ing, or not making reafon the general rule and measure of their actions, so that men of frong reafon are those who generally act agreeable to reafon, and thereby controul their appetites and paffions more eafily, and with less reluctancy; and men of ftrong appetites are fuch as generally follow what their natural appetites lead them to defire, and thereby thofe appetites are reftrained with greater reluctancy; then, I fay, that to be of strong or of weak reafon, &c. is a matter of free choice to every man: because he may make either reafon, or appetite, the rule of action to himself, as he pleafes. So that neither reafon, nor appetite, let them be confidered in what way foever, neceffarily determine men to act, as is here supposed. Again,

Ninthly, It is urged that man is under a neceffity to act, if he is influenced by any motive whatever, provided fome equal or greater motive doth not hinder, and experience is urged, as proof, in the prefent cafe. Upon which I obferve, that motives, arifing from the fame branch of the conftitution, may be greater, or lefs; but motives, which arife from different branches of the conftitution, admit of no comparison. As thus, my defire to drink may be greater, or lefs, as the liquor is more or lefs defirable, or as my thirstinefs is greater or lefs, which excites that defire; and the reasonablefs or unreasonableness of my gratifying that defire may be greater, or lefs, in proportion to the greater or lefs good, or evil, I may fuftain thereby but if reafon and appetite come in competition, it is not the greater or lefs motive, with refpect to thefe, but a freedom of election which is the foundation of action, with refpect to either. For tho motives from appetites may be ftronger, or weaker, as I obferved, when compared with each other, and tho motives from reafon may admit of the like diftinction, yet a motive from appetite and a motive from reafon cannot be greater, or less, with refpect to each other, because there is not any foundation in nature for fuch a diftinction. And, therefore, when men judge that a perfon is under a neceffity to act from any motive whatever, if fome equal or greater motive doth not hinder, because, they think, they experience this to be their cafe; all that they experience, I think, is only this; viz. that, with respect to action, fometimes they follow their reafon, and fometimes their appetite, when it is a matter of free choice to them, which of these they will follow. And whichfoever of these they do follow, that is, whichfoever of thefe is to them the ground or reafon of action, that, in that inftance, they call the ftrongest motive; and the motive whofe perfuafive influence they reject, that, in this inftance, they call the weakest; the determination itself being the only ground of that distinction. Thefe few points I have here taken notice of, because I would remove every difficulty which the principle of liberty, and which, I think, is the truth of the cafe, may be fuppofed to be incumbered with. I will conclude with recommending one thing to my reader's confideratión; viz. if action in man, allowing the expreffion to be the produce of neceffity; then, felf-consciousness of the good, or evil, of our actions is a grofs delufion; because it was not in a man's power to have done otherwife than he did; and the fleafure, or unhappiness, which naturally flows from fuch a confcioufnefs, is, in reafen, groundless. But, I think, the principle of felfconfcioufnefs of the good, or evil, of our actions, which naturally introduces happinefs, or unhappiness, as aforefaid, is natural, and a part of the human conftitution; and if this be the cafe as, I think, it is, then, furely, it will be allowed,

that

that the placing fuch a principle in the human constitution must be wrong, becaufe it is an unreasonable introduction to mifery: and, if fo, then, I think, it will be difficult to account for fuch wrong conduct in God, that is, for his placing such a principle of self-consciousness in man which, in reafon, ought not to be in him, whether we confider action in God, as the produce of liberty, or neceffity. If it should be faid, that tho the pleasure and uneafinefs, which naturally flow from a conscioufnefs of the good, or evil, of our actions, are, in reality, groundlefs; yet this anfwers a good purpose, by leading men to the practice of the like good actions, and preventing them from practifing the like evil ones, and, therefore, fuch a consciousnefs was rightly placed in human nature. I answer, The remorse and uneasiness of mind, which flows from the consciousness of having done a bad action, is very often the immediate attendant of thofe actions, which are the grounds of it; and tho thofe bitter reflections will, upon fome occafions, return upon a man; yet it is feldom, when he is in the perfuit of any enjoyment, but rather, when those perfuits are over, and he is taking a review of them, or when under fome affliction, or at the apprehension of death, and at fuch times as not to anfwer the purposes of restraint to him. So that the confciousness of having done a bad action is not only groundless in itself, but it is an unreasonable introduction to misery, fuppofing action in man to be the produce of neceffity.

TREATISE XXIX.

THE

GLORY of CHRIST:

O R,

A Discourse upon thofe Words, as they are in St. Paul's fecond Epiftle to the Corinthians, Chap. viii. Verfe 23. Wherein is fhewn, That the Chriftian Salvation is the only proper Expedient to take away Divine Displeasure, and to render Men truly acceptable and wellpleafing to God. Humbly offer'd to the Confideration of the Modern Deifts.

