in love. For as in all queftions which do not admit of abfolute certainty, and which, I think, is the prefent cafe, it is great odds, but fome will err; fo fuch errors cannot, in the nature of the thing, be a proper foundation for resentment. The different abilities, improvements, and opportunities of different perfons, and the various ways in which men are capable of being biaffed, that is, of leaning to one fide of a question, rather than to the other; these lay a foundation for erAnd as, in all questions of this kind, a man ought to be modeft in his af fumptions, feeing he is liable to mistake; fo, for that reafon, he ought to treat decently and civilly all that differ from him, as knowing that error, in fuch cases, is what all men are liable to. The Unbeliever too often looks down upon Believers with an eye of fcorn and contempt, and defpifes them, as perfons who are under the power of fuperftition and bigotry, and who have captivated their understandings to the will of defigning priests. On the other fide, the Believer magisterially denounces the judgments of heaven upon the Unbelievers, and confiders them, as enemies to God and all that is good, and as men whom luft and fin have blinded, that they cannot fee the truth. But, wherefore all this? Surely, which fide foever of the queftion is right, fuch a conduct must be wrong, and highly difpleafing to that God, who has a common concern for the good of us all. Would it not be more decent and candid for the Unbeliever to think with himself, that tho he is not convinced by the evidence propofed, yet others may? and that, therefore, it must be as right for them to give affent, as it is for him to withold it? and that as men's judgments are capable of being mis-led by education, authority, vulgar opinion, and the like, fo they do not difcern the delusion themselves, and that others cannot be judges for them; and, therefore, it becomes a man to be rather jealous of himself, in thefe refpects, than to charge them, at all adventures, upon his opponents? And, would it not be alike candid and becoming for the Believer to confider, that evidence does not appear alike conclufive to all perfons? and, therefore, if he is fo happily difcerning as to fee the strength and conclufiveness of an argument, when the other does not, that, then, the other ought to be the object of his pity, but not of his cenfure or contempt? and that tho men's judgments are as liable to be mis-led by their vicious inclinations, as by any other caufe; yet as this is what they are not qualified to difcover, with regard to other men, so it must be exceeding wrong in them to charge that upon another, which they cannot be judges of, and of which they ought rather to think the contrary? I would, therefore, request both Believers and Unbelievers to confider themselves and each other, as men, and to treat one another accordingly. I likewife beg leave to remind them, that they are creatures conftituted and appointed to contribute to, and to promote each other's happiness; and that it is not their different apprehenfions, in any point, which can leffen, or take off, this obligation: and as the only end of our being is, that we, and the rest of our fellow-creatures, might be happy, fo it is a very wrong way to fecure the happiness of another life, by making ourfelves, or others, miferable in this. He that contributes moft to the common fclicity here, whether he be a Believer, or an Unbeliever, bids faireft for happinefs hereafter. And he that does his utmoft, to obftruct the tranquillity of this world, is the most unworthy of, and the most unlikely to obtain the happiness

of another.

But,

But, farther, I beg leave, thirdly, to offer a word of caution to both forts. To Believers my request is, that they would take heed, left their faith prove a fnare to them. Alas! how common is it for a few to value himself, because he is such; and fo of all other religious parties in the world. How eafy is it for a man who fpends his time, his ftrength, his zeal in a caufe, which he confiders, as the cause of God, to think that these will render him acceptable to his Maker? Whereas, if these are separated from true goodness, that is, from a true regard to the prefent as well as future happiness and well-being of the reft of his fellow-creatures; then, it is morally impoffible that he fhould be fo, feeing there is nothing which can render us valuable in the fight of God, but our acting a worthy and a manly part. Our rendering ourselves agreeable creatures, by acting conformably to our compofition, is that, and that only, which will render us acceptable to the Author of it. Let not, then, a strong perfuafion of the truth of divine revelation, and a zealous contending for it, blind our eyes, by leading us to think that these, or any thing short of perfonal virtue, will render us worthy of divine regard: but let us endeavour to answer the great end of all divine revelation, which is to make us good creatures, by acting a part fuitable to, and becoming our rational I and manly nature; and then we fhall not fail of God's favour. Again, my requeft to the Unbeliever is, that he would take heed, left his infidelity lead him to Libertinifm. Alas! how eafy is it for him to split upon this rock! for when he fees that the generality of men make revelation the only ground of religion; and when he judges that the divinity of that revelation has no folid foundation, he is then in danger of drawing this falfe conclufion from thofe premifes, namely, that he is under no religious obligation at all; and, confequently, that he is perfectly at liberty to gratify every vicious inclination, I would, therefore, beg leave to remind him, that however the cafe may ftand, with regard to the divinity of this or that revelation, yet this makes no alteration, with regard to true religion. He is a man; and, from hence, his religious obligations arife. He is a moral agent, who is excellently conftituted to promote and carry on a common happiness; and, therefore, it must and will be his duty, to put on fuch a temper of mind, and such a behaviour, as is fuitable to, and becoming fuch a creature. But, farther,

