Reflections on Natural Liberty.

WHEREIN

The Cafe of Liberty, and Neceffity, when confidered, as a proper Foundation for Virtue and Religion, for Rewards and Punishments, is examined. Occafioned, by Dr. Morgan's Tract, entitled, A Defence of Natural and Revealed Religion. In a fifth Letter to a Friend.

SIR,

of

Should not have given you any farther trouble, on the subject of my former letters, were it not that, fince my laft, a fcheme of fatality has been advanced, in favour of Mr. Barclay's principles: which fcheme is confidered, as the foundation of virtue and religion, of rewards and punishments. This gives me an occasion of sending you a fifth letter, in order to examine the forementioned scheme, as to the particulars here referred to. And, accordingly, I obferve, that, in my Examination of Mr. Barclay's Principles, I fhewed what, I apprehend, conftitutes an agent, viz. " intelligence and activity. intelligence and activity. By intelligence I mean a capacity "of thinking or taking in ideas, the fubject of fuch ideas being motives or ex"citements to action, or to be at reft, with regard to all fuch beings in whom "the power of acting refides. And by activity I mean a capacity or power beginning or performing motion or action, or of being at reft, in confequence of "thofe ideas that take place in the understanding, and which are the ground or "reason of fuch motion or action, or of the fufpending the exercife of that powAnd, in order to conftitute a moral agent, it is not only neceffary that "the being should be intelligent, in the lower and lefs proper fenfe of the word intelligent, as before described; but it is alfo neceflary that it should be fo, in "the higher and more proper fenfe of that term. That is, that it should be ca"pable of feeing things in a moral view, and thereby of judging of the moral fit"nefs or unfitnefs of actions; and likewife that it should have power to act, or "to refrain from acting, as it pleases.

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Here my reader will fee, that as I have diftinguished betwixt moral agency and mere agency, or agency confidered fimply as fuch; fo I have made, not, as it is faid * of me, intelligence and unintelligence, but a different capacity of difcernment in each subject, the ground of that diftinction. With me, intelligence is neceffary to mere agency, and to moral agency fuch intelligence is neceflary as renders the agent capable of feeing things in a moral view, and thereby of difcerning and judging of the moral fitnefs or unfitnefs of actions. And tho mere agency and moral agency may fitly be distinguished into brutality and moral agency, bein Dr. Morgan's Defence of Natural and Revealed Religion.

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cause,

caufe, I think, one is the cafe of brutes, and the other of men; yet they may not be fitly diftinguished into natural liberty and moral agency, because, I think, moral agency is as natural, and as free, as mere agency itself. And

As I have here confidered intelligence, as neceffary to agency; fo I have confidered activity, as neceffary alfo. By activity I mean fuch a power of self-motion, as enables the fubject, in which it refides, to chufe to move, or to be at reft, in contradiftinction to fuch motion, or reft, as is the refult of external force, or of neceffity. By external force, I mean fuch force as is the refult of fome foreign agency or moving power, independent of any agency or moving power in the fubject moved, or at reft. And by neceffity I mean the natural and necessary refult of any conftitution of things, independent of the free election or choice of the fubject moved, or at reft. As thus, fuppofing gravitation were neceffarily an inherent property of matter, fo that, when a ftone is moved up into the air by external force, when that force ceases, the ftone will, from a principle neceffarily inherent in itself, and independent of any foreign agency or moving power, move down to the earth again. I fay, fuppofing this to be the cafe, fuch motion, in my opinion, would not be action, fuch a principle of motion would not be agency, neither would the fubject, in which fuch a principle refided, be an agent. And if we confider intelligence, as a neceffary part of any conftitution of things, and neceffary not only to the production, but to the direction and regulation of motion, the cafe is ftill the fame; for as motion, or reft, in fuch a cafe, is the natural and necessary result of such a conftitution, independent of the will or free choice of the fubject moved, or at reft; fo fuch motion would not be action, fuch a principle of motion would not be agency, and the fubject, in which fuch a principle refided, would not be an agent. As thus, Suppofing man, with every other creature capable of pleasure and pain, were, from his conftitution, naturally, neceffarily, and unavoidably led to perfue what appeared to him his greateft felf-good, and, confequently, to the performing fuch motions as conftitute that perfuit; and fuppofing fuch motions were in their directions, and regulations, neceffarily conformable to the impreffions made upon the understanding, with refpect to the greatest felf-good, and the way to attain it? Yet as all fuch motions, together with their directions, and regulations, are the natural and neceffary refult of the human conftitution, independent of any free choice or election in man; fo fuch motion would not be action, the principle from which it flowed would not be agency, and man, in such a cafe, would not be an agent ; at least, those terms would not be rightly applied, in my eftimation. However, whether they would, or not, I fhall not here enquire. For as it is a difpute about the propriety of words; fo I will leave that difpute to those who are better judges, what ideas common ufage has fixed to them. And, therefore, admitting the ufe of those terms, four things feem proper to be enquired into; viz. first,

