the fat of fed beafts; and I delight not in the blood of bullocks, or of lambs, or o be-goats. When ye come to appear before me, who hath required this at your hands to tread my courts? Bring no more vain oblations, incenfe is an abomination unto me, the new moons and fabbaths, the calling of affemblies I cannot away with, it is iniquity, even the Jolemn meeting. Your new moons, and your appointed feafts my Joul bateth: they are a trouble unto me, I am weary to bear them. And when you Spread forth your hands, I will hide mine eyes from you: and when you make many prayers, I will not hear; your hands are full of blood. Wash ye, make you clean, put away the evil of your doings from before mine eyes; ceafe to do evil, learn to do well, feek judgment, relieve the oppreffed, judge the fatherless, plead for the widow. In fine, divine revelation muft, when rightly understood, be confiftent with nature; and confequently, what I have fairly deduced, from the reafon of things, cannot be prejudicial to it, nor to revealed religion founded upon it. Thus I have gone thro what I propofed. I fhall now clofe up this fubject with the following remark; namely, that as having right notions of the deity, when confider'd in his moral capacity, is the ground and foundation of all true religion; fo the having a wrong and unworthy idea of God, when confider'd in that fame capacity, is the foundation of all religious fuperftition, whether exercifed in men's paffions or actions. For as religious fuperftition, with regard to our paffions, confifts in exercifing our hopes and fears, with respect to God, when there is no juft ground for the exercise of them; fo thofe hopes and fears naturally fpring from a false notion of the deity, with regard to his moral character. When we fuppofe fuch a temper of mind in our Creator as he is a stranger to, and when we confider him as governing his actions by fuch rules as he is the fartheft from; as fuch an unworthy conception of God will naturally alarm our paffions, fo all those hopes and fears which arise from, and are founded upon it, will be exceedingly fuperftitious and groundless. The cafe is the fame, with refpect to men's actions. For when they have formed in their minds a wrong and unworthy idea of God, with regard to the moral rectitude of his nature, then they are fuperftitiously led upon that account to do many things as duty, and to avoid many others as fins, when there is no juft ground nor foundation for either. And the more grofs and unworthy men's conceptions of God are in this refpect, the more grofs and vile will that fuperftition be, which is produced by it. When men confider God as an abfolute Sovereign, whofe actions are directed not by the fitnefs of things, but by arbitrary pleasure, and that he will refpect men more for the orthodoxy of their opinions, or for their attendance on, and zeal for this or that ceremony, and the like, than for the fweetness of their tempers, or the virtuousness of their lives; and that he hates and will punish men for their innocent mistakes concerning himfelf, or the fervice they are to pay to him: as fuch an opinion is very wrong in itself, and difhonourable to the deity, fo men are eafily and naturally led, by it, to think that religious perfecution is pleafing to God; this being (in their way of thinking) a conformity to the divine pattern, in hating and punishing thofe, whom they think God hates and will punish. And thus a falfe and unworthy opinion of the deity, with regard to his moral character, will lead lead men to actions which are moft injurious to mankind, and most dishonourable and hateful to God. Our Saviour faid to his Difciples, as in John xvi. 2, 3. They (viz. the Jews) fhall put you out of the fynagogues: yea the time cometh, that whojoever killeth you, will think that he doth God Jervice. And these things will they do unto you, because they have not known the Father, nor me. In these words our Lord obferves, that men's religious fuperftition would lead them to the killing of God's fervants, out of zeal for his honour. He likewife obferves, that the ground of this fuperftitious zeal is their ignorance and false notions of the deity; which ignorance must relate to him, with regard to his moral character. The Jews ignorance of God could not relate to his natural character; because they had as just ideas of him in that refpect, as the chriftians. Neither could their ignorance of this kind (fuppofing they had been justly chargeable) be productive of fuch barbarities as our Lord faid they would be guilty of. A wrong opinion of God's natural properties, his perfonality, and the like, cannot, in the nature of the thing, lay a foundation for thinking that religious perfecution is pleafing to God; and confequently cannot have any fuch influence upon men's tempers and actions, as was the cafe, with refpect to the Jews beforementioned. Thefe Jews confidered God as an abfolute fovereign, the ground of whose favour or difpleasure is not the perfonal virtuoufnefs or viciousness of his creatures, but their fubmitting or not fubmitting to what he arbitrarily