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the deliroufness or lunacy has ceafed; and the perfon has returned again to a state of moral agency. Now, the question arifing from hence will be, whether deliroufnefs or lunacy, or whether moral agency in fuch a perfon, be the natural refult of the human conftitution? and which of these states may, strictly and properly, be faid to be the natural state of that perfon? Or the question may be, when a man becomes delirous or lunatick, whether this arifes from his ceafing to be under the grace of Christ, and thereby ceafing to be a moral agent; or whether it be the effect of a diforder in his conftitution? And, when his deliroufness or lunacy goes off, whether this be the effect of the return of the grace of Chrift upon him, and by its return he becomes a moral agent again; or whether it be not the effect of the removal of a diforder from the conftitution, and fo the creature is restored again to what is properly its natural state, viz. moral agency? The like may be faid of idiots. For, I think, upon Dr. Morgan's fcheme, idiotifm is not the refult of fome defect in the particular conftitution of the idiot, but it is occafioned by the grace of Chrift, or a fupernatural influence, being witheld from him. These are cafes which, I think, are proper to be confidered, in order to our difcerning and judging, whether brutality, or moral agency, may be the natural refult of the human conftitution. But to return,

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If it fhould be faid, Tho man, in his natural condition, according to Mr. Barclay, is abfolutely fubjected to the power of the devil and his own lufts, and fo is upon a level with the brute beafts, or in a ftate below them; yet that no contradiction arifes from hence. I answer; Mr. Barclay expreffes himself differently, with refpect to the natural condition of man in the fall, in other parts of his book; as in page 144, as quoted by Mr. Bearsen: "Indeed, that man, as he is a ratio"nal creature, hath reason, as a natural faculty of his foul, by which he can "difcern things that are rational, we deny not.' Here we fee that the natural man is confider'd as a rational creature, one who has reafon as a natural faculty of his foul, by which he can difcern things that are rational: and, if fo, then, furely, he is a moral agent; and this I call confufion and contradiction. Befides, the Doctor fays, page 23. « Tis plain that Barclay here fuppofes that the good and evil feed as he calls it, that is, the motives and inducements that incline and dispose men to felffness on the one hand, or to benevolence on the other, do not act neceffarily, or produce their effects by any irrefiflible agency upon the mind; but "leave men entirely to their liberty, and natural power of chufing and refufing, whether they will refift or not refift, comply with or reject either the one or "the other." And, if fo, then, I think, it will not only follow that man is a free creature, and a moral agent, but also that he is fuch, antecedent to, and independent of all fupernatural influences, whether good, or evil: and then, I think, man's ability in the fall, and out of the fall, comes to the fame thing; which brings more confufion ftill. For, according to Mr. Barclay, man in the fall is a free creature, and he is not a free creature; he is a moral agent, and he is not a moral agent; he is abfolutely fubjected to the power of the devil and his own lufts, and he is not abfolutely fubjected to the power of the devil and his own lufts. I fay, this will unavoidably be the cafe, upon Mr. Barclay's fcheme. And it appears to be so, without confounding the two views he takes of man, which the Doctor reprefents me to have done. And this is fuch confufion and contradiction, as,

I imagine, Dr. Morgan will not be able to get clear off.

But

But to conclude: the Doctor tells me that my notion of Chrift's redemption, and the neceffity of divine grace is, he thinks, a little extraordinary for a chriftian. Let it be fo. He likewife tells me, 'tis by way of fcorn and reproach, and with an air of ridicule, that Chrift tells the proud felf-juftifying Pharifees, that he had no business or concern with them, as fuch. But if he will pleafe to confider the text, I think, he may fee that Chrift, in that place, is not reproaching the Pharifees, but juftifying himself and his own conduct, in keeping company with Publicans and Sinners: and this he does by telling them, that, in this, he was perfuing the great end and purpose of his miniftry, and like a good phyfician, who ministers not to the healthful, but to the fick. So his bufinefs was to apply himself, not to the good and virtuous, but to vicious men, to bring them to repentance and amendment of life. But fuppofing I am mistaken herein, yet, furely, Dr. Morgan's notion or representation of Chrift's redemption is fomewhat extraordinary, as well as mine. With him, it is extended to all mankind, without exception; and yet the poor Hottentots are excepted, they are left in their fallen ftate, without any redemption; they are to die like brute beafts as they are, and to remain under the power of death, without any refurrection to life and immortality. And fo the chriftian redemption is a general redemption, as it is extended univerfally to all; and it is a particular redemption, as the poor Hottentots are excluded from it. But, I fhall leave the Doctor, with his confused and contradictory Hottentot scheme; prefuming he is as fingular herein, as, he imagines, I am in mine.

