good of others: the terms good and virtuous, in this cafe, being generally confin'd to those actions which are the produce of benevolence. It is, when we perfue the good of others, in diftinction from, or in oppofition to the good of ourselves, that our actions come under the denomination of good and virtuous actions; and they are more or less fo, as the good and happiness of others is more or lefs the ground and reafon of thofe actions. And as far as a view of our own good comes into the cafe, fo far the goodness and virtuoufness of thofe actions is leffened and decreased. And the reafon of this is evident, viz. because the actions only, which fpring from benevolence, render the actor amiable and rewardable to a foreign agent, who is difinterested in those actions. When a man does hurt to himself thro fome wrong conduct, tho this would render him worthy of blame, and tho his actions would be difapprovable; yet here is nothing which excites the refentment of a by-ftander, and which would render him worthy of correction, upon that account: he has done no evil to others, and, therefore, he can deferve no evil from them. So likewife, when a man does good to himself, how reasonable and just foever this may be, yet there is nothing valuable in it, which merits reward, or which excites a by-ftander to contribute to fuch a man's felicity: for as he fought himself only in that action, fo he cannot deferve any thing from another, upon the account of it. Whereas, when a man perfues the good of another, for that other's fake, then he renders himself truly lovely and amiable in the eyes of others; and they are naturally and justly excited by it to contribute to fuch a man's felicity, if ability and opportunity concur to render them capable of fo doing. For as he generously fought the good of others, fo he justly merits the love and service of others upon that account. And, therefore if a man perfues the good of others, partly for their fakes, and partly for his own; as far as his own intereft is the ground and reafon of that perfuit, so far, of course, the virtue and rewardableness of it is leffened. And if the ground of that perfuit be purely felfishness, then, there can be nothing virtuous or rewardable in it; because it is not felfifhness but benevolence only, which is the ground and foundation of amiableness and rewardablenefs in the prefent cafe, as I have before fhewn. From which it will follow, that if selfishness were the fole and only principle of action in man, then, virtue and rewardableness would be incompatible with human nature. Again, if a man perfues the good of others, upon condition and in view of fome prefent or future good promised to him; this, I think, would give him a legal and just title to what is promifed; but, then, here is nothing of virtue or * reward in the cafe. This is all fair traffick or bargaining; here are covenants made and executed, from which virtue and reward are excluded. For as, in fuch a cafe, man is not virtuous, but felfif in what he does, fo he is not rewarded, but paid a just debt in what he receives.

If it should be urged, that this fubverts the defign of the gofpel, which was to lead men to the practice of their duty, from the hope and expectation of a promised future reward; for if acting in view of fome good promifed be selfishness, as most certainly it is; and if acting from a felfish principle does not render men the proper objects of reward, as is here fuppofed; then, the promises of the gof

*Note, That the term reward is here taken in a strict sense, as expreffing only what is given freely upon the account of merit or defert, and not what is paid as a debt upon the account of promife, or otherwise.

pel

pel tend only to betray men into felfishness, which will not qualify them for the reward promised.

I anfwer, first, That the common happiness is the grand defign of the prefent system of things, and the great end which God propofed in calling this world into being. And this end is abundantly frustrated by men's indulging their felfish, and depreffing their focial affections; this being the grand caufe of all thofe evils and miferies, which mankind introduce and bring upon each other. And, therefore, if God, out of regard to the common good, has promifed to thofe, who perfue it, the happiness of another world, tho that perfuit be not the produce of benevolence, but only in obedience to his command, and from an expectation of what he has promifed; then, God will most certainly be as good as his word, by paying every debt which he has thus contracted by promife; and, confequently, the promises of the gospel ferve not to betray men into selfishness, and fo to unqualify them for the promifed reward, but to engage them to do, out of regard to themselves, what would be valuable and rewardable in itfelf, if done from a better and a more generous principle. Again,

I answer, fecondly, That the great defign of the gofpel, and to which its promifes are intended to be fubfervient, is to work in men a benevolent temper and difpofition, in oppofition to that general corruption, or vicious felfishness, which prevails amongst mankind, and which is the ground and foundation of all our woe. The great thing, recommended in the gofpel, is a spirit of love: and as love worketh no ill to its neighbour, fo it difpofes the agent, in which it refides, to remove the uneafinefs, and contribute to the happiness and well-being of all. And it is to those who are animated by this fpirit, to whom the promises of the gofpel are made; so that, where the benevolent temper is wanting, there is no title to thofe promises. St. Paul was fo fenfible of this, that he declares for himself, if he bad beftowed all his goods to feed the poor, and if he had given his body to be burned, and had not charity, or a benevolent temper, it would have profited him nothing. 1 Cor. xiii. 3. He carries the fuppofition to the greatest height, and instances in cafes, which if actions alone, confidered abftractedly from the difpofition of mind they spring from, would be valuable, then, thefe, furely, would be confidered, as fuch. And yet thefe, when confidered abstractedly from a benevolent temper, as the ground and foundation of them, St. Paul confiders, as unprofitable.

