and it would never be maintained, that these various effects of his intellectual power pre-suppose a necessary plurality. Thus likewise animation causes different effects, as nutrition, growth, sensation, and the effects of 'volition, desire, and reflection.

Philosophers, however, have not by these various effects been induced to consider the soul as composite. But that some of them have been induced to advance that opinion, is owing to the circumstance, that growth has been found by itself in the vegetable kingdom, sensation by itself in animals, and intellect by itself in the superior intelligences; which has induced some physicians to assert, that there are three souls in man; although this opinion is erroneous, and it is proved that the soul is one, however manifold the effects it produces.* He therefore who does not understand the powers of the human soul will, perhaps, assign its differing effects to different causes; whilst he who is better acquainted with these powers will know, that, though the soul is but one, and no plurality can be assigned to it, yet its effects are various and even contrary: So that, though it be said of a man that he caused such a place to be destroyed, and such other place to be built and inhabited, that he discovered such a land, or invented such a science, all these different acts do not of necessity require any plurality in the essence of this intellectual agent. If such is the case with agents of an inferior degree, whose powers are within the grasp of

our

reason, how much greater is the likelihood that the power of producing various and contrary effects should be possessed by that Supreme Being, who is the First Cause of all effects, as well of necessary as of intentional ones!

Accordingly we maintain, that, although we perceive the manifold, various, and contrary effects and operations emanating from Him, (blessed be HE!) still it does not by any means follow, that there is or should be any plurality in his es

As the reasoning adduced by our author in support of the last opinion is a mere transcript of that made use of by Maimo

sence. And though this enables the reflecting searcher to attribute to the Deity the various qualifications apparent by means of these different effects;-whether their differences arise from the various objects which they influence, such as the power of causing vegetation displayed in the the vegetable kingdom, and of causing animation evinced in animals, or from the contrary influence they exercise on the same object,-nevertheless it is certain that no plurality can be supposed in His essence. We see, for instance, that life emanates from Him, and is imparted to all animate beings; we thence conclude that he is alive, not that he is composed of different lives. For, say we, as all life emanates from Him, He must be its Source and Origin. In like manner we say, "Light is with Him," as we see that it is by His light we are enlightened, and that he bestows the power of beholding the light by causing sight to proceed from possible into actual operation. As the sacred Singer says, "Should he that gave the ear not hear? Should he that formed the light not see?" (Psalm lxxiv. 9.) We also call Him wise, because we perceive effects emanating from Him with wonderful wisdom and order; which demonstrate that there must be in Him the most perfect wisdom. In this manner we may assign to Him the qualifications which are evidenced by the different effects he produces, without therefore imputing to Him any plurality in His essence. In like manner we may ascribe to Him the different relations which exist between Him and the various objects submitted to His agency, as it is said in common parlance, "God is near to a man," or, "He is far from a man." Thus Holy Writ says, "The Lord is near the contrite;" (Psalm xxxiv. 19;) and again, "Far distant is the Lord from the impious." (Prov. xv. 29.) The proximity or distance which is here mentioned, is not in the Deity, but in man, and results from the relation in which he has placed himself to

nides in his Schmona Perakim, we refer our readers to the first chapter of that Treatise in the present Number, page 110.

wards his Creator: As our Rabbies, of blessed memory, say, when they expound Exodus xxxi. 6, The Lord! The Lord!" I am the Lord before man commits any sin: I am the the same after the sin has been committed." Their meaning is, the change wrought by sin is confined to man only; and the relation between him and his Creator is different before he transgresses, from what it becomes afterwards. Thus a tree is said at one time to be near a man, at another to be distant from him; at one time to his right hand, and at another to his left; still it is not the tree which has changed its position, but the man, whilst the tree remains stationary; however our habits of parlance may vary its position. When it is said, The Lord (blessed be HE!) is the Creator, the King, the Master, and more epithets of a similar kind; these, however multitudinous, will as little imply plurality in his essence as our saying of any man, "Reuben is the son of Jacob, the brother of Simeon, the father of Hanoch, the companion of Naphtali, the proprietor of a certain house, and the owner of such a field." All these epithets do not imply any plurality in Reuben, but result from the different relations in which he stands towards the various persons and things which we have enumerated, as connected with him: And, therefore, when we say, "The Deity has volition: Is the Creator omnipotent and omniscient?" our intention is not to say that He has one quality by which he wills, another by means of which He creates, a third by means of which he knows, and a fourth by means of which He is powerful; as little could it ever be our intention to maintain, that He created the elements by means of one quality, the astral world by a second, angels by a third, and man by a fourth quality; because when we say, He is the Creator of all these various beings," it does not imply any plurality in him. Accordingly, whether the Deity be described by the various qualities evidenced from effects according to their various influence on different objects, or from the effects abstractedly, or from the

various relations to him in which different objects stand, the conclusion remains invariably and decidedly the same, that all such qualities do not of necessity imply or presuppose plurality in his essence; but can only be considered as due to Him in virtue of the perfection resulting from his inherent, absolute, and unconditional existence. Thus the law and the prophets attribute such various qualities to the Deity. But whether it be possible that he can be designated by various qualities in consequence of his own essence, is a question that demands our careful investigation.

