wanderings from the subject; and, then, I am perfuaded, the controverfy will foon come to an end. To conclude: I obferve, that the great end and purpose of Chrift's coming into the world was to fave finners; and not to put men in a capacity of finning. He came not to make us men, by putting us in a capacity of voluntary agency; but to make us good men, by ufing all those methods which are confiftent with, and proper to work on moral agents, whether by internal or external operations: thereby to engage us to repent and amend our ways; to live godlily, foberly, and righteously in this world, and fo to fit and prepare us for the happiness of another. And, I perfuade myself, that, in this view, chriftianity is capable of being defended.

Once more, and I have done: either man, in his natural capacity, is a moral agent, or he is not; if he is, then, man, in his natural state, has power, and is at liberty to do, or avoid doing either good, or evil; and, confequently, has power, and is at liberty to render himself acceptable or difpleafing to his Maker, without a fupernatural influence: I fay, this must be unavoidably his cafe, fuppofing him to be a moral agent. For, if man, in his natural state, has not a power and liberty of doing or avoiding either good, or evil, and, confequently, of rendering himfelf acceptable or difpleafing to his Maker; then, he is not an agent, but a mere patient. And, to fay in this cafe, that there is in man a proneness and inclination to fin, is to fay nothing to the purpose: because, in a free creature, it is fuppofed that there is a power and liberty either to indulge or controul that proneness and inclination. So that a power and liberty of doing good, or evil, of pleafing or difpleafing God, ftill remains for if this proneness and inclination to fin either destroys or is inconfiftent with a power and liberty of doing good, or evil, of pleafing or difpleafing God, as aforefaid; then, it is the fame as neceffity, and, confequently, it destroys or is inconfiftent with our agency. But if man, in his natural capacity, is not a moral agent, then, I acknowledge his cafe to be otherwife than I have represented it to be; and, when that is fhewn, I will give up the point. However, this, I think, is a matter of the utmost importance, and in which mankind are nearly concerned; because all morality and religion have an apparent dependance upon it. For if man is fuch a creature, as I have above proved him to be; that is, if he has in him a power and liberty of doing either good, or evil, and either of thefe is the fubject of his own free choice, fo that he might, if he had pleased, have chofe and done the contrary; then, his actions, in every instance, will be more or lefs religious, or irreligious, virtuous, or vicious, as the motives to those actions, which are the ground and reafon of them, are more or less fo: and then those actions will be justly approved, or condemned, not only in the judgment of God, but of every man's own confcience accordingly. But if man in his natural capacity, as man, has not a power and liberty, as aforefaid, then, with respect to him, thofe actions, which are performed by his inftrumentality, have no religion nor irreligion, virtue nor vice in them; neither can he, in justice and equity, be approved, or condemned, in his own confcience, nor in the judgment of any other being, upon the account of them. And as a power and liberty of doing either good, or evil is abfolutely neceffary to render our actions religious, or irreligious, virtuous, or vicious; fo

every principle which destroys or is inconfiftent with human liberty, I think, ought carefully to be guarded againft, as being highly injurious to mankind. For when men confider themfelves under a fatality, and that their actions are not the fubject of their own free choice; whether that fatality be brought upon them by the fall of Adam, or any other way; or whether it appears under the difguife of another name; then, not only the exciting or reftraining influence, which otherwise might arife from a fenfe of the good, or evil, of the action in view, is taken away; but also every motive to virtue and religion is weakened, if not destroyed by it; becaufe, in this cafe, the actions, which are performed in, and by man, are not, ftrictly and properly, the effect and produce of his own will and agency, but of the will and agency of another. And as the fundamental principle in Mr. Barclay's fcheme is, that man cannot do good, without a fupernatural influence; and as this principle is inconfiftent with human liberty, as I have fhewn above; fo the ground or reafon of my examining Mr. Barclay, on this head, was not to engage myself in a wrangling controversy, but to prevent the misleading of mankind in a point of fuch importance. And as, in the foregoing discourse, I have fully proved the agency of the natural man, and, I think, thereby have faid all that is neceffary, or that the subject requires; fo I fhall take my leave of it and you, who am,

SIR, your obliged humble Servant, &c.

TREATISE XXV

SOME SHORT

Remarks upon Dr. Morgan's Tract,

ENTITLED,

A Letter to Mr. Chubb; occafioned by his two Letters to a Friend, c. In a third Letter to a Friend. Humbly offered to the Confideration of the People called Quakers.

