has been repeatedly acknowledged by the moft diftinguished characters who flourished in his day; but a more decided proof, that thefe efforts were not only able but effectual, is afforded in the rancour with which he was treated by the friends of Mr. Hume; who, to this day, cannot forgive the contempt brought on their favourite fophiftry, nor hear the name of Beattie mentioned without accompanying it with one of thofe epithets which poorly conceal the confcioufnefs of defeat. Of fuch a champion for Chriftianity, it is furely defirable to know all that can be known; and we are here gratified, not only by fuch memoirs of Dr. Beattie as are interefting and fatisfactory, but with fuch valuable additions to the literary history and characters of his contemporaries, as ought not to be received without ample acknowledge

ment.

The plan adopted by Sir William Forbes is that of Mason in his Life of Gray, and of Hayley in his Life of Cowper, confifting of an alternation of biographical detail, and of correfpondence. This plan we have ever thought judicious, and to us therefore lefs apology feems necellary than Sir W. F. has thought proper to offer for the introduction of epiftolary correfpondence, “not originally intended for the prefs." The propriety of printing fuch letters will not admit of a difpute, if the queftion be fairly ftated, and if the talk be placed in judicious hands. The practice is neither univerfally right, nor univerfally wrong. All depends upon the judgment employed in the selection; and if that be made in fuch a manner, as neither to injure the feelings of the living, nor difgrace the memory of the dead, the public is benefited, and the writers are honoured. We may obferve, however, that while Sir W. appeals to the authority of Mafon and Hayley, he is lefs correct in referring to that of the editor of Lord Orford's Works. The letters in his lordship's volumes, we know, were prepared, and very carefully prepared, by his lordfhip for the prefs. What has become of the originals we know not, but we have feen enough of his unpublifhed correfpondence to convince us that he had more ways of writing than one.

As it is our object rather to exemplify the valuable contents of thefe volumes, than to anticipate the pleasure which our readers will find in the perufal of them in connection, we fhall pafs over curforily the incidents of Dr. Beattie's early life, which in him, as in moft men of literary fame, are not very interefting. It appears that he ftruggled with confiderable difficulties, owing to the narrow circumstances of his family, but that he very early drew the attention of a local

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public

public by his poetical attempts. As foon as he commenced his academical courfe, (at Aberdeen) he became noted for uncommon proficiency. In his 23d year he was chosen one of the ufhers of the Grammar-fchool of Aberdeen, and, humble as this appointment was for a man of his talents and acquired knowledge, it ferved to bring him into a fociety, where his merits could be more duly appreciated, and where he had the opportunity of cultivating the friendship of perfons of tafte and learning.

Such was the fame he acquired here, that, a vacancy happening in the Marifchal College, he was appointed Profeffor of Moral Philofophy, and began in 1760-1 (in his 25th year) to deliver a courfe of lectures, which he continued to improve by gradual ftudy, till he brought them to that perfection, of which fome idea may be formed from the publication of the compendium of them, entitled "Elements of Moral Science.' His literary affociates, at this time, were principally Drs. Gerard, Campbell, Reid, and Gregory, men, whofe attainments are too well known to require recapitulation here. In 1760 he published his first collection of Poems, under the title of "Original Poems and Tranflations." This volume was very favourably received by the public, but the author did not, upon mature confideration, join in the praifes it received, and fuppreffed the greater number of pieces in his fubfequent editions. In 1765, he published his "Judgment of Paris," which, after a fecond edition, he alfo thought proper to fupprefs. Inftances of an author fuppreffing what is in its fair progrefs towards popularity, are furely rare, but whether from timidity, or just tafte, Dr. Beattie was both rigidly fevere in criticising, and peremptory in fuppreffing his early poetical productions.The "Verfes on the Death of Churchill" appeared foon after, with the author's name, and, we are told, had a rapid fale, and the author was partial to them. Of this poem, however, we have never feen a copy, nor can we find any notice of it in the literary journals of the time. Sir W. F. promifes it in his Appendix, but when we refer to that, he appears to have changed or forgotten his intention.