CHAPTER IX.

THE qualities which are attributed to any being are not that being itself, but a something attained by it. The manner of such attainment is two-fold; either intrinsic or accidental. When we, for instance, say, "The animal is alive," the quality "life" is intrinsic to the animal : In fact, what we did say is only tantamount to the expression, The animal is an animal," which without life it cannot be. "Life" is, therefore, merely an explanatory term, appended to the noun substantive "animal," but does not form any addition to its essence. Accordingly it might be supposed that it is possible to attribute to the Deity such qualities, as they do not add to his essence; and the plurality of epithets does not imply any plurality in him, but only tend to facilitate the proper understanding of his essence. As when we say, "An animal is material, nourished, and sensitive," these different epithets do not confer any plurality on the animal. But such supposition would be erroneous; and it therefore behoves us to know, that it is impossible to attribute to the Deity any quality or qualities which can be said to appertain to his essence: For, could that be done, the Deity would be composite of two things,-His essence, and what appertains to that essence. Whereas we have already repeatedly declared and proved, that the Deity is an absolute Unity. That the Holy One (blessed be HE!) has certain qualities that are acci

3.

The faculties of the soul are as follow: 1. Nutrition, which is likewise called "growth." 2. Sensation. Imagination. 4. Desire. 5. Reason. We have already premised, that our present investigation is limited to the soul of man; for his faculty of nutrition is not like that of the horse or the ass. Man thrives through the faculty of nutrition in the human soul; whilst the ass thrives by that in the asinine soul, and the eagle by that which is peculiar to its soul. And although we apply the same expression, (nutrition,") indiscriminately to all beings, nevertheless its operation is not, by any means, the same. In the same indiscriminate manner we use the term "sensation " of all animate beings; not that the sensations of man are the same as those of other animate beings, or the feelings of one species are exactly like those of any other. But, as each distinct species has its peculiar soul, the faculties of each species of soul must be peculiar to itself. And though a similarity observable in the operation of these peculiar and distinct faculties might induce us to class them together, as resulting from the same species of soul, our doing so would be an error, as such is not the case.

In order to illustrate what we have here stated, we offer the following example: Three dark places become illumined, one by the light of the sun, the second by that of the moon, the third by that of a taper. In each of these places the operation of the light produces the same effect, namely, the dispelling of darkness. Nevertheless, the operating cause is, in each place, different and distinct; being, in the one, the sun, in the second the moon, and in the third a taper. Such likewise is the case with the cause of sensation; which, in man, is the human soul, in the ass the asinine soul, and in every individual species of animals its own peculiar soul. Nor is there any thing in common to them except the name, which, as we said before, is indiscriminately applied. This illustration is most important, as many philosophers have fallen into errors on the subject, which necessarily led to paradox and unfounded opinions.

To return to our subject, the faculties of the human soul: We say, NUTRITION is the faculty to lead the particles of nourishment into the stomach, to retain them until they are fully digested, to perform the functions of digestion and of evacuation, to cause growth and procreation, and completely to separate the nutritive and useful juices which are retained, from all others which must be expelled. How and in what manner does this sevenfold faculty perform its operations? In which members of the human body is the operation most visible or perceptible? Which of them are constantly active? And which are the others that operate only at certain times? All these questions appertain to the science of medicine, and form no part of our examination.

SENSATION is the well-known fivefold faculty of seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, and feeling; which last is equally found in all parts of the body, whereas, each of the other four has its own seat in some particular part.

IMAGINATION is the faculty, peculiar to man, of recalling sensations or impressions, even after the objects which caused them are no longer present, to add or diminish, to combine or separate, the same; also to create from the impressions received by the senses that which never did, and never can, exist. Thus it creates a ship of iron, navigating the air; a man, whose head reaches the heavens, whilst his feet rest on earth; a quadruped, which has a thousand eyes; and many more similar impossibilities, which it embodies and represents as if they were actually existing. Dialecticians have fallen into a great and pernicious error, when, on the strength of the generally received division of the necessary, the possible, and the impossible, they raised a structure of sophisms, and believed, or led others to believe, that all the creations of the imagination are possible; and did not consider that this faculty itself is none other than the unlimited power of giving existence to what is not, and cannot be.

DESIRE is the faculty of wishing or declining; which occasions active