Imágenes de páginas
PDF
EPUB

vernour of the world, in no other fenfe than the spring of a watch is a governour to the rest of the movements in that machine. For tho one is intelligent, and the other unintelligent; yet as they both are neceffary causes of what they produce, government must be the fame, in both cafes. The cafe is the fame, with refpect to any advantage or benefit we receive. That is, we are as much obliged to the fun, as we are to God, for the light and heat we receive from it; they both being involuntary, with refpect to thofe favours. For as the fun cannot avoid diffufing its light and heat; fo God could not avoid giving it being, being, placing it where it is, and giving it thofe ufeful qualities. Whereas, on the other fide, if God and men are free beings; that is, if God's productions are the effect, not of fate or neceffity, but of free choice or election; and if men are at liberty to act conformable to those laws, which God hath freely, and thereby kindly, recommended, as a rule of action to them, from fuch motives as render their choice either justifiable, approvable, or condemnable: then, God is, in reality, a benefactor to the intelligent world, and mankind are under a rational and moral government, which otherwise neither of them would be.

If it should be faid, fuppofing God has power, and is at liberty to do either good, or evil; then, we cannot be certain, but he will do the latter; yea he may do more evil than good, for any grounds we have, from which we may justly conclude the contrary. I anfwer, the certainty of God's not doing evil does not arise from his being under a neceffity of doing good, but it arifes from hence, viz. that there is not any thing in nature, which can poffibly afford him an excitement or temptation to it. And from hence arifes a proper ground of certainty, not that God cannot, but that he will not do evil. God can do evil, with refpect to any natural neceffity he is under to the contrary; but we may be affured he will not, because we are fure nature does not afford a motive, which will be to him the ground or reason of fuch a choice. And tho nature does not afford an excitement or temptation to God to do evil; yet he is not the lefs free in doing good; becaufe, when he does fo, he acts in the fame way, and his actions fpring from the fame principle or cause of action, and he thereby acts with equal freedom, in those inftances in which there is no excitement to the contrary, as he would do, if there were fuch excitements; and, in such a cafe, tho a free being can act without a motive, with refpect to any neceffity he is under to the contrary; yet, I think, it is evident he will not, because, I think, there must be fome motive, to be the ground. and reason of his choice. And, thus, we may be fure that tho every man has the power of his own life in his own hand; yet no man will lay violent hands himself, without fome excitement or temptation to it. And tho cannot and will not, in this cafe, are the fame, with refpect to the event; yet they are not the fame, with respect to the ground and cause of action. As to thofe questions, viz. whether God does foreknow the actions of men? and whether prefcience and liberty are confiftent? these I am no way concerned with. Tho, that man is a free being, and that God does foreknow what man will do, are propofitions, which, I think, do not deftroy one another.

upon

To conclude, I obferve, that if moral government confifted in the necessary fubjection of its fubjects to the laws that are given them; and if action in man were the neceffary effect of the impreffions made upon the understanding; then,

the

the truths, the promifes and threatenings of the gofpel, would have a different effect upon the lives of thofe that believe them, than at present they appear to have. Then, the actions of chriftians would be exactly conformable to that light which every man receives from the gofpel; which, furely, every day's experience shews to be wrong. Upon the whole, I obferve, That as liberty to act, in oppofition to neceffity, is neceffary to render the agent justly approvable, or condemnable, according to those motives which are to him the ground or reafon of his choice; fo liberty is neceffary to the very being of religion, whether natural, or revealed, for, without liberty, there cannot poffibly be either. And as not any thing can, in reason, be a man's duty, but what comes within the reach of his agency; and as liberty to act, in oppofition to neceffity, puts it into a man's power to do whatever comes within the reach of that agency: fo from hence it will follow that man has er, and is at liberty to do all that is his duty, or that is necessary to render him acceptable to his Maker, without a fupernatural influence; which is the point I have been concerned to make good; and which, I think, is destructive of Mr. Barclay's fcheme.