Befides, the promises of the gospel are defigned, and are fubfervient to another purpose, viz. to render the loffes and croffes, the pains and afflictions, which good men are liable to, and often meet with in this world, the more easy and tolerable to them. For tho patience and refignation are the best and most alleviating remedies, which can be applied under the aforefaid evils, and, therefore, one would think, should be always chofen, for their own fake, feeing the contrary to these does but add to the burden of affliction; yet fad experience fhews, that this is not always the cafe. And, therefore, when a man is directed by the promises of the gospel, to look forward to a state, when all pain and anguish shall cease, and all tears fhall be wiped away from his eyes, and he fhall be filled with unfpeakable joy; this naturally tends to lead him to that patience and refignation, which is his prefent only refuge, and which poffibly otherwife he might not obtain.

If it should be urged, that if virtue is founded folely in benevolence, then, in

many

many inftances, it cannot be fupported as when a man is called to fevere trials and sufferings in the caufe of virtue; then he has not wherewith to fupport him under, and carry him thro thofe trials, except he calls in the hope and expectation of a future recompence. And, if he does that, then, as far as he acts from fuch a view, fo far the virtuoufnefs of his actions and fufferings is deftroyed.

Before I return an answer to this objection, it will be proper to confider, what it is to fuffer in the cause of virtue and goodness; namely, when that fuffering is apparently fubfervient to the publick good. So that when a man fuffers for his propagating or maintaining this or that fet of opinions, or this or that speculative propofition, except the propagating or maintaining fuch opinions and propofitions apparently tend to the publick good, this is not fuffering in the caufe of virtue. A man, in such a cafe, may fuffer in the caufe of truth, but not in the caufe of virtue; truth and virtue being as diftinct and different in nature, as colour and found. I fhall not enter into the question, whether fuffering for the truth be not, in some instances, amiable and rewardable? But what I obferve is, that to suffer for the truth, as fuch, confidered abstractedly from the good and benefit which the world may receive by that fuffering, is not fuffering in the cause of virtue. But when a man fuffers to promote or fecure the good of others, and with that view; then, I think, he may properly be faid to fuffer in the cause of goodness, or for virtue's fake.

This being premised, I obferve, that a benevolent temper, which is the produce of, or is a part of the human conftitution, when not depreffed by the prevailing power of selfishness, but cherished and kept to its due height, and when feconded by reafon, is a proper foundation for virtuous actions, in the most trying inftances. True benevolence, &c. will difpofe a man to venture upon the mouth of a cannon, and look even death in the face, when that adventure is apparently neceffary, to fecure his country from slavery and mifery. And tho selfishness fo far prevails, as that the instances are but few, in which men fuffer greatly in the cause of virtue, from a virtuous principle; yet it will not follow, that virtue has no folid foundation in nature, nor any thing by which it may be fupported: but all that will follow is, that eminent virtue is rarely to be met with in the world; which poffibly may be too true. But, then, it is equally as true, that there are but few men, comparatively, upon whom the promifes of future happiness have fuch a prevailing influence, as to difpofe them to forego all prefent enjoyments, and to yield up themselves to fuffering and death, to fecure to themfelves that future happiness. And as it would be inconclufive to argue, that feeing the promise of future happiness does not always prevail upon men to go thro the feverest sufferings, when called to it, for its fake; therefore, the promife of future happiness is not a proper or fufficient foundation for fuch fufferings; fo it would be alike inconclufive to argue, in the cafe of virtue, that feeing benevolence, tho feconded by reafon, does not always prevail upon men to practise virtue, in the moft trying instances, that, therefore, a benevolent temper, &c. are not a proper or fufficient foundation for the practice of virtue, in fuch inftances, the argument being equally inconclufive in both cafes. As to that question, viz. whether a man can chufe abfolute and extreme mifery, for the fake of virtue? This not being the L112

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cafe of those who fuffer in the caufe of virtue, the question is needlefs. All fuffering in the caufe of virtue, as it is a matter of choice or election, will yield abundant fatisfaction to the mind, tho that fatisfaction be not the ground and reafon of thofe fufferings. And