Let me intreat both Believers and Unbelievers not to play upon, and sport themfelves with each other's weakness, but rather in a decent and manly way endeavour the removing it, and, if that cannot be done, to cover it with the mantle of love. It is true, ridiculous things are and will be the objects of ridicule: but, then, it ought to be remembered, that the proper end of ridicule is, in a way of pleafantry, to convince the judgments of thofe men, who would not be fo eafily convinced, in a way of grave argument. For, when they fee that the fool's coat is the natural drefs of their opinions or practices, this gives them a jealousy that there is fome defect in the arguments that convince them, which jealoufy otherwife they would not have. I fay, the proper end of ridicule is to convince the judgment, and thereby to remove the ridiculous object; and not to awaken resentment, and inflame the paffions: and, therefore, every man, who practises in this way, ought to take care, that, if poffible, the proper end of ridicule may be anfwer'd by it.

To conclude this head; give me leave to repeat what I have already so often ob

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obferved, namely, that our different apprehenfions, in any point, cannot poffibly cancel the obligation we are under to love and do good to each other; much lefs will it justify or excufe any inhuman action. For as our religious obligations arise from our being men, fo they must and will remain upon us, whilft we continue to be fuch. I will only add, that we are men, and, as fuch, our understandings are liable to be mis-led: and if error is a proper foundation for resentment, which, furely, it is not, then, let him that is free caft the first stone. Again,

Fourthly and laftly, I beg leave to remind the Unbelievers, that however the case may stand, with regard to the divinity of this or that revelation, yet the folid grounds of a future judgment and retribution are the fame; and, therefore, their rational hopes and fears, arifing from the expectation of fuch a judgment and retribution, ought not to be weakened or destroyed by it. Man is an intelligent free creature, who is naturally qualified to difcern and judge of good and evil, and to direct his actions accordingly: and, confequently, he is capable of promoting or hindering the common happiness, by rendering himself an agreeable and useful, or a difagreeable and hurtful creature. Now, if it is right and fit in the nature of the thing, when fuch a creature has acted his part in life, and is gone off the stage of action, that God fhould call him to an account for his conduct, and render to him the due reward of his deeds in another ftate, which, furely, will be granted; then, a future judgment and retribution will most certainly take place, because God will always moft certainly do what is right and fit in the nature of things, and, confequently, future rewards and punishments are as evident, and as certain, from the nature of the thing, to all those who fee the fitnefs of fuch a conduct, as any divine revelation can declare, or prove them to be. And that the fitness of rewards and punishments is feen and allow'd by men of all capacities, nations, and religions, is evident from hence, viz. that when any of these repose a trust in any other perfon, whom they have a dominion over, they judge it right and fit to call the trustee to an account, and likewife to fhew their favour or difpleafure to him, according as he has rightly imploy'd or abused the trust lodged in his hand, and as that truft has been of greater or lefs importance to themselves, or others; which, I think, is an evident proof, that all mankind are capable of difcerning, and muft allow the fitnefs of future rewards and punishments, feeing nothing is more natural and eafy to be difcerned, than that what men are, and have, is a trust lodged with them, by the Maker of all things, to be imploy'd for the common good; and, confequently, that they are, and will be answerable for that truft. And,

For the farther illuftration of this point, I beg leave to take a short view of the prefent fyftem of things, and of the gracious defign of our Creator in calling them into being; that hereby I may vindicate the divine conduct, in rewarding men of virtue and honour, with a plentiful share of happiness in another state, and in his barring vicious men from the enjoyment of that happiness, and plunging them into unfpeakable mifery. God is a Being abfolutely wife and good; and as he is the Author and fountain of being to all others, fo his fole end, in creating all things, was, that he might introduce and promote a common happiness. To have made a world, without that view, might have fhewn the power, but not the wisdom and goodness of the Creator. Whereas, to make a world, for the fake

fake of a common happiness, and to make a provifion of all things neceffary and conducive to that happiness; this difcovers the perfection of wisdom and goodness. And as it befpeaks a large extent of knowledge and power, fo it fhews them to be rightly employed, by making them fubfervient to the best of purposes. And this is plainly the cafe of the prefent fyftem of things, in which God has not only exerted his knowledge and power, in fuch a manner, and to fuch a degree, as exceed all human conception; but he has likewife display'd his wisdom and goodness most confpicuously, by difpofing the whole, as beft ferves the purposes of a common felicity. The good of the whole is the grand defign: and as every individual capable of happiness is intended to be a farer in it, fo each and every one are intended to be contributers to it. Every fpecies of vegetables and every tribe of animals, each in their place, order, and time, being defigned either actively, or paffively, to be fubfervient to the common good. And

