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certain, unlimited, conditional, and dependent on the will and works of man; he confessed that his opinion was contrary to that of St. Austin; but he also said, that St. Austin's was contrary to the opinion of all others.

"The second proposition was variously censured according to the diversity of principles: and the proposition was, that the elect could not be damned, nor the reprobate saved. Catarino confessed that the elect could not be damned ; but he would not say that the reprobate could not be saved; because God giving them sufficient grace, if they made good use of it, they might be saved. Here the Thomists flourished their distinction, in sensu composito & in sensu diviso, and said, that in a sense compounded or complex, the elect could not be damned; but in a sense divided or distinct they might. That is to say, that the elect considered under a decree of election could not be damned; but if considered simply as men, abstractedly from that decree of election, it might be said, that they might be damned, because they might never have have been elected. This distinction raised more mist before the eyes of the prelates, who were neither great philosophers nor divines, than it brought light to the question. The other six propositions were condemned by unanimous consent, particularly that which asserted the perseverance of true saints, and the inamissibility of righteousness. They alledged the examples of Saul, Solomon, Judas, and others, who had totally fallen from the real righteousness wherewith they had been invested.

"After matters were thoroughly examined, canons and decrees must pass over them. But they were in great perplexity how to do that; every party striving to have the decrees worded in terms that might favour their opinions. Giacomo Cocco, Archbishop of Corfu, was of the mind that no opinion which could be interpreted in a sound sense, should be condemned; and therefore he desired that all necessary exceptions and limitations should be put in the canons for removing all ambiguity. Others opposed that, saying, that if all interpretations must be inserted, it would render the canons long, tedious, and intricate, But the bishop

of Simigaglia proposed a method which was approved, and followed during the remaining time of the council. He said that there ought to be made in the first place a decree of doctrine, which should be divided into chapters; that therein the doctrine of the Church should be declared in a style and method capable to give content to all Catholics: and that then another decree ought to be made containing nothing but the canons and anathemas against heretics. The Legate Cardinal Santa Croce, applied all his pains and skill in the composing of these decrees: and laboured in it with so much success, that he gave content to all; because he worded them with so much ambiguity, that every party found their opinions therein. But this was not done without trouble; for there were above an hundred congregations as well of divines as prelates held about it, and from the beginning of September until the end of November, there past not a day wherein the cardinal did not peruse his decrees, and altering something in them. In a word, they found a means to satisfy the Scotists and the Thomists, Catarino and his adherents, who stood for the certainty that one may have of his own justification, and those that opposed it. The decrees were so artificially contrived to please all, that Dominico à Soto immediately after wrote three books, de natura & gratia, and found all his opinions in the decisions of the council. And nevertheless, Andreas de Vega, a famous condelier, on the other hand composed fifteen large books upon the same subject, and found all his opinions in the same decrees, though they were quite opposite to the sentiments of Soto."-Jurieu's History of the Council of Trent. Book II. p. 130-135.

NOTE I. (Page 42.)

On the subject of implicit faith, Dr. Campbell has the following ingenious observations. "Religion, the Christian religion in particular, has always been understood to require faith in its

principles; and faith in principles requires some degree of knowledge or apprehension of those principles. If total ignorance should prevail, how could men be said to believe that of which they knew nothing? The schoolmen have devised an excellent succedaneum to supply the place of real belief, which necessarily implies, that the thing believed is, in some sort, apprehended by the understanding. This succedaneum they have denominated implicit faith, an ingenious method of reconciling things incompatible, to believe every thing, and to know nothing, not so much as the terms of the propositions which we believe. When the sacred lessons of the gospel were no longer addressed to the understandings of the people; when in all the public service, they were put off with sound instead of sense, when their eyes and ears were amused, but their minds left uninstructed; it was necessary that something should be substituted for faith, which always presupposes knowledge; nay, that it should be something which might still be called faith; for this name had been of so great renown, so long standing, and so universal use, that it was not judged safe entirely to dispossess it. Exactly such a something is implicit faith. The name is retained, whilst nobody is incommoded with the thing.

