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Human Nature vindicated:

OR, A

REPLY

то

Mr. BE AVE N's Book,

ENTITLED,

Supernatural Influences neceffary to Salvation; being a Vindication of the fourth Propofition of Robert Barclay's Apology. Wherein is fhewn, That Man, in his natural Capacity, is a Moral Agent; that he has Power, and is at Liberty to do both Good and Evil; and, confequently, can render himself either acceptable, or difpleafing to his Maker. In a fecond Letter to a Friend. Humbly offered to the Confideration of the People called Quakers.

SIR,

I

N my former letter, I gave you my opinion of Mr. Barclay's performance, with regard to man's natural ability fince the fall; and likewife the grounds and reafons, upon which that opinion is founded. And as I proposed it to publick confideration, fo it has given occafion to Mr. Beaven, to publish a tract, entitled, Supernatural Influences necessary to Salvation, &c. which he is pleased to call an answer to it. I, therefore, now crave leave to wait on you by a second letter; in order to let you fee that this performance of Mr. Beaven's is not fufficient to cover the weakness and confufion of Mr. Barclays scheme: which, I think, will appear in the following lines. And, that I may proceed in an open and fair way, and, thereby, render the cafe eafy and plain to my reader, in the following difcourfe, I think it proper, first, to examine, wherein the question or point in debate lies, betwixt Mr. Barclay and me: this being a pro

per

per expedient to prevent all wanderings from the fubject, whether on the right hand or the left. And, accordingly, I observe, that

The question betwixt me and Mr. Barclay is not, whether God does fometimes kindly interpofe, and by a fupernatural operation bring to men's view fuch useful truths, as they, thro floth, bigotry, or fome other impediment, are ignorant of, or do not attend to? or, whether by thofe operations he prefents fuch motives to men's minds as are neceffary to excite to good actions, ftill leaving them perfectly at liberty, as moral agents, whether they will hearken to and follow, or whether they will reject those wholesome counfels, as he, by fuch fupernatural operations, or, by the written word, is pleased to lay before them? Again,

The question is not, whether fuch fupernatural operations, as aforefaid, are or may be neceffary or expedient to fome men's falvation? I fay neceffary to fome men's falvation and, I think, the words of Chrift, as well as the nature of the thing, will justify me herein: The whole, faith our Lord, have no need of a phyfician, but they that are fick. I came not to call the righteous, but finners to repentance as in Mark ii. 17. Chrift here diftinguishes betwixt righteous men and finners, that is, betwixt those who make a right ufe of their agency to ferve the purposes of virtue and true goodness, and thofe who abuse their agency to ferve the purposes of vice and wickedness. And as he declares himself a phyfician only to the latter; fo all his operations, whether internal or external, are directed, to this end, viz. to prevail upon men to repent and amend their lives. Again, I fay [neceffary or expedient] to fome men's falvation; not upon the account of any want of agency in man, nor for want of natural ability to see the unfitnefs and vileness of his prefent conduct; nor for want of natural ability to act, or to refrain from acting, and fo to correct and amend his ways: but they are, or may be necessary or useful to fome men's falvation, upon the account of that ignorance, Stupidity, bigotry, felfishness, perverfeness, or the like, which take place in them, and are bars to their reflecting upon, and amending their ways. I fay, that the question or point in debate, betwixt Mr. Barclay and me, is not either of those points abovementioned. And this I obferve, once for all, and defire that it may be remembered throughout this controverfy. And, therefore, whatever in Mr. Beaven's book relates to thefe, or either of these points, is to be caft out of the cafe, as foreign to the prefent argument. And, when that is done, I imagine, his performance will not make a very great figure, when confidered, as under the character of an answer to me. Having thus fhewn wherein the question or point in debate does not confift, I now proceed to fhew wherein it does. And, accordingly, I obferve, that, in my examination of Mr. Barclay's principles, with regard to man's natural ability fince the fall, I reduced his fenfe of this point into the two following propofitions.

PROPOSITION I.

Man, confider'd as man, or that compound creature, confifting of understanding, of appetite, affection, &c. which sprang from Adam, as his original parent, has no power or ability, at any time, to think, speak, or act that which is good.

PRO

PROPOSITION II.

Man, confider'd as man, or that creature compounded and deriv'd, as aforefaid, is neceffarily determin'd, at all times, either by his own natural compofition, or by the agency of the ferpent, to think, speak, and act that which is evil.