makes the conditions of his acceptance. They likewife confidered themselves as those who had the good fortune to be fingled out for divine love; that God had, from mere fovereign pleasure, made them his people; that he had given them the only and the certain conditions of his favour, and that he had excluded the rest of mankind from any fhare in his affections. And as these were the unworthy ideas they had of God and of his conduct; fo they were very eafily led to conclude from them, that the afflicting and grieving, and even killing those whom they prefumed God had prepared for deftruction, would be a facrifice acceptable and well-pleafing to him. The time cometh, that whofbever killeth you, will think that he doth God fervice. And thefe things will they do unto you, because they have not known the Father, nor me. I will only add, that to know, or have a juft idea of God, with regard to his moral character, is the most noble and the most ufeful knowledge, which the mind of man can be furnished with. To know God in his natural capacity, that is, to know him, with regard to his metaphyfical nature or effence, his perfonality, his natural properties, fuch as neceffary exiftence, immenfity, and the like; fuch knowledge may make us good philofophers, and that is the most it can poffibly do. But to know God in his moral capacity, this may make us good men, as it is capable of having a powerful influence upon our minds and lives, by difpofing us to model them after the divine pattern, and to render ourfelves the fuitable and proper objects of his approbation and affection.. • I am, Sir, Humble Servant, &c. TREA A SUPPLEMENT ΤΟ ΤΗ Ε Vindication of God's Moral Character. WHEREIN Three Objections are examined; two urged against the Wisdom and Goodness of God, and the other against human Liberty. I T being thought by fome, that, in my Vindication of God's Moral Character, I have not fo fully vindicated the divine conduct, as might have been expected from a performance of that kind; I think it proper to offer what follows, by way of anfwer to what has been urged on this head. And, to make way for a difficulty in the prefent cafe, the following principles are laid down, viz. first, that God perfectly foreknows in what inftances, and to what degree, every man will be virtuous or vicious, before his formation or conception. Secondly, that there are fome perfons, who, in fact, prove to be exceedingly vicious, by their being guilty of a great deal of moral evil, with respect to themselves, and thereby introduce a great deal of natural evil, or unhappiness, upon others. And, thirdly, that as there are fome actions neceffary to human formation or conception; fo there are a multitude of thofe actions which take place, and yet no conception follows. These things being premised, from hence it is argued, that either God does immediately interpofe, and by his parti cular providence render all those actions fuccessful upon which human conception depends, in all thofe inftances wherein conception does follow or accompany fuch actions; or else he does not interpofe, but leaves that affair to be conducted by thofe laws by which the natural world is governed. If the first is the cafe, then it would be an inftance of wisdom and goodness for God not to interpofe in all those cases upon which the lives of all vicious perfons depend, and thereby to prevent the exiftence of fuch perfons: whereas, by his interpofing, he does manifeftly occafion a multitude of evil. But, if the latter be the cafe, then it would be an inftance of wisdom and goodness for God to interpofe, and by his particular providence render the conception of all vicious perfons abortive; whereas, his forbearing to do this is a manifeft inftance of the contrary. With refpect to the first branch of the objection, it is fufficient to answer, that God does not interpofe, as aforefaid, to render thofe actions fuccefsful upon which human conception depends; conception being as much the produce of, and under the direction of the laws of nature, as any other branch of this fyftem of things; and thofe laws are as exactly complied with and followed in all those inftances in which conception does, as in those instances in which it does not follow or accompany fuch actions. With refpect to the latter part of the objection, the answer is, that if it would be an inftance of wisdom and goodness for God thus immediately to interpofe, and thereby to prevent evil, by preventing the exiftence of all vicious perfons, then it would be a like inftance of wifdon and goodness for him immediately to interpofe and prevent every hipwreck, every injurious fire, yea, every evil of every kind. The confequence of which would be the conftant fufpending of thofe laws by which the natural world is governed. So that the objection, in its last refult, amounts to this, namely, that it would have been an instance of wisdom and goodness for God not to have given being to this world. But this objection cannot be of weight, except it can be made appear that there has been more unhappiness than happiness introduced by it. If