PRACTICE.

1. When the answer, in an action at law, both denies the plaintiff's allega-
tions and sets up matters in avoidance, and the jury returns a general
verdict for the defendant upon all the issues, he is entitled to judg-
ment, notwithstanding any error in rulings upon the matters in avoid-
ance, or any statements of fact in that part of the answer setting up
those matters, or in a bill of exceptions to such rulings. Glen v.
Sumner, 152.

2. Either a statement of facts by the parties, or a finding of facts by the
Circuit Court, is strictly analogous to a special verdict, and must state
the ultimate facts of the case, presenting questions of law only, and
not be a recital of evidence or of circumstances, which may tend to
prove the ultimate facts, or from which they may be inferred. Rai-
mond v. Terrebone Parish, 192.

3. Avery v. Cleary, ante, 604, affirmed; but as the defendant did not prose-
cute a writ of error, the judgment below is affirmed on the ground
that no error was committed to the plaintiff's prejudice. Cleary v.
Ellis Foundry Co., 612.

4. It was proper for the Circuit Court to direct a verdict for the plaintiff.
Robertson v. Edelhoff, 614.

5. Where a case has gone to a hearing, testimony been submitted to the
jury under objections but without stating any reason for the objection,
and a verdict rendered with judgment on the verdict, the losing party
cannot, in the appellate court, state for the first time a reason for that
objection which would make it good. Patrick v. Graham, 627.

See COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES;

EQUITY, 3, 4;

EXCEPTION;

JURISDICTION A, 2, 6, 7;

MANDAMUS;

MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM.

PROBATE COURT.

See JURISDICTION, B, 4.

PUBLIC LAND.

1. While the title to public land is still in the United States, no adverse
possession of it can, under a state statute of limitations, confer a title
which will prevail in an action of ejectment in the courts of the United
States, against the legal title under a patent from the United States.
Redfield v. Parks, 239.

2. So long as a homestead entry, valid upon its face, remains a subsisting
entry of record whose legality has been passed upon by the land
authorities, and their action remains unreversed, it is such an appro-
priation of the tract as segregates it from the public domain, and

precludes it from a subsequent grant by Congress. Hastings & Dakota
Railway Co. v. Whitney, 357.

3. A defect in a homstead entry on public land in Minnesota, made by
a soldier in active service in Virginia during the war, which was
caused by want of the requisite residence on it, was cured by the act
of June 8, 1872 “to amend an Act relating to Soldiers' and Sailors'
Homesteads," 17 Stat. 333, c. 338, § 1 (Rev. Stat. § 2308). Ib.
4. While the decisions of the Land Department on matters of law are not
binding on this court, they are entitled to great respect. Ib.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 1;

LOCAL LAW, 7 to 14;
MINERAL LAND.

PUBLIC OFFICERS.

See CONTRACT, 4.

PURPRESTURE.

See LIMITATION, STATUTES OF, 1.

QUIET TITLE.

See MINERAL LAND, 1.

RAILROAD.

The purchaser from a railroad company, at a reduced rate of fare, of a
ticket for a passage to a certain station and back, containing a contract
signed by him, by which he agrees that the ticket is not good for a
return passage unless stamped by the agent of the company at that
station, and that no agent or employé of the company is authorized to
alter, modify or waive any condition of the contract, is bound by
those conditions, whether he knew them or not; and if without
having attempted to have the ticket so stamped, but upon showing it
to the baggage-master and gateman at the station, he has his ticket
punched and his baggage checked, and is admitted to the train, and
upon being told by the conductor that his ticket is not good for want
of the stamp, refuses either to leave the train or to pay full fare, and
is forcibly put off at the next station, he cannot maintain an action
sounding in contract against the company, or except to the exclusion,
at the trial of such an action, of evidence concerning the circumstances
attending his expulsion and the consequent injuries to him or his
business. Boylan v. Hot Springs Railroad Co., 146.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 2;
MORTGAGE.

REMITTITUR.

See MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM, 2 (1).

REMOVAL OF CAUSES.