Thus, Sir, I have given you a fhort view of Dr. Morgan's letter, and have fhewn you how groundless his complaints against me are; and if he should go on as he has begun, then, I think, I fhall give you no farther trouble on his account.

I am, Sir,

Your obliged humble Servant, &c.

TREA

Y y 2

Scripture Evidence confider'd:

IN

A View of the Controverfy, betwixt the Author and Mr. Barclay's Defenders, viz. Mr. Beaven and Dr. Morgan. Wherein is shewn, What Qualifications are abfolutely neceffary to take Place in the Bible, in order to render it capable of being the Rule of Truth; and that, as it is such a Rule, the following Propofition, viz. that Man cannot do what is morally Good, without a Supernatural Influ ence, is not, nor cannot be contained therein. In a fourth Letter to a Friend. Humbly offered to the Confideration of the People called Quakers.

SIR,

I'

N my first letter, I gave you my opinion of Mr. Barclay's principles, with refpect to man's natural ability fince the fall; and fhewed you that this fcheme is confufion, and a contradiction to itself. This has alarmed the Qua

kers, or fome of them at least; and tho they cannot defend those principles, yet they seem unwilling they should be given up. And this has given occafion to Mr. Beaven to appear in Mr. Barclay's defence, in a tract entitled, Supernatural Influences neceffary to Salvation, &c. What he has principally offer'd, in favour of Mr. Barclay, is, that I have mireprefented him in the two propofitions, by which I have expreffed his fenfe of the condition of man in the fall; and likewife that my principles are very injurious; that Mr. Barclay was allow'd to be a very great man; that he has declar'd otherwife than what my two propofitions fet forth, in other parts of his book; that I have contradicted myself; that Monro and Locke, Tully and Hierocles, were of Mr. Barclay's opinion; and that the fcriptures are on his fide of the question. The groundlefness of fome of these, and the weakness of the reft, I have fully fhewn, in my fecond letter.

Which letter, together with the former, hath drawn forth another advocate for Mr. Barclay, namely, Dr. Morgan, in a tract, entitled, A Letter to me; which letter is principally made up of complaints, viz. that I recommended my two letters to the confideration of the Quakers only; whereas if I had not been partial, if I had not made myself a party-man, &c. I should have offer'd them to a multitude of others; and likewife that I have very much misreprefented Mr. Barclay. The groundlesness of these complaints I have fhewn you, in my third letter. Dr. Morgan has also appear'd a second time, in a tract entitled, A farther Defence of Mr. Barclay; in which tract he gives a particular account of the condi

tion of man in the fall, when confider'd abstractedly from fupervening grace. And this new scheme he confiders as Mr. Barclay's, and as the fcripture account of the matter, viz. that man in the fall, without fupervening grace, has natural liberty, but is deftitute of moral agency. This diftinction he complains I have not made, and it is with him a distinction of fuch importance, that it helps him out upon all occafions; with refpect to which, I allow the Doctor, if that will please him, that there may be natural liberty in a creature, where there is not moral agency; but where moral agency takes place, which is the cafe of man, there natural liberty and moral agency are the fame thing; and, therefore, I made no such distinction, becaufe, in the cafe before us, there is no place for it.

A

By natural liberty I understand the Doctor means, that man in the fall, without fupervening grace, has power, and is at liberty, to act, or not act, from such motives as are prefent to his mind; that he has power, and is at liberty, either to follow, or to controul his appetites and paffions, and the like. This is the idea which the words, natural liberty, convey to me. But how fuch liberty will confift with man's being abfolutely fubjected to the power of his own lufts is what I cannot conceive. Abfolute fubjection, in the present case, seems to fuppofe, that when paffion or appetite interpofe, man is necessarily and unavoidably carry'd on to action, independent of his own will or choice: but, then, this appears to me inconfiftent with natural liberty, and is confufion and contradiction; tho poffibly the Doctor, by the help of fome lucky diftinction, may get clear off it. gain, if man has natural liberty, then, how he is abfolutely fubjected to the power of the devil is hard to conceive. Abfolute fubjection, in this cafe, feems to fuppofe, that when the devil exercifes his power in or upon a man, action from that man will unavoidably follow according to the devil's intention; and that, in fuch a cafe, it is not in a man's power to refrain from acting, or to act otherwife: but, then, this is inconfiftent with natural liberty. And if we confider the devil's power to confift only in tempting men to the performance of this or that action, which it has hitherto been judged to be; and if man has natural liberty, as aforefaid, then, it is a matter of choice or election to every man, either to comply with, or to reject the devil's temptations. But, then, in this cafe, man is not abfolutely fubjected to the devil's power; fo that the whole is manifeft confufion and contradiction. Besides, it has hitherto been judged, that the work and business of the devil with man has been to tempt and betray him into fin; whereas man in the fall having only natural liberty, and being deftitute of moral agency, he is incapable of finning, and, confequently, of being tempted to fin. And when we confider the cafe, in this view, it will be hard to find what is the ground of the devil's temptations, and what it is which makes him to intereft himself in the affairs of mankind; tho, perhaps, this may be all clear'd up in the Doctor's next performance.

