A SUPPLEMENT TO THE Previous Queftion, with regard to Religion. Wherein several objections made to the Previous Queftion are examined, and in which God's moral character is more fully vindicated. In a Letter to a Friend. SIR, Take it very kindly, that you would inform me of what has been urged to you, by way of objection, to my previous question. For tho, I cannot but think myself in the right, the contrary fuppofition implying in it a plain contradiction; yet feeing error is what all men are liable to, and feeing my mind may poffibly be biaffed by fome unfeen prejudice in its favour; therefore I cannot but think it proper, to examine, with care and freedom, what is offered against any opinion I embrace or maintain. In the tract referred to, I only gave a fair representation of the cafe, without entering into any of those questions the fubject is liable to, or might be perplexed with; defigning thereby to bring it into as narrow a compafs as poffible. And if this was a defect, I hope it will be supply'd in the following lines, in which I fhall examine what the Gentleman (your friend) has been pleas'd to urge against it. The fum of what is objected may (if I understand it aright) be reduced to the two following propofitions. PROPOSITION I. The God does in fome inftances act from or according to the moral fitness of things, yet he does not always do jo, that is, he fometimes alts arbitrarily. PROPOSITION II. Tho true religion, or that which is the ground of divine acceptance, does confift in doing what is right and fit in the nature of things; yet it does not confift in this alone, but also in our complying with thofe forms of worship which are of divine inftitution. So that, tho we do the former, yet we shall not be accepted of God unless we perform the latter. Be Before I proceed, I beg leave to obferve, that, in order to judge aright of the moral fitness or unfitnefs of any action, every circumstance and confequence, which stand related to it, must be taken into the cafe; because the fitnefs or unfitness of any action arifes from the good or bad purposes it is fubfervient to, and thefe oftentimes arife from the different circumftances the action is perform'd under. So that the fame action may be morally fit under fome circumftances, and unfit under others. And from hence it is, that in fome cafes we, not being appriz'd of the circumftances that attend an action, or the confequences which follow it, judge the action fit at the performance, and afterwards. are convinc'd of the contrary. Again, I obferve, that, at the conclufion of my previous question, I made the following remark: "Note, When I fay it will not be allow'd that God acts arbitrarily, my meaning is, that he will not "act thus in all thofe cafes, in which the moral fitnefs of things can be a rule "to him. As to all other cafes, he must act arbitrarily, if he acts at all; be"cause the fitnefs of things does not come into the question" These things being premised, I proceed to confider, PROPOSITION I. Tho God does in fome inftances act from, or according to the moral fitness of things, yet he does not always do jo, that is, be fometimes acts arbitrarily. With regard to this propofition, I fhall firft, examine the propofition itself: and fecondly, what the Gentleman has offer'd for the proof of it. And First, With regard to the propofition itself, I obferve, that, whereas it faith God fometimes acts arbitrarily, the meaning of this muft be, as it is urg'd by way of objection to what I have laid down, that he acts thus in fome inftances in which the moral fitnefs of things can be a rule to him; and, confequently, if he made the moral fitness of things a rule to him in those instances, he would act otherwife. I fay, this must be the meaning of the propofition, as it is urg'd by way of objection against me; because to urge, that God acts arbitrarily in fuch inftances in which the moral fitness of things cannot be a rule to him, is to urge that against which I have not oppofed any thing; and confequently, is wholly foreign to the prefent queftion. So that the obvious meaning of the propofition is this, namely, that tho God does in fome instances act from, or according to the moral fitness of things, yet he fometimes acts contrary to it: which in other words is the fame as to fay, that in fome inftances God's actions are morally evil. The fenfe of the propofition being fettled, viz. that God fometimes makes the moral fitnefs of things the rule and measure of his actions, and fometimes acts contrary to it, I now proceed to fhew that it is erroneous. And, Firft, Tho it could be made appear that God does, in fact, fometimes do what is right and fit in the nature of things and that fometimes he acts otherwife; yet it would not follow, that the fitness of things was a rule to him, that is, that it was the ground or reafon of his acting in any cafe; because he might act from capricious humour: as well in thofe inftances in which he acts Like the unjuft judge in the gofpel, who, tho he neither feared God nor regarded man, yet he would do the widow justice that required