Secondly, That Abraham ftood to Ifaac in the relation of a father, that is, he voluntarily became the inftrument of bringing Ifaac into being; and from hence he became naturally obliged to guard and protect that life, which he had, by a voluntary act, been the inftrument of introducing. For, as life to Ifaac was a natural good, fo it must be right and fit that every person, but more. especially he who introduced it, fhould guard and fecure that good to him, provided Ifaac did nothing to forfeit his title to life, and confequently his title to that protection; and whilft no circumftance attended his cafe, which might render his life injurious to the common happiness, or any other way render it fit that he should die. This I take to be a felf-evident propofition. By natural obligation, I mean that it was right and fit, in the nature of the thing, that Abraham fhould guard and protect the life of Ifaac, as aforefaid. Which obligation as it is founded in nature, fo it is independent of, and antecedent to any divine command; yea, it is antecedent to the confideration of a Deity, because it must and would be the fame, if there were no fuch thing as a Deity. Now if this be the cafe, then I think it will unavoidably follow, that no fubfequent divine command could poffibly cancel or take off the aforefaid natural obligation; it being a manifeft abfurdity, and a contradiction in terms, to fay, that a natural obligation arifes from, or is deftroyed by a divine command; for if it depends upon a divine command, then it is not natural in the fense I here use that term. And, if the divine command could not make void the natural obligation which Abraham was under, then, I think, it will follow, that the giving fuch a command, with an intent that it fhould be obeyed, must be wrong; and confequently, that obedience to fuch a command must be wrong alfo. God did not intend that the command given to Abraham fhould be obeyed, as is evident by his recalling it. This I take to be the state of the cafe. Again, I obferve,

But

Thirdly, That as life is a natural good, as it renders us capable of tasting thofe pleasures, which the present state of things has furnished us with; fo confequently, death is a natural evil, whilft we are capable of those pleasures. Now, if this be the cafe, as moft certainly it is, then it will follow, that the taking away of life, caufelefly, is, in the nature of the thing, morally unfit; because it is a bar to the enjoyments of life: and therefore, if Abraham had not been obliged to guard and protect the life of his fon, yet it would have been unfit that he should take it away. And if fuch an action would, in the nature of the thing, have been morally unfit, then no divine command can poffibly change its nature, and make it otherwise.

If it should be urged, that God has originally a property in all his creatures, and as he gives life to them, fo it must be right and fit that he should take it from them, when and in what way he pleases: I answer, first, what was fit for God to do, and what was fit for Abraham to do, are plainly two distinct queftions or cafes. God's relation, and Abraham's relation to Ifaac, are here fuppofed to be different; which relation is likewife fuppofed to be the ground of the fitness or unfitness of their actions, in either cafe. And therefore fuppofing God's having a property in Ifaac render'd it fit that he should take away Ifaac's

I i

life,

life, when and in what way he pleased; yet it will not follow, that it was fit that Abraham fhould do the like, feeing it is not here fuppofed that Abrabam had any fuch property in Ifaac, as aforefaid.

If it should be faid, that tho Abraham had no right to take away Ifaac's life, upon the account of property; yet it was fit that he should do it, when under a divine command, feeing he who gave the command had a property in Ijaac, as aforefaid: I answer, if Abraham had not been under a natural obligation to guard and protect the life of his fon, antecedent to the divine command; and, if life had not been a natural good, and the taking it away, caufelefly, a moral evil, antecedent to that command, then there might have been fome reafon to infift, that it was fit for Abraham to take away Ifaac's life, when commanded, as aforefaid. But this is not the cafe; for as Abraham became obliged, by his relation to Ifaac, to guard and protect his life, antecedent to any divine command; and, as the taking away of life, caufelefly, was, in the nature of the thing, morally unfit; fo God's property in Ifaac could not poffibly make void Abraham's obligations, nor change the nature of things, by making that action fit, which, in the nature of the thing, is otherwife. Again,

