that evil, which he has unkindly and unreasonably communicated to others: fo that where there is no evil communicated, nor intended to be communicated, there is no foundation for refentment, or punishment. Whether we ourselves, or others, have suffered that evil, it alters not the cafe, any otherwife than as the refentment rifes higher, and grows ftronger, when we fuffer in our own perfons, than when the communicated evil is fuffered by others; the ground and reafon of refentment, and, confequently, of punishment being the fame in both cafes. He, who uses another ill, deferves ill usage from all, and, confequently, from us, whe ther we have been sufferers by him, or not. Whereas he, who has only injured himself, does not hereby render himself the proper object of refentment to others, upon that account. The cafe is the fame in publick punishment, which is no other than the produce of publick refentment; he, who has been injurious to the commonwealth, deserves publick correction ; whereas he, who has only been hurtful to himself, cannot, I think, deferve ill usage from the publick, upon that account. Upon the whole, it appears plain to me, tho perhaps it may appear otherwise to others, that tho all virtue is, in reafon, approvable; yet all is not, in reason, rewardable. And tho all vice is, in reafon, condemnable; yet all is not, in reafon, punishable. And as benevolent virtue or a doing good to others, and, in some instances, to deny ourselves pleasure, or to fuffer pain, for their fakes, without any view of advantage to ourselves, either prefent, or future, is a proper foundation for reward: fo, I think, it is founded in reafon, or it is an action worthy of a rational being. As thus, fuppofing one man denies himself the enjoyment of a low degree of pleasure, or chufes to undergo a low degree of pain, for a very short space of time, thereby to remove from another a violent fit of the gout, or flone, or the like, without any view of pleasure or advantage to himself, either in this world, or in the next; in this cafe, I think, it would be not only a kind and generous, but also a reasonable action; because it appears to me, that the end is worthy of the means by which it is obtained. And if any farther enquiry should be made, Wherein the reasonableness of such an action lies? the answer is, That the action befpeaks or fhews itself to be fo; and that, in the nature of the thing, it does not admit of being fhewn to be fo any other way. And if, in the cafe above, the action is reasonable; then, there may be other cafes in which the chufing to undergo greater jelf-denial, or greater or more durable pain, in order to promote the good of others, without any view of advantage to one's felf, either prefent, or future, may be reafonable alfo: tho I grant that benevolence may be carried to an extream, and thereby become unreasonable. As when a man chufes to undergo great and durable pains himself, merely to procure a very low degree of fhort-lived pleasure to another. I do not here take upon me to point out the bounds of reasonable and unreafonable benevolence: but all that I obferve is, that benevolent actions appear to be reasonable, tho there are cafes in which, when it is carried to an extream, they appear to be otherwife. And as benevolent virtue is founded in reafon; fo it is likewife practicable to a rational being; that is, fuch a being, when an opportunity offers of doing good to another, is capable of doing it, purely for that other's fake, without any view of pleasure or advantage to himself. I fay, he is capable of acting fuch a part; because the good of another is a proper motive or reafon of action to a rational being. And this, I think,

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think, is the cafe of men, who are not only capable, but do, I think, even the most selfish of them, in fome inftances, perfue the good of others, without any regard to their own good, whether prefent, or future. And tho, in such instances, pleasure will attend benevolent actions; yet that pleasure is only the result of, but not the motive to, or the ground and reason of those actions. The motive to and the confequence of an action are as diftinct and different, as two things. can be; and the want of diftinguishing betwixt these feems to be the foundation of men's errors, in the prefent cafe. One man by an action intends to do good to another, and, if the action has that effect, it will give pleasure to the agent; but, if it has a contrary effect, and does harm to that other, then, it will give pain to the agent. Here we fee that the effect and refult of the action are different, tho the motive to action is the fame. And if it should be urged, that as pleasure refulted to the agent, in the former cafe; therefore, pleasure was the motive to action: then, it may, with equal reafon, be urged on the other fide, that as pain refulted from the action to the agent, in the latter cafe; therefore, pain was the motive to that action. I fay, the reafoning is equally as juft, in one cafe, as in the other: tho, the truth is, it was neither pleasure, nor pain, to the agent, but good to another, which was the motive to action in both cafes. And as man is capable of doing good to another, purely for that other's fake; fo, furely, fuch benevolent virtue is not too high, too exalted for our great Creator. I fhall not enquire, What is the foundation of pleasure to God? for if, as is fuppofed, it refults from his doing good, it will not follow that felfishness is the principle of action in him, when he does fo. The reasonableness of an act is certainly a proper motive to action to a rational being; and the question arifing from hence is, whether the reasonableness of doing good to another arifes from the action itself, confidered as doing good to another, abstractedly from the effect it has upon the agent, in giving him pleasure? or whether it arifes from the pleasure which accrues to the agent, confidered abftractedly from the good which is done to the other thereby? If the former be the cafe, then, to do good to another, for that other's fake, under proper circumftances, is a proper motive to action to every rational being: and, therefore, it is fo to the most rational being, even the God and Father of us all. But if the latter be the cafe, viz. that the reasonableness of doing good to another arifes from the pleasure, which accrues to the agent thereby; then, it will follow that, if doing harm to another will produce that pleasure, doing harm to another is a reaJonable action. And, from hence, will arife another question, viz. If the reasonablenefs of an action arifes from the pleasure, which accrues to the agent thereby; then, how comes the doing good, rather than harm to another, to be the ground and foundation of pleasure to God? If it fhould be faid, that there is not any thing in nature which difpofes God to take pleasure in doing one, rather than the other; and that it depends upon his arbitrary will and pleasure. Then, I fay, that all his creatures are in a very unfafe condition, because tho he may take pleafure in doing them good to day, yet he may take the like pleasure in doing them harm to morrow; which is a very uncomfortable confideration, and, therefore, I hope, it is not the truth of the cafe. But if it fhould be faid, that there is a real difference in the actions themselves, antecedent to any effect they may have upon the agent, which is the truth of the cafe, and that God takes pleasure in