it, left, by her continual coming, fhe should weary him. He would do a right action, tho it were from a wrong motive or principle. Again, right, as in thofe in which he acts wrong. Secondly, If God makes the moral fitnefs of things a rule to him in fome inftances (which is allow'd in the propofition) then he will do it in every inftance, in which that fitnefs can be a rule to him. And the reafon of this is evident, namely, that as the moral fitnefs of things is in its own nature truly excellent and valuable, and highly preferable to capricious humour and arbitrary pleasure; and, as God knows full well wherein the fitnefs and valuableness of every action lies; and, as he cannot poffibly be under any temptation to act wrong; fo this will always be a reafon, arifing from the nature of things, for God to prefer a rational conduct before arbitrary pleafure, and to direct his actions accordingly. It is true, that man, tho he is qualified to difcern and judge betwixt good and evil, yet, notwithstanding this, he fometimes acts right, and fometimes wrong. And the reafon of this is likewife evident, namely, that as man is a compounded creature, confifting partly of understanding, partly of appetite, of affection, &c. and as each part of his compofition affords a distinct kind of motive or excitement to action; fo he fometimes acts from one motive, and fometimes from another. And this gives occafion for his mixed character, viz. that he fometimes acts right, and fometimes otherwife; he fometimes follows reafon, and fometimes acts against it. But this cannot be the cafe with respect to God, who, as he knows the moral difference in things, fo he has no felf-intereft nor vitiated affection to mislead him (which is generally the cafe with respect to men) and, therefore, he will, not only in fome inftances, but in every cafe do what is right and fit in the nature of things. Having thus fhewn that the propofition is erroneous, I now proceed, Secondly, To examine what the Gentleman has offer'd to fupport it. In my previous question I brought two arguments to prove, that God always makes the moral fitnefs of things, and not arbitrary pleasure, the rule and measure of his actions. And I do not understand, that the Gentleman attempted to fhew the weakness and inconclufiveness of thofe arguments; but only, in oppofition to them, he urged an argument drawn from fact, by producing two inftances, viz. the prohibiting Adam and Eve to eat of the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and the prohibiting the use of fwines-flesh to the Ifraelites which inftances he urg'd as a proof, that God fometimes acts arbitrarily. And here I observe, that it is fuppofed, as these inftances are urged against me, that it was really wrong, in the nature of things, for God to make those prohibitions. And indeed I grant it would be fo, fuppofing the things prohibited were proper and useful, and that no ill confequence attended the enjoyment of them; because here is a reafon for, but no reason against that enjoyment, But this does not appear to be the cafe; and therefore the contrary ought rather to be prefumed. As to the first instance, tho the prohibited fruit might be proper food for the ferpent, yet it might be otherwife to man. For, tho it was was agreeable to the fenfes, and gave a brifkness to the fpirits; yet the taking plentifully of that fruit might tend to the hurt and diffolution of the human compofition. And, fuppofing this to be the cafe, then here is a reason for the prohibition; and confequently this is not an inftance of arbitrary pleasure. Here is a reason for the prohibition, namely, because this fruit was prejudicial and hurtful to mankind: In the day thou eateft thereof thou shalt (or thou wilt) furely die (or contribute to thy death.) As to the fecond inftance, namely, the prohibiting the ufe of fines-flesh to the Jews; this I think likewife falls fhort of proof, as in the former cafe. For, tho fwines-flesh might be proper food in one climate, yet it might be very hurtful in another; and this might poffibly be the cafe, with respect to the land of Canaan. The taking plentifully of that food might introduce the leprosy, or fome other disorder very afflictive or disagreeable to mankind. And, if this was the case, then here is a reafon arifing from the nature of things for the prohibition; and confequently this is not an inftance of arbitrary pleasure. If it should be urged, that these are mere fuppofitions, which have no foundation in the hiftory. I answer, Allowing them to be fuch; yet, if God governs himself by the moral fitnefs of things in his dealings with his creatures (which I think I have proved that he does) then thefe, or fomething like these must be the case. If any should yet infift, that these are inftances of arbitrary pleasure. I answer, This is begging the queftion; and, if these prohibitions are allow'd to be divine, then there is a moral certainty of the contrary. Befides, whoever thus infifts, I think it will lie upon him to prove (upon the foot of God's acting arbitrarily) that the foremention'd prohibitions