be confider'd; because as fuch a reprefentation is wrong, fo it has been exceedingly pernicious to mankind.

Upon the whole, if my admonisher had thought that faith, gofpel-ordinances, and the fufferings and death of Chrift, were proper to be confidered and treated of, as means of our falvation, in the fenfe in which I have fhewn they are; and if he had judged that fuch a performance would have been useful to mankind, he was at liberty to have treated of this fubject, as largely as he pleafed, in a difcourfe of his own; and fo might have fupplied every defect which he imagined he had discovered in mine. But, then, this would not have juftified his groundless complaints against me, because I did not undertake to fhew, what is in a remote fenfe, but what is directly and immediately, and for its own fake, the ground of divine acceptance? And if my admonisher judged that faith, gofpel-ordinances, and the fufferings and death of Chrift, are directly and immediately the grounds of divine favour, that is, that thefe do, upon their own account, and not on the account of that influence they have upon men's tempers and actions, render them acceptable to God: I fay, if he judged this to be the cafe, which, I think, he muft, or else his complaints were trifling; then, furely, he is mistaken in a point of the greatest concern, and which has been moft pernicious to mankind, as I have fhewn above.

Thus, Sir, I have gone thro your Admonition, and have taken a fhort view of the feveral points complained of in it, prefuming I fhall be acquitted of the charge laid against me by every difcerning, impartial, and unprejudiced judge. And, to conclude this Letter, I beg the favour, that, if you have any more admonitions in store for me, you would be pleased to put your name to them, that so we may be upon an equal foot. And tho you have laid hold of every trifling occafion, to juftify your negative but groundlefs charge, and have fuggefted and infinuated feveral things of me, which are not just, nor friendly, but perfectly unkind; yet as I take the admonition, upon the whole, to be the produce of your pious but mifguided zeal, and to be intended for mine and the publick good, fo I, again, return you my hearty thanks, and crave leave to fubfcribe myself,

SIR, Your obliged humble Servant, THO. CHUB B.

TREATISE XXXI.

A

Few Things humbly offered to the Confideration both of Believers and Unbelievers, in thefe happy Days of Liberty of Enquiry.

W

E of this age and nation enjoy many privileges and advantages, which other ages and nations have been ftrangers to. One of which is a liberty of enquiry into matters of religion. For tho men's profeffing their opinions freely, in fome points, may be contrary to the laws of this kingdom, and tho

there

there may be fome be fome among us, who wish to fee the laws rigorously executed upon their neighbours, in this refpect; yet thefe are under a proper and a happy refraint, by the just and wife adminiftration of the prefent government. Surely, nothing can be more unjuft or unreasonably affuming, than for any man, or body of men, to take upon them to direct and govern the understandings and confciences of others, in matters of religion; that is, in matters relating to the favour of God. For as religion is purely perfonal, and every man must be anfwerable for himself to God; fo every man muft, in reafon, have a right to judge for himself, in all matters pertaining thereto; and, confequently, it must be just and reasonable in our governours, to indulge their fubjects in the enjoyment of that right. And as fuch indulgence is juft and reasonable in itself, fo it is most certainly wife and politick. For when the people of any nation are made or fuffered to afflict and perfecute one another, for religious matters, in which the good, or hurt, of the community is not concerned, then the strength and power of that nation is imployed to weaken and destroy itfelf; as fuch divifion, enmity, and oppofition, in any nation, naturally tend to its diffolution. However, this is not our cafe, perfecution being an evil which our governours have, and, I trust, will carefully guard againft. But

Tho a liberty of enquiry is kindly indulged, yet we do not fee all the good ef fects which might be expected from it; and efpecially with refpect to the grand queftion betwixt the Believers and the Unbelievers; this being a time, in which one might hope to fee that question fully and clearly difcuffed, every objection and difficulty fairly removed, and truth fettled upon the most folid and lafting foundation; which, I think, as yet, does not appear to be the cafe, each party being too apt to wander from the fubject, and to endeavour the exposing each other more than the discovery of truth. The Unbeliever, instead of fairly propofing his own objections, is too apt to fish after the weak and abfurd things, which have been at any time faid by Believers. And as this becomes a ground of triumph to him, fo hereby he awakens the paffions of fome, and gives occafion for laughter and diverfion to others. But, furely, the chriftian religion is not anfwerable for all the wild and extravagant things, which any of its profeffors have put upon it; and, therefore, I think it unfairly urged by the Unbelievers, and to be an abuse of that liberty, which they are kindly indulged in. Whether prophecy, miracles, or fuch other topicks, as are urged to prove the divinity of the chriftian revelation, do, when fairly and impartially examin'd and confider'd, prove or make good that propofition, is the queftion betwixt the Believers and Unbelievers: and, therefore, if the Unbelievers would fhew the weakness of thofe grounds, upon which that propofition is founded, they ought to confine themselves to the question before them, and not introduce that into the cafe, which is foreign to it. I grant, that the Unbelievers are under a very great difficulty, in the prefent cafe; because, if they should be open and frank in declaring their opinions and objections, they are not fure they fhall not fall under a profecution. But, then, tho this may be a proper ground to act with caution, in order to guard against any evil which fuch freedom may expofe them to; yet, furely, it cannot be any ground for trifling in argument, or to minifter occafion for diverfion, in a queftion which ought to be treated of with the utmoft ferioufnefs. Believers are likewife too apt to wander

