THE SIEGE OF MALTA. (Watson's History of the Reign of Philip II.) A.D. 1565. Ar length the Turkish fleet having left Constantinople in the end of March, arrived in sight of Malta about the middle of May; consisting of more than two hundred sail, and having on board, besides a great number of Christian slaves, designed to serve as pioneers, above forty thousand land forces, composed chiefly of Janissaries and Spahis, the bravest soldiers of the Ottoman empire. This formidable army landed at some distance from Il Borgo, and soon afterwards spread themselves over the country; setting fire to the villages, putting the peasants to the sword, and carrying off such of the cattle, as, notwithstanding the orders of the grand-master, had not been secured within the forts and towns. While the Turks were thus employed, La Valette sent out De Copier, marshal of the order, with two hundred horse and six hundred foot, to watch their motions. De Copier, an officer of great experience, executed his commission with so much prudence and vigour, that by falling unexpectedly on detached parties, he cut off one thousand five hundred of the Turks, with the loss of only about eighty men. But La Valette intended, by permitting these skirmishes, only to make trial of his troops, and to accustom them to the looks and shouts of the enemy. He considered that even so small a loss as was occasioned by these rencounters, was more than he could easily support. He therefore recalled De Copier, and sent the soldiers and knights under his command to their respective posts. The Turkish general held a council of war as soon as all his troops were landed, to assist him in resolving where he should begin his attack. Piali, agreeably to what he understood to have been the Sultan's instructions, was of opinion that they ought not to enter upon action till Dragut should arrive, but Mustapha having received information of the King of Spain's preparations, thought that something must be done instantly for the security of the fleet; which lay at present in a creek where it was exposed to the violence of the east wind, and might be attacked with great advantage by the Spaniards. On this account he was of opinion, that they should immediately lay siege to a fort called St. Elmo, which stood on a neck of land near Il Borgo, having the principal harbour on one side of it, and on the other, another harbour, large enough to contain the whole fleet in safety. This proposal was approved by a majority of the council, and Mustapha proceeded, without delay, to carry it into execution. He vainly expected that he would be able to reduce the fort in a few days. But, besides the valour with which it was defended, there were two circumstances which greatly augmented the difficulty of his enterprise; one of these was, that the garrison could easily receive supplies from the town, across the great harbour, which was secured by two forts, called St. Angelo and St. Michael, or La Sangle; and the other, that his approaches to the fort were retarded by the nature of the road leading to it, which was either a bare rock, or the rock thinly covered with a stony soil. This last inconvenience he remedied, by substituting in the place of trenches, a parapet formed of planks and beams, covered on the side towards the fort with earth, which they brought from a distance, and mixed with straw and rushes. By this invention he was enabled to open a battery, mounted with his largest cannon, on the sixth or seventh day after his arrival on the island; and he quickly convinced the governor, the bailiff of Negropont, that it would be impossible for him to | hold out long. Of this the governor gave immediate information to the grand-master, and made choice of a knight of the name of La Cerda for his messenger. This man, greatly disturbed by fear, exaggerated the danger which he had been sent to represent, and had the imprudence to tell the grand-master, in the presence of many of the knights, that he must not expect that the place would sustain the siege above a week longer. "And what loss," said La Valette, "have you received that makes you SO soon despair?" "The fort," replied La Cerda, "is to be considered as a sick person, greatly reduced, who must receive continual remedies and supplies." "I myself," answered the grandmaster with great indignation, "will be the physician; and will bring others along with me, who, if they cannot cure you of your fear, will, at least, preserve the fort from falling into the hands of the infidels." La Valette did not expect that a place which was neither strong, nor large enough to admit a numerous garrison, could be defended long against so great a force as was employed to reduce it; but he thought it necessary that the siege of this fort should be prolonged as much as possible, in order to give the Viceroy of Sicily time to come to his relief. With it, in which the besieged could no longer appear with safety. They resolved, however, to defend this ravelin as long as possible, whatever it should cost them. this view he resolved to throw | had raised upon the counterscarp, himself into St. Elmo with a select overtopped a ravelin which lay near body of troops; and he was preparing to set out when the whole body of knights remonstrated with such earnest importunity against his leaving the town, that he at last consented to suffer the reinforcement which he had prepared, to be conducted to the fort by a knight called De Medran, upon whose conduct and intrepidity he could rely with the most assured confidence. Not long after De Medran's arrival in the fort, the garrison made a vigorous sally, in which they drove the enemy from their entrenchments, and put a number of them to the sword. But the rest soon recovered from their surprise, and having returned to the charge, they compelled the Christians to retire. In this rencounter, the vigorous efforts of the Janissaries were favoured by the wind, which blew the smoke of the guns upon the fort, and covered the besieged with a thick cloud, through which it was impossible to discern the operations of the enemy. This incident the Turks had the presence of mind to improve to great advantage. They seized, unperceived, upon the counterscarp, made a lodgment there with beams, woolsacks, and gabions; and raised a battery upon it with incredible expedition. After the smoke was dispersed, the besieged beheld what had been done with much astonishment; and they were the more disquieted as the fortification which the Turks In the meantime Dragut and another noted corsair called Uluchiali arrived with twenty galleys, having, besides slaves and seamen, two thousand five hundred troops on board. This reinforcement and the presence