As man is made the chief or principal inhabitant of this globe, fo he is qualified to have a larger fhare of felicity on it than any other animal. For as he has, in common with the creatures below him, thofe appetites and paffions, which dispose them to all fenfual enjoyments; fo he is better qualified for procuring those enjoyments, for guarding against the loss of them, for laying in a provifion for their continuance, and for the heightening the pleasures which arife from them. And as man is thus qualified to tafte the pleasures arifing from fenfe; fo there are other pleasures provided for him to enjoy, which the rest of the animal world, as far as we can difcern, have no taste or relish of. He is qualified to drink plentifully of the cup of intellectual delight, if I may fo call it, by taking a view of the material world with its inhabitants; by contemplating upon the nature, the relations, the beauty, and order of things; by looking forward and backward, and seeing a long chain of caufes and effects; by taking a view of his own frame and compofition, and of the frame and compofition of the rest of the animal and vegetable world, with their dependence upon, and the relation they bear to each other yea, he can extend his view beyond this globe to the other planets, and confider them, with regard to their different magnitudes, motions, denfities, distances, and the like. In short, he can indulge himself abundantly in this kind of pleafure, by ranging to and fro thro the immense space, if I may fo call it, of natural truth, each part of which affords materials for delight. Man is likewife qualified to fee things in a moral view, and thereby to tafte pleasures, which are of a more noble and exalted nature than thofe abovemention'd. He is capable of viewing the prefent fyftem of things, confider'd as a fcheme laid out for happiness; in which not only the knowledge and power, but likewife the wifdom and goodness of God are amply difplay'd. He can fee, and delight himself in feeing, how each species of beings becomes fubfervient to the common good; how each tribe of animals is qualified for and difpofed to pleasure, and the provifion which is made for their enjoyment of it. And as man is thus qualified for delight, by taking a view of the kind purposes of his Creator; fo he can contribute to his own happinefs, by promoting and carrying on the fame defign. He can every day add to and increase his own delight, by every day adding to and increafing the felicity and happiness of others. Add to this the pleafures which arife from relation, friendShip, and the like: from all which, I think, it abundantly appears, that man is qualified for a more plentiful share of happiness than any other animal. And

As

As man is thus interested in the common felicity, fo he is qualified to contribute largely to it, by conducting his own actions, and directing and governing the creatures below him, in fuch a manner as will be moft fubfervient to the common good. He can indulge or controul his appetites and paffions, as his own happiness and the happiness of his fellow-creatures arife from and depend upon it. He can employ the members of his body and the faculties of his foul, in ministring affiftance, fuccour, comfort, and delight, to the rest of his fellow-creatures. He can provide for, direct, govern, and ufe the animals below him, in fuch a way as will be moft for their's and for the happiness of mankind. In short, man is capable of rendering himself an agreeable and an ufeful creature, and of contributing largely to the common tranquillity. And

As man is thus qualified to promote a common happiness, fo he is likewise qualified to fee the moral fitnefs of fuch a conduct. Man is endowed with a faculty of understanding, which qualifies him to fee things in a moral view, as I obferv'd above: and as happiness is the defire of every living thing, fo every man muft fee that every creature has equally a title to it, whilft its happiness is confiftent with the publick good. And as there is a provifion made for the happiness of the whole, fo, in the nature of the thing, it must be intended for the whole. And as every individual is only a part of that whole, fo his interest in, and his title to happiness, can only be fuch as is common to the reft of his fellow-creatures. And as man is qualified to have a large fhare of the common felicity, fo it is highly reasonable that he should contribute as largely to it; yea, as happiness is a natural good, fo it must be right and fit, in the nature of the thing, to communicate it according to our power, tho we have no other intereft in it, but the pleafure which arifes from that communication. And as the happinefs of the whole is, in the nature of the thing, preferable to the happiness of an individual; fo the latter ought, in reason, to give place to the former: and, confequently, it is right and fit that every individual, who is qualified to fee that fitness, should deny himself, when his own and the common happinefs come in competition. And

As virtue confifts in communicating happiness to the fuitable fubjects of it; fo it is the height and perfection of virtue and goodness, to deny ourfelves, for the fake of the publick. And as every man cannot but fee, if he will reflect upon it, that the publick good is the principal object of his care, and that he ought steadily to persue it, and make his own private interest submit to it; fo it is the height of generosity, and, therefore, will render him truly valuable and most acceptable to his Maker. And as this is the cafe of every virtuous perfon, in a greater or a lefs degree; fo it most certainly becomes the wisdom and goodness of God, to fhew his respect for, and manifeft his love to fuch perfons, by amply rewarding their me rits with a plentiful fhare of happiness in another world, and by filling them with delights, which infinitely furpafs all prefent enjoyments. For as, in the present state of things, there is no difcrimination of perfons, no manifeftation of divine love, or hatred, from any thing that comes before us; but one event happens to all, whether virtucus, or vicious; all move on according to the general frame and conftitution of things, being under the direction of thofe laws by which the natural world is governed; fo, furely, it must be worthy of, and fuitable to the character of perfect goodness, for God to take a time hereafter to manifeft his love and respect

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