preme tribunals" of the "magna virum mater," but which, we trust, will never be received into the American schools of criticism. The author continues thus:

"But if we acquire a knowledge of reflection, through the medium of consciousness, and have as clear a knowledge of reflection, as of any other mental operation, it will also follow, that we acquire a knowledge of every other mental operation or faculty, through the same medium; in other words, that all our faculties, and mental operations, are subjects, or modifications of consciousness."

And how are we bettered by taking consciousness, instead of reflection, as the medium of our knowledge, of all the operations, or faculties of the mind? Consciousness is as much a faculty of the mind, as reflection, and being a faculty of the mind, we must acquire a knowledge of it, through the same medium, that we acquire a knowledge of all the other faculties. Is it, then, less absurd to say, that we acquire a knowledge of consciousness, through the medium of another consciousness, than it is to say, that we acquire a knowledge of reflection, through the medium of another reflection? There appears to us to be no sort of difference, or at most, a very trifling difference, between consciousness and reflection. The former, according to Mr. Locke, (whose Essay on the Human Understanding is deservedly complimented by this author,) is the perception of what passes within our own minds; and the latter is the action of the mind upon itself, which, if it has any meaning, can mean nothing more nor less, than the perception of the operations of our own minds. The mind must be employed in acquiring a knowledge of its own operations; and if reflection be the perception of these operations, then reflection must be the medium through which we acquire a knowledge of the mind, and of all that passes within it.

We are at a loss to know what the author means, when he says, that reflection is merely the concentration of consciousness, on whatever is accompanied by an unusual degree of pleasure or pain, or strongly excites desire or aversion. Does he mean by this, that the mind is never employed in reflection, or that it never perceives its own operations, except when strongly excited? In speaking of mind, we necessarily speak of it, in its most perfect state; and thus, whatever it perceives, it must per

ceive distinctly and perfectly: the consciousness, therefore, of any one operation of the mind, must be as complete as the consciousness of any other operation; and if we obtain a knowledge of reflection, through the medium of consciousness, it is manifestly absurd to say, that this object of our knowledge is a concentration of the medium, through which it is attained. The "arrangement of the various subjects or modifications of consciousness, in the order of cause and effect," is, we humbly conceive, an effect of knowledge, or an attribute of knowledge, and not knowledge itself.

Having stated his definition of science, the author thinks himself bound to enter into an "analysis of the relation of cause and effect," in order to render what he has to say upon the subject intelligible. From this analysis, he deduces twelve or thirteen "important conclusions;" which conclusions, together with the analysis itself, constitute what he is pleased to call an essay "on the nature, extent, and limits of human knowledge." We shall take the liberty of transcribing the eighth of these conclusions, which we single out from the multitude, for several reasons: first, because the author considers it "the most important;" secondly, because it offers a fair specimen of his perspicuous, logical and comprehensive mode of arguing; and lastly, because we think it a curiosity. It is only one sentence, reader! but if thou hast breath to read it, without stopping to rest, or sense to understand it, after thou hast read it, we can venture to tell thee, for thy comfort, that thou art more longwinded, and more intelligent, than many of thy neighbours! Here it is:

"Eighthly: It is deducible from the preceding analysis, (and this inference is the most important that can be deduced from it,) that as the dignity of human nature, its preeminence and dominion upon earth, its capabilities of progressive improvement and virtue, primordially originate, in its capacity to unravel indefinitely, the chain of cause and effect: as the successive stages of intellectual and moral improvement, at which it actually arrives, are indissolubly connected, or more properly identified, with the knowledge of the relation of cause and effect, not only attained, but diffused: as the rumerical individuals who compose the human species, disappear periodically, and are periodically renovated by successive generations, within periods seldom exceeding one hundred years, and never exceeding a mean duration of sixty years: as the individuals who compose* every successive generation commences

We copy this according to the directions given in the errata.

its mortal career in ignorance and impotence, endowed by nature with capacities for the acquisition of knowledge, at least equal to those of their progenitors, (although susceptible, possibly, of organical melioration and deterioration,) but at the moment of birth, undisciplined by and unfurnished with knowledge; without any actual participation in the patrimony of the species, progressive seience: as these capacities can be disciplined and furnished only, as knowledge of the relation of cause and effect can be imparted to individual mind, in its advances from infancy to maturity, only by EDUCATION; by the benevolent and judicious exertions of adult and cultivated minds, to instruct minds immature and uninformed: It follows, that education is the only efficient means, within the reach or power of man, by which the improvement of human society, individually, or, in its totality; (of a single individual, of any given number of individuals, or, of the whole number of individuals, who compose a nation or generation,) can be realized: It follows, that as the methods for communicating knowledge through the medium of education, are simplified in their process, and as the academical institutions for communicating knowledge by these methods, are multiplied and matured: in other words, in proportion to the numbor of individuals in each succeeding generation, or, to the number of individuals in every civilized community, who are educated in those academical institutions; will be the sum of happiness, enjoyed by each succeeding generation, taken collectively, by any civilized community, taken separately, and in a great majority of cases, the degree of happiness and usefulness enjoyed by any individual, taken singly."

