ties of mind, which, from our particular constitutions or habits, we are most disposed to be affected by. If the beauty or sublimity of such tones were independent of the qualities of mind we thus associate with them, such diversities could not happen, and the same sounds would produce uniformly the same emotions, as the same colours or smells produce uniformly the same sensations.

3. Similar tones, in this case, do not produce similar emotions, as should seem to happen if these effects were produced by the mere sounds themselves. There is little affinity, for instance, between the low and depressed tone of grief, and the shrill and piercing note of joy; yet "both are beautiful. There is little resemblance between the loud sound of rage, and the low placid tone of patience; yet both are, in many cases, sublime. The tone of peevishness is not very different from the tone of melancholy; yet the one is beautiful, the other positively disagreeable. The tone of pusillanimity is little distinguishable from the tone of patience; but how different in the effects they produce upon our minds !-Observations of this kind, it is in the power of every one to extend.

4. Whenever these tones are counterfeited, or whenever they cease to be the signs of those qualities of mind of which we have generally found them significant, they immediately cease either to be sublime or beautiful. Every one must have observed that this is the effect of mimickry. Wherever, in the same manner, any species of deceit is used; or where we know that these tones are employed, without the existence of the correspondent passions, we no longer feel them as beautiful or sublime. If the sounds themselves were the causes of these emotions, whatever we might think of the person, the sounds themselves would continue to produce the emotions of sublimity or beauty, in the same manner, as the

most absurd misapplication of colours never disturbs our perception of them as colours.

5. There is yet a further consideration, which may perhaps more clearly illustrate this opinion, viz. That the beauty or sublimity of such sounds in the human voice, altogether depend on our opinion of the propriety or impropriety of the affections which they express. We know either from nature, or from experience, that particular sounds or tones are the expression of particular passions and affections; and the perception of such sounds is immediately accompanied with the conception of such affections in the person from whom they proceed. But it is only from actual observation or inquiry, that we can know what is the cause of these affections. Our sympathy, our interest, it is plain, depends on the nature of this connexion, on our opinion of the propriety or impropriety of such affections in such circumstances. All this, however, does not in any degree affect the na ture of the sound, which is still the same, whether the affection be proper or improper. It is very obvious, however, that our sense of the beauty or sublimity of such sounds, depends on our opinion of this propriety. No tone of passion or affection is beautiful, with which we do not sympathize. The tone of joy, for instance, is beautiful, in most cases where it is heard. Suppose we find that such a sound proceeds from some very trifling or ridiculous cause, our sense of its beauty is instantly destroyed with our opinion of its propriety. The tone of melancholy, or moderated grief, is affecting and beautiful beyond most others. Assign some frivolous reason for it, and instantly it becomes contemptible. The tone of patience is sublime in a great degree. Tell us that it is pusillanimity, and its effect is instantly gone. The high, imperious note of rage is often sublime. A trifling

cause renders it simply painful. The same observation may be extended to the tones of all our passions. It is, I conceive, extremely difficult, if not impossible, to account for this change of emotion, on the principle of the original and independent beauty of such sounds.

With regard to the human voice, however, it is to be observed, that besides all this, there is also a beauty in particular degrees of the same tones. Although the expression of the different passions is the same in all men, yet it necessarily happens, that there is a sensible difference in the degree or character of these similar sounds. There is no man of any delicacy of organs, who must not often have been sensible of such differences. These also are expressive to us of several qualities. They are, in the first place, expressive of the perfection or imperfection of the organs of speech, and of the health or indisposition of the person; circumstances which often determine in a great degree, when either of these expressions are strong, the pleasure or pain we have in their conversation. 2dly, They are expressive also of the temper or character of mind. As we are naturally led to judge of the character of the person, from the peculiar tones of his voice, and to believe that such passions have the principal dominion of his mind, which have the most* prevalent expression in his speech, so we are led in the same way to judge of the degree or force of these passions, by the degree or strength of such tones in his voice. This kind of inference is so natural, that there is perhaps no person who has not made it. That the beauty of such degrees of sound arises from such associations is apparent, as it is expressive to us of moderation and self command-as it expresses habit, more than immediate impulse-as it is peculiar to such tones only as are expressive of affecting passions or dispositions of mind

-as it is felt alone by those who are affected by such dispositions and as it is beautiful only in those cases where this temperance of emotion, of which it is the sign, is considered as proper. I forbear therefore any further illustration of it.

The observations which I have offered on the subject of simple sounds, are perhaps sufficient to show, that the sublimity and beauty of these sounds arise, in all cases, from the qualities with which we have observed them connected, and of which they appear to us as the signs or expressions; and that no sounds in themselves are fitted by the constitution of our nature to produce these emotions.

It is natural, however, to suppose, that in this, as in every other case, our experience should gradually lead to the formation of some general rules with regard to this expression; and that different sounds should appear to us to have a difference of character, according to the nature of the qualities with which we most frequently find them conjoined. This supposition will appear more probable, when we consider, not only that the diversities of sounds are few, and consequently that rules of this kind can be more easily formed; but particularly, that these diversities of sounds are the immediate expressions of different qualities of mind in the human voice, and consequently, that their character becomes more certain and definite.

I believe, in fact, that something of this kind takes place early in life, and that, long before we are able to attend to their formation, we have formed certain general associations, with all the great diversitics of sound, and that, in after life, they continue to be generally expressive of these characters.

To enumerate these general expressions, is a very delicate, as well as a very difficult task. I hazard, therefore, the following observations, only as hints for the prosecution of the subject; and as I am sensible of their imperfection, I am willing to rest no conclusion upon them.

The great divisions of sound are into loud and low, grave and acute, long and short, increasing and dimin-· ishing. The two first divisions are expressive in themselves: the two last only in conjunction with others.

1. Loud sound is connected with ideas of power and danger. Many objects in nature which have such qualities, are distinguished by such sounds, and this association is farther confirmed from the human voice, in which all violent and impetuous passions are expressed in loud tones.

2. Low sound has a contrary expression, and is connected with ideas of weakness, gentleness, and delicacy. This association takes its rise not only from the observation of inanimate nature, or of animals, where, in a great number of cases, such sounds distinguish objects with such qualities, but particularly from the human voice, where all gentle, or delicate, or sorrowful affections, are expressed by such tones.

3. Grave sound is connected with ideas of moderation, dignity, solemnity, &c. principally, I believe, from all moderate, or restrained, or chastened affections being distinguished by such tones in the human voice.

4. Acute sound is expressive of pain, or fear, or surprise, &c. and generally operates by producing some degree of astonishment. This association, also, scems principally to arise from our experience of such connexions in the human voice.

5. Long or lengthened sound seems to me to have no