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meet with in their perfuit of them; how fort-lived their enjoyments are, and how heavily the time goes off in the intervals, having no other fountain from which they can draw forth pleasure and delight to themfelves. See how many enjoyments, valuable in themfelves, and various in their kinds, which they exclude themfelves from tafting; how much pain of body and uneafinefs of mind they, fooner or later, draw upon themfelves; and how often they cut off their lives in the midft of their days, or elfe bring upon themselves fuch disorders, as render life a weight and burden to them. This, I think, will, upon a just enquiry, appear generally to be the cafe, with refpect to all violent and extravagant perfuits of pleafure whatever. Solomon's condition and circumftances in life furnifhed him with materials for delight, and gave him the opportunity of enjoyment; and he seemed refolved, if poflible, to take the fortest way to happiness. And, accordingly, he informs us, that he fet himself to perfue pleasure various ways, and in the most violent manner, that his fuperiour circumftances in life rendered him capable of: but, upon trial, he found that this was not the way to folid and lafting happiness. For tho, by this means, he enjoyed fome very intenfe but momentary pleasures; yet the care and follicitude in procuring them, the uneafinefs mixed with them, and the unhappiness entailed upon them, were much more than an equivalent to thofe pleafures: fo that, upon the whole, he pronounces all thofe violent and extravagant perfuits of pleasure, as vanity and vexation of spirit. The cafe is the fame, if men go into the other extreme, viz. into a violent and extravagant perfuit of riches, denying themfelves many of the comforts of life, and putting off enjoyment to the next generation. This is fo far from introducing a happy life, that, on the contrary, it bars up the way to it. For tho their prefent acquifitions and poffeffions, with the faint profpect of the ufe which pofterity may make of them, may give a man fome low, weak pleasure and fatisfaction; yet they are not once to be named with thofe more intenfe and numerous pleafures, both fenfual, intellectual, and moral, which his conftitution and condition in life render him capable of tafting, and which he denies himself the enjoyment of. Befides, an eager perfuit of riches is fuch a difeafe upon a man, as introduces a great deal of care and follicitude to procure them, a great deal of anxiety and thought how to fecure and preferve them, together with the danger and fear of lofing them, and the loffes and croffes which frequently attend them; all these prey upon a man's fpirits, and eat out the comforts of life. And tho fuch men regard fcarce any other intereft, but their own, yet they are conftantly betraying it; their very perfuits and poffeflions ferving only as fuel to feed that fire, which confumes the most valuable pleafures in life. And hereby the most selfish are the greatest enemies to themfelves, by their fruftrating and difappointing themselves of that happiness, which they are naturally led to defire and perfue, and which only renders being valuable to them. So that riches, to fuch men, are so far from being fubfervient to a happy life, that, on the contrary, they bar up the

way to it. Whereas if men would avoid thofe extreams, and perfue pleasure in the way which God and nature have pointed out to them; that is, would moderately perfue and temperately enjoy the good things of this world, and would fo mix and restrain their enjoyments, as that one kind, or one inftance, fhould not break in upon, but heighten the pleasures which arise from the other kinds, or the other instances of

enjoyment;

enjoyment; this would naturally tend to preferve in them a healthy constitution, foundness of mind, calmness in their paffions, quickness in their affections, and a relifh for every kind of pleasure: and when they thus perfue their own happiness, in conjunction with the happiness and well-being of the rest of their fellow-creatures, making a fuitable provifion for their offspring and dependents, miniftering affiftance and fuccour, according to their ability, to the needy and diftreffed, living neighourly and friendly with all, and making the common good the common and the grand principle to direct their actions by; this will be a conftant spring of pleasure to them, which will minister abundantly to their delight and fatisfaction. And as it will give them the enjoyment of many valuable pleafures, which otherwise they would not tafte; fo it will prevent many evils which otherwise they would be in danger of falling into. It will cut off a great deal of anxious and needless care, of burdenfome and afflictive toil and labour, and remove the foundation of those uneafineffes which many of our fpecies groan under the weight of. In short, this is the way to folid and lasting felicity, and the high road to a happy life.