T will be needlefs for me to enquire, who was the author of this epistle, and to whom it was fent? This being fpccified in the title; namely, that it was wrote by the Apostle St. Paul, and was directed to the Corinthians; that is, to the Chriftians at Corinth, an antient city in Greece. Neither fhall I, at prefent, concern myfelf to enquire into the Jubject of this epiftle, any farther than to

obferve

obferve, that as the Chriftians, at that time in Judea, were driven into great streights and difficulties, thro the violent perfecutions which the Jews ftirr'd up against them; fo St. Paul, who fympathiz'd with them in their afflictions, did all he could to render their burden as eafy to them as poffible. And, accordingly, he took care to acquaint the feveral churches, which were under his infpection, with the afflicted ftate of their brethren in Judea; and call'd upon them to raise contributions for their relief. And; thus, he addrefs'd himself to the Corinthians, provoking them by the example of the great liberality of their neighbours, the Macedonians; and ftirring them up, by many other arguments, to a chearful and a generous diftribution of their charity. Upon this occafion, he likewife fent Titus and others to Corinth, to collect and receive their contributions; men who had devoted themselves to promote the common tranquillity, and, therefore, were highly worthy of fuch a truft. And, as it was very natural and proper for the Corinthians to enquire, who or what the perfons were, by whose hand they should send this gift? fo St. Paul took care to fatisfy them in this particular, by giving them a character, in the verfe of which the text is a part.

Whether any do enquire of Titus, he is my partner and fellow-helper concerning you: or our brethren be enquir'd of, they are the messengers of the churches and the glory of Chrift. As much as if he had faid, if any ask the character of Titus, I prefume, this will fatisfy; he is my partner in the labours and fufferings of the gospel, and affifted me much in my travels and preaching to the Gentiles. Or, if our brethren, whom I have fent with, him, be enquir'd of, they are perfons of fuch reputation, and whose character and conduct are fo well approv'd of by the churches, that they have conftituted them their messengers. Yea, they are such, upon whom the gospel has had its genuine effect, and who reflect back great bonour upon its author: they are the glory of Chrift. As the fuccefs of any undertaking crowns the attempt, and gives glory to the undertaker; and as every performance brings more or lefs glory to the performer, as it more or lefs answers the defign: fo Chrift receiv'd much glory from the brethren whom St. Paul fent to Corinth, inafmuch as the purposes of his miniftry were anfwer'd upon them. The gofpel of Christ had made fuch an impreffion upon their minds, as that they could willingly forego their own ease, pleasure, and profit, when their labour and service became ufeful and neceffary to the common good. And, accordingly, they took upon them that long, laborious, and hazardous work, of going from place to place, in the vinces of Greece, to collect the churches contributions, for relieving their diftreffed brethren under perfecution, and to carry what they had thus collected to Paleftine. This I call a long, laborious, and hazardous undertaking; whether they travelled from Greece to Judea, by land, or by fea. And, thus, these brethren gave a noble inftance of the bleffed effects of the gofpel of Chrift, when it is receiv'd as it ought to be; and, thus, Chrift receiv'd much glory from them. They were the glory of Christ. This is the character St. Paul gives of the perfons referr'd to, which certainly render'd them worthy of that truft, he defir'd the Corinthians might repofe in them. Having fhewn the cccafion, and given the fenfe of the text; two things naturally offer themfelves to be confider'd, viz. first, What was the grand purpose of Chrift's miffion? And, fecondly, how the means he used were adapted to anfwer that defign? These two points being difcufs'd, from hence it

pro

1

will eafily and evidently appear, in the third place, What it is to glorify Christ, and who they are that in reality do fo. And,

First, I am to confider, What was the grand purpose of Chrift's mission? And, here, if we examine thofe facred records, which relate to his perfon and ministry, and which alone are capable of giving us fatisfaction in the prefent cafe; we shall find, that the great end which Chrift had to profecute, and for which he was fent into this world, was to take away divine difpleasure, and to render men acceptable and well-pleafing to God. Thus, it was prophefied of him, Isaiah xlix. 6, That he should be given for a light to the Gentiles; and that he should be for falvation unto the ends of the earth, Acts xiii. 47. Thus, Zachariah rejoiced at the birth of John the Baptift, because he was to be the Prophet of the Higheft, who was to give the knowledge of falvation to his people, by the remiffion of their fins, Luke i. 77. Thus, the angel, at Chrift's birth, faluteth the fhepherds with this joyful acclamation, Fear not; for behold, I bring you good tidings of great joy which shall be to all people. For unto you is born this day, in the city of David, a Saviour, which is Chrift the Lord, Luke ii. 10, 11. And, thus, Chrift declar'd concerning himself, that he was come to fave that which was loft, as in Matt. xviii. 11. And that he was come, not to deftroy men's lives, but to fave them, as in Luke ix. 5, 6. And that he came to feek and to fave that which was loft, Luke xix. 10. And that he came not to judge the world, but to fave it, John xii. 47. And, thus, by way of eminence, Christ is call'd a Saviour, and the Saviour, and the like, Acts v. 30, 31. Chap. xiii. 23. Phil. iii. 20. 1 Tim. i. 10. Tit. i. 4. 1 John iv. 14. Thus, again, Chrift's gofpel is call'd falvation, Acts xiii. 26. Chap. xxviii. 28. Rom. i. 16. Eph. i. 13. In fhort, Chrift's gofpel is call'd the miniftry of reconciliation; and he is faid to reconcile us to God, 2 Cor. v. 18, 19. And all things are of God, who hath reconciled us to himself by Jefus Chrift; and hath committed unto us the miniftry of reconciliation, to wit, that God was, in Chrift, reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing their trefpaffes unto them; and hath committed unto us the word of reconciliation. From all which, I think, it abundantly appears, that the grand end and purpose of Chrift's miniftry was to take away divine difpleafure, and to render men acceptable and well-pleafing to God: which was the first point that lay before me to be confider'd. And, now, I proceed to the