are divine; which I think cannot be done, as I have fhewn in my previous question (obfervation III.) and which I now come more particularly to confider. And, Tho all religions which are founded on revelation ftand upon a foot in this cafe; yet, seeing the fuppofed inftances of arbitrary pleasure, which are urged against me, are taken from the Jewish revelation, therefore I fhall make the divinity of that revelation the fubject of my prefent enquiry. And, left my opponents fhould fall under any difficulty with regard to the hiftorian, the tranfmitting the history or the facts recorded in it, I fhall, in favour of them, give them leave to take for granted that Mofes was the writer of all the books which are commonly afcribed to him; that those books have been truly transmitted to us without corruption; and that the facts (viz. the turning a rod into a ferpent, water into blood, and the like) were real as they are recorded. And farther, that thofe facts were fupernatural, that is, they were above the natural ability or inherent power of man to perform; and confequently, that they were performed by the agency or co-operation of an invifible being. This being the ftate of the cafe, the queftion will be, Whether this revelation and the law, of which Mofes is allow'd to be the promulgator, is divine; feeing the fupernatural operations, abovemention'd, were wrought to prove it to be fuch? And, The true answer to this question will be, that this is perfectly uncertain upon the prefent fuppofition; becaufe God may act arbitrarily in this inftance, as well as in any other cafe, for any thing we know, or can can fhew to the contrary. That is, notwithstanding thofe fupernatural operations were wrought to prove what Mofes declared to be true; yet, Mofes might be but an impoftor; becaufe God might, in this cafe, as an instance of his arbitrary pleasure, either ufe his own power, or permit fome other invifible agent to exert fuch power, for the confirmation of this impofition. I say, this may be the cafe, for any thing we know. For, as God is here fuppofed fometimes to act arbitrarily; fo this may be fuch an inftance of his arbitrary pleasure, seeing we have no rule by which we can judge when he acts thus, and when he acts otherwife. If it should be urged, that fuch a conduct, viz. the ufing of his power, or the fuffering other invifible agents to use theirs, for the confirmation of a lie, in a matter of fuch importance, is inconfiftent with God's moral perfections. I answer, fo is every other inftance of arbitrary pleasure. And therefore, if an argument drawn from God's moral perfections is conclufive in one case, it must 'be fo in every cafe: and, if fuch an argument is inconclufive in one inftance, it will be fo in every inftance. And from hence I think it plainly appears, what a precarious foot the divinity of every religion stands upon, which is built upon revelation, fuppofing God acts arbitrarily, as aforefaid; because from hence 'it evidently appears impoffible, in the nature of things, to prove any revelation to be divine, upon this principle. Befides, fuppofing we could be able to prove a revelation to be divine, upon the prefent fuppofition, yet ftill we should be in a very evil cafe; because God might, as an inftance of his arbitrary pleasure, actually deceive us himself, as well as leave us in the hands of other deceivers. And this leads me to afk of those men (who maintain that God fometimes acts arbitrarily) how they can certainly know, what will plcafe God, and what are the fure grounds upon which they build their trust and confidence in him? If they fay, that divine revelation is the rule of their actions, and the ground of their confidence, alas! this, in confequence of their own principles, is like that broken reed Egypt (if I may be allow'd to use the Prophet's expreffion) upon which, if a man lean, it may difappoint his truft. For, if God fometimes acts arbitrarily, as in this cafe he is under no reftraint; fo he must be perfectly at liberty to deceive his creatures, whenfoever he pleases; and confequently, the foundation of certainty, with regard to revelation-evidence, is taken away upon this principle. And this leads me to put to thofe men their own queftion, which I will leave them to anfwer: What, has not God a right to do what he will with his own? which is the fame as to fay, may he not deceive his own creatures, if he pleafes? But I perfuade myself, that the greateft advocates for arbitrarinefs in God will not allow that he is equally difpofed to reveal the truth or a lie; and that he does either of thefe at pleasure: but, on the contrary, they will be ready to affirm, that the fupreme Being is a God of truth, who cannot lie; and therefore is the proper object of their trust. Which, if there be any meaning or confiftency in their words, is the fame as to fay, that truth, in the prefent cafe, is fo preferable to deceit and falfhood, that God cannot but be difpofed, from the reafon of the thing, to prefer the former before the latter, and to govern his actions accordingly. But then, I must take the Gg |