Croats were bivouacked, their right | troops across the Adige, to make leaning on the village, and their left towards the mouth of the river, so that they had the dike in front of them, from which they were separated only by the stream. Firing before them, they took in flank the column of which the head was upon Arcola. It was necessary to fall back in all haste to the part of the road which did not present its flank to the left bank. Alvinzi was informed that some musket shots had been fired on the bridge of Arcola; he paid little attention to this. At the break of day, however, the movement of the French could be perceived from Caldiero and the neighbouring steeples. Moreover, the reconnoitring parties of hussars, who, every morning passed along the Adige to ascertain what had happened through the night, were received with musket shots from all the dikes, and chased by the French cavalry. So from every side Alvinzi acquired the certainty that the French had passed the Adige and were present in force upon all the dikes. It appeared to him absurd to imagine that a whole army could have been thrown into these impracticable marshes. He supposed rather that it was a detachment posted on that side to disturb him, while he should be attacked in force from the side of Verona. But his reconnaissances on the side of Verona having informed him that all there was quiet, Alvinzi thought it a matter of imdortance to drive these French his rear secure. He marched a division upon the dike of Arcola, and another towards the dike along the Adige, with orders to fall upon whomever they might encounter, and sweep all into the river. In fact, towards nine o'clock in the morning, these divisions made a brisk attack. Massena, who had charge of the left dike, having allowed the enemy to engage, charged upon him, drove him back with great loss, and made a large number of prisoners. The same was done on the dike of Arcola ; they waited till the enemy had passed the bend of the bridge ; they attacked at the double, put him to rout, and made many prisoners. It became of the greatest consequence to get possession of Arcola, as thence they could debouch on the rear of the enemy and could establish themselves there before the enemy had time to form. He But the bridge of Arcola, owing to its situation, continued to resist all our attacks. Napoleon made a last effort in person. seized a flag, rushed towards the bridge and planted it there. The column which he led had half crossed it, when the flanking fire made the attack waver. The grenadiers at the head, abandoned by the rear, hesitate; they are carried away in the flight, but they are not willing to desert their general; they take him by the arm, the hair, the clothes, and drag him away with them through the dead, the dying, and the smoke. The general-in-chief is precipitated into a marsh; he is buried in it and his reserves. The French, up to his waist; he is in the from the top of the steeple of middle of the enemy; but the Ronco, saw with sorrow such a French perceive that their leader prey escape them; by this time, is no longer among them. A cry and in the precipitate movements is heard: "Soldiers, forward to of the enemy, they could judge of rescue the general!" The brave the extent and the consequences fellows return again at a run upon of their general's plan. Every one the enemy, push him back beyond saw what might have been the the bridge, and Napoleon is saved. | result of a combination so profound This was the day of military devo- and so bold; it was destruction tion. General Lannes had has- from which the enemy's army was tened from Milan; he had been escaping. It was only towards wounded at Governolo; he was four o'clock that General Guieux still in pain at this time; he could march on Arcola by the left placed himself between the enemy bank of the Alpon. The village and Napoleon, covered him with was taken without striking a blow, his body and received three wounds, but now it was of no use; it was not being willing to leave him. six hours too late; the enemy Muiron, aide-de-camp of the gene- had gained a natural position. ral-in-chief, was killed protecting Arcola was only an intermediate his commander with his body-post between the front of the two Heroic and touching death !—Bel- | armies. In the morning the villiard, Vignolles were wounded | lage had been on the enemy's rear. while leading the troops forward. The brave general Robert was killed there. A bridge was thrown over the mouth of the Alpon, so as to take Arcola in reverse; but in the meanwhile Alvinzi, informed as to the real state of affairs, and conceiving the most lively alarm as to the danger of his position, had abandoned Caldiero, dismantled his batteries, and repassed the Alpon with all his artillery, his baggage, All the same, this day had been crowned by great results: Caldiero had been evacuated, and Verona ran no more risk. Two of Alvinzi's divisions had been defeated with considerable loss. The numerous columns of prisoners, and the large quantity of trophies which were paraded through the camp, filled the soldiers and officers with enthusiasm, and every one regained confidence and the feeling of victory. THE BATTLE OF THE NILE. (Southey's Life of Nelson.) A.D. 1798. THE squadron made the Gulf of Coron on the 28th. Trowbridge entered the port, and returned with intelligence that the French had been seen about four weeks before steering to the S.E. from Candia. Nelson then determined immediately to return to Alexandria, and the British fleet accordingly, with every sail set, stood once more for the coast of Egypt. On the 1st of August, about ten in the morning, they came in sight of Alexandria; the port had been vacant and solitary when they saw it last; it was now crowded with ships, and they perceived with exultation that the tri-colour flag was flying upon the walls. At four in the afternoon, Captain Hood, in the Zealous, made the signal for the enemy's fleet. For many preceding days Nelson had hardly taken either sleep or food: he now ordered his dinner to be served, while preparations were making for battle; and when his officers rose from the table and went to their separate stations, he said to them: "Before this time to-morrow, I shall have gained a peerage or Westminster Abbey." The French, steering direct for Candia, had made an angular passage for Alexandria; whereas Nelson, in pursuit of them, made straight for that place, and thus