Second, namely, to fhew, How the means, Chrift made ufe of, were adapted to anfwer that defign. But, before I do this, there is one thing which is very neceffary to be enquir'd into, viz. what it is, in the nature of the thing, which renders men the suitable and proper objects of divine difpleasure? For, when we have thus discovered the difeafe, then, we shall be much better qualify'd to difcern and judge, whether the means, Chrift made ufe of, were a proper remedy against it? That, then, which I am, at prefent, to enquire into, is this; viz. what it is, in the nature of the thing, which renders men the fuitable and proper objects of divine difpleafure? And this, I think, will eafily appear, when we confider, what kind of creature man is, as he came out of his Maker's hand, viz. that he is a dependent creature, who, in his natural compofition, is framed and conftituted for fociety. By a dependent creature, I mean, that every individual has a mutual dependence upon each other; and that man, when confider'd alone, is not qualified to be happy: because, in a fingle capacity, he is not capable of procuring the

comforts,

comforts, nor guarding against the evils of life. And, by being fram'd and conftituted for fociety, I mean, that man's natural appetites, his affections, his understanding, and his fpeech qualify him for, and dispose him to fociety; and that the greatest part of his enjoyment arifes from fociety. So that, I think, it may be faid with ftrict juftice, that man is a focial creature, or a creature, who, in his natural compofition, is framed and conftituted for fociety, or for the being happy with others of his kind. And as man is, thus, fitly conftituted to promote and carry on the common happiness; fo he is capable of the contrary. Each and every of his appetites and paffions are capable of being vitiated, by being exercised upon wrong objects, or by being indulged to an excess: by which means, man becomes a difagreeable and hurtful creature; and is fo far from contributing to the common good, that, on the contrary, his selfish, brutal, and inhuman temper and conduct ftands as a bar to it. And, when, or wherever this is the cafe, fuch men must be exceeding vile and disagreeable in the eyes of God, their minds and conduct being directly oppofite to the mind and conduct of their Maker, and their defigns and endeavours being to fruftrate and difappoint God's kind intentions towards his creatures. God is a Being, in whom all moral perfections take place, in the highest degree: and, therefore, as felfishness could not poffibly be the motive, which induc'd him to call any of his creatures into being; fo, of course, it must be true goodness; that is, a true regard to the happiness and well-being of the creatures themselves, which excited him to it. And as this planet is made a convenient habitation for a multitude of creatures, who have a mutual dependence upon each other, and whofe happiness is bound up in the happiness of the whole, if I may fo fpeak, fo the common felicity was the common and the only end, which God propos'd, in giving being to this world. And as God has made man a focial creature; so the happiness of fociety, or, in other words, the publick good, was the great end which God intended that man should be in the perfuit of, and to which all his actions should be principally directed. And when man carefully perfues the great end of his creation, by rendering himself an agreeable and useful creature; then, of course, he renders himself agreeable and lovely in the eyes of his Maker. And, on the other fide, when he opposes this end, and fets himself as a bar to the common felicity, he muft lay a juft foundation for divine difpleasure. I fhall not take upon me to fhew, how many ways, and in what inftances, men are injurious to the common-wealth; it being fufficient to my prefent purpose, to obferve, that when men covetoufly perfue their own pleafures and defires, when they are injurious to others, and obftruct the common felicity; they, then, in the nature of the thing, become the proper objects of God's difpleasure. Surely, nothing can be more provoking to fuch a wife and good Being as God is, than for a moral agent, defign'd and conftituted to promote a common happinefs; for fuch an one to kick against his Maker, by difappointing his gracious purposes, and by introdu cing that mifery into being, which he was defign'd to prevent. And yet this is the cafe of every wicked man, who, by his disagreeable and unfocial temper conduct, cbftructs the common felicity. Having, thus, difcover'd the difeafes, by fhewing, What it is, in the nature of the thing, which renders men the fuitable and proper objects of divine difpleasure? I, now, proceed to the remedy; namely, to thew, How the means, Chrift made ufe of, become a proper expedient, to take away

and

that