Man is made a focial creature; and as he is defigned, with all other living creatures, for happinefs, fo he is defigned to be happy in and with fociety. And when he perfues his own happiness, under a strict regard to the common good, then he is in the most proper and likely way to obtain it. Then as he is capable of, and difpofed to taste of what may give him pleasure; fo in his enjoyments he is the most free from reluctancy, and from every thing elfe which might be an allay to it. And as he prevents the pain and diforder of body and the uneasiness of mind, which are the attendants on a selfish and violent perfuit of pleasure; so the absence of this or that kind or branch of pleasure cannot be the ground of much uneafiness to him; because as he is not violently fet upon any enjoyment, fo the abfence of one kind or branch of pleasure can eafily be fupply'd by the prefence of another. And as he is interested in the common felicity, fo he is a fharer in every one's happiness thereby; whenever he beholds the peace, the plenty, the profperity, which others abound in, these afford joy and delight to him; and whilft the felfish covetous man is gnawing his tongue for pain, at the profperity of another, who plentifully enjoys what he would monopolize to himself, but would not make ufe of; the other is folacing himself in beholding the pleasure and fatisfaction in life which his neighbours are enjoying. And tho the troubles and afflictions which befal others will give an occafion of concern to him, yet that is abundantly made up by the agreeable pleasure, which arifes from his ministering affiftance, comfort, and relief to them. And whatever difficulties, afflictions, or diftreffes he may fall into, he has this fatisfaction in himself that he has acted a worthy and a manly part. And as he has carefully avoided every thing which might draw upon him the just enmity of any, fo he has taken the moft fure courfe, to fecure to himself the affections and friendship of all. If he looks back upon his life paft, this affords no remorse or uneafinefs of mind, but pleasure and fatisfaction. And, if he looks forward upon death, this gives him no forebodings of a dreadful judgment and retribution, but good hope of a blessed immortality.

Thus, I have given a fhort representation of the true and only way to a happy life, wifhing that hereby I may prevail upon thofe of my readers, who are otherwife-minded, to try the experiment; and, then, I doubt not, but it will turn to

account

account. Surely, if the men of pleafure falfly fo called, that is, thofe who violently and extravagantly perfue this or that kind or branch of pleasure; if they would but give themfelves leave to confider the cafe; and much more, if they would but make trial, they would be convinced that the courfe they are in is not the way to folid and lafting happiness; and that the way which I here recommend, and which, in truth, is the way that God and nature have provided and pointed out to them, is the high road to a happy life. I am fenfible of my inability to do juftice to the fubject before me; and what I propofe and hope for, by this imperfect effay, is to ftir up fome more able hand to treat of it more clearly, and to reprefent it to a much better advantage, than I am capable of doing; because, I think, it is a point of the utmost concern to mankind. For as every individual perfues happiness for himself, fo many lofe what they feek for, by perfuing it only and wholly for themfelves. To conclude; I obferve, that as the love and practice of virtue is the most likely way to happiness in this life, so it is the only fure way to the happiness of another. It is by our thus anfwering the great end of our creation here, that we effectually recommend ourselves to the love and favour of God hereafter. For if we are thus faithful in the unrighteous mammon, then, God will commit to our truft the true riches.

TREATISE XXXIII.

SOME SHORT

Reflections on Virtue and Vice.

Wherein is fhewn,

What Kind of Virtue is, in Reason, rewardable; and what Kind of Vice is, in Reafon, punishable. Occafioned, by Dr. Morgan's Tract, entitled, A Defence of Natural and Revealed Religion.

T

HE word virtue, as I have elsewhere * obferved, is fometimes taken in a larger, and fometimes in a more restrained fenfe. In a larger sense, it includes all fuch actions, as are in themselves right and fit, and thereby render the agent, in the performance of them, the proper object of the approbation of every other intelligent being, who is qualified to difcern the fitness of thofe actions, and the unfitnefs of their contraries. And, in a restrained fenfe, it includes only fuch as are acts of kindness and beneficence unto others, and thereby render the agent, in the performance of them, not only worthy of the approbation, but alfo of the kindness and beneficence of every other intelligent being,