SIR,

I

HAVE received a letter fubfcribed by Dr. Morgan, which, he fays, is occafioned by my two former letters to you. The fubject of the Doctor's letter is chiefly made up of complaints. First, that I offer'd the foremention'd letter to the confideration of the Quakers only; whereas, if I had not been partial, if I had not made myself a party-man, and the like, I should

have offered them to the Calvinistical Church of England, and to a multitude of others: tho, by the way, this, I think, is ufing the Church of England unkindly; for, however the cafe were heretofore; yet, I am perfuaded, Dr. Morgan is fenfible that the generality of the Church of England at prefent, both Clergy and Laity, have given up Calvinism, as erroneous. Secondly, that I have very much mifrepresented Mr. Barclay. And, under both thefe heads of complaint, I am reprefented, as acting a part very unfair and difingenuous.

As to the first complaint, I anfwer, that I cannot charge myfelf with having any vicious view in this matter. For as Mr. Barclay's book is ftyl'd, An Apology for the true Chriftian Divinity, as the fame is held forth and preached by the People called Quakers; and as, I apprehend, Mr. Barclay's Apology is held in great veneration by the people of that profeffion, who, therefore, probably are much influenc'd by it; fo I thought it was fuitable and proper to recommend what I had to offer upon the fubject, to their confideration, not in the least intending thereby to make myself a party-man, or to infinuate any thing which might be dishonourable to the Quakers. This is the truth of the cafe; but, whether it will be to the Doctor's fatisfaction, I know not. And, whether I have given any juft occafion for what he has urged against me upon this head, I will leave to the more candid world to judge. Again,

Secondly, It is urged that I have very much misreprefented Mr. Barclay. In answer to which I observe, that, in the 27th page of Dr. Morgan's letter, he expreffes himself in the following words. "It might, for ought I know, be "Barclay's opinion, that the ftate of mankind, confidered merely as fallen in "Adam, without the death of Chrift, or the recovering grace of God thro him, would have been the fame as reprefented in your propofitions: that is, men would have been abfolutely fubjected to the power of the devil, and their "own lufts, under an incurable ignorance, blindness, and felfishness; in which cafe, man would not have been a moral agent, or accountable for his actions. And, in consequence of this, man would have perished with the beasts, or have remained for ever under the power of death, without any refurrection to "life and immortality. And I am the more apt to think that this might be Barclay's opinion, because I take it to be the true fcripture account of the "matter. Here I obferve, that Dr. Morgan acknowledges that Mr. Barclay's opinion of the condition of man in the fall, confidered abftractedly from, and without the grace of Chrift, may be, and he thinks that it is, what I have reprefented it to be, in the two propofitions I have expreffed it by. Now, if this be admitted to be the cafe, then, it is highly reasonable to fuppofe that Mr. Barclay expreffed this opinion in that propofition, wherein he profeffedly undertook to treat of this subject: and if fo, then, furely, I cannot have misreprefented him in my two propofitions, because I only reprefented him, as speaking his own opinion set forth and declared in his own propofition. And here I crave leave to obferve, that tho the Doctor's complaint against me, of misreprefenting Mr. Barclay, makes up a great part of his letter, and is every way reprefented to my difadvantage; yet this complaint, by his own acknowledgment, is perfectly groundless.

Mr. Barclay fpeaks of man under a two-fold confideration, first, as he is in,

what

what we call, his natural condition, viz. man as man, or as the natural feed of Adam, or as he is in the fall, with refpect to his capacities and abilities, confidered abftractedly from the grace of Chrift, or any fupernatural influence upon him. Secondly, He confiders man, with refpect to his capacities and abilities, when under a fupernatural influence, and the enlivening aid of Jefus Chrift. But, then, he does not confider man, in this laft view, as his ftate in the fall, but, on the contrary, as having fomething fupernatural afforded him to restore and recover him from that fall. So that the condition of man in the fall, in Mr. Barclay's fenfe, is the natural ftate and condition of every man, as he is a man, or the offspring of Adam, with refpect to his capacities and abilities, at all times, and in all places, confidered abftractedly from the grace of Chrift, or any fupernatural influence upon him. Dr. Morgan indeed, in treating of this fubject, expreffes himself differently from Mr. Barclay, and fpeaks of man, not what he is, but what he would have been in the fall, without the grace of Christ. Whereas Mr. Barclay expreffes himself thus: "All Adam's pofterity, or mankind, both Jew and Gentile, as to the firft Adam or earthly man, are fallen, "degenerate, and dead," not would have been fallen, degenerate, and dead. Again, "man, therefore, as he is in this ftate, can know nothing aright"; not as he would have been in another flate, he would not have known any thing aright. Here we fee, that the condition of man in the fall, according to Mr. Barclay, is not any chimerical Hottentot Yahoo state, which man would have been in, without the grace of Chrift; but it is the ftate and condition of mankind, which they are in, as they are barely men, or the offspring of Adam, confider'd as fuch, without any fupernatural influence upon them. Whether by this different way of fpeaking, which, I find, runs thro the Doctor's letter, he intended to convey to his reader the fame idea of the condition of man in the fall, as plainly appears to arife from Mr. Barclay's words, and which, I think, he ought to intend, if he would be ingenuous in the defence of that author; or whether he intended another view of the condition of man in the fall, than what Mr. Barclay profeffedly treats of, I know not, neither am I follicitous about it, because the cafe is not changed by any wrong reprefentation which may be given of it. Man being reprefented in a two-fold view by Mr. Barclay, as I obferved above; I undertook to examine his principles, only with respect to one of those views, viz. man as he is in the fall. And to this I applied myself, both in my Examination of Mr. Barclay's Principles, and in my Reply to Mr. Beaven: wherein I have taken a view of the natural condition of man, confider'd abstractedly from, and without the grace of Chrift; and, I think, have fully fhewn, that human nature is very much misreprefented by Mr. Barclay, without blending together and confounding his two-fold view of man, as the Doctor represents me to have done. And as I undertook to examine Mr. Barclay's opinion in this one point, viz. the condition of man,as man, or as he is the natural feed of Adam,or as he is in the fall, confidered abstractedly from, and without the grace of Chrift; fo I reduced his fenfe of this point to two plain propofitions: which propofitions Dr. Morgan allows may be a just and true reprefentation of Mr. Barclay's fenfe herein; and that man in this view, according to Mr. Barclay, is not a moral agent, is not accountable, &c. and if so, then, I have not mifreprefented him; and, confequently, Dr. Morgan's complaint is groundless, by his own acknowledgment.