We now advance to what may be confidered as the moft interesting part of this work, that in which we are presented with the correfpondence of Dr. Beattie and his friends, on the fubject of his celebrated "Effay on Truth," his first thoughts, his original defign, the neceffity there was for fuch an attempt, and the encouragement and difcouragement he met with in accomplishing his purpose. With refpect to his views, they are explained, in a letter to Dr. Blacklock, at confiderable

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confiderable length, but in a manner which unfolds the character of the writer fo plainly, that we fhall make no apology for extracting fome part of it.

Perhaps you are anxious to know what firft induced me to write on this fubject; I will tell you as briefly as I can. In my younger days I read chiefly for the fake of amufement, and I found myfelf beft amufed with the claffics, and what we call the belles lettres. Metaphyfics I difliked; mathematics pleafed me better; but I found my mind neither improved nor gratified by that study. When Providence allotted me my present station, it became incumbent on me to read what had been written on the fubject of morals and human nature: the works of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, were celebrated as mafterpieces in this way; to them, therefore, I had recourfe. But as I began to ftudy them with great prejudices in their favour, you will readily conceive how ftrangely I was furprifed to find them, as I thought, replete with abfurdities: I pondered thefe abfurdities; I weighed the arguments, with which I was fometimes not a little confounded; and the refult was, that I began at laft to fufpect my own understanding, and to think that I had not capacity for fuch a ftudy. For I could not conceive it poffible that the abfurdities of thefe authors were fo great as they feemed to me to be; otherwife, thought I, the world would never ad mire them fo much. About this time fome excellent antifceptical works made their appearance, particularly Reid's "Inquiry into the Human Mind." Then it was that I began to have a little more confidence in my own judgment, when I found it confirmed by thofe of whofe abilities I did not entertain the leaft diftruft. I reviewed my authors again, with a very dif ferent temper of mind. A very little truth will fometimes enlighten a vaft extent of fcience. I found that the fceptical philofophy was not what the world imagined it to be, nor what 1, following the opinion of the world, had hitherto imagined it to be, but a frivolous, though dangerous, fyftem of verbal fubtilty, which it required neither genius, nor learning, nor tafte, nor knowledge of mankind, to be able to put together; but only a captious temper, an irreligious fpirit, a moderate command of words, and an extraordinary degree of vanity and prefumption. You will eafily perceive that I am fpeaking of this philofoph only in its moft extravagant ftate, that is, as it appears in works of Mr. Hume. The more I ftudy it, the mor confirmed in this opinion. But while I applauded

the fagacity of thofe who had led me into.

raged me to proceed in, this train

gether fatisfied with them in ano

that extraordinary adulation

arch-adverfary. I could

compliments to a man'