*Note, By free election or choice I mean, that as there is in man a principle of motion, which, upon fome occafions, is exerted: fo that exertion, or the fufpending the exercife of that moving power, is not the natural and neceffary result of the human conftitution; but it refults from the will of man, who is at liberty to act, or not to act, under the fame circumstances. And when a man wills to act, or not to act, and is at liberty to will either; then, he is faid to elect or chufe to act, or not to act, in oppofition to each of their contraries. And as fomething or other will be the ground or reafon of choice; fo when a man chufes, upon any reafon which is prefent to his mind, he being at liberty to chufe as he does, or to chufe otherways, confonant to any other reafon which invites him to the contrary; then, his election on choice is faid to be free; and this is what I mean by a free election or choice, throughout these reflections.

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whether any subject under such a constitution of things, as is now under confideration; that is, any being whose motion, or reft, is not the produce of free choice or election, but refults naturally, neceffarily, and unavoidably from the conftitution of that being, or from the nature and conftitution of things in general, be in a ftate of liberty. Secondly, whether fuch a conftitution is a proper foundation for virtue and religion, for rewards and punishments. Thirdly, whether it comports with Mr. Barclay's principles, and is a proper defence of them. Fourthly and lastly, whether it is the truth of the cafe.

First, I am to enquire, whether any fubject, under fuch a conftitution of things, is in a state of liberty. And here, I think, the idea, which the word liberty ferves to convey, is a power of felf-motion, and freedom to exert or fufpend the exercise of that power, as that it is a matter of free choice or election to the fubject, in which it refides, whether it fhall be exerted, or not. So that liberty, in the prefent cafe, fuppofes intelligence, to direct the principle of felf-motion in the fubject, in which it refides. And, therefore, the queftion is not, whether a stone is free? because a stone being deftitute of intelligence, fuppofing it to have gravitation, as a neceffary principle of motion inherent in itself, which would be exerted under fome circumstances, there is no place for that queftion. But, intelligence being a part of the human conftitution, it becomes a queftion, whether man is free, or not. Again, liberty, in the prefent cafe, does not ftand oppofed to want of power, or to a restraint of power by external force; and, therefore, the question is not, whether an intelligent creature is at liberty to fly, which has no wings? or whether a prifoner is at liberty to walk farther than his chain will admit? but it ftands opposed to fuch restraint, as arifes from neceffity. That is, such restraint as refults neceffarily from the conftitution of the fubject, thus reftrained, whether fuch restraint refults ultimately from the nature and conftitution of things in general, or from the will or free choice of a fupreme governour. This, I think, is a fair reprefentation of what is commonly understood by the term liberty, in the prefent cafe. So that any intelligent being whofe motion, or reft, or who is the cause of motion to any other being; if fuch motion, or reft, or the caufe of fuch motion is not the produce of free choice or election, but is the natural and neceflary refult of the conftitution of that being, or of the nature and conftitution of things, in general, fuch a being, or a being under fuch a conftitution of things, is not in a state of liberty; but is in a state which, I think, is commonly expreffed by the term fatality. And, therefore, if man is, from his conftitution, naturally, neceffarily, and unavoidably led to perfue what appears to him his greatest felf-good, and, confequently, to the performing fuch motions as conftitute that perfuit, independent of any free choice or election in himself, then, he is not in a ftate of liberty, he is not a free creature.

If it fhould be faid, that tho man is naturally, neceffarily, and unavoidably led to perfue what appears to him his greatest felf-good, yet, notwithstanding, he. is a free being; becaufe he is at liberty to reftrain himself from that perfuit, and to examine whether what appears to him to be his greatest felf-good be, in reality

fo or not.

I answer, if the appearance of the greatest felf-good has fuch a neceffary effect upon the active faculty, as that a man must unavoidably perfue what appears to

him to be fo, independent of any free choice or election in himself; then, he is not at liberty to examine that appearance; because, by fuch neceffity, the door or way to examination is barred up. And, on the other fide, if he is at liberty to examine whether what appears to him to be his greatest felf-good be, in reality, fo, or not; then, that appearance has no fuch neceffary effect upon the active faculty, as is here fuppofed; thefe being propofitions which deftroy one another. But if examination could come into this fcheme, it would not help the cafe; because examination would be as necessary, and as unavoidable, as the actions would be, which would follow upon it. For as there must be the appearance of a probability of error, or the intervention of fome motive, to be a foundation for fuch examination; fo where that probability appears, or fuch motive intervenes, man, under fuch a conftitution of things, muft neceffarily and unavoidably examine whether what appears to be his greatest felf-good be, in reality, fo, or not. And, confequently, he is not, in any respect, a free being. And this leads me,