We must not omit to state, that there is a note to this passage, of something more than three pages in length, in which the author confesses, that he has deliberately exposed it "to the charge of tautology, pleonasm, verbosity: has deliberately disregarded every rule of brevity and laconism; for the sake of conveying this inference clearly, and, if possible, impressing it deeply, on the mind of the reader." He might have added that he had, also, deliberately disregarded the rules of grammar, and set common sense at defiance. This is the first time we have ever heard it maintained, that "tautology," "pleonasm," and "verbosity" were necessary to render language more plain and clear; or, that the perspicuity of an inference, depended upon the extent, to which it could be stretched, by the multiplication, and ramification, of the proposition. Among the notes to this Essay, (which, by the way, are about ten times more voluminous than the Essay itself,) there is another precious specimen of composition, which can hardly fail to acquire for the author, what he so ardently pants to obtain, “extensive celebrity as a philosophical writer." We

shall do all that we can towards the gratification of his "laudum immensa cupido," by calling the attention of our readers to the following sentence:

"It has been too long and too tamely endured, not in the old but in the new world, that, whilst the author of Political Justice was doomed to expiate his honest errors, in insignificance and infamy; obscene jesters, and blaspheming; bards, and venal ballad-mongers, and lascivious minstrels, and soul-less sophists, and heart-less sentimentalists, and frontless hypocrites, and wonderworking, horror-breathing novelists, have basked in the sunshine, not of courtly favour, (that might be forgotten,) not of fashionable javour, that might be unnoticed) but of popular favour, which he must be more or less than man, who can regard with indifference, or forfeit without reluctance.”

of

Besides the beautiful collection of high sounding epithets, and copulative conjunctions, and parentheses, and antitheses, in this delectable sentence, the reader will not fail to admire, also, the handsome compliment paid to the new world, for their encourage ment of all sorts of wickedness, at the Mr. Godexpense poor win. We read through eight or ten pages of this note, in perfect ignorance of the motive which could have led the writer to scrape together all the terms of eulogy, that could be found in the language, and to pour them in "full tide" upon the head of this "victim for the tomahawk of vituperative satire," until we came nearly to the close, when the whole mystery was explained by an "extract of a letter," which Mr. Godwin had had the civility to address to the author, "in reply to one which the author had previously taken the liberty to address to him." A correspondence with "William Godwin, author of Political Justice, The Enquirer, Caleb Williams, St. Leon, Memoirs of Mary Woolstoncraft, Fleetwood, and of a most somniferous Tragedy," was an honour, which, it would have been too great a self-denial, to have concealed from the publick.

The Third and last of these Philosophical Essays, is "on the modern abuse of moral fiction, in the shape of novels." Here the author seems to have got upon familiar ground; and though it cannot be called the best of his essays, it may be pronounced not so bad as the preceding ones. Every one can talk better, or write better upon a subject that he understands, than upon one of which he is ignorant; and we must do the author the justice to say, that he appears to have read more novels, good, bad and indifferent, than any philosopher of the age; and, almost as many as any

young lady who subscribes to Robinson's Circulating Library. But he has said very little, either in approbation, or reprobation, of this species of writing, which may not be found in some of the Dedications or Introductions, or Prefaces to the novels themselves. As usual, the notes to this essay are very "copious," and embrace a great variety of subjects, wholly "disconnected," (as the author himself would say) from the text. In one of these notes, “S. Johnson," the "literary usurper," is honoured with the raving, ranting abuse of this declaimer against novels. We could not for the soul of us, when we read his masterly criticism upon the definer of "oats," help thinking of the viper and the file. But let us see how this philosophical critick knocks down the dead Lion.

"The Zoilus of Gray, S. Johnson, has objected to the epithet, "velvet." The reason he assigns (as usual, where this literary usurper and idol, condescends to assign a reason for his dicta and dogmas) will not sustain the stricture. This dogmatist opines and pronounces, "that an epithet drawn from nature, ennobles art; an epithet or metaphor drawn from art, degrades nature. It is not so; amongst a variety of instances that might be quoted, to prove the fallacy of this notion, the writer selects the following:

"Was I deceived, or did a sable cloud

Turn forth her silver lining on the night,'

"In these exquisite lines, an epithet properly applicable, to one of the humblest and most familiar operations of art, is applied to one of the most fugitive, delicate and beautiful forms of nature; a cloud embellished by the moon-beam:

"The pillard firmament is rottenness,

And earth's base built on stubble,'

"Pillard' and 'base,' although properly applicable to works of art, are here applied, (in a manner of which every admirer of poetry will admit the propriety, and feel the beauty,) not only to natural objects, but to the grandest natural objects, presented to the contemplation of man."

We do not mean to defend the rule which "S. Johnson" has laid down; indeed, it cannot be admitted without many exceptions. But we shall show, that the writer of these Philosophical Essays, and Copious Notes, does not understand what he has so boldly attempted to criticise; and that the examples, which he has produced, are no proofs of the fallacy of the "notion" which