character, it is seldom susceptible of beauty, when under the dominion of opposite or unanalogous emotions. In countenances of deep melancholy, laughter is painful. In those of extreme gaiety, melancholy is not less so. Dignified features are disgraced by mirth, and mirthful fea tures made ridiculous by the assumption of dignity. Nothing is more distressing than for the manly counte nance to affect the look of softness or effeminacy; and nothing more absurd than for the effeminate countenance to affect the expression of manliness. Such observations are in the power of every one; and I believe it will universally be found, that whenever the countenance possesses any characteristic species of beauty, no emotion is ever beautiful in it, but such as accords with this predominant expression.

It is on the same account that our experience of the different dispositions that become the different ages of life, govern, in so great a degree, our opinion of the beauty of the countenance in those different ages. We expect mirth and joy in infancy; firmness and vigour in manhood; gravity and serenity in old age. Nothing is more painful to us than the confusion or alteration of these expressions. Gravity in youthful features; or the heedless mirth of infancy in the features of maturity; or the passionate joy of youth in the features of old age, are expressions which we never observe without censure or disgust, and which, however beautiful in other cases, are in these painful and revolting. It is hence, too, very obviously, that there arises a certain propriety or decency which we expect in men of different professions; and that the expressions of countenance which we feel as beautiful or appropriate in one character, we feel as very different in others. The fearless and gallant look which we love in the sailor and the soldier, we should disap

prove in the countenance of a judge, and still more, in that of a minister of religion. The gravity and sober thought which we expect in the looks of these, we should again disapprove in the courtier or the man of the world. We expect a different expression in the countenance of the great merchant and the little shopkeeper, in the landlord and the farmer, in the teacher of science and in the disciple. Each of these may be appropriate, and so far beautiful; 'but we feel them only as beautiful in their proper cases, or when they correspond to that general character of expression which we expect in such cases. I forbear to allude to the expressions of the female countenance; to the peculiar emotions which are beautiful in it, which do not extend to the other sex; to the degree of emotion which we expect in it, in comparison with that of men; and to the painful sentiments we feel, when female features assume the expression of man, or those of men assume that of woman, because they are within the reach of every person's observation.

3. The illustrations which I have offered of the truth of the general proposition, “That the beauty of colours "or features in the human countenance, is estimated by "their harmony or correspondence with the general ex"pression, and from no original and positive beauty in "themselves," has been supported by that reference to common fact and common experience, of which every reader can judge. There is another argument, which arises from our consciousness, in which, perhaps, some of my readers may find a deeper interest.

If there were any original beauty in certain colours or forms of the human countenance, or if the human mind were adapted to experience the emotion of beauty only from such forms or colours, it would then inevitably follow, as in the case of every other sense, that one single and

"

individual sentiment of pleasure would be felt upon such appearances; that the emotion of beauty would be a simple and unassociated sentiment; and that language every where would have conveyed it with the same unity and accuracy, as it does the sentiments of right or wrong, of justice or injustice.

If, on the contrary, our sense of the beauty of such forms or colours, is dependent upon their relation to a general expression; if our sentiment of their beauty varies with that relation; and if the same forms and col. ours that are beautiful in one case are not beautiful in others, then it ought to follow, that our consciousness and our language (as expressive of that consciousness) e should vary with the different circumstances of composition; that instead of one peculiar emotion of beauty, we should experience as many different emotions of beauty as the qualities of the human mind can excite; that the countenance of each sex, and of every age, should be susceptible of beauty wherever the composition of its features, &c. corresponded with the character we expected and wished; and that no countenance should be felt y or be expressed by us, as beautiful, but when the conformation of the various features and colours corresponded with the characteristic, or temporary character, which we wished and expected under the circumstances in which we perceived them.

Which of these two theories is the most just, or the most correspondent to our plain and common experience, I willingly leave to my readers to determine.

From the illustrations I have offered in this chapter, with regard to the origin of the beauty of the human A Countenance, there are some general conclusions which

seem to follow, which it may not be unuseful to the observers of nature to attend to; and to the artists who are engaged in the representation of beautiful nature to remember.

I.

There seem to be three distinct sources of the beauty or sublimity of the countenance of man.

1st, From physical beauty, or the beauty of certain colours and forms, considered simply as forms or col

ours.

2d, From the beauty of expression and character; or that habitual form of features and colour of complexion, which, from experience, we consider as significant of those habitual dispositions of the human mind, which we love, or approve, or admire. And,

3d, From the beauty of emotion; or the expression of certain local or tempory affections of mind, which we approve, or love, or admire.

II.

Each of these species of beauty will be perfect, when the composition of the countenance is such as to preserve, pure and unmingled, the expression which it predominantly conveys; and when no feature or colour is admitted, but which is subservient to the unity of this expression.

III.

The last or highest degree of beauty or sublimity of the human countenance, will alone be attained when all these expressions are united; when the physical beauty corresponds to the characteristic; when the beauty of temporary emotion harmonizes with the beauty of character; and when all fall upon the heart of the spectator as one whole, in which matter, in all its most exquisite

forms, is only felt as the sign of one great or amiable

eharacter of mind.

SECTION III.

Of the Beauty and Sublimity of the Human Form.

THE same principle which leads us to ascribe the beauty of inanimate forms to some one original and independent configuration of beautiful form, has a tenden

cy to mislead us with regard to the beauty of the human form. In some species of form we perceive beauty; in others, we perceive none. Of so uniform an effect we believe there must be an equally uniform cause, and as the apparent cause is in the nature and circumstances of the material form, we very naturally satisfy the indolence of inquiry, by supposing that there must be some one appearance or character of this material form which is originally beautiful; and that, of consequence, the absence of beauty arises, in any case, from the absence of this peculiar and gifted form. Such is the first and most

natural theory of mankind. It is that which we universally find among the lower ranks of men; and which, though it does not satisfy them, perhaps, in any individual case to which they give their attention, is yet sufficient to give them something like a general principle, which, while it has the appearance of truth, has still more the great convenience of theory, that of saving them from the labour of farther investigation. Of this popular and infant theory, it is needless for me to enter into any investigation. It is always abandoned as soon as men are capable of observation; when they are able to perceive, that there is in fact no such supposed form of original beauty; and when they begin to feel, from their own experience, that the sentiment of beauty is felt from ma