of Dragut added fresh vigour to the operations of the siege. This gallant corsair exposed himself on all occasions with the utmost intrepidity; spent whole days in the trenches; and as, besides his other extraordinary talents, he was particularly skilful in the management of artillery, he caused some new batteries to be raised in more advantageous situations than had hitherto been made choice of; and kept up a continual fire both upon the ravelin above mentioned, and a cavalier that covered the fort, and was one of its principal defences. This cavalier soon became the only defence which could prevent the besiegers from coming up to the very foot of the wall. Some Turkish engineers having approached the ravelin at day-break, to examine the effects of their artillery, observed a gun-port so low, that one of them, when mounted on the shoulders of another, looked into it, and saw the Christian soldiers lying on the ground asleep. Of this they gave immediate information to the troops; who, advancing as quickly and the pioneers coming forward. with wool-sacks, planks, and gabions, put the troops at length in safety, and made a lodgment in the ravelin, of which the garrison were never able to dispossess them. and silently as possible, and clap- | ping ladders to the gun-hole, got up into the ravelin, and cut most of the Christians to pieces. Between this ravelin and the cavalier lay the ditch, over which the besieged had thrown a temporary bridge of planks, leading up to the cavalier. The Turks perceiving this, leapt instantly upon the bridge, and attempted to make themselves masters of the cavalier, as they had already done of the ravelin. But the garrison was now alarmed; the bravest of the knights hastened from different quarters to the post of danger ; and, after an obstinate engagement, they compelled the Turks to retire into the ravelin. There the Janissaries observing another way of reaching the cavalier, by a path from the bottom of the ditch, they threw themselves down without dread or hesitation; and having ascended by this path to the other side, they renewed their attack with greater fury than ever. The combat lasted from sunrise till noon, when the invincible bravery of the garrison proved at last victorious. About twenty knights and a hundred soldiers were killed, and near three thousand of the enemy. As the ravelin was open on the side towards the fort, the besieged pointed some cannon against it, and made great havoc among the infidels. But Mustapha, sensible of the value of the acquisition which he had made, poured in fresh soldiers without number; The grand-master's concern on account of this disaster was greatly augmented, by considering that it could not have happened so soon, without some negligence on the part of the garrison. He sent them, however, an immediate reinforcement; but both the siege and the defence were carried on with the same vigour as before. But the situation of the besieged was now become much more dangerous than formerly. The Turks applied themselves with unremitting diligence to heighten the ravelin till it overtopped the wall of the fort; and after this, the garrison could no longer appear upon the parapet with safety. Many were killed by the enemy's artillery. Several breaches were made in different parts of the wall, and the hearts of the bravest knights began to fail within them. They apprehended, that ere long the Turkish general would attempt to take the fort by storm, and they dreaded that it would be impossible for so small a number to resist so numerous an enemy. They agreed therefore, though with much reluctance, to apply to the grand-master for liberty to quit the fort; and they made choice of the chevalier De Medran for their messenger. De Medran represented that the fort was in reality no longer tenable, and that to continue this account La Valette subjoined, that the preservation of the Order depended almost entirely on the length of the present siege. This he represented to the chevalier De Medran, and sent him back with instructions to remind the knights of the vow which they took at their entrance into the Order, of sacrificing their lives for its defence. He likewise bade him assure them, in his name, that he would not fail to send them such reinforcements as they should stand in need of, and was deter in it, though only a few days, would infallibly occasion the utter destruction of the garrison. That nothing could be of greater advantage to the Turks than sending the forces of the Order to a place where there were no fortifications to defend them; that by doing so, the troops necessary for the defence of the other fortresses would soon be consumed, and these fortresses become an easy prey to the enemy. But he concluded with saying, that, although this was the opinion of all the garrison, he was commissioned to declare to the grand-mined, as soon as it should be master, that, whatever resolution he should form, they were determined to yield an implicit obedience to his authority. Most of the knights in council thought that this request of the garrison ought to be immediately granted. But La Valette was of a contrary opinion. The fort, he acknowledged, would not probably hold out much longer; and he lamented the fate of those gallant knights and soldiers who were stationed in so perilous a situation. But there were cases, he said, in which it was necessary to sacrifice some of the members for the preservation of the body; and such he knew to be the present critical state of their affairs. For he was credibly informed that the Sicilian viceroy had declared, that if the fort of St. Elmo were lost (as he could not then attack the Turks with the same advantage as at present), he would not expose his fleet to the risk of a defeat for the sake of the rest of the island. And on | necessary, to come himself to their assistance, with a fixed, unalterable purpose to lay down his life, sooner than deliver the fort into the hands of the infidels. This answer had the desired effect on several of the knights, and particularly on those whose principles of honour and attachment to the Order were confirmed by years. But the greater part of them were much dissatisfied. They thought the grand-master's treatment of them harsh and cruel, and wrote him a letter, subscribed by fifty-three, in which, after repeating their former request, they informed him, that if he did not, on the next night, send boats to carry them to the town, they were determined to sally out into the Turkish camp, where they might fall honourably by the sword, instead of suffering such an ignominious death as they had reason to expect, if the fort were taken by storm. To this letter La Valette replied, |