I anfwer, fecondly, that property in any fubject does not leffen or destroy the natural obligations of the proprietor; and therefore it must be right and fit for him either to exert or fufpend his power, with regard to that subject, when the circumstances of the cafe render it fit and proper fo to do. Thus my ability to convey my mind to another, by words, is my natural property; and yet I am obliged, in the nature of the thing, either to exert or fufpend the exercise of that power, as the circumftances of the cafe render it fit and proper that I fhould fpeak my mind, or be filent. In like manner, if by my labour and industry I acquire a property in a plentiful eftate, my property in that estate would not leffen or take off the natural obligations I am under to promote the happiness and well-being of the rest of my fellow-creatures; and therefore it would be fit that I fhould use and employ the estate which I had thus acquir'd a property in, to promote the common happiness, as aforefaid. The cafe is the fame with refpect to every kind of property, whether it be original, natural, or acquired. But, that I may give a cafe more directly to the prefent purpose, I will fuppofe, that God had called a creature into being, and had given it a constitution which might run out to the age of fixty years in a state of happines; and that he had likewife made a plentiful provifion of all things, neceffary and conducive to that happinefs: now the queftion is, whether it would be right and fit, in the nature of the thing, for God, from mere fovereign pleafure, to cut off that creature in the midst of his days, when no ill confequence nor inconvenience attended that creature's enjoyment of life. And the answer to this question is most evident, namely, that fuch an action, in the nature of the thing, would be morally unfit, seeing it would be a barring that creature of thirty years felicity for as the letting fuch a creature live out its time would be an inftance of wisdom and true goodness; fo the taking life from it would be a manifest instance of the contrary. And, to fay in this cafe, that God had a property in that creature, would be to urge what does not alter the cafe at all.

If it should be farther urged, that it is equally as fit for God directly and immediately to take away fuch a creature's life, as it is for him to do it by an earthquake, or a tempeft, or the like: I answer, this is putting a cafe which is not to be admitted, because, in ftrictnefs, God does not take away the life of those creatures who die by earthquakes, &c. death, in these cases, being an accidental evil, which arifes from the natural frame and conftitution of the world, and which could not be prevented, in the present state of things, but by breaking in upon thofe laws by which the natural world is governed.

If it fhould be urged, that God could have recompenfed the lofs of life to Ifaac an hundred-fold in another world, or he could have raised him again from the dead, and placed him in a much better state than he was in before, and that in these cafes Ifaac would have been no further a fufferer than barely the pain he felt in dying by the hand of his father; fo that upon the whole, death would have been a benefit to him, and confequently, it would have been an inftance of divine goodness in taking life from him: I answer, fuppofing God should at any time (as an inftance of his fovereign pleasure) take away the life of any of his creatures, and then recompenfe that lofs to them, as aforefaid; yet this would not affect the cafe with refpect to Abraham, whofe relation and obligations to Ifaac would be ftill the fame. And therefore fuppofing it be admitted, that God might, if he pleased, have taken away the life of Ifaac, as aforefaid; yet it was most unfit that he fhould do it by the hand of Abraham. God may, if he pleases, ufe various ways of calling men out of this world; he could, by an immediate operation, or an exerting of his power, have fo flagnated the blood and fluids in Ifaac's body, or thrown them into fuch a rapid motion, or taken a variety of other methods, that would effectually and speedily have put an end to Ísaac's life: and therefore for him to require Abraham to kill his fon, which action in Abraham (fuppofing the cafe to be as I have stated it above, and which I think is the prefent cafe) would have been a breaking thro an obligation that no divine command could poffibly cancel or make void; which would have been a very bad precedent to others, and have reflected great dishonour upon the moral character of him who required it. All these reasons, I think, make it perfectly unfit that Ifaac fhould die by the hand of his father; and, confequently, that God fhould give fuch a command with an intent that it fhould be obeyed, or that Abraham fhould yield obedience to it. I am fenfible that it is fome men's opinion, that if God had commanded Abraham to hate his fon, fuch a command would, in the nature of the thing, have been morally unfit; and yet thofe men infift, that it was right and fit for God to require Abraham to take away Ifaac's life. This makes it neceffary to enquire, what it is which renders the paffion of hatred vicious; and, confequently, what it is that would render fuch a command unfit. And here I prefume it will be admitted, that the vicioufnefs of hatred confifts in its being indulged beyond its due bounds, or in its being exercifed upon a wrong object; and that therefore it would have been wrong in Abraham to hate that object, which, in the nature of the thing, he ought to love. Now, if this be the cafe with respect to our paffions, then, I think, it must be the fame with refpect

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to

to our actions, that is, it would have been equally as wrong for Abraham to take away that life, which, in the nature of the thing, he ought to preferve, as it would have been for him to hate that perfon whom he ought to love. Again, I obferve,

Fourthly, That I think Abraham could not, in the nature of the thing, have any rational fatisfaction that the aforefaid command was divine. For, fuppofing he received information, in the prefent cafe, either by a strong impreffion upon his own mind, or by a dream, or a vifion, or a voice from heaven, or by the report of a perfon whom he esteemed an angel, or the like; as he could not be abfolutely certain that he might not be deluded, nor impofed upon in any of thefe ways; fo, in the nature of the thing, the moral unfitness of the action (as in the prefent cafe it must appear to be) was a stronger reafon against the divinity of that command, than any of thofe extraordinary ways in which that command was conveyed to him could poffibly be for it.