But

But, then, the Doctor obferves, that it will not follow from hence that man is a mere patient: for tho, in his natural condition, he is not a moral agent; yet he is an agent, fuch as the brute beasts are. To which I anfwer, that according to the Doctor's representation of the condition of man in the fall, which he thinks may be the opinion of Mr. Barclay, men, without the grace of Chrift, would be abfolutely fubjected to the power of the devil and their own lufts and if so, then, what fort of agency would remain in them, I cannot conceive; not, furely, fuch agency as takes place in brutes, because they are not abfolutely fubjected, as aforefaid, their actions being the effect of choice or election; for otherwise they could not be agents. A mere machine is abfolutely fubjected to the power of the agent, which acts upon it; and one agent may be abfolutely fubjected to the power of another, when he has not fufficient ftrength to repel force with force: but, then, in such a case, he does not act, but is acted upon. Whereas, in all cafes, where action takes place, or where there is fufficient ftrength to repel force with force; there both activeness and paffiveness, or action and paffion, is the produce of choice or election; and, confequently, there is not abfolute fubjection. So that if man, as he is in the fall, according to Mr. Barclay and Dr. Morgan, is abfolutely fubjected to the power of the devil and his own lufts; then, in that state, he is not an agent, but a patient. And this must be his cafe, both without and with the grace of Chrift; except the work of grace confifts in turning a patient into an agent, which, I prefume, Dr. Morgan will not affirm.

power

But admitting that fuch agency, as is in brute beafts, would take place in the natural man, upon Mr. Barclay's principles; yet the Doctor does not pretend that this is the truth of the cafe: he only obferves, that it appears to him to be the true fcripture account of the cafe, and that he thinks it is not contrary to the reafon of things or the conftitution of human nature. As to its being the scripture account of the cafe, viz. that man, in his natural capacity, is not a moral agent; that his foul is naturally mortal, and dies or perishes with the body, &c. This, I think, is using the fcripture unkindly, because, I imagine, it is out of his to fhew that there are any fuch doctrines contained therein. Surely, nothing is more plain and evident in the fcriptures, than that the work of grace confifts in changing men from bad to good, and not in turning brutes, ftrictly and properly fo called, into men. And as to its being the Doctor's opinion, that it is not contrary to the conftitution of human nature, that men fhould be brutes, and not moral agents; in this I can fcarce believe him. That men may neglect, as well as abuse their faculties, and fo live in a way which is unworthy of and below their reafon, is eafy to be conceived, and is, I think, the cafe of the Hottentots. But that a man fo well acquainted with the human conftitution, as Dr. Morgan may reasonably be fuppofed to be, can think that brutality, and not moral agency, may be the natural refult of the conftitution of man, when that conftitution has not fuffer'd any injury by any accident which may attend it; this is what I am doubtful of. I cannot but think that the Doctor has obferved, in the course of his practice, as a phyfician, many inftances of perfons who have become delirous or lunatick, when they have been under a violent fever, or fome other diforder upon their conftitutions; and fo, for a time, have ceased to be moral agents; and that, by the application of proper medicines, the disorder upon the conftitution has been removed,

Y y

the