Here I obferve, upon a fuppofition, that I have justly and truly represented Mr. Barclay's fenfe in the above propofitions; then the queftion or point in debate is apparently this, viz. whether man, in his natural ftate fince the fall, is an agent, or a patient? that is, whether the good and evil which is performed in, and by man, be the effect and product of his own will and agency, or of the will and agency of another? So that the question at prefent is, whether I have truly reprefented Mr. Barclay's fenfe, or not? With respect to which, I obferve, that, in my Examination of Mr. Barclay's Principles, &c. I fhewed the grounds, upon which I proceeded in fixing his fenfe, as above. And, as Mr. Beaven has not taken the pains to examine them, but has quoted a propofition from Mr. Barclay, and has fet that up as a ftandard, by which his fenfe is to be judged of: fo I am content, that the point in debate fhould be tried by it. But, that I may proceed regularly, in introducing the abovementioned propofition, I obferve, that after Mr. Beaven had complained of me, that I had not quoted all the fourth propofition, &c. (tho the remainder of the propofition, which I omitted, related to other things, with which the point I undertook to examine was not concerned; and, for that reafon, I omitted it) he proceeded to quote from Mr. Barclay, more largely than I had done; and, at laft, fums up the whole in the following propofition:

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“R. B. affirms and maintains, that man has power and ability, during a day of mercy and grace afforded to all men, thro the fupernatural influence and enlivening aid of Jefus Chrift, whereby man is put in a capacity of voluntary agency, to "think, speak, and act that which is good. See Apology, pages 114, 115, 116, 117; 132, 133; 147, 148, 149, 150, 151.

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I have not examin'd Mr. Barclay's book, to fee whether this propofition is put down in the fame words, in the pages here referred to, or, whether it may be fairly deduced from what Mr. Barclay has faid in thofe pages; but take it upon truft from Mr. Beaven, that either they are the very words of Mr. Barclay, or elfe that they exprefs the true fenfe of what he has faid: prefuming that Mr. Beaven would not mifreprefent the author he was defending. And, as the above propofition is, by the mutual confent both of Mr. Beaven and me, made the touchstone, by which Mr. Barclay's fenfe is to be tried; fo I fhall underftand the terms of which it is compofed in their plain and obvious fenfe, that is, in the sense which common ufage has affixed to them. And, accordingly, I obferve, that, in this propofition, there are two things maintained; the one is expreffed, and the other implied. The thing expreffed is, that man, thro the fupernatural influence and enlivening aid of Jefus Christ, is put in a capacity of voluntary agency. The thing implied is, that man, confidered abstractedly from, and antecedent to that fupernatural influence, is not in a capacity of voluntary a

gency;

gency; and, confequently, that he is a mere patient, who does not act, but is acted upon. It is the fame as if I fhould fay, that my Lord King, by, or thro the grace of his Majefty King George, is made a Peer of Great Britain. Now, in this propofition, there are two things maintained; the one is expreffed, the other is implied. The thing expreffed is, that my Lord King, by the grace of his Majefty, is made a Peer of Great Britain. The thing implied is, that my Lord King, before his Majesty's favour to him, as aforefaid, was not a Peer, but only a commoner of Great Britain: for, if he had been a Peer, antecedent to his Majefty's favour, then, that grace could not poffibly make him to be what he was before. And this is the very cafe, with refpect to the propofition I have now under confideration: for, if man is, by a fupernatural influence, put in a capacity of voluntary agency; then, it will unavoidably follow, that man, confider'd abstractedly from, and antecedent to that fupernatural influence, or in the language of Mr. Barclay, man in the fall, is not in a flate or a capacity of voluntary agency. Becaufe fuch a fupernatural operation cannot poffibly put him in a state or capacity, which ftate he was in, antecedent to that operation. And, confequently, upon Mr. Barclay's principles, man, in his natural state, is a mere patient: for betwixt these, viz. agent and patient, there is no medium. And tho the word voluntary is annexed to the term agent, in the above propofition, yet that does not help the cafe: because every agent is free or voluntary in those instances, and fo far as he is an agent; a necessary agent being a manifest contradiction. Thus, it appears from the propofition which Mr. Beaven has urged, that I have justly and truly reprefented Mr. Barclay's fenfe, in the two propofitions I have expreffed it by, viz. that man, as he is in the fall, has no power or ability to do good, and that he is neceffarily determined to do evil. I fay, neceffarily determined, &c. For, tho Mr. Barclay has not expreffed himself in thofe very terms, yet it is in terms which are equivalent to them: for he faith, that, as a stone is prone and inclined to move down, towards the center; so the heart of man is prone, and inclined to evil, &c. (See the explanation of the fourth propofition in Mr. Barclay's Apology.) Now the proneness or inclination which is in a fone to move down, towards the center, is not fuch a proneness or inclination as is in a man to liquor, when he is thirsty; because this proneness fuppofes in man a power and liberty, either to indulge or controul that inclination; whereas the pronenefs which is in a stone to move down, towards the center, fuppofes neceffity; the ftone having no power or liberty to check or indulge that inclination: and, therefore, as man, according to Mr. Barclay, is prone and inclined to evil, in the like manner as a ftone is prone and inclined to move down, towards the center; fo this proneness and inclination, in man, must be the fame as neceffity. And tho Mr. Beaven has urged the above propofition, as the fum of what Mr. Barclay has faid upon the point I have under confideration: yet he intended thereby to fhew, that I had mifreprefented Mr. Barclay's fenfe, which is a little furprizing; because he takes Mr. Barclay's propofition in one view, intending thereby to deftroy or make void the fame propofition in another view.

