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therefore his moral character is not blemished hereby. As for those questions, namely, why God gave this command, and what were the wife purposes he intended to ferve by it? the fcripture has given no farther account than that it was by way of trial to Abraham; and therefore whatever is offered, beyond this, is but conjecture. Thus, in the fupplement to the previous question, I obferv'd, that God gave the command to Abraham with an intent to recall it, and thereby to fhew to Abraham, and to all his pofterity, the unfitness of all human facrifices. But herein I intended no more than a bare conjecture, viz. that God might give and recall the command, to answer the wife and good purpose aforefaid: to which I here add, that the command might be given in order to convince Abraham, that even his honesty and integrity, when not under the direction of his understanding, might mislead him in the conducting of his actions, of which (to appearance at leaft) this was an instance. And tho these are mere conjectures, yet I cannot fee why they should be given up, before some better reason for the command be offered; feeing they are fuitable to that wisdom and goodness, by which God always directs his actions.

I have here but juft touched upon the cafe of miracles, because poffibly fome time or other I may treat of that fubject more at large.

These are the reflections which your query has occafioned: I fubmit them to your confideration, and beg leave to fubfcribe myself,

Reverend SIR,

Your moft Humble Servant, &c.

TREATISE XX.

A

VINDICATION

O F

GOD's Moral Character,

AS TO

The Cause and Origin of Evil, both Natural and Moral. Wherein the case of Liberty and Neceffity is confidered, with regard to human Actions. In a Letter to a Friend.

To which is added,

A SUPPLEMENT

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Vindication of God's Moral Character.

Wherein three Objections are examined, two urged against the Wisdom and Goodness of God, and the other against human Liberty.

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Received your kind letter, in which you were pleafed to exprefs your dif fatisfaction, with regard to what I have faid concerning God's moral character. You fay you have read my previous question, and the fupplement to it; but it still remains to you a doubtful cafe, and the ground of this doubt, is the evil which takes place in the world and, accordingly, you reafon thus, If God is all-knowing and almighty, and if he is in reality fuch a wife and good Being, as I have endeavour'd to prove him to be, then it might reasonably be expected, that he would prevent evil, by preventing the existence of every thing which leads to it, or is any way the cause of it. But, say you, the contrary to this is evident in fact, and that therefore it ftill remains a doubtful point, whether God is in reality a wife and a good Being, or not. I shall be glad if I can offer any thing which may be effectual to remove this difficulty, and give you fatisfaction in the cafe. The fum of what you have urg'd may, I think, be fitly expreffed in the following queftion; namely, that if God is, in reality, a wife and a good Being, From whence does this evil proceed? But,

Before I return an answer to this question, I beg leave to obferve, that as the propofing my previous question to publick confideration has drawn on me the delightful employment of vindicating the moral character of Almighty God, and as this is a point of the utmost importance; fo I thought it proper, in order to compleat that work, and thereby clofe up this fubject; first, to lay before my reader the feveral kinds of evidence, upon which the truth and certainty of God's moral character may be fuppos'd to depend, or by which he may be proved to be a wife and a good Being, &c. fecondly, to vindicate that character, as to the cause and origin of evil, both natural and moral, by anfwering the queftion now before me. And, thirdly, to improve the whole, to ferve the purposes of virtue and true goodness, by reprefenting to my reader, what it is which will render him truly lovely and valuable in himself, and truly acceptable and well-pleafing to God. But, before I proceed, I fhall make one or two previous obfervations; and accordingly I observe,

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First, That actions take their denomination of good or evil, from the good or evil they are productive of, from the good or evil intention of the actor, or from the good or evil motive or principle they fpring from, and which is the ground or reafon of them. So that an action may be good in one refpect, and evil in another. As thus, one man may intend to kill another, and that very action, which was defign'd to procure the man's death, may be the means of preferving his life. In this cafe the action is good, with regard to its effect; life is preferv'd by it, but it is evil, with respect to the defign of the actor, inasmuch as death was intended. Yea, an action may be good in both these respects, and yet be evil with regard to the motive or principle it fprings from. As thus, one man relieves another in diftrefs, with an intent to minifter that relief; and he does this, not because it is right and fit, in the nature of things, and out of pity to the diftrefs'd, but only, that he may render himself capable of doing fome greater mifchief, when a proper occafion offers. In this cafe the action is good, with regard to its effect, the diftreffed perfon is reliev'd; and it is good, with refpect to what was immediately intended by the actor, viz. he intended to minifter that relief; but it is evil, with regard to the motive or principle it fprung from, and which was the ground or reafon of it. And, as actions take their denomination of good or evil, upon the different accounts above-mention'd; fo it is the latter of thefe, in which the morality or immorality of the action is concern'd. An action may be good, with regard to its effect, and the actor may intend, that that good effect should be produc'd by it (as in the instance above) and yet that action would be evil, in a moral fenfe, if the motive or principle, it fprung from, was evil and vicious. Again, I observe,

Secondly, That virtue or goodness comes under a two-fold confideration, viz. abfolute and relative. By abfolute, I mean virtue or goodness confider'd abfractedly, or that which has an intrinfick goodness in it, when confider'd fimply in itself, and which does not derive its virtuoufnefs from its relation to any other thing. Virtue or goodnefs, confider'd as abfolute, is reducible into a very narrow compafs, confifting only in one fingle point; namely, in the communicating happiness to the suitable subjects of it, or in the endeavouring to do it, by doing or avoiding what appears to be proper for the attainment of that end, from a sense of the fitness of fuch a temper and conduct. This is goodness itfelf, or what is fuch confider'd abftractedly, it not deriving its virtuousness from its relation to any other thing. By relative virtue, I mean that which derives its virtuoufness from its relation to goodness, that is, from its relation to what is abfolutely good and virtuous, as above explain'd. Virtue or goodnefs, under this confideration, is more extenfive, and includes in it truth, justice, temperance, and the like. Thefe, as they derive their virtuoufnefs from their relation to goodness; fo there are circumstances which will change their nature, and make them otherwife: that is to fay, tho the practice of these, in almost every inftance, tends to the common good, yet there may be fome poffible cafes, in which it may be otherwife. Having made the above observations, I shall now proceed to what I propos'd; namely,

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