modification of it, is essentially irrational. And in like manner the Second Part of the Clavis consists of reasonings in proof of the impossibility of an external world. Finally, in his full-blown theory, as well as in its visual germ, Berkeley takes for granted, as intuitively known, the existence of sensible, including visible, matter; meaning by this, its relative existence, in necessary dependence on a mind. In like manner, what may be called the third proposition of Collier's system asserts the existence of visible matter in particular, and of sensible matter in general. Berkeley and Collier are not, however, to be identified.

The invisibility of distances, as well as of real magnitudes and situations, and their suggestion by interpretation of visual symbols, propositions which occupy so large a space in Berkeley's Theory of Vision, have no counterpart in Collier's First Part. His proof of the nonexternality of the visible world consists of an induction of instances of visible objects, which are allowed by all not to be external, although they seem in visual sense to be as much so as any that are called external.

The Second Part of Collier's Demonstration consists of nine proofs of the impossibility of an external or absolute world, which may be compared with the reasonings and psychological analyses of Berkeley.

Collier's Demonstration concludes with answers to objections, and an application of the theory of a dependent material world to the refutation of the Roman doctrine of the substantial existence of Christ's body in the Eucharist.

The universal sense-symbolism of Berkeley, his broad recognition of the distinction between physical or symbolical, and efficient or proper causation, and his large philosophical insight, are all wanting in the narrow but acute reasonings of Collier. Berkeley's philosophy, owing to its own comprehensiveness, not less than to the humanity of his sympathies and the beauty of his style, is now recognised as a striking expression or solution of problems of modern thought, while Collier is condemned to the obscurity of a mere reasoner of the Schools1.

1 Collier never came fairly out in sight of the philosophical public of last century. He is referred to in Germany by Bilfinger, in his Dilucidationes Philosophicae (1746), and also in the Acta Eruditorum, Suppl. VI. 244 &c., and in England by Corry in his Reflections on Liberty and Necessity (1761), as well as in the Remarks on the Reflections, and Answers to the Remarks, pp. 7 8 (1763), where he is described as a weak reasoner, and a very dull writer also.' Coller was dragged from his obscurity by Dr. Reid, in

A. C. F.

his Essays on the Intellectual Powers, Essay II. ch. 10. He was a subject of correspondence between Sir James Mackintosh, then at Bombay, and Dr. Parr, and an object of curiosity to Dugald Stewart. A beautiful reprint of the Clavis (of the original edition of which only seven copies were then known to exist) appeared in Edinburgh in 1836; and in the following year it was included in a publication of Metaphysical Tracts by English Philosophers of the Eighteenth Century, prepared for the press by Dr. Parr.

THREE DIALOGUES

BETWEEN

HYLAS AND PHILONOUS.

THE DESIGN OF WHICH IS PLAINLY TO DEMONSTRATE

THE REALITY AND PERFECTION OF

HUMAN KNOWLEDGE,

THE INCORPOREAL NATURE OF THE

SOUL,

AND THE IMMEDIATE PROVIDENCE OF A

DEITY:

IN OPPOSITION TO

SCEPTICS AND ATHEISTS.

ALSO TO OPEN A METHOD FOR RENDERING THE SCIENCES MORE EASY, USEFUL, AND COMPENDIOUS.

THE

LORD BERKELEY OF STRATTON1,

MASTER OF THE ROLLS IN THE KINGDOM OF IRELAND, CHANCELLOR

OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER, AND ONE OF the lords OF
HER MAJESTY'S MOST HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL.

MY LORD,

The virtue, learning, and good sense which are acknowledged to distinguish your character, would tempt me to indulge myself the pleasure men naturally take in giving applause to those whom they esteem and honour and it should seem of importance to the subjects of Great Britain that they knew the eminent share you enjoy in the favour of your sovereign, and the honours she has conferred upon you, have not been owing to any application from your lordship, but entirely to her majesty's own thought, arising from a sense of your personal merit, and an inclination to reward it. But, as your name is prefixed to this treatise with an intention to do honour to myself alone, I shall only say that I am encouraged by the favour you have treated me with, to address these papers to your lordship. And I was the more ambitious of doing this, because a Philosophical Treatise could not so properly be addressed to any one as to a person of your lordship's character, who, to your other valuable distinctions, have added the knowledge and relish of Philosophy. I am, with the greatest respect,

THE PREFACE1.

THOUGH it seems the general opinion of the world, no less than the design of nature and providence, that the end of speculation be Practice, or the improvement and regulation of our lives and actions; yet those who are most addicted to speculative studies, seem as generally of another mind. And, indeed, if we consider the pains that have been taken to perplex the plainest things-that distrust of the senses, those doubts and scruples, those abstractions and refinements that occur in the very entrance of the sciences; it will not seem strange that men of leisure and curiosity should lay themselves out in fruitless disquisitions, without descending to the practical parts of life, or informing themselves in the more necessary and important parts of knowledge.

Upon the common principles of philosophers, we are not assured of the existence of things from their being perceived. And we are taught to distinguish their real nature from that which falls under our senses. Hence arise Scepticism and Paradoxes. It is not enough that we see and feel, that we taste and smell a thing: its true nature, its absolute external entity, is still concealed. For, though it be the fiction of our own brain, we have made it inaccessible to all our faculties. Sense is fallacious, reason defective. We spend our lives in doubting of those things which other men evidently know, and believing those things which they laugh at and despise.

In order, therefore, to divert the busy mind of man from vain researches, it seemed necessary to inquire into the source of its perplexities; and, if possible, to lay down such Principles as, by an easy solution of them, together with their own native evidence, may at once recommend themselves for genuine to the mind, and rescue it from those endless pursuits it is engaged in. Which, with a plain demonstration of the Immediate Providence of an all-seeing God, and the natural Immortality of the soul, should seem the readiest preparation, as well as the strongest motive, to the study and practice of virtue.

This design I proposed in the First Part of a treatise concerning the

1 This Preface is omitted in the last edition of the Dialogues, and in all the collected editions of Berkeley's works.