to make the necessary distinction, without presupposing in the individual that very knowledge of the doctrines contained in Scripture, which, by our hypothesis, is not yet attained. We cannot conceive of any arbitrary test, by which the private Christian may be satisfied that his guide is not leading him in matters beyond her province. If it be said that the Church is authorized to declare the truth on all doctrines, a belief of which is necessary to salvation, the difficulty remains the same. It is only from Scripture itself that we can learn what truths are of this nature, together with the consequent limit of the authority of the Church. From what source can the believer become acquainted with these fundamental articles of faith, except from the Bible itself? And how can he arrive at such knowledge, without the free exercise of his own judgment? He has not yet decided upon any authority at all; and until he has attained that requisite acquaintance with the divine will, which it is supposed to be the prerogative of this guide to communicate, he must follow no leading whatsoever. So that either the inquirer must decide on the meaning of Scripture according to his own teach. The rule of Vincentius is applied only for the discovery of what she actually teaches. personal convictions, or he must remain in ignorance upon all questions of revelation from God. If he cannot stir a step towards a knowledge of his proper teacher without a knowledge of the Scriptures, but yet is incompetent to interpret those Scriptures for himself, he must remain untaught altogether. 2. If it be alleged that the opinion of the Church on any doctrine, is to be regarded as a weight to be put into the scale in favour of such doctrine, we thereby assume that in itself it is not sufficient to outweigh all opposing considerations. The bare act of comparing arguments for or against a proposition, implies that neither of the points compared is considered by the person who institutes the comparison as necessarily sufficient to establish the view which it favours. If it were otherwise, he would never have thought of balancing them one against the other; the simple fact that there existed in favour of one side of the question, one single proof which could not possibly be fallacious, would have compelled him at once to the adoption of the opinion thus supported. While in looking upon the authority of the Church as no more than a presumption in favour of any interpretation of Scripture language, we deliberately set up our own judgment to decide both upon the value of all other reasonings on the question, and upon the precise degree of importance to be attached to such authority. We use our own powers of mind with the same freedom, as when we canvass the opinions of other men on any one subject of human thought. CHAP. III. ON THE LEGITIMATE MODE OF REASONING ON THE QUESTION. It will be useful to commence our more immediate investigation of the question which it is proposed to discuss, with a few remarks on the mode of arguing which may be legitimately employed, with especial reference to some of the errors in reasoning which are now prevalent. 1. There is, perhaps, no one fallacy more frequent among the great body of controversialists, than that which is commonly called begging the question. There are times when those who are engaged in the debate, seem one and all to leave out of their consideration the principle which lies at the root of all the disputed points, and to content themselves with urging arguments which are altogether invalid, except on the supposition that some one great fundamental proposition is already either established or overthrown. An instance of this practice of assuming the real question under discussion, is to be found in the arguments which are often brought forward from Scripture, in order to disprove the existence or the authority of the tradition which is upheld by the Church of Rome. It is sometimes argued, that tradition cannot be looked upon as a trustworthy guide on subjects of divine truth, because by it are proved doctrines which are not mentioned in the Scriptures. This line of argument manifestly assumes the matter under debate. When we are doubting whether or not tradition is entitled to put forward doctrines not spoken of in the written word, it is impossible to argue that it is not so entitled, from the fact that it advances, as revealed truths, doctrines not declared in the Bible, for thereby we should be taking for granted, as a point already decided, that nothing is to be received which is not in the Scriptures, which is the very question under discussion. The same, also, with regard to the interpretations of the words of Scripture which tradition furnishes. We cannot prove that tradition is not to be followed, by the fact that it plainly contradicts the Bible, according to our individual judgment; for the very question on hand is, whether or not the traditionary expositions of the inspired volume are necessarily true, however opposite they may be to our own interpretations. When we are debating which authority is to be |