doing good, rather than in doing harm, because the former is a valuable, generous, and rational action; whereas the latter is bafe, mean, and unreasonable, and, therefore, cannot be the ground of pleasure to him. Then, I fay, that the valuablenefs, goodness, and reafonablenefs of an action is a proper motive to a rational being to perform that action, as well as a proper foundation for the pleasure which refults from it. And that, when God does good to others, it is benevolence, and not selfishness, which is the fpring or principle of action in him; it is the goodness of the action, which is the motive to his doing good, as well as the foundation of that pleafure, which accrues to him in fo doing. I will conclude this argument with obferving to my reader, that to confider felfishness, as the fole principle of action in God, is paying but a mean compliment to the great Author of the universe.

TREATISE XXXIV.

SOME SHORT

REFLECTIONS

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Grounds and Extent of Authority and Liberty, with Refpect to Civil Government: Wherein the Authority of Civil Governours, in Matters of Religion, is particularly confidered. Occafion'd by Dr. Rogers's Vindication of the Civil Establishment of Religion.

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EFORE I proceed to what I propofe, I think it proper to premife two or three things, with refpect to the grounds and foundation of argu-ment. As, first, that good and evil, right and wrong, truth and error, arife from, and are founded in the nature of things, and, confequently,. are what they are, viz. good and evil, right and wrong, truth and error, antecedent to, and independent of the opinion or determination of any perfon, or perfons, concerning them. And, therefore, in reafon, the opinion or determinations of any man, or body of men, ought not to be admitted, as a foundation for argument, with refpect to them. Again,

Secondly, In reafon, no principle, no propofition, or action, ought to be chargeable with any confequences, but what are the natural refult or produce of fuch. principle, propofition, or action. And, therefore, if unnatural confequences are at any time prefumed to attend any principle, propofition, or action, and if arguments are founded upon fuch prefumptive confequences, and conclufions are

drawn,.

drawn, tho never fo juftly, this is fallacious, and, in reafon, ought not to be admitted. As thus: Suppofing I was perfuaded of the truth of this propofition, viz. that bleeding, in all cafes, is very injurious to the health and the conftitutions of men; and this induced me to declare to others that propofition in the most publick manner; and likewife to declare the grounds and reafons upon which I affented to it, and which, I judged, were evidences from which the truth of that propofition would moft manifeftly appear; and if, in fuch a cafe, any man should prefume that breaking the publick peace and diforder in fociety would be the confequence of fuch a publication, this confequence would be unnatural, and, therefore, in reafon, ought not to be admitted, as a foundation for argument; because that publication has no natural tendency to produce it. It is not enough to fay in this cafe, that, in fome inftances, breaking the publick peace and diforder in fociety have attended men's publishing their opinions freely, as aforefaid: because these are not the natural produce of fuch a publication, but of private intereft, mifguided zeal, and the like: and of the turbulent and diforderly passions of men, which are fometimes raised by the most inoffenfive and virtuous actions. Christ published his moft benevolent and peaceful gofpel to the world: this gave occafion for alarming the turbulent paffions of men, and much disorder followed upon it. But, then, that diforder cannot, in reafon, be charged upon the publication of the gofpel, because it had no natural tendency to produce fuch confequences, but the contrary. And, therefore, no argument ought, in reafon, to be admitted, which is founded upon fuch unnatural confequences. Again,