out

out of their way, and to fifh after the perfonal faults of the Unbelievers; and, from hence, they raise a battery against infidelity; and will have it that unbelief, with refpect to the divinity of the chriftian revelation, is not the refult of a free enquiry, but the produce of vicious inclinations; and that men chufe to be Infidels, in order to get rid off those restraints and reluctancies, which otherwife they would be liable to. This, I think, is ufing the Unbelievers exceedingly unkind and ill, as if what was true of fome must be justly chargeable upon all; and as if a man could not be an Unbeliever, that is, in common language, a Deift, but he must be destitute of all honour and confcience, virtue and religion: whereas Deifm is not fubverfive of thefe, but perfectly confiftent with them. And, if I am not mifinform'd, the thing is falfe, in fact; that is, there are many Deifts who are men of strict honour, virtue, and religion. And

As Believers and Unbelievers are thus ufing each other ill; fo hereby they alienate their affections from each other, inflame one another's paffions, ftir up refentment, and bar up the way to that kindness, friendship, and brotherly love to each other, which are effential to, and are fome of the most principal parts of true religion. And, if any thing farther were in their power, it is to be feared they would not ftop here, but would go into all thofe inftances of cruelty and perfecution, which others have practifed. This is what fome men fhew too strong an inclination to, tho, by the bleffing of a good government, they are happily reftrained. But this is not all: for, whilft the Believers and Unbelievers are thus playing upon each other, they minifter occafion to men of gay tempers and little reflection, to throw up the whole, as an amufement, and to confider it only, as a proper fubject for laughter and ridicule for when they fee fo much wrangling about the grounds of divine revelation, which they confider as the grounds of religion, tho thefe are as diftinct and different, as two things can be, and fo little certainty on either fide, for any thing that appears to them, then they are too eafily led to think, that religion has no folid foundation; that it only ferves the purposes of crafty and defigning men; and that it is right for them to give a loose to their appetites and defires, and to gratify every vicious inclination. This, I fear, is too much the truth of the cafe; that, whilft men are contending about the divinity of the christian revelation, religion itself is wearing out of the world; men either throw it up, or else exert fuch zeal in its favour as is fubverfive of it. And, therefore, I think, it cannot be amifs, but rather fuitable and proper, to remind mankind, that whatever difficulty or perplexity may attend revelation, which may minifter occafion for difpute, their religious obligations are the fame. For, fuppofing the divinity of a revelation to be most manifeft and clear, the Believers moral obligations must be the fame, as if it manifeftly appear'd to be otherwife; because thofe obligations are antecedent to, and independent of fuch a revelation: and, confequently, the cafe must be the fame, with respect to the Unbelievers also. And as this is a matter which equally concerns them both, fo I beg leave to offer a few things to their confideration. I fhall not enter into the question or point in controverfy betwixt them, but only make fuch reflections as are equally just, whether this or that revelation be of a divine original, or not. And,

First, I obferve, that whatever uncertainty may attend any revelation, yet it makes no alteration, with refpect to true religion, that not being a precarious

thing founded on arbitrary pleasure, and thereby liable to perpetual change and alteration, but on the moral fitness of things; and, therefore, must be the fame yesterday, to day, and for ever. For as duty neceffarily fuppofes an intelligent being, who is naturally qualified to difcern and judge of good and evil, or that moral fitness and unfitness which arifes from the nature and the relations of things, and likewise a power and liberty of acting one way, or the other; fo the duty, which lies upon fuch a creature, muft neceffarily confift in acting agreeably to the nature and the relations of things, as aforefaid. And whoever takes an impartial view of human nature will fee, that man is a creature excellently conftituted to answer the purposes of Jecial felicity, and to promote and carry on a common happiness: all his appetites and paflions, when rightly directed and kept within due bounds, fo as that one is not indulged to the depreffing of another, lead to this end, by rendering man, upon the whole, an agreeable and an useful creature. His underftanding likewife qualifies him not only to direct and govern his appetites and paffions, but also fhews him the fitness of a common good, and the intrinfick excellency and valuableness of perfuing it.