it should be farther urged, that tho things cannot be otherwife than they are in this respect, in the prefent ftate of things; yet God might, if he had pleased, have prevented the existence of all vicious perfons, by giving such laws to the natural world, as would have introduced none but perfons of virtue and bonour: I answer, that vice is not occafioned by any defect in the law of nature; but, on the contrary, it arifes from that liberty and freedom of action which takes place in every moral agent. The * human compofition is excellently constituted to ferve the purposes of virtue and true goodnefs; and, upon the whole, tends to render man an agreeable and a useful creature. But then, as man is a moral agent, he must be at liberty to direct or restrain his inclinations and endeavours, either to ferve the purposes of virtue, or the contrary: so that when vice takes place, this is fo far from being the produce of the laws of nature, that, on the contrary, it is the perverfion and abuse of those laws; and fuch abuse is the fubject of every man's free choice. So that to fay, God might have given fuch laws as would have prevented this evil, is the fame as to fay that he might have prevented our agencies. Besides, this objection is founded upon a fuppofition, that God foreknows in what inftances, and to what degree, every man will be either virtuous or vicious, before his formation or conception. But this is only prefumed, and not proved: and therefore as the ftrength of the objection chiefly depends upon the truth of this fuppofition, fo, till this point is proved, the objection cannot be of any weight. Again, See my Vindication of God's Moral Character. St Secondly, It is urged, that whereas all the moral, and a great part of the natural evil which is in the world, is occafioned by that liberty and freedom of action which takes place in man; and, whereas God foreknew that man would abufe that liberty, and that he will be feverely punished in another world for that abufe: therefore liberty, upon the whole, is a curfe and not a bleffing; it being better for man not to have this power, than to have it, and be liable to abuse it: and, confequently, as the witholding this gift from man would have been an inftance of wifdom and goodness, fo the making man a free creature is a manifeft inftance of the contrary. I answer, first, Whether God does or does not abfolutely foreknow the actions of men is a difputable point, which, I think, cannot be abfolutely determined on either fide: and therefore the divine prefcience ought not to be brought into the cafe; because, to argue from thence is to draw conclufions from uncertain principles. And as to the punishment which will be inflicted on vicious men in another world, this will be done in a way perfectly confiftent with divine wisdom and goodness. And whereas, in the objection, man is fuppofed capable of exifting, and enjoying the pleasures he now taftes, tho deftitute of liberty; and that God might have given or witheld this power from him as he pleased: this, I think, is a wrong reprefentation of the cafe; because liberty is abfolutely necessary to conftitute fuch a creature as man, and to render him capable of thofe pleafures he now enjoys. The pleasures with which man is here entertained, whether fenfual, intellectual, or moral, fuppofe him poffeffed of the faculties of intelligence and activity, to render him capable of those pleafures. So that where thefe faculties are wanting, as in ftones, trees, and the like, there is an utter incapacity for the enjoyment of thofe pleasures: and if agency is neceffary to render a creature capable of tafting the pleasures which this globe affords, then liberty is neceffary; because, ftrictly speaking, agency and liberty are the fame thing. So that the queftion will be at laft refolved into this, namely, whether it be confiftent with, or rather, whether it be an inftance of wisdom and goodness, or of the contrary, for God to call fuch a creature as man into being. To which I answer, Secondly, That man, as a free creature, comes under a two-fold confideration, viz. first, as a species of beings, who stand related to the rest of the animal world; and, in the exercife of their liberty, are the occafion of both evil and good to them. And, fecondly, as a fpecies of beings, who, in the exercise of their liberty, are introductive of both evil and good to each other. If we confider man, as he ftands related to the rest of the animal world, in this view the wisdom and goodness of God are abundantly difplayed; because man, in the exercife of his liberty, is introductive of much more happiness to the animals below him, than the contrary. For tho some particular animals, or fome particular species of them, may receive more evil than good from the hands of men; yet this is by no means the cafe, with refpect to the animal world in general. It is by man's labour and industry that the earth is cultivated and improved, by which means it yields a plentiful increase for their use. It is man who watches the feafons, and gathers in the fummer to preserve them in the |