Thirdly, In all points of moral confideration, there must be fome evident principle of reafon to be the ground and foundation of all argumentation on fuch fubjects: or, at least, in those cafes where there may be fome things prefumed and Suppofed, there must be a high degree of probability to juftify and warrant fuch prefumptions and fuppofitions. And, therefore, where fuch probability is wanting, prefumptions and fuppofitions ought not, in reafon, to be admitted, as a foundation for argument. As thus, it is highly reasonable that all men should be good and virtuous. But, then, this will not afford a proper foundation for prefuming and fuppofing that all men are fo, feeing they are not only liable to be otherwife, but likewife experience fhews that it is not generally their cafe. Again, it is highly reasonable, that all thofe, who have the reins of government in their hands, fhould make the common good the governing principle of their actions, throughout their adminiftration. But, then, this does not afford a proper foundation for prefuming and fuppofing that all governours act thus; seeing they are not only liable to act otherwife, but likewife experience fhews that many of them have done fo. And, therefore, in argument, no reafonings or conclufions ought to be admitted, which are founded upon fuch groundless principles. And because this is a way of reafoning which is fallacious, and, when it is artfully managed, it may and often does mislead; therefore, I fhall give another inftance of fuch groundless prefumptions and fuppofitions, and thereby more fully illuftrate the point I have now under confideration. As thus, man, by his natural frame and compofition, is liable to neglect, or abufe, his faculties; and, confequently, all men are liable to be thieves, drunkards, murderers, and the like. But, then, this will not be a proper foundation for prefuming and fuppofing that all, or that the generality of

men,

men, will be thieves, drunkards, murderers, &c. except fome pofitive religious inftitutions are established to reftrain them. Pofitive religious inftitutions leave men, as they find them, in this refpect; that is, men's natural abilities, their natural tempers and conftitutions, their appetites and paffions, and whatever are the fprings of action in them, and the natural confciousness of the good, or evil, of thofe actions, are the fame, both with and without fuch pofitive religious inftitutions. And, confequently, the probability and the prefumption arifing from it lie on the other fide of the queftion: that is, it may fairly be prefumed, that men would generally be what they are, drunkards, or fober; honeft, or dishonest; virtuous, or vicious; both with and without fuch pofitive religious inftitutions. This, I think, is farther evident from experience: men, who are difpofed to follow their vicious inclinations, do so, notwithstanding their being under fuch religious establishments. And, therefore, to prefume that all others would be alike, or more vicious, were it not for the establishment of fome religious pofitive inftitutions, is a groundless fuppofition, which has nothing in reafon, or experience, to fupport it. Add to this, that pofitive religious inftitutions cannot poffibly lay men under any reasonable reftraint, which natural religion does not lay them under. And, therefore, all argument and reafoning, founded upon fuch prefumptions and Suppofitions, ought not, in reafon, to be admitted.

These things being premifed, I obferve that, in order to proceed fairly, and to reafon justly and conclufively, upon the fubject under confideration, I think, it will be proper to enquire into the ground and reafon upon which fociety and government is founded; and into the end and purpofe which affociation is defigned to obtain; and likewife into the nature of that relation which governours ftand in to their people: and, from hence, I prefume, there will unavoidably arife some evident principle of reafon, which will be a proper foundation for all farther arguments and reafonings upon the point in hand.

Man's natural frame and compofition, and his fituation and condition in the world, fhew that he is defigned and conftituted for fociety, and to be happy in, and with it; and he is hereby naturally and unavoidably led into it. His natural affections difpefe him to fociety; his natural ability to convey his ideas to others by fpeech, the figure and parts of his body, and the endowments of his mind, qualify him for it; his indigence and dependence upon others, as being unable, in a fingle capacity, to procure the comforts, or guard against the evils of life, neceffitate or force him into fociety; and his understanding fhews him the fitnefs and reasonableness of fo doing. And as man is thus naturally led into fociety, or to conftitute a publick intereft, which is the fame thing; fo, in reason, he has a right to claim from fociety protection from those injuries he is liable to, and which, in his fingle capacity, he is not qualified to guard against; and likewife to claim that affiftance from fociety, which his particular neceffities call for, and which fociety is capable of, and, in reafon, ought to afford him. I fay, every individual, from the ground and reason, the end and purpose of affociation, must, in reason, have a right to claim thus much from fociety; and, confequently, the fociety muft, in reafon, be obliged to afford fuch affiftance and protection to him. And as each individual is thus naturally interested in fociety, fo each individual comes under natural obligations to it: that is to fay, each individual is, in reafon,

obliged