As virtue is founded folely in benevolence, fo it is the preferving and cherishing in ourselves a benevolent temper, which is the foundation of a happy life. Happiness is the great end of being to every fenfible creature, as I have already obferved; 'tis for that only that being is defirable; barely to be, confidered abstractedly from happiness, is no better than non-existence. And to be miferable, exclufive of any degree of happiness mixed with that mifery, is worse than not to be, in proportion to that degree of mifery which existence introduces. A happy life is what we all defire and perfue. Who is there, but would, who is there, but does chuse to pafs agreeably thro life? And yet this is what almost all our fpecies, more or less, complain of the want of. From whence, then, is it that we are not generally happy? Surely, our Creator intended us for happiness, and has provided whatever is neceffary to make us fo; and, therefore, the ground of this complaint must be in ourselves. This, then, must be worth our enquiring into, viz. What is the ground of our miscarriages, and which is the most fure way to a happy life. And, Here, if we take a partial view of the cafe, we may be led to think, that the indulging our selfish, and depreffing our focial affections, is the shortest and fureft way to happiness. For as, in fuch a cafe, a man perfues happiness only for himfelf, and this one point is what all his defires, contrivances, and endeavours are directed to obtain, without incumbering himself with any care or regard for the happiness of others; fo, from fuch a view, one may be led to think, that this is the most likely way to obtain it. But this is fo far from being the truth of the cafe, that, on the contrary, it is the caufe of our miscarriages, and the ground and foundation of our unhappiness. Whereas, if we preferve a due balance in the human conftitution, by keeping our selfish affections under a proper restraint, by cherishing in ourselves a benevolent temper, and by making the common good the common and grand principle to direct our actions by; this is the high road to a happy life. And, That we may have a full view of the cafe, it will be proper to obferve, that a happy life is a compofition of various kinds of enjoyments, viz. fenfual, intellectual, and moral. And these are so intermixed and restrained, as that one kind, or one inftance, does not deftroy, but heighten the pleasures, which arife from the other kinds, or the other inftances of enjoyment: fo that no particular enjoyment is to be taken into the account, which introduces fuch pain and vexation in the perfuit, or leaves fuch remorse and anguish after the enjoyment, as is equal to, or more than an equivalent to the pleasure which arofe from that enjoyment. If I fhould, in the drinking a gallon of liquor, tafte very agreeable pleasure, for the space of three hours; and if this enjoyment should bring upon me fix hours of intense pain and remorse, and anguish of mind for fo many days more; then, the forementioned enjoyment is fo far from being a part of a happy life, that, on the contrary, it must be placed to the other fide of the account: because that, and fo much pleafure more, is to be fubftracted from other enjoyments, as is an equivalent to the overplus of mifery, which that enjoyment introduced, before the account, with refpect to happiness and mifery, will be upon a balance. Again, all the branches

of

of enjoyment, which break in upon, and are bars to other kinds or instances of enjoyment; fo much pleasure must be substracted from thefe, as is equal to that overplus of pleasure which they are a bar to. And if thofe enjoyments are not equal to that overplus, fo far as they are deficient, they are to be placed to the other fide of the account, and to be confidered, not as branches of happiness, but as obftructions to it. If a man, in heaping up a large quantity of the riches of this world, fhould tafte fome low degree of pleajure, in reflecting upon his acquifitions and poffeffions; yet, if his prefent perfuits are a bar to other enjoyments, that would give him pleasures, which, for kind and degree, are much fuperior to thofe he now taftes; then, thofe pleasures are not to be confidered, as parts of a happy life, but as bars to that happiness. These things being premifed, the proper question will be, confidering the various kinds and inftances of pleasure which a man's conftitution and condition in life render him capable of enjoying, what course he should take, which might, upon the whole, give him the greatest pleasure, and render life the greatest bleffing to him? And this, I fay, will be done by preferving a due balance in the human conftitution, by cherishing in ourselves a benevolent difpofition, by keeping our selfish affections under a proper restraint, and by fubjecting our conduct to the government of reafon. The iffue of all which will be a moderate perfuit, and a temperate enjoyment of this world's good things, under a ftrict regard to the happiness and well-being of the rest of mankind. And,

For the farther illuftration of this point, I obferve, that a vicious felfishness generally leads men either to a violent and extravagant perfuit of pleasure, that is, to perfue this or that kind or branch of pleasure, at all adventures, without regarding how a man's own good in the general is affected by it, or how it directly, or in its confequences, affects the good of others and the happiness of fociety; or else it leads men to a violent and extravagant perfuit of riches, and fo bars the enjoyment of many comforts, with refpect to themselves, and prevents their being kind and beneficent to others. But neither of these is the way to a happy life: that lies ftrait before us in a mean betwixt thofe extremes viz. in a moderate perfuit, and a temperate enjoyment of the bleffings of life, perfuing our own happiness, under a ftrict regard to the common good.

As to all violent and extravagant perfuits of pleasure, thefe, furely, when weighed in the balance, will be found wanting. These are fo far from conftituting a happy life, that, on the contrary, they are bars to that happiness. For tho the drunkard, the debauchee, and the like, may tafte fome very agreeable and intenfe, but momentary pleasures, in their enjoyments; yet, alas! when thefe come in competition with the intellectual and rational delights, which a man bars himself the enjoyment of, with the diforder, fooner or later, brought upon his conftitution; the pain and anguish of body, the uneasiness and remorse of mind, which is introduced thereby; the trouble and vexation he gives to others, and which, when reflected on, return back upon himself; I fay, when every thing is taken into the cafe, then, ftrictly fpeaking, fuch a man's pleafures cannot be faid to conftitute a happy life, but are bars to that happiness. And, here, I would beg my reader to look abroad, and take a general view of those persons who violently and extravagantly perfue pleasure: fee them with and without their enjoyments; see what they go thro in many inftances to procure them, how many disappointments they

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