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no other fenfe than I do afcribe miraculous power to the Apoftles. Our Saviour faid unto his difciples, as in Matt. xvii. 20. If ye have faith as a grain of muftard feed, ye shall fay unto this mountain, remove hence to yonder place, and it fhall remove; and nothing shall be impoffible unto you. Now if the Apostles had at any time faid to a mountain, remove hence to yonder place; and if it had removed accordingly, I fhould have thought, that I may truly fay, they had power to remove a mountain, or that they did remove a mountain, or that God did it by them, and yet not afcribe omnipotency to them, John xiv. 12. Verily, verily, I fay unto you, he that believeth on me, the works that I do fhall be do alfo, and greater works than thefe fhall he do, because I go unto my Father. And I fhould perhaps have called the Apoftles God's agents, in fuch a work. But Mr. Claggett now informs me, that the term agent in fuch a cafe would have been improperly applied; and if fo, I am content to have it put by. So in like manner we read in Eph. iii. 9. That God created all things by Jefus Christ. By creation here I understood, the creation of this world; and I thought, that the rational or fpiritual part of our Saviour had acted the fame part in this creation as the Apostles did in the removing of a mountain, if such à remove at any time took place; and I thought, that I might truly fay, upon the fame grounds, that Chrift had power to create the world, or that he did create it, or that God created it by him, and yet not afcribe omnipotency to him, and I thought, I might juftly fay, that he was God's agent in this work; but now I am told otherwise. However, Mr. Claggett may fee from hence, 』 that his time and pains were fpent in vain, in this particular. And tho he is pleased to take it for granted, that creating power is incommunicable, yet that does not determine me to be of his judgment in this point; for as it feems to be a bold limitation of God's power, fo likewife, for ought that I can fee reafon to the contrary, it is equally as eafy for God to communicate creating power, as for him to communicate generating power, or any other fort of power whatever. We are informed, by experience, as well as from divine revelation, that one man begets another man. Now if a begotten fon may have power to beget another fon, why may not a creature have power from God to create another creature? Mr. Claggett fuppofes, he cannot; but perhaps this may be a cannot of his own making. Suppofe that God had propagated the feveral fpecies of living creatures (which inhabit this earth) fome other way, and not by generation, it is likely, if this had been fo, Mr. Claggett might then have as freely pronounced generating power omnipotent and uncreated, as he now does creating power.

If Mr. Claggett fhould reply, that in human generation a fon is not begotten or produced out of nothing. I anfwer, it is fufficient to remind him, that the creating of things out of nothing, is no-where afcribed to Chrift in the fcriptures. And as Adam's body was produced from the duft of the ground; fo the producing it of that fpecies, was properly a creating of it, according to the ufe of that expreffion, in the language of the fcriptures. Befides we are no-where affured from fcripture, that this earth was created out of nothing, when it was produced into that form in which it now is. We read, that God

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created the heavens and the earth; and that the earth was without form, and void; and that darkness cover'd the face of the great deep: but we do not read, that the earth was nothing antecedent to its creation; and therefore Christ might create the world, and yet not create it out of nothing. I fhall not enter into fo nice and philofophical an enquiry, as to examine, whether there be any fuch thing as created power, properly fo called. I think all power, properly fpeaking, is God's power, whether it be created or uncreated, tho the exercife of it, in different degrees, hath a dependence upon the will of free creatures. When I move my finger up or down, the power which is exercised in that act, I think, is God's power; and it is no farther my power, than as God hath given me the use of it, or as it hath a dependence upon my will for the exercise of it and if my finger should be, at any time, moved up or down, independent of my will, that would not be my action. The cafe is the fame with refpect to any other human action. All the power which is exercised in any of these acts, is certainly God's power; but forafmuch as the exercife of this power depends upon our will, therefore the actions which are performed by it, are properly our actions. And as the power, which is exercised in thefe, is faid to be our power, fo I think it is ours only, in this refpect, as God hath given us the use of it, or as the exercise of it depends upon our will. And tho God cannot communicate to any being a power independent of himself, this being a contradiction, because all communicated power must be dependent power; yet he may fo far leave the exercife of his power to the will of free creatures, as that they may exercise it independent of his will: and that he doth fo in fact is evident, because this is the cafe in all the actual fins which are committed; in which cafes men exercife God's power, independent of God's will. And in this God doth not commit fin, tho his power is exercised in the committing of it, because the finfulness of these acts does not at all confift in the power which is exercifed, but only in the wrong use and exercife of it, in which alone, I think, the finfulness of any act confifts, viz. in its non-conformity to God's will. And tho in the cafe of creation God may, if he pleases, fo act as that there fhall be no medium betwixt his will and the exercife of his power in the production of what he wills; yet he may, if he pleases, act otherways: and that he hath done fo, is evident in his creating lice out of duft, in the land of Egypt, as in Exod. viii. 16, 17. In this cafe, as God will'd, that Aaron's rod fmiting the duft of the ground fhould change that duft into lice, which was an act of creation; fo Aaron's fmiting the dust (which depended upon Aaron's will) was by God's good pleasure made necessary to that creation; and was a medium (by God's appointment, if I may fo fpeak) betwixt God's will, and the effecting (of what he will'd) by his power. And as God thus acted, when there was previous matter to work upon, viz. the duft of the ground; fo I doubt not but he could, if he had pleased, have produced lice by the inftrumentality of Aaron, tho there had been no previous matter to work upon, that is, he might have produced lice out of nothing, and have made the concurrence of Aaron's will neceffary to their production, and fo might have created them by Aaron, and Aaron would have been, in