* See my Reflections on Natural Liberty,

who

who is qualified to difcern the valuableness of thofe actions, and the bafeness of their contraries. And as virtue is thus confidered in a larger, or in a more reftrained fenfe; fo vice admits of the like diftinction. And, accordingly, in the more extenfive fenfe of the word, vice, all actions which, in reafon, are wrong and unfit are faid to be vicious. Whereas, in the more restrained sense of the word, it includes only fuch actions as are injurious and hurtful to others, and thereby render the agent, in the performance of them, not only difapprovable, but also the proper object of refentment to every other intelligent being, who is qualified to difcern the bafenefs of thofe actions, and the valuablenefs of their contraries. And as vice is thus differently confidered; fo fome selfish actions are fo far from being, in any respect, vicious, that, on the contrary, they are really virtuous, in the more general fenfe of the word, virtue. And, therefore, in my Difcourfe on Virtue and Happiness, I did not, as it is faid * of me, confound together a virtuous and a vicious felfishness, and then argue against all selfish actions: but, on the contrary, I carefully diftinguished betwixt fuch selfishness as is, in reason, approvable, and fuch as is justly condemnable, as will appear from the following quotation, and likewife from the quotation in the fucceeding paragraph. "If a man perfues happiness for bimfelf, and prefers his own good to that of any other individual, this, I think, is perfectly just and reafonable, and is what approves itself to the understanding of every "man." And whereas, in my Difcourfe on Virtue and Happiness, I laid down the following propofition, viz. that virtue is folely founded in benevolence: here the term, virtue, I understood, not in the larger, but in the more restrained fenfe of that word, as is most evident from that whole discourse: wherein I referred only to fuch actions, as are not only approvable, but also render the agent, upon the account of them, the proper object of reward to every other intelligent being, who is no ways interested in those actions; and fuch rewardable goodness or virtue, I observed, is folely founded in benevolence. This is what I afferted; and which I endeavoured to fupport by the following reafon, viz. "When a man does hurt to himself, thro "fome wrong conduct, tho this would render him worthy of blame, and tho his “actions should be disapprovable; yet here is nothing which excites the resentment "of a by-ftander, and which would render him worthy of correction, upon that "account. For as he has done no evil to others; fo he cannot, in reafon, deferve << any evil from them. In like manner, when a man does good to himself, how " reasonable and just foever this may be; yet there is nothing valuable in it, which "merits reward, or which excites a by-ftander to contribute to fuch a man's felicity. For as he fought himself only, in that action; fo he cannot deserve any thing from another, upon the account of it. Whereas when a man perfues the good "of another, for that other's fake; then he renders himself truly lovely and amia"ble in the eyes of others, and they are naturally and justly excited by it, to "contribute to fuch a man's felicity, if ability and opportunity concur to render "them capable of fo doing. For as he generously fought the good of others; fo "he justly merits the love and fervice of others, upon that account." This is what I have offered, in favour of the propofition before referred to; which reafoning is just and conclufive, for any thing that has yet been fhewn to the contrary. However, that I may make it more clear, I will inftance in a case, or two, and * In Dr. Morgan's Defence of Natural and Revealed Religion.

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thereby

thereby fhew my reader that it is not the bare fitness, or unfitness, the reasonablenefs, or unreasonableness of an action, which renders the agent the proper object of reward, or punishment. As thus,

If it fhould be in a man's power to enjoy one hour's pleasure to day, or two hours pleafure to morrow, these being incompatible, fo that he cannot enjoy both in this cafe, as the greater good is, in reafon, preferable to the lefs; fo it is certainly fit and reasonable, that a man should deny himself one hour's pleasure to day, that he may enjoy two hours pleasure to morrow; and to act otherwife would be unfit and unreasonable. Now, fuppofing a man should act the unreasonable part, by giving himself one hour's pleasure, and thereby deprive himself of two; the queftion is, Whether fuch a conduct renders him the proper object of refentment, and, consequently, of punishment, to a by-ftander, when no one is a fufferer, but the fool himself, by his folly? and the anfwer to me appears felf-evident: viz. That he is not. His weakness and folly, I think, render him the object of my pity, but not of my resentment. And if I were to punish him for it, I cannot fee how I could, in reafon, be juftified. And as, in this cafe, vice carries with it its own punishment; fo, I think, in reafon, that is all that the vicious perfon deferves, upon account of it. On the other fide, fuppofe a man acts the reasonable part, by denying himself one hour's pleasure to day, for the fake of two hours pleasure to morrow: Would he deferve a reward, for fo doing? No, furely. For as he only fought himself, and as his virtue carries with it its own reward; fo, I think, it is all which, in reafon, he is entitled to. Again, fuppofe a man patiently bears the evil which it is not in his power to remove; this is certainly right and fit, because it renders the affliction fo much the lighter: but, then, does a man deserve to be rewarded, for making his affliction eafy to himself? Surely, no. The cafe is the fame with all felfifh virtues: for where men folely feek themselves, I cannot fee how they can, in reafon, merit, that is, deserve any thing from others, upon account of it. And as it is not selfish, but benevolent virtue only, which is, in reason, rewardable; fo it is not all vice, but only fuch as is injurious and hurtful to others, which is, in reafon, punishable.

All reward is the produce of gratitude, that is, it is returning to a perfon that good, which he has kindly and generously communicated to others. So that where there is no good communicated, nor intended to be communicated, there is no foundation for gratitude or reward. Whether we ourselves are sharers in the good communicated, or not, it alters not the cafe, any otherwise than as the obligation to be grateful rifes higher, and becomes ftronger, when we ourselves receive the communicated good, than when it is received by others, we being obliged, in reafon, to be grateful in both cafes. He, who kindly uses others, deferves kind ufage from all, and, confequently, from us, whether we have been sharers in his kindnefs, or not. Whereas he, who is only kind to himself, does not lay any obligation upon others to be kind to him, upon that account. The cafe is the fame in publick rewards, which are no other than publick gratitude. He, who has been beneficial to the common-wealth, deserves a grateful return of kindness from the publick, which, in other words, we call reward: whereas he, who has only been kind to himself, cannot, in reafon, have any title to it. Again,

All punishment is the produce of refentment, that is, it is returning to a person

that

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