materially shortened the distance. The comparative smallness of his force made it necessary to sail in close order, and it covered a less space than it would have done if the frigates had been with him: the weather also was constantly hazy. These circumstances prevented the English from discovering the enemy on the way to Egypt, though it appeared, upon examining the journals of the French officers taken in the action, that the two fleets must actually have crossed on the night of the 22d of June. During the return to Syracuse, the chances of falling in with them were fewer. Why Bonaparte, having effected his landing, should not have suffered the fleet to return, has never yet been explained. This much is certain, that it was detained by is a mmand: though, with his acrust med falsehood, he accused A imoral Erneys, after that officer's leath, of having lingered on the mast, Ny to crders. The French feet arrived at Alexandria n the 1st of July: and Brneys, but being able to enter the port, with time and neglect had ruined, noored his ships in Aboukir Bay, in a string and compact line of `ame; the headmost vessel, ac-¡ ording to his own account, being as close as possible to a shoal on¦ the N.W., and the rest of the fleet, eming a kind of curve along the ne of deep water, so as not to be mumed by any means in the S.W. By Eccaparte's desire, he had fered a reward of 10,000 livres to any pilot of the ecuntry who would carry the squadron in; but none would be found who would venture to take charge of a single ressel daring more than twenty, feet. He bad, therefore, made the best of his situation, and chosen the strongest position which he reald possibly take in an open rodi The commissary of the feet said they were moored in soch a manner as to bid defiance to a force more than double their own. This presumption could not then be thought unreasonable. Admiral Barrington, when moored in a similar manner off St. Lucia, in the year 1778, best off the Comte Estaign in three several attacks, though his force was inferior by almost one-third to that which assailed it. Here, the advantage of numbers, both in ships, guns, and men, was in favour of the French. They | had thirteen ships of the line and four frigates, carring 1196 guns, and 11,230 men. The English had the same number of ships of the line, and one fifty-gun ship, carrying 1012 guns and 8068 men. The English ships were all seventy-fours; the French had three eighty-gun ships, and one three-decker of 120. During the whole pursuit, it had been Nelson's practice, whenever circumstances would permit, to have his captains on board the Vanguard, and explain to them his own ideas of the different and best modes of attack, and such plans as he proposed to execute, on falling in with the enemy, whatever their situation might be. There is no possible position, it is said, which he did not take into calculation. His officers were thus fully acquainted with his principles of tactics: and such was his confidence in their abilities, that the only thing determined upon, in case they should find the French at anchor, was for the ships to form as most convenient for their mutual support, and to anchor by the stern. "First gain the victory," he said, “and then make the best use of it you can.” The moment he perceived the position of the French, that intuitive genius with which Nelson was endowed displayed itself; and it instantly struck him that where there was room for an enemy's ship to swing, there was room for one of ours to anchor. The plan which he intended to pursue, therefore, was to keep entirely on the | | brave and able man; yet the indelible character of his country broke out in one of his letters, outer side of the French line, and station his ships, as far as he was able, one on the outer bow and another on the outer quarter, of each | wherein he delivered it as his of the enemy's. This plan of doub- private opinion, that the English ling on the enemy's ships was pro- had missed him, because, not being jected by Lord Hood, when he superior in force, they did not designed to attack the French fleet think it prudent to try their at their anchorage in Gourjean strength with him.-The moment road. Lord Hood found it im- was now come in which he was to possible to make the attempt: but be undeceived. the thought was not lost upon Nelson, who acknowledged himself, on this occasion, indebted for it to his old and excellent commander. Captain Berry, when he comprehended the scope of the design, exclaimed with transport, "If we succeed, what will the world say !" "There is no if in the case," replied the admiral : "that we shall succeed is certain: who may live to tell the story is a very different question." As the squadron advanced, they were assailed by a shower of shot and shells from the batteries on the island, and the enemy opened a steady fire from the starboard side of their whole line, within halfgunshot distance, full into the bows of our van ships. It was received in silence, the men on board every ship were employed aloft in furling sails, and below in tending the braces, and making ready for anchoring. A miserable sight for the French; who, with all their skill, and all their courage, and all their advantages of numbers and situation, were upon that element on which, when the hour of trial comes, a Frenchman has no hope. Admiral Brueys was a A French brig was instructed to decoy the English, by manœuvring so as to tempt them towards a shoal lying off the island of Bequires; but Nelson either knew the danger, or suspected some deceit; and the lure was unsuccessful. Captain Foley led the way in the Goliath, outsailing the Zealous, which for some minutes disputed this post of honour with him. He had long conceived that if the enemy were moored in line of battle in with the land, the best plan of attack would be to lead between them and the shore, because the French guns on that side were not likely to be manned, nor even ready for action. Intending, therefore, to fix himself on the inner bow of the Guerrier, he kept as near the edge of the bank as the depth of water would admit; but his anchor hung, and having opened his fire, he drifted to the second ship, the Conquerant, before it was clear; then anchored by the stern, inside of her, and in ten minutes shot away her mast. Hood, in the Zealous, perceiving this, took the station which the Goliath intended to have occupied, and totally disabled the Guerrier |