their creation, God's inftrument, or agent (or whatever term my adversary fhall allow to be proper in this cafe) in fuch fort as Chrift and his Apostles were fo, Acts ii. 22, and xv. 12. and xix. 11, 12. I farther obferve, that upon a fuppofition God created this world, by the inftrumentality or agency of his Son, yet his Son would have no right of dominion over this world, by virtue of that creation, as fome men have freely maintain'd. Suppofe that one man should build an houfe by the agency of another man ; in this cafe the agent would have no right to inhabit this house, by virtue of his being the builder of it, because that right is wholly lodg'd in his principal: and he can have no right to habitation in this houfe, except his principal communicates it to him. So in like manner, if God created this world by Jefus Chrift, Jefus Christ can have no right of dominion over it, by virtue of that creation, because that right is wholly lodg'd in his principal. If what St. Paul faith should be urged in this cafe, viz. that all things were made by him, and for bim (to rule over.) I anfwer, they were made for him (to rule over) when God fhould give the right of dominion into his hand, as he hath done under the gofpel difpenfation. Suppofe a man should build an houfe by his agent, for himself to live in for a year, and for his agent to live in when that year should be expired, I think it might be truly faid of this agent, that the house was built by him, and for him (to live in) tho he did not live in it fo foon as it was built, and tho his right of habitation was not founded upon his being the builder, but wholly upon the grace and bounty of his principal. So in like manner, if God created this world by Jefus Chrift, and for Jefus Christ to rule over, when he should give the right of dominion into his hand, as in this cafe all things would be made by him, and for him, fo his right of dominion would not be founded in the act of creation, but wholly and folely upon the grace and bounty of his principal. Again I obferve, if the world was created by the effential power of the Father only, as Mr. Claggett fuppofes, and if the effential power of the Father is the very Father, as I have thewed it is, and if the Son was not an agent in that work; then it will follow, that he was not a co-efficient either, for as there must be two working together to conftitute a co-efficient, and as the effential power of the Father, which is the very Father, and which is but one, and is not a fecond, is the fole efficient caufe of the creation; fo from hence it will follow, by an unavoidable confequence, that there can be no fuch thing as a co-efficient in the cafe. There is an efficient, viz. the effential power of the Father, which is the very Father; but there is not a co-efficient, because the effential power of the Father, which is the very Father, is but one, and is not a fecond. Upon the whole, I obferve, that if creating power is incommunicable, as Mr. Claggett fuppofes, from hence it will follow, that the real Son of the Father never had fuch a power, for if the Father could not give it, the Son could not receive it. And if he never had fuch a power, then he never exercised it, because he could not exercise a power which he had not. And from hence will arife two confequences, first, that I was under a mistake when I afcribed creation power, and creation work, to the Son of God: which error I am ready to retract whenfoever it can K

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be proved to me that he could not, or that he did not exercise it. The fecond confequence is this, that thofe places of fcripture, wherein creation work is afcribed to the Son, are to be understood, not in a proper, but in a figurative fense: not of the natural creation, which Mofes hath given the hiftory of, but of that spiritual creation, which Isaiah prophefied fhould be effected under the gofpel. And if my afcribing creation work to Chrift, in a proper fense, is an error, it was my mifapplying thofe texts which fpeak about it that led me into that error. I applied them to the natural creation, when, upon this foot of argument, I ought to have applied them to the moral or spiritual creation. I was, in this cafe, like Nicodemus, who, when our Lord told him, that a man must be born again, or elfe he could not fee the kingdom of God, prefently applied this to the natural birth, when he ought to have applied it to the fpiritual birth. So in like manner, when I read, that God created all things by Jefus Christ; that all things were made by him, and without him was not any thing made that was made; that all things in heaven and in earth were made by bim, and for him, I haftily applied this to the natural creation; whereas if creating power is incommunicable, as Mr. Claggett fuppofes, then I ought to have applied it to the moral or fpiritual creation.