I am, SIR,

Your obliged bumble Servant, &c.

pow

TREA

TREATISE XXVIII.

EIGHT

DISCOURSES,

VI Z.

I. Some farther Reflections on Natural Liberty.

II. The Glory of Chrift: or a Discourse on those Words, as they are in St. Paul's fecond Epiftle to the Corinthians, Chap. viii. 23.

III. A Letter of Thanks to the Author of a Tract, entituled, A friendly Admonition to Mr. Chubb.

IV. A few Things humbly offered to the Confideration of Believers and Unbelievers, in thefe happy Days of Liberty and Enquiry.

V. Some fhort Reflections on Virtue and Happiness.

VI. Some fhort Reflections on Virtue and Vice.

VII. Some fhort Reflections on the Grounds and Extent of Authority and Liberty, with Refpect to Civil Government.

VIII. Reflections on Natural Punishments.

Reflections on Natural Liberty;

WHERE IN

Several other Points relating to the Subject are confidered.

B

EFORE I leave this fubject, I think it proper to take notice of a few points, which are urged in prejudice of natural liberty; viz. first, it is fuppofed clear and evident, from the nature of the thing, that a man is under a neceffity to chufe what he does chufe; or to chufe what, upon the whole, appears to be beft. The force of the argument, if I understand it aright, is as follows; namely, that as it is most clear and evident, from the nature of the thing, that a man must perceive things, and judge of propofitions, whilst they appear in the fame light, as he does perceive and judge of them, it not being in his power to perceive and judge otherwife: fo it is alike clear and evident, from the nature of the thing, that a man is under the like neceffity to will or chuse what he does chufe, it not being in his power to will or chufe the contrary; the will being as neceffarily determined to chufe what, upon the whole, appears to be beft, as the perception and judgment are neceffarily determined by those objects which are presented to them.

Upon which I obferve, that our perceptions of things are no other than the images of thofe things raised in, or impressed upon our minds: and our judgments. of propofitions are no other than the difcernment of the relation, or the contrary, which the parts of those propofitions stand in to each other, and the like. And, therefore, we cannot poffibly perceive or judge otherwife than we do; because that fuppofes we can have a perception of things different from the images of those things raised in, or impreffed upon our minds, which images, thus impreffed, are those very perceptions: and that we can judge of propofitions different from the relation, or the contrary, which we difcern the parts of thofe propofitions to stand in to each other, which difcernment is that very judgment; both which are abfurdities, and impoffibilities in nature. and impoffibilities in nature. But tho it thus appears evident, from the nature of the thing, that a man cannot poffibly perceive or judge otherwise than he does; yet it does not appear alike evident, that a man is neceffarily confined to chufe what he does chufe, or to chufe what, upon the whole, appears to be beft. And here, if it be admitted that good is the fole object of the will, tho, I think, this may juftly be * queftioned; yet that does not confine it

* I think, it does not imply a contradiction, if the will be fuppofed to chufe evil, as fuch. All that can be urged, in the prefent cafe, I think, is only this, viz. that nature does not afford a motive, which will be the ground or reafon of fuch a choice. And, if this be the cafe, then, it will follow, not that a man cannot, but that he will not chufe evil, as fuch. A man, that is at Hackney, can walk to London, fuppofing him to have health, and strength, and limbs fufficient to carry him thither; and yet he will not, without fome previous reafon, as the ground of fuch choice. To this I may add, that, in all revengeful actions, evil, as fuch, tho not to the agent, yet to another, seems to be the ground or reafon of them. For when one man revenges an injury upon another, the motive to action, în that cafe, is not the removing from himself the pain and uneasiness of mind, which arifes from, and attends his refentment, tho that may be the effect of it; but it is to give pain and mifery to another, who has been, as he thinks, voluntarily and unreafonably the cause of his affliction.

Dd d.

to

« AnteriorContinuar »