1. When it appears from the record in this court in a cause commenced
in a state court, and removed to a Circuit Court of the United States
on the ground of diverse citizenship, and proceeded in to judgment
there, that the citizenship of the parties at the time of the commence-
ment of the action, as well as at the time of filing the petition for
removal, was not sufficiently shown, and that therefore the jurisdiction
of the state court was never divested, the defect cannot be cured by
amendment, and the judgment of the Circuit Court will be reversed
at the cost of the plaintiff in error, and the cause remitted to that
court with directions to remand it to the state court. Jackson v.
Allen, 27.

2. On the facts stated in the opinion it is held, that there is no separable

controversy in this case; but that if there were, the provision as to
the removal of such a controversy has no application to a removal on
the ground of local prejudice. Young v. Parker, 267.

3. In order to the removal of a cause from a state court on the ground of
local prejudice, under Rev. Stat. § 639, it is essential, where there are
several plaintiffs, or several defendants, that all the necessary parties
on one side be citizens of the State where the suit is brought, and all
on the other side be citizens of another State or other States; and the
proper citizenship must exist when the action is commenced as well
as when the petition for removal is filed. Ib.

4. A bill in equity was filed in a state court by a creditor of a partnership
to reach its entire property. The prayer of the bill was that judg
ments confessed by the firm in favor of various defendants, some of
whom were citizens of the same State with the plaintiff, might be set
aside for fraud. On the allegations of the bill there was but a single
controversy, as to all of the defendants. One of the defendants, who
was a citizen of a different State from the plaintiff, removed the entire
cause into a Circuit Court of the United States. After a final decree
for the plaintiff, and on an appeal therefrom, this court held that
the case was not removable under § 2 of the act of March 3, 1875,
18 Stat. 470, and reversed the decree, and remanded the case to the
Circuit Court, with a direction to remand it to the state court, the
costs of this court to be paid by the petitioner for removal. Graves v.
Corbin, 571.

5. Under the act of March 3, 1875, c. 137, § 2, one of two corporations
sued jointly in a state court for a tort, although pleading severally,
cannot remove the case into the Circuit Court of the United States,
upon the ground that there is a separable controversy between it and
the plaintiff because the other corporation was not in existence at the
time of the tort sued for without alleging and proving that the two
corporations were wrongfully made joint defendants for the purpose
of preventing a removal into the federal court. Louisville & Nashville
Railroad Co. v. Wangelin, 599.

SERVICE OF PROCESS.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 10.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

See PRACTICE, 2.

STATUTE.

See TABLE OF STATUTES CITED IN OPINIONS.

A. CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.

The preamble to a statute is no part of it, and cannot enlarge or confer
powers, or control the words of the act unless they are doubtful or
ambiguous. Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad Co. v. Thomas, 174.

STREETS.

See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 4, 5.

SUPERSEDURE.

Although a bill to impeach a judgment at law is regarded as auxiliary or
dependent, and not as an original bill, the supersedure of process on
the decree dismissing the bill does not operate to supersede process on
the judgment at law. Knox County v. Harshman, 14.

SUPERVISOR OF ELECTIONS.

See EXECUTIVE.

TAX AND TAXATION.

1. Exemptions from taxation, being in derogation of the sovereign author-
ity and of common right, are not to be extended beyond the express
requirements of the language used, when most rigidly construed.
Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad Co. v. Thomas, 174.

2. The appellant's charter provided that it should" be exempt from tax-
ation for a term of twenty years from the completion of said railroad
to the Mississippi River, but not to extend beyond twenty-five years
from the date of the approval of this act;" Held, that the exemption
was intended to commence from and after the completion of a rail-
road to the Mississippi River, and was to continue thereafter for
twenty years if the road was completed to the river in five years from
the date of the approval of the act, but liable to be diminished by
whatever time beyond five years was consumed by the completion of
the road to the river. lb.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 8, 9; INTERNAL REVENUE;
JURISDICTION, A, 3.

DEED;

TEXAS.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 1, 10;

LOCAL LAW, 5 to 17.

UNITED STATES.

See CONTRACT, 3, 4;

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 3;

POST-OFFICE DEPARTMENT.

UTAH.

1. Under the organic act of that Territory the power to appoint an auditor
of public accounts is vested exclusively in the governor and council.
Clayton v. Utah, 632.

2. So much of the acts of the legislature of Utah of January 20, 1852, and
February 22, 1878, as relates to the mode of appointing an auditor of