winter, and makes that provifion for them which they are by no means capable of doing for themselves. So that, thro the care and industry of man, multitudes are called into being, which otherwife would have no existence. And as to thofe that would have exifted, the lives of multitudes of them are rendered more happy, and their deaths lefs afflictive than otherwife they would have been. This, I think, will appear to be the cafe, if we confider the fpecies of mankind, as feparated from this globe: fo that, I think, it may be truly faid that man is a blessing, or an inftance of divine goodness to the animal world. Again, if we confider man as a fpecies of beings who ftand related to, and in the exercise of their liberty are the cause of both evil and good to each other; in this view alfo, the producing of man into being will appear to be an instance of divine wisdom and goodness. Man, in his natural compofition, is not only capable of happiness, but he is likewife excellently constituted to promote and carry on the common happiness of his kind. So that the wifdom and goodness of God are abundantly fhewn in the human make and conftitution: and tho man is capable of vitiating his nature, and abufing his liberty, and thereby brings unhappiness upon himself and others of his fpecies; yet, I think, this ought not to be a bar to his existence, because, upon the whole, the evil introduced by the abuse of man's liberty is by no means equal to the good introduced by a right use of it.

It is true, that men are too apt to abuse their liberty, to ferve the purposes of vice and wickedness; and that there are fome perfons and fome places, and perhaps fome feafons, in which vice runs much higher than in others. But as to the generality of men and of their actions, if the cafe could be fairly examined, I imagine, that virtue and happiness would appear to have much the precedency in them over their contraries. For tho the inftances of perfons extraordinarily virtuous are but few, when compared with the generality of mankind; yet that is likewife the case of those who are extraordinarily vicious. The bulk of mankind, as their actions and characters are mixed, partly good and virtuous, and partly evil and vicious; fo they abound in the former more than in the latter. And this, I think, would evidently appear to be the cafe, if men would judge impartially from their own experience herein: then, I imagine, they would be forced to confefs, that they have, in the courfe of their lives, met with many more inftances of truth and honesty, of kindness and beneficence, than of their contraries. I fpeak this of the generality of mankind. Men are generally more inquifitive about the bad than the good deeds of their neighbours; by which means the former of thefe furnishes out materials for converfation, much more than the latter: fo that men's good works lie concealed, whilft their evil deeds are publifhed upon the houfe-top. Befides, one vicious action (like a dead fly in the ointment of perfume) fpoils a man's character, and makes all his good deeds to be overlooked, or elfe looked on with an evil eye. Moreover, men are apt to have a much quicker sense of the injuries done them, than of the benefits they receive from each other. And all these give occafion for a loud clamour, and raise an invincible prejudice against our fpecies: every one being ready to complain of the general prevalency of vice, tho no one will

al

allow the charge to be juft, with refpect to himself. If each individual should be charged with having been more frequent in the practice of falfhood and injuftice, of cruelty and inhumanity, than of the contrary virtues; I imagine there are but few who would plead guilty. Upon the whole, I think, there is just ground to prefume that it would appear, if it could be tried, that mankind (bad as they are, or as their cafe may be reprefented by an artful complainer) have much more virtue than vice amongst them; and, confequently, that the calling them into being is a manifeft inftance of divine wisdom and goodness. And, Tho fome men will be punished with unspeakable mifery in another world for their vicious behaviour here; yet, I think, that ought not in reason to bar a wife and good God from calling our fpecies into being; fince it is much more unreasonable and unkind, on the other fide, for God to withold his kindness and benevolence from a fpecies of beings, merely because fome of that fpecies will foolishly and wickedly exclude themfelves from being fharers in it, and bring upon themselves extreme mifery. Again,

Thirdly, It has been likewife objected, that I have not gone to the bottom, nor reach'd the main difficulty urged against human liberty, viz. that as motive is the excitement to action; fo a man is as much forced or compelled to act by that excitement, as a ftone is to fall to the earth, when it is thrown up into the air; because he not only does, but he must act according to the last or final judgment of his understanding, that is, he will and must always do what he judges beft at the time, it being impoffible for him to do otherwife.

This, I think, I have fully * answered in the tract referred to; wherein I have fhewn, that motive is not a power or active caufe, but barely a paffive reafon of the action; and in which I have likewife fhewn, that a man is not under a neceffity of doing what he judges beft at the time, whether the term best be used to fignify what is judged beft upon the whole, or what is judged will give him the greatest prefent pleasure. The cafe is the fame, whether the term best be ufed to fignify what is beft for a man'sfelf, or what is best for the publick, or the like. In which cafes, it is moft evident, that no man is under a neceffity of doing what he judges beft at the time, taking the term best in any one refpect whatever. The fame perfon at one time, chufes to gratify a natural inclination, without entering into the question, whether that gratification, upon the whole, be beft, or not: at another time he refolutely follows his inclination, tho under a conviction that that gratification, upon the whole, is wrong and, at another time, he chufes to deny himself that prefent pleasure, because he is convinced that, upon the whole, it is evil. And therefore to say that this perfon did, in all thefe inftances, do what he judged beft at the time, is to fix to the term best different and contrary ideas, and to introduce the utmoft confufion.