I now proceed to enquire, whether the perfon of Chrift could be a man, upon my principles. I need not follow Mr. Claggett through that long discourse, nor enter into all thofe queftions which Mr. Towgood's manufcript hath furnished him with; and which I have already anfwer'd, in my obfervations on the manufcript referr'd to, and on Mr. Towgood's letter. For the full ftating of this question, I obferve, that as God hath produced a multitude of things, and as mankind have for use or vanity encreased their number, fo these things are ranged or distinguish'd into forts, and every fort comes under a particular denomination or name, by which denomination or name every fort (in our fpeaking about them) is diftinguish'd or known from all other forts of things. And as they are thus diftinguish'd into forts, fo there is fomething peculiar to each fort, which is the foundation of that distinction, and that is made the standard of that fort of thing, because it is that, and that only, which makes an effential difference between it and all other forts of things. And as there is fomething peculiar to each fort of thing, which is made the ftandard of that fpecies, fo that peculiarity is always known, with respect to all thofe fpecies of things which come within our cognifance, and of which we are capable of judging whether things belong to their fpecies or not; for otherways we should never be able to diftinguish one thing from another, nor know what fpecies things belong to. Thus for example, if the ftandard of the fpecies of gold was fome unknown quality in that metal, then it would follow, that we could not know whether any piece of metal was gold, or not; because we could not discover whether that quality was in it, or not, which is made the standard of that fpecies. To apply this to the cafe in hand. I think, with fubmiffion, that the true and only standard of the fpecies of mankind, is this, viz. only one individual intel*The manufcript, referred to, contained animadverfions on the fupremacy of the Father, by Mr. Towgood, a diffenting teacher at Wilton.

ligent rational fpirit, fo united to only one individual human body, as that these two in their united ftate do conftitute one individual perfon; I fay, one, and only one of each of thefe, in their united state, does conftitute a man, properly fo called; because Adam, the first man, and all the men that ever sprang out of his loins, as far as we ever had any knowledge of them, were conftituted of only one of each of thefe, united as aforefaid. Now as this ftandard confists in something known, as the standard of all fuch fpecies muft do which comes within our cognifance, fo I can eafily judge who is a man, and who is not: and therefore, when I find a perfon, conftituted as aforefaid, I pronounce him a man; because I find that in him which is made the ftandard of that fpecies: and thus I prove Adam to be a man, and David to be a man, and Chrift to be a man, and Mr. Claggett to be a man; because I find, in each of thefe, that which is made the ftandard of the fpecies of mankind. But if I put by this standard, and set up fomething which is unknown in its ftead, then I am utterly at a lofs to know who is a man, and who is not; and confequently, for ought I know, Adam might not be a man, nor David, nor Chrift might be men; because I cannot tell whether they had that in them which is made the standard of that fpecies. And I think it will be a difficult thing for Mr. Claggett to prove, that either, or all of thefe before mention'd were men, upon any other grounds than those I have laid down. If he fhould reply, that the fcriptures declare Adam to be a man, and David, and Chrift to be men; let him remember, that in his opinion, this is no proof of the cafe, by his own declaration in the cafe of the angels that appear'd to Lot, with refpect to which he tells me, as from Mr. Whiston, that the fcriptures fometimes fpeak of things, not according to what they really are, but according to what they appear to be; and confequently all that the fcriptures prove in the cafe is, that Adam, David, and Chrift, appear'd to be men, but they by no means prove them to be really fo.

If he should farther urge, that each of these had an human foul, and so they were men; because an human foul and an human body, properly united, do conftitute a man, properly fo called; and the perfons before mention'd partaking of each of thefe, in their united state, were men in the proper fenfe of that term. I anfwer, this brings me to confider the standard of the fpecies of human fouls, which, as it must be fomething known, or else it is impoffible that we can ever know who has an human foul, and who has not, fo the ftandard of this fpecies I take to be only this, viz. the union of an intelligent rational spirit to an human body, as aforefaid. Here I make the ftandard of the fpecies of human fouls, to confift only in the relation, which an intelligent rational fpirit ftands in to an human body, which relation is founded in its union, as aforefaid. And according to this ftandard I can prove, that Adam had an human foul, and that David and Chrift had each of them an human foul; becaufe, upon examination, I find that each of these had intelligent rational fpirits, united to human bodies, as aforefaid: and fo they had that in them which is made the standard of the fpecies of human fouls. But if I put by this standard, and substitute fomething unknown in the room of it, then I am ut,

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