punishments: the one he thought too high for us to attain by our flight fervices; and the other was too extreme to be inflicted for fin. This was the fubftance of his fpeculations about God and religion.

I told him his notions of God were fo low, that the Supreme Being feemed to be nothing but nature. For, if that Being had no freedom or choice of its own actions, nor operated by wifdom or goodness, all those reasons, which led him to acknowledge a God, were contrary to this conceit; for, if the order of the univerfe perfuaded him to think there was a God, he must at the same time conceive him to be both wife and good, as well as powerful, fince

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these all appeared equally in the creation, though his wifdom and good nefs had ways of exerting themfelves that were far beyond our notions or measures. If God was wife and good, he would naturally love and be pleased with those that refemble him in these perfections, and diflike thofe that were oppofite to him. Every rational being naturally loves itfelf, and is delighted in others like itfelf, and is averfe from what is not fo. Truth is a rational nature's acting in conformity to itself in all things, and goodness is an inclination to promote the happiness of other beings: fo truth and goodness were the effential perfections of every reasonable being, and certainly moft eminently in the Deity. Nor does his mercy or love raife paffion or perturbation in him; for we feel that to be a weakness in ourselves which indeed only flows from a want of power or skill to do what we wish or defire. It is alfo reasonable to believe God would affift the endeavours of the good with fome helps fuitable to their nature; and that it could not be imagined, that those who imitated him should not be specially favoured by him; and therefore, fince this did not appear in this ftate, it was moft reasonable to think it fhould be in another, where the rewards fhall be an admiffion to a more perfect state of conformity to God, with the felicity that follows it; and the punishments fhould be a total exclufion from him, with all the horror and

darkness

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