that his aim is to fubvert the principles of truth. virtue, and religion; nor to his understanding, when we are charging him with publishing the groffeft and most contemptible nonfenfe. I thought I then forefaw, what I have fince found to happen, that this controverfy would be looked upon rather as a trial of skill between two logicians, than as a difquifition in which the best interests of mankind were concerned; and that the world, efpe cially the fashionable part of it, would ftill be difpofed to pay the greatest deference to the opinions of him who, even by the acknowledgment of his antagonists, was confeffed to be the best philofopher and the foundeft- reafoner. All this has happened, and more. Some, to my certain knowledge, have faid, that Mr. Hume and his adverfaries did really act in concert, in order mutually to promote the fale of one another's works; as a proof of which they mention not only the extravagant compliments that pafs between them, but alfo the circumftance of Dr. R. and Dr. C.+ fending their manufcripts to be perufed and cor rected by Mr. Hunie before they gave them to the prefs. I, who know both the men, am very fenfible of the grofs falfehood of these reports. As to the affair of the manufcripts, it was, I am convinced, candour and modefty that induced them to it. But the world knows no fuch thing; and, therefore, may be excufed for miftaking the meaning of actions that have really an equivocal appearance. I know likewife that they are fincere, not only in the deteftation they exprefs for Mr. Hume's irreligious tenets, but alfo in the compliments they have paid to his talents; for they both look upon him as an extraordinary genius, a point in which I cannot agree with them. But while I thus vindicate them from imputations, which the world from its ignorance of circumftances has laid to their charge, I cannot approve them in every thing; I wish they had carried their refearches a little farther, and expreffed themfelves with a little more firmness and fpirit. For well I know, that their works, for want of this, will never produce that effect which (if all mankind were cool metaphyfical reafoners) might be expected from them. There is another thing in which my judgment differs confiderably from that of the gentlemen juft mentioned. They have great metaphyfical abilities; and they love the metaphyfical fciences. I do not. I am convinced that this metaphyfical fpirit is the bane of true learning, true taste, and true fcience; that to it we owe all this modern fcepticism and atheifin; that it has a bad effect upon the human faculties, and tends not a little to four the tem per, to fubvert good principles, and to difqualify men for the bufinefs of life. You will now fee wherein my views differ from thofe of the other answerers of Mr. Hume. I want to show the world, that the fceptical philofophy is contradictory to itfelf,

"Dr. Reid.”

"Dr. Campbell.”

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and

and deftructive of genuine philofophy, as well as of religion and virtue; that it is in its own nature fo paltry a thing, (however it may have been celebrated by fome) that to be despised it needs only to be known; that no degree of genius is necessary to qualify a man for making a gure in this pretended fcience; but rather a certain minutenefs and fufpicioufnefs of mind, and want of fenfibility, the very reverse of true intellectual excellence; that metaphyfics cannot poffibly do any good, but may do, and actually have done, much harm; that fceptical philofophers, whatever they may pretend, are the corrupters of science, the pefts of fociety, and the enemies of mankind. I want to fhow, that the fame method of reafoning which these people have adopted in their books, if transferred into common life, would fhow them to be deftitute of common fenfe; that true philofophers follow a different method of reafoning; and that, without following a different method, no truth can be difcovered. I want to lay before the public, in as ftrong a light as poffible, the following dilemma: our fceptics either believe the doctrines they publish, or they do not believe them; if they believe them, they are fools-if not, they are a thousand times worfe. I want alfo to fortify the mind against this fceptical poison, and to propose certain criteria of moral truth, by which fome of the most dangerous fceptical errors may be detected and guarded againft.

"You are fenfible, that, in order to attain these ends, it is abfolutely neceffary for me to ufe great plainnefs of fpeech. My expreffions must not be fo tame as to feem to imply either a diffidence in my principles, or a coldnefs towards the cause I have undertaken to defend. And where is the man who can blame me for fpeaking from the heart, and therefore speaking with warmth, when I appear in the cause of truth, religion, virtue, and mankind? I am fure, my dear friend Dr. Blacklock will not; he, who has fet before me fo many examples of this laudable ardour; he, whofe style I fhould be proud to take for my model, if I were not aware of the difficulty, I may fay the infuperable difficulty, of imitating it with fuccefs. You need not fear, however, that I expofe myfelf by an excefs of paffion or petulance. I hope I fhall be animated, without lofing my temper, and keen, without injury to good manners. In a word, I will be as foft and delicate as the subject and my confcience will allow. One gentleman, a friend of yours*, I fhall have occafion to treat with much

"The gentleman here alluded to by Dr. Beattie, as a friend of Dr. Blacklock's, was Mr. Hume, who had patronised Dr. Blacklock at an early period, and done him several acts of kindnefs, which Dr. Blacklock never failed to acknowledge. all intercourfe between Mr. Hume and him had ceafed (through no fault on the part of Dr. Blacklock) many years before the

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