If it should be urged, fuppofing that Abraham received his information in the prefent cafe, in the fame way in which he had received feveral divine revelations before; and fuppofing this revelation had been backed with a miracle, or miracles, in like manner as the former divine revelations had been confirmed or proved to him to be fuch; in this cafe, furely, there would have been a juft and rational foundation for him to conclude that the command was divine. I answer, admitting this to be the cafe, then I think that Abraham would have been more liable to be deluded or impofed upon, than otherwise he might have been. But it would by no means justify in argument, or render fuch a conclufion rational, viz. that the aforefaid commandment was divine.

For,

First, Suppofing that Abraham had before received divine revelations in or by dreams a hundred times; yet furely it will not follow, by a juft confequence, that he could not be mis-led by dreaming; but, on the contrary, he became fo much the more in danger of being deluded. In this way his receiving frequently divine revelations, by dreams, might render him the les upon his guard, and he might hereby be more eafily led to think, that every dream was a divine revelation. The cafe is the fame in any other way in which he might receive his informations: his not being impofed upon, in many inftances, is not a good argument to prove that he was not, or could not be impofed upon in the fame way in one; because the latter will not follow by a juft confequence from the former. Again,

Secondly, Suppofing that the command for Abraham, to kill his fon, had been backed with a miracle, or miracles, in like manner as feveral divine revelations had before been confirmed or proved to him to be fuch; yet this does not prove the fore-mentioned command to be divine. Miracles are directly and immediately evidences only of the power, and not of the veracity or goodness of the agent that performs them. So that when any thing farther is to be concluded from them, that conclufion muft arife from the purpofes, that the power which is fhewn by thofe miracles is made fubfervient to. And therefore as Abraham justly concluded, that those former revelations backed with miracles were divine, because the purposes were good which those revelations and that

power

power were made fubfervient to; fo by a like way of reafoning it would follow, that there was a strong probability that the command, in the prefent case, was not divine, because this revelation, and the miracles wrought in its favour, were (to appearance at least, and as far as he could judge) made fubfervient, not to a good, but to an evil purpose.

If it fhould be urged, that what I have faid feems to be contrary to what is faid of Abraham, and contrary to the commendation given of him both in the Old and New Testament. I answer, what is faid of Abraham in the present cafe is as follows. Gen. xxii. 16, 17, 18. Because thou hast done this thing, and haft not witheld thy son, thine only fon; that in bleffing I will bless thee, and in multiplying I will multiply thy feed as the stars of the heaven, and as the fand which is upon the fea-fhore. And thy feed fhall poffefs the gate of his enemies; and in thy feed fhall all the nations of the earth be blefed, because thou hast obeyed my voice. Heb. xi. 17, 18, 19. By faith Abraham when he was tried, offered up Ifaac; and he that had received the promises, offered up his only begotten Son; of whom it was faid, that in Ifaac fhall thy feed be called: accounting that God was able to raise him up even from the dead, from whence alfo he received him in a figure. James ii. 21, 22, 23. Was not Abraham, our father, juftified by works, when he had offered up Ifaac his fon upon the altar? Seeft thou how faith wrought with his works, and by works was faith made perfect? And the fcripture was fulfilled, which faith, Abraham believed God, and it was accounted unto him for righteousness: and he was called the friend of God. This, I think, is all that is faid in the Bible, with regard to the point in hand: from all which it evidently appears, that Abraham's first trust and confidence in God, that he would make good his promife to him, and his ftrict honesty and integrity, which were fhewn by his fteady refolution to do what he judged to be his duty in fuch a trying instance; thefe alone are what Abraham ftands in the Bible fo highly commended for, and which are made the ground of God's extraordinary favours to him. As to the goodness of Abraham's judgment, or the juftness of his reafoning, the Bible takes no notice of it; neither does it once meddle with those questions, viz. whether Abraham had or had not any rational fatisfaction that the command was divine, or whether the action was fit or unfit; but leaves them to be discovered from the nature of the fubject. But to conclude, I obferve,

Fifthly, and laftly, What great difficulties men are thrown into, in order to excuse and justify the conduct of Almighty God, and of his fervant Abraham, in the cafe I have been confidering. Men's inventions have been put upon the wrack, in order to find out ways to reconcile the divine command with the principles of morality; and they have been led almost to give up the natural diftinction of good and evil, and to refolve it all into the arbitrary will of God. Whereas the cafe is not fo defperate as this fuppofes it to be; for tho God did give such a command, yet it was not with an intent that it fhould be obeyed, as the event fhewed. And tho Abraham thought it was right to yield obedience to the command, yet (fuppofing him to be mistaken) this only fhewed the weakness of his judgment in that particular, but not that he had a vicious mind; and

there