Man being thus conftituted, it will be eafy to know, what his duty must certainly be; namely, to put on fuch a temper of mind, and fuch a behaviour, as is fuitable to, and becoming fuch a creature: or, in other words, it is, first, to live under a grateful fenfe of that goodness, which God hath fhewn, in calling a multitude of creatures into being, on purpofe to communicate happiness to them; and in a wife and kind provifion of all things neceffary to make them fo. And, fecondly, man's duty confifts in a generous and fleady profecution of that grand defign, viz. the common felicity, by rendering himfeif an agreeable and an ufeful creature, and thereby introducing as much happiness into the creation as he is capable of doing; enjoying the bleffings of life in fuch a way, as is confiftent with, and conducive to the common tranquillity, and denying himfelf every pleasure which comes in competition with, or is deftructive of the common felicity. And,

As man is a creature defigned and conftituted to taste of, and propagate a common happiness; so, when he answers that end, by promoting the peace and comfort, the happinefs and well-being of all around him, and contributes to the common felicity, as much as is in his power; as he, then, becomes a valuable and a lovely creature, fo, of courfe, he will be accepted and approved of God. And, on the other fide, if he viciously monopolizes the bleffings and comforts of life to himself, and covetously perfues his own pleasures and defires, when they are deftructive of the happiness of others, and ftand in oppofition to the common felicity: as, in this cafe, he commences a difagreeable and a hurtful creature; fo he will be difpleafing and vile in the eyes of his Maker. And as our duty arifes from what we are, fo it must continue perpetually and invariably the fame, whilit we continue to be fuch creatures. Revelation cannot add to, nor diminish our duty, because it does not alter our compofition: and, confequently, whatever difficulty, or uncertainty, may attend any revelation, this ought not to be the ground of Libertinifm, or the foundation of uneasiness to us; feeing our duty may easily be difcovered without it, and feeing true religion and our obligations are the fame, whether this or that revelation be of a divine original, or not. Again, Secondly, I obferve, that tho Believers and Unbelievers differ in opinion from

each

each other, yet fuch difference in fentiments does not alter their compofitions, nor conftitute them two diftinct fpecies of beings; but, on the contrary, they ftill continue to be men, notwithstanding their differing in opinion, as aforefaid. And, therefore, it is highly just and reasonable, and their bounden duty, to act a part towards each other, and towards all men, as is fuitable to, and becoming human nature, and to preferve and maintain their manly character. Surely, nothing can be more abfurd than to suppose, that we are to put off humanity, in order to become religious. And yet it is too common for perfons to commence creatures of prey, by biting and devouring one another, in order to exert their religious zeal, and to fhew that they are religious men. Alas! we are caft into an age full of complaints of all kinds; and thofe which relate to religion, I imagine, are not the feweft. And, among thefe, fome complain of the mighty growth of fcepticism and infidelity, and others of the prevalency of bigotry, fuperftition, and enthufiafin. Now, whether these complaints are well or ill grounded, on either fide, is what I fhall not enquire into. All I fhall obferve is, that as men are apt to exert a bitter zeal in thefe cafes, fo they are likewife apt to value that zeal at too high a rate, by confidering it, as that which will render them truly acceptable and well-pleafing to God: but, furely, this must be a mistake. For as divine revelation is given by God to men, on purpose to lead them into the love and practice of virtue and true goodness, by laying down fuch rules of action, as were their duty, independent of, and antecedent to that revelation, by reprefenting to them the confequences of a good and bad life, with regard to divine favour, or difpleafure, and by appointing a form of worship, to prevent contention and difcord, and to preferve peace and unity amongst mankind: fo, where that end is answered, by the love and practice of virtue and true goodness, fuch men will be accepted and approved of God, whether divine revelation be introductive to it, or not. And where that end is not answered, but men continue in the love and practice of vice and wickedness, fuch men will not be approved, tho they believe divine revelation ever so strongly; faith and infidelity, in the present cafe, being no other than the giving or witholding our affent to a propofition, viz. that this or that revelation is of a divine original: neither of thefe, therefore, can be any farther valuable, than as they are the proper refult of that evidence, or the want of it, upon which each of them is grounded. Faith, ftrictly speaking, does not add to our duty; and infidelity cannot take from it. And, therefore, to exert a bitter zeal, on either fide, as it is unreasonable in itself, fo it cannot be acceptable to our Maker. All, I think, which can fairly be done in the prefent cafe, and which will become us, as reasonable creatures, is to propofe with decency, and in the best light it can be put, all that can be faid on either fide of the queftion; to examine it with care and freedom; to fhew, in the fpirit of meeknefs, what appears to us defective in what has been thus offered, and then to leave each other to that conviction, which fuch evidence, or the want or feeming want of it, fhall produce in each other's mind; still remembering that our duty, strictly speaking, is not affected by it. Let not, then, the Unbeliever defpife the Believer, nor the Believer judge the Unbeliever: for if neither of them anfwer their manly character, neither of them will be approved; and, if both of them act the part of good and virtuous men, God will receive them both. Rather let them bear with, and forbear one another