If it should be urged, that I have used the terms, abfolute fubjection, in a fenfe too strong for what Dr. Morgan intended. I anfwer, if abfolute fubjection does not force to action, but men are at liberty to act, or not to act, notwithstanding fuch fubjection; then, I think, the case will stand thus, viz. that there are appetites and paffions in men; and that they have power, and are at liberty either to indulge or controul them; that the devil tempts men; and that they have power, and are at

liberty

liberty either to comply with, or reject his temptations. So that men's being abfolutely fubjected to the power of the devil and their own lufts amounts just to nothing at all. In the Doctor's first tract, men's being abfolutely fubjected to the power of the devil and their own lufts feems to be confidered and ranged among the terrible effects of the fall. But, in this view of the cafe, it is no effect of the fall at all: it is the condition of man, whether standing, or fallen, whether with, or without fupervening grace, except fupervening grace irresistibly determines men to action; which, I prefume, the Doctor will not affirm, because, I think, he has elsewhere declar'd the contrary. Appetites and paffions, and being tempted, and likewise a power and liberty to indulge or controul thofe appetites and paffions, and to comply with or reject temptations, took place in our first parents, antecedent to their tranfgreflion; and this was their cafe, after they had tranfgreffcd. And the cafe must be always the fame with man, whilft he is conftituted and circumftanced as he is, and whilft agency or liberty take place in him: and, therefore, I cannot conceive to what end the Doctor introduced those terms, viz. men's being abfolutely fubjected to the power of the devil and their own lufts, except it were to amufe and mislead his reader. Thus, I have confider'd the cafe of man in the fall upon Dr. Morgan's fcheme, with refpect to what man has, viz. natural liberty. I now come to confider his cafe, with refpect to what he has not, viz. moral agency.

By the want of moral agency in man, I understand the Doctor means, that man in the fall, without fupervening grace, is incapable of difcerning betwixt good and evil, in a moral fenfe; that is, man is incapable of discerning, that to fuccour and relieve the diftreffed, to feed the hungry, clothe the naked, and the like, are actions which are kind and good, and, therefore, proper for him to perform. He is incapable of difcerning, that to do as he would be done by, to make a grateful acknowledgment of a benefit received, to honour and reverence a benefactor, and the like, are actions which are right and fit, and, therefore, worthy of his performance. He is incapable of difcerning, that to flander and revile his neighbour, to invade his property, or to commit adultery, murder, and the like, are actions which are wrong and evil, and, therefore, ought to be avoided. And, as this is the condition of man in the fall, according to Dr. Morgan; fo, according to him, man is tranflated out of this into another state, viz. that of moral agency, by fupervening grace; which grace is extended univerfally to all, tho, according to his first tract, the poor Hottentots are excepted; and, according to his last performance, it is very partially adminifter'd; because fome perfons, for want of fupervening grace, remain in invincible ignorance, with refpect to fome points, and upon others the effects of the fall remain in part. For tho they can reason justly, in fome cafes, yet they are mad, with refpect to others; tho they can govern and reftrain their appetites and paffions, in fome inftances, yet thofe appetites and paffions are invincible, in others, according as fupervening grace is afforded or witheld from them. And hereby I think the Doctor, whether he intends it, or not, is giving a most fatal wound to religion and virtue, and doing fuch injury to mankind, as he may never be able to repair, by his pointing out to men a way to excufe and justify themfelves in the practice of every vileness. For will not every man, who follows his vicious inclinations, be glad to have this to plead to, and

for

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