If it fhould be farther urged, that tho a man does not always do what he judges beft at the time, fuppofing the term best be used in the fame respect; yet he does always do what he judges beft, using that term in one refpect or other: I answer, admitting this to be true, yet it is not to the purpose: the be

Vindication of God's Moral Character.

ing beft at the time, that is, the giving the greatest prefent pleafure, and the being beft upon the whole, thefe are different and contrary ideas, when they come in competition; that is, when one is an excitement to act, and the other is an excitement to the contrary: which is frequently the cafe. So, again, the being beft for a man'sfelf, and the being beft for the publick, are different and contrary ideas, when they come in competition, as aforefaid. And therefore, as there is not any thing in the human compofition which neceffarily determines a man to prefer a prefent good to what is beft upon the whole; nor what is best upon the whole to what will give him the greatest present pleafure; nor to prefer his own interest to that of the publick, nor the publick intereft to his own: fo from hence it will follow, that action, in either cafe, is the produce, not of neceffity, but of liberty. If he prefers a prefent pleasure to what is beft upon the whole, or if he chufes otherwife, when these come in competition, he is voluntary herein; he might, if he had pleased, have chofe the contrary. Again, if a man prefers his own intereft to that of the publick, or prefers the publick to his own, in either cafe, it is a manifeft inftance of liberty; feeing there is not any thing in nature which neceffarily determines him to be either generous or selfish. So that the giving such a latitude to the term beft does not affect the cafe at all.

If it should be farther urged, that when a man prefers a prefent good to that which is best for him, upon the whole; he then judges that best which is the fubject of his prefent choice, or elfe he would not chufe it: I answer, this is a mistake: for if a man chufes a prefent pleasure, in oppofition to that which is beft, upon the whole, when he makes the comparison between them; then it is impoffible for him to chufe the former, under the confideration of its being best, because it is impoffible for a man to judge it best in the present cafe. It is not poffible, in the nature of the thing, for a man to judge, that a prefent momentary pleasure is really better than a future good, that is vastly greater in itself, and a thousand times more durable. The latter of thefe will unavoidably appear beft to every moral agent; it being above the power of every fuch agent to over-rule his judgment, and thereby to make himself think otherwife: I fay, this will unavoidably be the cafe, if he takes a view of these, and makes a comparison betwixt them; but if he makes no fuch comparison, then there is no place for the term best in the prefent queftion; then the prefent pleasure becomes a motive to action, not under the confideration of its being best, but under the confideration of its being a prefent pleasure. And tho a man cannot command his judgment, and make himself think that that pleasure is really preferable to a vaftly greater and more durable future good; yet he can command his actions: and herein confifts his liberty, he can give or deny himself that pleasure, as he pleases.

If it should be farther urged, that in this cafe a man does what he judges best at the time, not as beft, when compared with a greater good; but, in oppofition to felf-denial, he judges it better at that time to gratify his inclination than to deny it: I answer: that men do fometimes prefer a prefent pleasure to felf-denial is allowed; but that a fenfe of prefent pleasure compels them

to chufe it, this is denied upon good grounds, viz. because every act of selfdenial is an inftance of, and thereby an evident proof of the contrary.

If it should be urged, that, when a man denies himself, as aforefaid, he then judges felf-denial best; not beft, confidered as felf-denial, but as it leads to a greater future good: I answer, that to use the term best in so loose and confufed a way, as above, fometimes making it to fignify what is best in one respect; and when that will not answer the purpose, then to make it fignify what is beft in another refpect; and when that will not do, then to tack about to the former fenfe of the term best, and fo on: I fay, thus to ring the changes upon the term beft is to play with words, and looks more like banter han argument.

TREA

A

DISCOURSE

CONCERNING

PERSECUTION,

WHEREIN

The Grounds upon which Chriftians afflict and grieve, and bereave each other of Life, for their different Opinions in Matters of Religion, are examin'd.

T

HAT mankind have various and different opinions, with regard to a variety of fubjects, is abundantly evident from experience; but that fuch difference in fentiments becomes the ground and foundation for refentment is, I think, peculiar to the fubject of religion. If men differ ever fo much in their judgments, with regard to this or that or the other science, no perfecution follows; but if chriftians have happen'd to differ from each other in their religious principles, their paffions have been alarm'd, their resentment has been rais'd, and they have been too often led to hurt and injure, and fometimes to deftroy one another. And,

Tho the fuffering party, in their remonstrances with their afflictors, have urged the unchriftianliness and the unmanliness of fuch a procedure, and the unreasonableness of that burden which their fellow-chriftians have laid upon them; yet this has prov'd infufficient to obtain them relief. Yea, that which is most furprizing is, that those very fufferers, when they have gotten the reins of government into their own hands, have turned perfecutors, and have rejected thofe arguments against perfecution, which themselves had urged in their fuffering ftate. This having fometimes been the cafe, I thought it might not be amifs to enter into the question, by examining the grounds upon which chriftians afflict and grieve one another, for their different apprehensions in matters of religion.