him, do for the present render the office of the minister thus appointed a sinecure,—if they think that by retaining all the advantages and privileges of an establishment, the cause of true religion will be furthered, then assuredly nothing but brute force ought to induce them to forego those advantages and privileges. If, on the other hand, any man think that by the retention of these privileges, the cause of truth will be retarded rather than advanced, however you may regret what may appear to be an error in judgment, you can have no right to blame him for pursuing with the same end in view a line of conduct different from your own. I say this that I may not seem to be trenching upon party politics, when, as a matter of general politics, which is part of religion, I venture to remind you on the authority of my text, that every Christian man, whether laic or cleric, magistrate or subject, is in duty bound in this and all like cases, to consider, not what is expedient at the moment for the sake of peace, but what is beneficial to the cause of truth. Expedience may be the idol of the heathen, but truth is still the guide of him who, on becoming a legislator or a magistrate, has not ceased to be a Christian.

But here we are met by the sneering sceptic, who, from the days of Pontius Pilate to the pre

sent hour, has been accustomed to ask, "What is truth? It may be all very well to propagate the truth, but, after all, where is it to be found, and what is it? The Papist lays claim to it, and the ultra-Protestant lays claim to it, and both the Papist and the ultra-Protestant assert it to be what you of the Church of England refuse to admit. Why must they be wrong? and why must you, of necessity, be right?"

Now, my brethren, what does this very popular insinuation, that there is no such thing discoverable as religious truth, amount to? It amounts to nothing less than a virtual denial of the existence of revelation. I say that to insinuate that religious truth is not to be ascertained, is to insinuate that God has not revealed his will to man; and he who is guilty of the insinuation, be his professions what they may, is only an infidel in masquerade. If there be a revelation of God's will and word, then it follows as a matter of course that in the record of that revelation religious truth is discoverable. Thus the Gospel is expressly declared by St. Paul to be the word of truth, for truth, as well as grace, came by Jesus Christ.

But, says the adversary, the question still recurs, because, among those who receive the Bible, disputes exist as to what the Bible really says.

It may be so. It is so. And the question, now, therefore is, whether this difference can be ac counted for.

Now this is certain, that to any thing as serted by Scripture there cannot be two contrary meanings attached. All these differences, therefore, must be occasioned by some defect, not in the object contemplated, but in the persons contemplating it. Though the thing seen may be the same, it may be seen through a discolouring or distorting medium, or the eye seeing it may be diseased; when, therefore, there is some known wrong principle in the interpreter of Scripture, we are not to wonder, if, in some instances, the truth is hidden from his mental vision. Now that the mental eye, both of the Papist and of the ultra-Protestant, is jaundiced on those points where they differ from ourselves, appears from this, that both parties come to the interpretation of Scripture influenced by principles which they would not acknowledge as correct for the interpretation of any other ancient book.

The Papist first of all exalts tradition to an equality with Scripture, and then receives as tradition, not what is really such, that is, what has been received as such by the Catholic church, but what has at any time been decreed by that

branch of the church which is in slavery to the court of Rome. Thus the canons of the council of Trent are received as traditions. The Papist, therefore, interprets Scripture, not as we do, by the light of tradition, properly so called, by reference to the opinions and practices of the primitive ages, and by deference to the authority of the church Catholic, but according to certain dogmas of a comparatively modern date of the Roman church 9.

The ultra-Protestant meets the Papist, though they start from the very opposite extremes. He avowedly puts aside the tradition which the Papist only virtually rejects. Instead of seeking to ascertain how the Scriptures were understood by those to whom they were in the first instance addressed, how they were interpreted by the church universal before those divisions existed which we have now to deplore, and when, therefore, (by means of corresponding churches and general

See Waterland on Ecclesiastical Antiquity, chap. vii. Patrick on Tradition, p. 41. Stillingfleet's Rational Account, part I. chap. v. Marsh's Comparative View, p. 45. Beveridge on the Nineteenth Article, works ix. 393, and especially Jeremy Taylor's Dissuasive from Popery, x. 485. Bellarmine, Tract. de Potest. Sum. Pontif., plainly declares "that the modern church of Rome has power not only to declare and explain, but even to constitute and command what shall belong to the faith.”

councils,) the opinion of the universal church could be known, he relies entirely on his private judgment; and thus, while rejecting with indig nation and scorn the claim to infallibility made by the Pope of Rome, he, in effect, converts every individual teacher, either into an infallible pope, or into a mere sceptic. I do not deny the right of private judgment as a political privilege, but to contend for it, as some persons do, as a sure guide to truth, is not only absurd, but cannot fail to involve those who do so in inconsistency as well as error.

We see, then, why these parties are not able to discover the truth, although the Bible may be open before them; there is always something intervening to prevent them from seeing the truth clearly; and we all know how very small a substance held close to the eye will eclipse the sun at its zenith. I wish not to throw blame upon them. Whether the dimness or obliquity of their vision be a misfortune or a fault, or rather, when it is the one or the other, it is not for us to determine who are forbidden to judge, it can be known by Him only to whom all hearts are open, and from whom no secrets are hid. The object, in alluding to the subject now, is simply to shew that their having missed the truth is no proof that the truth is not discover