Secondly, To enquire, whether fuch a conftitution of things is a proper foundation for virtue and religion, for rewards and punishments. Virtue is fometimes confidered in a larger, and fometimes in a more reftrained fenfe. In a larger fenfe, it includes all fuch actions as are in themselves right and fit, and thereby render the agent, in the performance of them, the proper object of the approbation of every other intelligent being, who is qualified to difcern the fitness of those actions and the unfitnefs of their contraries. And, in a restrained fenfe, it includes only fuch as are acts of kindness and benevolence unto others; and thereby render the agent, in the performance of them, not only worthy of approbation, but alfo of the kindness and benevolence of every other intelligent being, who is qualified to difcern the valuablenefs of thofe actions and the bafeness of their contraries. Now, the question arifing from hence is, whether fuch a constitution of things, as I have now under confideration, is a proper foundation for virtue, whether it be confidered in a larger, or in a more restrained sense? and, I think, it is moft evident that it is not. For as, in the prefent cafe, every man muft neceffarily fee things in that view, in which they are reprefented to his understanding, which reprefentation is independent of his free election or choice; and as he must neceffarily act conformable to fuch appearances, it being no more in his power to see things otherwife, than as they are reprefented to him, nor to act otherwife than confonant thereto; than it is in the power of a clock to stop or vary its motions, at pleafure: fo the confequence is clear that there is nothing approvable or difapprovable, in a moral fenfe, in fuch a spring or principle of action. For whatever good, or evil, fuch actions may be fubfervient to, as they are the produce, not of free choice or election, but of neceffity: fo there cannot poffibly be any thing morally good, or evil, in man the agent, or rather the inftrument of performance. A man may be well or ill conftituted, and the produce of his constitution may be good, or evil, in a natural sense, accordingly. But as his conftitution, and his actions confequent upon it, are not owing to himfelf; so the good, or evil, of either, cannot, with any colour of reafon, be placed to his account. For example, fuppofe one man to be fo conftituted, as that it appears to him that the way to his greater felf-good is in promoting the good of the publick; and another is fo conftituted, as that it appears to him that the way to his greater

felf

felf-good is in the deftruction of the common-wealth; and each of these neceffarily and unavoidably act, accordingly. Now, feeing it is not what things are in themselves, but what they appear to be, which neceffarily moves and directs the principle of motion in each; and feeing thofe different appearances are the different refult of their different conftitutions, and of fuch concurring circumftances, as it was not in the power of either, to introduce, to remove, to alter, or change; and seeing the actions, which follow, are neceffarily conformable to thofe appearances; and feeing the appearance of the greater felf-good is neceffarily the fpring or principle of action in both: therefore, neither of them are the proper object of approbation, or diflike, in any other fenfe than as a watch or a clock may be the proper object of either: and, confequently, man, in fuch a ftate, is not capable of being either virtuous, or vicious. Whereas, on the other fide, if man is a free creature; that is, if he has power, and is at liberty to do either good, or evil, and either of these are the produce not of neceffity, but of a free choice or election; then, he is capable of rendering himself approvable or difapprovable to every other intelligent being; and, confequently, to be either virtuous, or vicious. Again, By religion, I mean that which is a proper ground of acceptance to Almighty God; fo that all thofe actions may be faid to be religious, which render the agent pleafing and acceptable in the eyes of his Maker. And the queftion here is, whether the aforefaid conftitution of things is a proper foundation for religion? and, I think, the answer is evident, that it is not. For whatever good, or evil, a good or a bad conftitution, together with thofe concurring circumftances which attend it, may be fubfervient to; yet as fuch good, or evil, is not owing to man, but to the Author of his conftitution; therefore, it ought not, in reafon, to be placed to man's account, nor cannot, in reafon, render him pleafing or difpleafing to his Maker. God may have reafon to be pleafed or difpleafed with himself, if I fo fpeak, for making a good or a bad conftitution, and for caufing all that good, or evil, which fuch a conftitution neceffarily produced, fuppofing him to be free and voluntary in fuch productions: but he cannot, in reafon, be pleafed or difpleafed with man, feeing it is not in man's power to be otherwife than he is, or to do otherwife than he does; and, therefore, this fcheme of fatality cannot be a proper foundation for religion. Whereas, on the other fide, if good and evil be the produce, not of neceflity, but of free choice or election in man, and he is at liberty to do either; then, he is capable of rendering himself either lovely or vile, either pleafing or displeafing to his Maker; and, confequently, of being either religious, or irreligious. Again,

may

By rewards and punishments, I mean fuch favours and fuch afflictions as are laid upon a creature, upon account of fome good or bad action which that creature has done, which good or bad action is the ground or reason of those favours or afflictions being laid upon him. All favours do not come under the denomination of rewards, nor all afflictions under the denomination of punishments: but only fuch favours and fuch afflictions as have fome precedent good or evil action, or which is judged to be fo, as the ground or reafon of them. And tho fome favours are confidered as introductory to other and greater favours; and fome afflictions as preventions of other and greater evils; yet they are not confidered, as rewards and punishments, exccpt there be fome precedent good or evil action, as the ground and reafon of their