"The terms implicit faith are used in two different senses. With us Protestants, at least in this country, no more is commonly meant by them than the belief of a doctrine, into the truth of which we have made no inquiry, on the bare authority of some person or society declaring it to be true. But this always supposes, that one knows, or has some conception of the doctrine itself. All that is denoted by the term implicit in this acceptation is, that in lieu of evidence, one rests on the judgment of him or them by whom the tenet is affirmed. No ignorance is implied but of the proofs. But the implicit faith recommended by the schoolmen is quite another thing, and is constituted thus; if you believe that all the religious principles, whatever they be, which are believed by such particular persons, are true; those persons who hold the principles are explicit believers, you are an implicit believer of all their principles.

Nor is your belief the less efficacious, because you are ignorant of the principles themselves. Perhaps you have never heard them mentioned, or have never inquired about them. For it does not hold here as in the faith whereof the Apostle speaks, How shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard? In the presence of those profound doctors the schoolmen, the Apostle would be found to be no other than an arrant novice. The transcendent excellency of implicit faith consists in this, that you have it then in the highest perfection, when, in regard to its object, you know nothing, and have even heard nothing at all. In brief, it is neither more nor less than being a believer by proxy. Scripture saith, "Ye are saved through faith," and "without faith it is impossible to please God." Now implicit faith is a curious device for pleasing God, and being saved by the faith of others. It is, in fact, imputative faith, at least as extraordinary as the imputative justice, which brought so much obloquy on some of the reformers. It is as if I should call one an implicit mathematician, who knows not a tittle of mathematics, not even the definitions and axioms, but is convinced of the knowledge of some other person who is really, or whom he supposes to be an adept in that science.

"To believe implicitly," says Bona, " is to believe in general "universally all that holy mother church believes; so as to "dissent from her in nothing, nor disbelieve any of her articles. "And though it be convenient (licet opportunum sit) for all, "not only to believe all the articles implicitly, but even some of "them, since the coming of Christ, explicitly; yet it is not "necessary (non tamen est necessarium) for all, especially the common people, to believe them all explicitly. It is proper "rather for those, who assume the office of teaching and preach

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ing, as they have the cure of souls." Further, to shew the wonderful virtues and efficacy of such a faith, another of the doctors, Gabriel Byel, maintains, that, " if he who implicitly be"lieves the Church, should think, misled by natural reason, "that the Father is greater than the Son, and existed before "him, or that the three persons are things locally distant from

"one another, or the like, he is not a heretic, nor sins, provided "he do not defend this error pertinaciously. For he believes "what he does believe, because he thinks that the Church be"lieves so, subjecting his opinion to the faith of the Church. "For though his opinion be erroneous, his opinion is not his "faith, nay, his faith, in contradiction to his opinions, is the "faith of the Church. What is still more, this implicit faith "not only defends from heresy and sin, but even constitutes “merit in heterodoxy itself, and preserves in that merit one who "forms a most heterodox opinion, because he thinks the Church "believes so." Thus far Byel. It is then of no consequence what a man's explicit faith be; he may be an Arian, a Socinian, an Anthropomorphite, a Polytheist, in short, any thing, he cannot err, whilst he has an implicit faith in the Church. This they give as their explanation of that article of the creed, "I believe in the holy Catholic Church;" though, agreeably to this interpretation, there should have been no other article in the creed. This point alone supersedes every other, and is the quintessence of all." Dr. Campbell's Lectures on Eccles. History, Vol. II. p. 255-259.

NOTE K. (Page 68.)

Optatus Melevitanus. Lib. 5. ad princip.

Vos dicitis, licet; nos, non licet: Inter vestrum licet, & nostrum non licet, nutant & remigant animæ populorum. Nemo vobis credat, nemo nobis; omnes contentiosi homines sumus. Quærendi sunt judices: si Christiani, de utraque parte dari non possunt: de foris quærendus est Judex. Si Paganus, non potest nosse Christiana secreta: si Judæus, inimicus est Christiani Baptismatis. Ergo in terris de hac re nullum poterit reperiri judicium: de cœlo quærendus est judex. Sed quid pulsamus cœlum, cum habeamus hic in evangelio testamentum? Quia hoc loco recte possunt terrena cœlestibus comparari; tale est, quod

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