If it fhould be urged, that Mr. Beaven has quoted from Mr. Barclay's book feveral paragraphs, wherein the agency of the natural man is openly avowed;

I answer, this is what I have already allowed, in my Examination of Mr. Barclay's Principles, &c. and, therefore, Mr. Beaven's quotations were needless. But then, what will follow from hence? why, truly, nothing more nor less than this, viz. that Mr. Barclay's fcheme is confufion, and a contradiclion to itself. Befides, the fundamental principle, in Mr. Barclay's scheme, I take to be this, viz. that man, in his natural capacity, cannot do good, without a fupernatural influence. And if fo, then, man, in his natural ftate, muft, upon Mr. Barclay's principles, be destitute of moral agency. And, confequently, I have juftly and truly reprefented his fenfe of the point in queftion, in the two propofitions I have expreffed it by. Moral agency confifts in a power and liberty to do, or avoid doing all that good and evil, confidered as fuch, which comes within the reach of that agency and, therefore, to fay, that a moral agent cannot do good, without a fupernatural influence, is to fay a manifeft contradiction; except the agent be placed in fuch circumftances, as that no good action can poffibly come within the reach of his agency; which, furely, is not the cafe of man. Vain and trifling, therefore, is that pretence, viz. that Mr. Barclay allows moral agency to the natural man; because fuch an allowance is inconfiftent with, and deftructive of the forementioned fundamental principle of his fcheme. This is what I would particularly recommend to the confideration of Mr. Barclay's adherents: and I prefume it will be allowed, that they ought either to clear his scheme from that confufion and contradiction I here charge upon it; or else to give up a scheme which cannot be defended. Upon the whole, it evidently appears that the queftion or point in debate, betwixt Mr. Barclay and me, is, as I have ftated it above, viz. whether man, in his natural capacity, is an agent, or a patient: which was the first thing I propofed to enquire into. proceed, next,

To examine, on which fide of this queftion the truth lies. And tho I think I might very fairly excufe myfelf from offering any thing, in defence of that fide of the queftion which belongs to me, feeing I have already prov'd the agency of man, in my Examination of Mr. Barclay's Principles, &c. and Mr. Beaven has not produced the Shadow of a proof, with refpect to the contrary; yet, as the question is now before me, I fall offer what follows. By man in his natural state, I mean man confider'd barely as man, and as the kind has been propagated down from Adam to this prefent time, without any thing superadded. And here I prefume it will be allowed, that the idea, annex'd to the term man, contains a body fitly organized and formed, in the general, as all our bodies are; and that this body is actuated by a mind, whofe principal faculties are intelligence and activity. Intelligence, by which it is capable of thinking or taking in ideas, of reflecting upon things paft, prefent, or to come, according as it has received informations, and of looking into the nature and the confequences of things, and thereby of forming a judgment of the fitnefs or unfitnefs of actions; and a faculty or power of felf-motion or action, by which it moves and directs the body in that way, and to ferve fuch purposes, as it intends. And as the idea, which we fix to the term man, arifes from the human compofition, as aforefaid; fo that compofition is the effect or produce of nature, and not of a fupernatural influence; that is, it is the produce of thofe laws by

which

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